

## Author index

ABC Research Group, see Gigerenzer et al. Abrahamsen, A., 162 American Psychiatric Association, 231 Anscombe, G. E. M., 42 Armstrong, D. M., 14, 34, 219 Audi, R., 39, 95, 213

Bach, K., 213, 214, 220 Baier, A., 21, 72 Barkow et al., 157, 230 Baron-Cohen, S., 231, 232, see also Baron-Cohen et al. Baron-Cohen et al., 231 Bechtel, W., 162 Bennett, J., 56 Bickerton, D., 22 Blackburn, S., 35 Block, N., 4 Botterill, G., 2, 36, 167, 181 Boucher, J., 57 Bovens, L., 63 Braithwaite, R. B., 15, 66 Bratman, M. E., 28, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 125, 126, 130, 133, 135, 209-10, 211 Braun, D., 39 Burge, T., 159

Canfield, J. V., 213
Carruthers, P., 2, 14, 22, 35, 36, 56, 57, 58, 100, 221, 230, 231, 232
Chamberlain, A., 230
Cherniak, C., 54, 62, 169, 172
Chisholm, R. M., 60
Chomsky, N., 58
Christensen, S. M., 162
Churchland, P. M., 2, 200
Churchman, C. W., 66
Clark, A., 2, 27, 57, 76, 161, 162, 166, 169–71, 172, 181, 189–90

Clarke, D. S., 83, 134 Cohen, D. J., see Baron-Cohen et al. Cohen, L. J., 20, 81–4, 86, 90–2, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 102, 104, 107, 125, 126, 204, 209, 215 Copeland, J., 190 Cosmides, L., see also Barkow et al. Crimmins, M., 95

Davidson, D., 7, 34, 37, 39, 40, 46, 96, 148, 166, 167, 203, 204–5, 207–8, 213, 217
Davies, M., 7, 162, 165, 184–9, 190, 196, 197
de Sousa, R., 31, 67, 72, 158
Dennett, D. C., 2, 3, 4, 22, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 46, 55, 71–80, 103, 105, 118–20, 147, 156, 158, 169, 173, 199, 204, 229
Descartes, R., 20
Donnellan, K. S., 163

Eells, E., 30 Engel, P., 80, 81, 82, 86, 125, 126 Evans, G., 185, 186, 189, 190, 221 Evans, J. S. B. T., 10, 24, 227

Dretske, F., 39

Fishburn, P. C., 30 Fodor, J. A., 1, 16, 34, 38, 58, 161, 184 Foley, R., 60, 63 Frankfurt, H., 159 Frankish, K., 76, 97, 103, 122, 129, 153 Fricker, E., 219 Frith, U., 232, see also Frith et al., Hurlburt et al.

Garon, J., see Ramsey et al. Gazzaniga, M., 225



#### Author index

Gelman, S., 157, 230 Gigerenzer, G., 47 Gigerenzer et al., 30 Goldman, A. I., 16, 30, 39, 96, 103, Gordon, R. M., 103, 221 Graham, G., 2, 36, 163 Gustavson, D. F., 213 Happé, F., 232, see also Frith et al., Hurlburt et al. Harman, G., 18, 22, 209 Harnish, R. M., 220 Harris, P. L., 103 Harsanyi, J. C., 61 Hawthorne, J., 63 Heal, J., 8, 103, 220, 226 Heil, J., 167, 169 Hempel, C. G., 31 Hirschfeld, L., 157, 230 Holton, R., 213 Horgan, T., 2, 36, 163, 165, 181 Horst, S., 13 Hume, D., 20, 60 Hurlburt, R., 100, see also Hurlburt et al. Hurlburt et al., 232

Jackson, F., 35, 169 Jeffrey, R. C., 30, 59 Johnston, M., 214 Joyce, J., 77

Kahneman et al., 46 Kaplan, M., 30, 53, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67–8, 69–70 Kripke, S., 163 Kyburg, H. E., 62, 63

Lance, M. N., 29 Lehrer, K., 120, 121, 159 LePore, E., 39 Leslie, A., 231 Levi, I., 61 Lewis, D., 133 Locke, J., 60 Loewer, B., 39 Lycan, W. G., 35, 162

