

RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

RICHARD H. ROBERTS

Lancaster University



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xii
Introduction	I
PART I SPIRITS OF CAPITALISM AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF THE SOUL	
1 The closed circle: Marxism, Christianity and the ‘End of History’	15
2 Religion and the ‘enterprise culture’: the British experience from Thatcher to Blair (1979–2000)	36
3 Power and empowerment: New Age managers and the dialectics of modernity/postmodernity	62
4 The end of the university and the last academic?	86
PART II THEOLOGY AND POWER IN THE MATRIX OF MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY	
5 Lord, bondsman and churchman: integrity, identity and power in Anglicanism	113
6 Ruling the Body: the care of souls in a managerial church	161
7 Theology and the social sciences	190

PART III RELIGION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: IDENTITY, GLOBALISATION AND THE TRANSMUTATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FIELD		
8	The souls of Europe: identity, religion and theology	217
9	Globalised religion? The Parliament of the World's Religions (Chicago, 1993) in theoretical perspective	248
10	Time, virtuality and the Goddess: transmutations of the religious field	269
CONCLUSION		
11	Identity as vocation: the prospect for religion	295
	<i>Bibliography</i>	306
	<i>Index</i>	326

CHAPTER I

The closed circle: Marxism, Christianity and the 'End of History'

This book begins with the image of a closed circle, that is with the idea that the separated strands of Western, and increasingly world history, have converged and that a sense of closure is widespread. The phenomena of globalisation and environmental degradation now serve to compound this impression; yet, simultaneously, as the drive towards uniformity takes place so differences, economic, social and cultural, increase and intensify, and these phenomena are often exacerbated by what Theodor Hanf has depicted as the 'sacred markers' that provide focal points for the assertion of identity in the face of homogenisation.¹ The decade from 1989 to 1999 is marked by a progressive realisation that the apparent optimism of the earliest years of the decade has been undercut by events, of which the wars in the former Yugoslavia have proved to be but one of the best-publicised instances of political and societal disfunctionality. The tension between the rather facile hopes of ideologues who saw a New World Order freeing itself from the sterile polarities of the Cold War and the onset of renewed forms of chaos and disintegration, all overshadowed by an ever more apparent global environmental degradation amounting to an 'ecological eschaton',² serves as a natural point of departure for these reflections on the changing configuration of the relationships between religion, theology and the human sciences.

The Japanese-American political theorist Francis Fukuyama represented the transition marked by the events of 1989–90 as the inauguration of the 'End of History', and the interrogation of this assertion serves as a point of departure for a long journey into the confused and changing cultural field that is the central concern of this book. The 'closed circle'

¹ See Theodor Hanf, 'The Sacred Marker: Religion, Communalism and Nationalism', *Social Compass*, 41/1 (1994), 9–20.

² This was a term that I coined in 1989 when preparing the conference Religion and the Resurgence of Capitalism, which took place at Lancaster University in 1990. This notion has gained salience during the intervening years and is directly responded to in part 3 below.

in the title of this chapter thus refers to the generalisations that underlie Fukuyama's claim that the collapse of ideological polarities presages a united world in which all that remains to be undertaken is the safe management of a progressive adjustment to the reality principle of 'liberal democratic capitalism'. In such managerial terms, the issues of history are resolved, and all that stands out is the task of presentation and thus a perceptual problem of reality acceptance on the part of an expanding and increasingly globalised world bourgeoisie. For the influential ideologue Francis Fukuyama, we inhabit both a post-Christian and a post-socialist world in which the ancestral struggle between the strong and the weak becomes a matter of managed cultural adjustment. Fully unfettered, the strong will tend to destroy the weak and provoke their discontent; but if the strong are not permitted a measure of freedom, then the weak and mediocre will paralyse the now universal liberal capitalist world order. Fukuyama seeks to reconcile these contrasting impulses on the basis that a pre-Christian and pre-socialist answer is required.

Given the scenario outlined above, the notion of the 'End of History' is outlined critically as it becomes the context in which to examine and evaluate Fukuyama's rehabilitation and synergistic juxtaposition of Hegel's parable of Lord and Bondsman and Plato's deployment of the archaic term *thymos*. According to Fukuyama this conjunction provides the remedy for the present and likely future ills of triumphant capitalism. The recovery of Hegel and Plato forms the core of a concerted attempt to fill the ideological and mythic vacuum left after the decay and implosion of the slave ideologies represented by Marxism, Christianity and their socio-cultural adjuncts. Fukuyama argues that,

Christianity and communism were both slave ideologies (the latter unanticipated by Hegel) that captured part of the truth. But in the course of time the irrationalities and self-contradictions of both were revealed: Communist societies, in particular, despite their commitment to principles of freedom and equality, were exposed as modern variants of slave-holding ones, in which the dignity of the great mass of the people went unrecognised. The collapse of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s reflected in a sense, the achievement of a higher level of rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and of their realization that rational universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order.³

