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0521792185 - Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980  
Constitution

Robert Barros

Table of Contents

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## Contents

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<i>Foreword</i>	<i>page</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>		xv
<i>Abbreviations</i>		xvii
<b>Introduction</b>		1
<b>1 Dictatorship, Legality, and Institutional Constraints</b>		10
DICTATORSHIP AND UNBOUND POWER		10
SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-BINDING, AND LIMITS		16
PRECOMMITMENT AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT		28
NONMONOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP AND COLLECTIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR ONGOING INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS		32
<b>2 The Constitution of the Exception: Defining the Rules of Military Rule</b>		36
INITIAL UNKNOWNNS		40
1974–1975: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS		49
DEFINING THE PRESIDENCY: THE DEMISE OF ROTATION		52
D.L. No. 527: THE <i>ESTATUTO DE LA JUNTA DE GOBIERNO</i>		57
DEFINING LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES		61
PERSONALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS		68
<b>3 The Constitution and the Dictatorship: The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Decree-Laws</b>		84
THE STATUS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1925		87
THE SUPREME COURT AND DECREE-LAWS		96
THE <i>CONTRALORÍA</i> AND THE LEGALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS		107
CIVIL LAW AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW		112
		<b>vii</b>

Cambridge University Press

0521792185 - Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980  
Constitution

Robert Barros

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

## Contents

<b>4</b>	<b>The Shadowy Boundary between Force and Law: The Judiciary, Repression, and the Cosmetic Limitation of Emergency Powers</b>	117
	COMBATING THE ENEMY IN TIME OF WAR	119
	THE SUPREME COURT AND MILITARY JUSTICE	132
	THE JUDICIARY AND THE <i>RECURSO DE AMPARO</i>	140
	LAW AND THE BOUNDARIES OF PRUDENTIAL SELF-LIMITATION	150
<b>5</b>	<b>Constitutionalization without Transition: Prompting the Dual Constitution of 1980</b>	167
	THE 1980 CONSTITUTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS	168
	MAKING SENSE OF THE MAKING OF THE DICTATORSHIP'S CONSTITUTION	174
	PROMPTING THE DECISION TO ENACT A NEW CONSTITUTION	180
	PERMANENT MILITARY RULE AND THE EMERGENCE OF "THE TRANSITION"	193
	THE "PERIOD OF TRANSITION": CONSTITUTIONALIZATION WITHOUT ELECTIONS AND WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION	204
<b>6</b>	<b>The Permanent Text: Constitutional Controls or Military Tutelage?</b>	217
	TWO DRAFTS AND A CONSTITUTION	218
	THE UNDERSTANDING OF "CONSTITUTION"	220
	BINDING THE FUTURE OUT OF FEAR OF THE PAST	226
	ORGANS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL: THE <i>CONTROLARÍA</i> AND THE <i>TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL</i>	234
	THE ARMED FORCES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	240
	ELECTIONS AND THE SILENCES OF THE DUAL CONSTITUTION	249
<b>7</b>	<b>Even Custom Shoes Bind: Military Rule under the Constitution, 1981–1988</b>	255
	DICTATORSHIP AND THE TRANSITORY DISPOSITIONS	258
	THE DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY RULE	266
	THE JUNTA AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN ACTION	274
	THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE POLITICAL ORGANIC LAWS	288
	VOTING OUT THE DICTATORSHIP	305

Cambridge University Press

0521792185 - Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980  
Constitution

Robert Barros

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

## Contents

<b>8</b>	<b>Military Dictatorship and Constitutionalism in Chile</b>	<b>308</b>
	THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL DÉNOUEMENT OF 1989	308
	DICTATORSHIP AND TRANSITION IN CHILE	311
	COMMITMENT, SELF-BINDING, AND INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS	315
	THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS	320
	CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP RECONSIDERED	323
	<i>References</i>	327
	<i>Index</i>	341