Macdonald, C., 162 Macdonald, G., 162 McDowell, J., 159 McLaughlin, B. P., 213
Maher, P., 53, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70
Makinson, D. C., 62
Malcolm, N., 16
Maloney, J. C., 181
Margalit, A., 81
Martin, M. W., 213
Mellor, D. H., 34, 35
Mithen, S. J., 157, 230
Montmarquet, J., 149
Mumford, S., 34, 35

Nisbett, R. E., 46, 225

O'Brien, G. J., 181 O'Shaughnessy, B., 56 Over, D. E., 10, 24, 227

Pargetter, R., 35 Peacocke, C., 187 Pears, D., 7, 203, 205, 213 Penelhum, T., 213 Perry, J., 81 Pettit, P., 55, 169 Piattelli-Palmarini, M., 46 Pink, T., 95, 159 Pinker, S., 57, 58, 230 Pojman, L. P., 56 Popper, K. R., 35 Price, H. H., 15, 22, 23, 159 Prior, E., 35

Ramsey, F. P., 30

Ramsey, W., 162, see also Ramsey et al. Ramsey et al., 7, 162, 165–7, 169 Recanati, E, 136 Rey, G., 162, 185, 188 Rorty, A. O., 209, 213 Rosenthal, D., 14 Ross, L., 46 Rudner, R., 66 Rumelhart, D. E., 162 Russell, J., 232 Ryle, G., 34

Savage, L. J., 30 Scott-Kakures, D., 56 Searle, J. R., 14, 220 Sellars, W., 60 Siddons, F., see Frith et al.



#### Author index

Skinner, B. F., 77 Sloman, S. A., 25, 227 Slovic, P., see Kahneman et al. Smart, J. J. C., 34 Smolensky, P., 25 Sperber, D., 120, 121 Stalnaker, R. C., 64, 81, 82 Stanovich, K. E., 25, 227 Stein, E., 54, 62 Stich, S. P., 2, 47, 54, 161, 162, 166, 167, 170, see also Ramsey et al. Swinburne, R., 15, 57

Tager-Flusberg, H., see Baron-Cohen et al.
Tanney, J., 226
Teller, P., 66
Tienson, J., 165, 181
Todd, P. M., see Gigerenzer et al.
Tooby, J., 47, see also Barkow et al.
Turner, D. R., 162

Turner, M., 232 Tversky, A., *see* Kahneman et al.

Ullmann-Margalit, E., 81

van Fraassen, B. C., 67 Varley, R., 33 Velleman, J. D., 126, 127, 142 Vygotsky, L. S., 57

Walker, A. F., 28, 205 Walker, M. T., 149 Wason, P. C., 24 Wiggins, D., 205 Williams, B., 56, 126 Wilson, T. D., 225 Winters, B., 56 Wittgenstein, L., 219 Wright, C., 219

Zynda, L., 46



# Subject index

abductive inference, 104-5 absent-mindedness, 16, 169, 172-3, 178-81, 182 acceptance in Lehrer's sense, 120, 121 in Perry's sense, 81 premising conception of, 80-1, 88 as term for flat-out belief, 59 see also acceptance-as-a-premise acceptance-as-a-premise (acceptance<sub>p</sub>), 80-7, 88, 90-5, 124-40, 141 active formation of, 82, 92-3, 113-16, 128-9 behavioural view of, 85, 108-13 Cohen on, 81-4, 90-2 context-relativity of, 82-3, 129-30 deductive closure of, 91-2 explicit, 94-5 as flat-out, 83 general, 135-6, 141, 214 implicit, 94-5, 112-13 implicit (Cohen's sense), 91 influence on action, 116-18 as language-involving, 83, 97-107 and meta-representational belief, 120-1 non-doxastic, 124-32, 141 non-policy-based forms of, 112 as not truth-directed, 82, 126-8 occurrent form of, 113 overt, 93-5 relation to basic-level mental states, restricted versus unrestricted, 130-6, 141 and strand 2 belief, 84-7, 124-36 tacit, 93-5, 112-13, 176 terminology, 93 theoretical, 139-40, 141 see also acceptance; premising; premising policies

act view, 66-7, 88 action dual explanations of, 143-5 role of the supermind in, 116-18, 143-8, 205-7 two strategies for predicting, 117 see also akrasia active belief adoption, 20-2, 55-6, 70, 74, and believing 'at will', 128-9, 151 high confidence as enabling condition for, 149-50 introduces qualitative attitude, 23 pragmatically motivated, 137, 149, see also acceptance-as-a-premise, active formation of; first-person authority active reasoning, 31-2, 33, 91, 97-107, see also conscious reasoning; premising; supermental reasoning activism, 55-6 challenge to, 56 defended, 148-51 see also active belief adoption akrasia, 7-8, 73, 203-13 compatible with basic-level austerity, 208 Davidson on, 204-5, 207-8 intention-related, 212-13 irrationality of, 208, 212 supermind theory's account of, 205-8 animals, 16, 24, 30, 33, 182, 183, 199 anti-realism, 36-7, 49 aphasia, 33 assent, see active belief adoption assertion view, 68-70, 88, 140 assumptions and suppressed premises, 27-9, 41, 85, 94, 177



### Subject index

austere view, 5, 9, 35-8, 75 defined, 65 and akrasia, 203, 208 distinguished from austere functionalism, appropriate for strand 1 mind, 43 65 - 6compatible with behavioural view of extended to occurrent belief, 78 acceptance<sub>p</sub>111, 145-6 integrated version of, 80, 85, 113 compatible with rich view of the of opinion, 73-4 supermind, 147-8, 175-7, 178-81, promises solution to the Bayesian 194 - 6challenge, 65 and eliminativism, 163 behaviourism, 5, 15, 17 folk commitment to qualified, 169, see also austere view; dispositionalism 172 - 3belief involves presumption of rationality, 37, active formation of, see active belief 54, 203 adoption and mental explanation, 39-40, 47-8 categorical-state versus dispositionalist as realist, 36-7 views of, 34-6 and self-deception, 203, 216-17 and context-relativity, 66, 86, see also see also rich view under superbelief autism, 231-3 divisions in folk view of, 12-24, autonomy, 158-9 34 - 8avowals, 218-19 implicitly active, 28-9 language-dependent, 23 as performative, 219-26 see also first-person authority language-involving, 22-3, 56-8 responsiveness to pragmatic motives, 86, Baldwin effect, 229 see also under superbelief basic belief (strand 1 belief), 6, 23-4, 33, truth-directedness of, see under 43, 44-5, 50, 142 superbelief not introspectable, 158 two strands identified, 23-4 two-strand views of, 58-89 relation to acceptance, 109-12 as a unitary psychological kind, 12, see also non-conscious belief; partial 24 helief see also basic belief; conscious belief; basic mind (strand 1 mind), 6, 33, 43, 50, 122, 122-3, 147-8, 175-7, 178-81, flat-out belief; meta-representational 182-3, 194-6, 198-200, 223-6, belief; non-conscious belief; occurrent belief; partial belief; reflective belief; austere view of optional, 9, 159-60 standing-state belief; superbelief; role in akrasia, 205-8, 212 theoretical belief role in self-deception, 214-17 betting on sentences, 67, 73, 76 supports premising machine, 108-13 basic reasoning (strand 1 reasoning), 33, categorical-state theories, 34-6 45–7, 49, *50* causal systematicity, 186-7, 195-6 see also non-conscious reasoning causation, sustaining versus dynamic, Bayesian challenge, 5, 52-5, 143-8 Bayesian confirmation theory, 59-60 change of mind, see making up of mind Bayesian decision theory, 29-30, 45-9, 52 cognitive orientation, 126 as interpretative framework, 45-7 conceptual capacities, chapter 7 passim see also Bayesian challenge basic-level, 199-200 behavioural view, 65-70, 73-4 as general abilities, 185-6 of acceptance<sub>p</sub> and goal pursuit, 85, as inferential commitments, 186, 190, 108 - 13191-2, 199 and active belief adoption, 70, 74, as personal skills, 189-90, 199-200 113-16 sub-personal, 200



supermental, 191-6

## Subject index

see also conceptual modularity conceptual modularity, 7, chapter 7 passim absent at basic level, 198-9 compatible with basic-level austerity, 194-6 exhibited by the supermind, 190-8 folk commitment to, 184-90 as involving sub-personal commitments, 188 - 9see also modularity of process; modularity of vehicle confidence, degree of, see partial belief confidence view, 60-4, 88 conjunctive closure, 62-3, 68, 138-9 connectionism, 162, 173 conscious belief, 13-14, 23, 153-4 as belonging to separate system, 14, 17, 25 - 6defined, 13, 17 and the Joycean machine, 77-80 as language-involving, 22, 57 as requiring occurrent activation, 28-9 see also superbelief; supermind conscious reasoning, 25-6 as explicit, 26 as language-involving, 32-3, 57 not wholly Joycean, 78-9, 118-19 role of suppressed premises in, 27, 28-9 usually classical, 30-1 see also active reasoning; premising; supermental reasoning consciousness, 14 cognitive role of, 25-6, 153-4 content, 8, 174 conceptualized, chapter 7 passim of goals, 96-7 information, 185 degrees of confidence, see partial belief desire, 2, 24, 70 see also goal pursuit; superdesire direction of fit, 12, 126 dispositionalism, 34-6 as a form of functionalism, 34-5 see also austere view domain-general thinking, evolution of, 230 - 1dual-process theories, 4, 10, 24-5, 227-8

eliminativism, 2, 7, 161-5, 182-3, 188-9, 198, 200-1 mitigated, 163-4 and theories of reference, 162-3 equipotency cases, 166-7, 170-2, 177-8, 182, 195 explicit reasoning, 26-9 defined, 26 first-person authority, 8, 128, 218-26 and confabulation, 225-6 other views of, 219 and self-deceit, 224 supermental (performative) view of, 219–22 supermental view of defended, 222-6 see also self-knowledge flat-out belief, 17-20, chapter 3 passim act view of, see act view apparent irrelevance of, 52-5 assertion view of, see assertion view Bayesian approaches to, 59-71 behavioural view of, see behavioural view confidence view of, see confidence does not require certainty, 61 influence on action, 52-5, 63-4, 68-70, 143-8 as a linguistic disposition, 67-70 not context-dependent, 66 as realized in partial beliefs and desires, role in scientific inquiry, 59-60 see also acceptance-as-a-premise; superbelief Fodor's challenge, 56-8, 78, 85, 107, 152 - 3folk psychology architectural commitments of, 7, 165-73 austere and rich interpretations of, 5, 38 commitments vindicated, 173-83, 190-200 divisions in, 4-5, chapter 2 passim duality in explanatory practice of, 41-2 as employing mongrel concepts, 3-4 integration into science of, 1-4, 10-11, 24, 38, 162-4, 200-1 and neural architecture, 164-5, 182, 200 regularization of, 2, 10, 42-4, 47-50, 183 use of term, 1



## Subject index

functional states, thickly carved versus compatible with basic-level rationality, finely carved, 35-6 functionalism, 34 see also absent-mindedness; akrasia; austere versus rich forms of, 35-8 self-deception see also austere view; rich view Joycean machine, 76-80 general premise, 136 compared with the premising machine, Generality Constraint, 185, 199 118 - 20goal adoption, see goal pursuit influence on action, 79, 119 goal pursuit, 83, 95-7, 140-2 and opinion, 79-80 behavioural view of, 108-13 and standing-state belief, 79-80, 119 content of, 96-7 judgement see active belief adoption intention as form of, 210-11 occurrent form of, 113 language tacit and implicit forms of, 96, 112-13 cognitive conception of, see language, as medium of thought as cognitive tool, 56 heuristics and biases, 30, 46-7 high-level dispositions, defined, 65 communicative conception of, 57 holism of belief, 167-9 evolution of language-based thinking, ascriptive, 167-8 152 - 3as medium of thought, 22-3, 32-3, framework, 167 inferential, 168-9, 175-6 56-8, 152-3, 197-8 as modularized, 58, 152 individual acquirability, 165-6, 167-9, role in premising, 97-107 174 - 7see also assertion view; betting on individual efficacy, 166-7, 169-73, sentences 177-83 language of thought, 184-5 inference rules, 98-103 see also conceptual modularity; language, concept mastery as involving grasp of, as medium of thought look-up tables, 190, 201 lottery paradox, 62 non-conscious knowledge of, 101-2 as reliable heuristics, 98-9 role of language in application of, making up of mind, 20-2, 72-3, 75-6, 99-102 115, 149, 151, 155-6, 223 inferential potential, 191 see also active belief adoption; opinion inner speech memes, 80 comes with semantic interpretations mental explanation, 38-42 attached, 57 counterfactual analysis of, 47-9, as medium of thought, see language, as 169 - 72medium of thought role of Bayesian idioms in, 47-9 as self-stimulation, 77 two levels of, 117-18, 143-5 instrumentalism, 36 Mentalese, 57 integrationism, 1-4, 24, 162-4 meta-representational belief, 120-1 see also folk psychology, integration into minimal premising, 105-6 science of modularity of process, 184, 185-6, 188-90, intention, 209-13 193-7 planning theory of, 209-10 modularity of vehicle, 184, 186-8, as a supermental state, 210-12 197 - 8see also akrasia modules, 157, 230-1 interpretation, 30, 37, 45-7, 145-6 see also domain-general thinking irrationality, 37, 147-8 mongrel concepts, 3-4



## Subject index

non-conscious belief, 13-14, 23 defined, 13, 17 distinguished from Freudian Unconscious, 13-14 as lacking an occurrent form, 16-17, 28-9, 44-5 not language-involving, 44-5 see also basic belief non-conscious reasoning, 25-6, 49, 155, interpretable as Bayesian, 45-7 as non-explicit, 26-8 not language-driven, 33 non-explicit reasoning, 26-9 defined, 26 occurrent belief, 14-17, 20 conscious versus non-conscious, 16-17 role in action and inference, 16-17, 75-6 opinion, 3, 4, 71-6, 88 behavioural view of, 73-4 influence on action, 75-6 and the Joycean machine, 79-80 and strand 2 belief, 73, 75-6 partial belief, 17-20 as behavioural disposition, 45 as non-conscious, 23 not reducible to flat-out belief, 18-19 and rational decision-making, 52-5, partitioning strategies, 203, 205, 213, 214 passive reasoning, 32 performative utterances, 220-1 avowals as, 219-26 role in acceptance, formation, 115 policy adoption, narrow and broad senses of, 114–15 policy possession, 108-9, 211-12 pragmatism, 53 preface paradox, 62, 68, 138-9 premising, 91, 97-107 extended techniques of, 106-7 minimal form of, 105-6 role of heuristics in, 102 role of inference rules in, 91, 98-103 role of language in, 91, 99-102, 105, 106, 107 role of self-interrogation in, 103-5

premising machine, 5-6, 85, chapter 4 compared with the Joycean machine, 118 - 20failures of, 117 influence on action, 116-18 relation to the basic mind, 108-13 see also supermind premising policies, chapter 4 passim adoption of, 113-16 causal role of, 174 how constituted, 109-10 nature and extent of, 90-3, 95-7, 153 - 4realized in basic-level mental states, 110-12, 138 use of term, 97 professional belief, see acceptance-as-a-premise, non-doxastic propositional modularity, 7, chapter 6 passim absent at the basic level, 182-3 compatible with basic-level austerity, 175-7, 178-81 exhibited by the supermind, 173-82 folk commitment to, 165-73 see also individual acquirability; individual efficacy propositions, optative and declarative, 96-7 Quine-Duhem thesis, 98 realism, 36-7 about mental acts, 146-7 reasoning classical versus probabilistic, 29-31, divisions in folk view of, 24-33 language-driven versus not language-driven, 32-3 two kinds identified, 33 see also active reasoning; conscious reasoning; dual-process theories; explicit reasoning; non-conscious reasoning; non-explicit reasoning; passive reasoning; unity of processing assumption reflective belief (Sperber), 120, 121 representation theorems, 30 representational theory of mind, 15



#### Subject index

rich view, 5, 35-8 appropriate for strand 2 mind, 43 folk commitment to, 16-17, 165-73, 184-90 and mental explanation, 40-1 of the supermind compatible with basic-level austerity, 147-8, 175-7, 178-81, 194-6 see also austere view scientific inquiry, see theoretical inquiry scientific psychology, 226-33 self-deception, 7-8, 73, 203-4, 213-18 compatible with basic-level austerity, 216 - 17and first-person authority, 224 interpersonal model of, 213 and positive thinking, 214 supermind theory's account of, 214-16 and wishful thinking, 218 self-interrogation, 103-5, 148, 196-7 limitations of, 104 role in abductive inference, 104 role of language in, 105 role in retrieving premises, 105 and self-simulation, 103 self-knowledge, 158 see also first-person authority shielding strategy, 214-17 simulated belief, 136 simulation theory, 103, 136 standing-state belief, 14-17 two types of, 17 strand 1 belief, see basic belief strand 1 mind, see basic mind strand 1 reasoning, see basic reasoning strand 2 belief, see superbelief strand 2 desire, see superdesire strand 2 mind, see supermind strand 2 reasoning, see supermental reasoning subjective probability, see partial belief sub-mind, 122, 123 see also sub-personal psychology sub-personal psychology, 9, 43-4, 47, 49, superbelief (strand 2 belief), 6, 23-4, 33, 43, 50, chapter 3 passim, 88, 124-40, 141, 142, 143-54 and acceptance, 84-7, 124-36 active formation of, 128-9, 148-51

and context-relativity, 129-30 does not require certainty, 134-5 as dynamic cause of action, 144 high confidence necessary for, 135-6, 137-40, 180-1, 217 as individually acquirable, 174-7 as individually efficacious, 177-82 influence on action, 143-8, 205-7, see also under acceptance-as-a-premise introspectable, 158 and opinion, 73, 75-6 relation to basic-level mental states, see under acceptance-as-a-premise responsiveness to pragmatic motives, 137, 149, 151 tacit and implicit, 136, 176-7 theoretical interest of, 125, 135 truth-directedness of, 126-8, 137 as unrestricted acceptance, 130-6, see also TCP deliberations see also acceptance-as-a-premise; conscious belief; flat-out belief superdesire (strand 2 desire), 85, 140-2 see also goal pursuit supermental reasoning (strand 2 reasoning), 33, 50, 97-107, 118-19, 190-8 control over, 157 function of, 155-6 improvability of, 157 possibility of irrationality in, 147 see also active reasoning; conscious reasoning; premising supermind (strand 2 mind), 6, 33, 43, 50, 122, 122-3, 154-9, 173-82, 190-8, 200-1, chapter 8 passim and akrasia, 205-8, 212-13 and autism, 231-3 and autonomy, 158-9 components of, 228-9 cultural and individual variation in, development of, 228-31 and domain-general thinking, 230-1 exhibits individual acquirability, 174-7 exhibits individual efficacy, 177-82 exhibits modularity of process, 193-7 exhibits modularity of vehicle, 197-8 and first-person authority, 219-26 functions of, 6, 154-9 influence on action, 116-18, 143-8, 205 - 7



#### Subject index

and intention, 210–12
as a kludge, 229
as a premising machine, 85
relation to the basic mind, see under
premising machine
and self-deception, 214–16, 217–18
and self-knowledge, 158
and theory of mind, 228–9, 233
see also premising machine
supermind theory, 159–60
and dual-process theories, 227–8
and scientific psychology, 226–33
status of, 9–11, 121–2, 125–6
syntax, see modularity of vehicle

TCP deliberations, 132–6, *141*, 150–1, 215–16, 217 defined, 132 TGP deliberations, 133

theoretical belief, 139–40 theoretical inquiry, 59–60, 133, 139–40 theory of mind, 228–9, 231, 233

Unconscious (Freudian), 13 unity of belief assumption, 2–3, 226 basis for, 12, 24, 31 challenged, 12–24 unity of processing assumption, 3, 26 challenged, 24–33

virtual belief, 122 virtual mind, 122 volitionism, see voluntarism voluntarism, 56, see also activism

weakness of will, *see* akrasia Williams's challenge, 55–6, 74, 148–51 wishful thinking, 218