Fukuyama attempted to outflank and supersede these defective alternatives by exposing their real similarities within the single context

³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992), p. 205.

represented by the termination of the era of antithesis between traditions and ideologies and thus of their capacity for the enslavement of humanity. I maintain, on the other hand, that the post-Hegelian histories of socialism and religion actually possess a dialectical potency that escapes Fukuyama's repressive interpretation, once this is more fully unearthed. But, significantly, the very notion of the 'End of History' involves a suppression of contradiction, and it is this that is most troubling. Fukuyama's closing of the circle, a gambit that consists in the joint condemnation of Marxist socialism and Christianity and a rather superficial return to Hegel in the context of universal supersession by 'liberal democratic capitalism', may indeed be represented as closure and as an 'End'. But at a more fundamental level the Hegelian dialectic of power resists all such attempts at closure. Whilst Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis sanctions a limited reopening of a more banal history in the contained revival of a domesticated 'warrior' and Promethean ethos of *thymos*, his domestication of the dialectic of the real and its recasting within the bounds of capitalist 'normalisation' obscure what I shall represent as the truth-seeking and 'living in truth' central to the creation of fully human identities. I therefore argue that Fukuyama's 'closure' is in reality a *fore-closure*, a suppression of dimensions of reality that not only disguises the full significance of contemporary cultural change, but also disarms and disempowers a fully human and humane response to a nihilistic culture.

In a globalised and, above all, in a *managed* world,⁴ the expert suppression of real contradiction and its relocation in a sealed and repressed cultural unconscious becomes feasible. Given the weakening or even the demise of both religious and socialist alternatives, ethically and culturally responsible access to that repressed unconscious becomes more difficult for both individuals and communities, not least when other gateways, such as main-line education and religion, are aggregated into the managerial paradigm. The repression or marginalisation of these dimensions of human existence (as is proposed in a limited way by the traditional secularisation thesis) is, however, moderated precisely because, as we shall later see, the tapping of the unconscious and the facilitation of 'spirituality' have themselves been assimilated into the managerial prerogative, in a process facilitated by 'soft capitalism'.⁵ Moreover, indeed, the true ambitions of managerial governance shift from material and economic

⁴ Our reliance upon a managerial paradigm of 'modernity' is supported by Willard F. Enteman's *Managerialism: The Emergence of a New Ideology* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

⁵ Nigel Thrift, 'Soft Capitalism', unpublished lecture delivered at the Centre for the Study of Cultural Values, Lancaster University, June 1996.

goals to the politics of culture, and even to exercising conscious control over the construction of the human 'soul' itself. These are all features of the remarkable migration and mutual exchange of attributes that has taken place following the events of 1989–90. In brief terms, the bureaucratic 'democratic centralism' epitomised by Stalinism headed west to extend and reinforce the managerial prerogative, and radical marketisation and socio-economic atomisation moved east, where it has had, when unmitigated, highly destructive consequences, not least in Russia. As we shall see, this interchange took place in an environment in which the struggle for ultimacy and the guardianship of the sacred also migrated from their traditional strongholds in main-line religion. The latter has sometimes uncritically adapted itself to, and, on occasion, even ingested commodification and managerialism in its desire to act as handmaid to a largely unchallenged managerialised Mammonism. A degraded sacrality has become but a shifting and ambiguous set of experiential opportunities and disembedded values open to both benign capture and malign manipulation. The attendant and contrasting religious and ethical implications of these migrations are important features of the recomposition of the religious field in late modernity that are to be analysed in the course of the ensuing argument.

It is important to acknowledge that Francis Fukuyama's now famous article 'The End of History', published in the summer of 1989,⁶ and his subsequent book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, did indeed mark the end of one epoch and the beginning of another. The theses presented in *The End of History* were heavily criticised, but in daring to articulate a transition, Fukuyama took a worthwhile risk. In *The End of History*, he at least recognised a historical watershed and expressed optimism about the future of the human condition, and the capacity of 'liberal democratic capitalism', rightly understood, to deliver a tolerable, humane historical inevitability after the final collapse of Marxist socialism. Like Oswald Spengler, to whom he refers at length, Fukuyama tried to give meaning to contemporary history. In *The Decline of the West*,⁷ Spengler addressed the apparent failure of German culture and civilisation following the Armistice and defeat of Germany in the First World War in a 'morphology of world history', in what amounted to the secular analogue to theodicy. Meaning was given to defeat through a pattern of repetition, the inevitable cycle of the rise and fall of civilisations: Germany could rise

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', *The National Interest*, 16/2 (1989), 3–18.

⁷ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West: Form and Actuality* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926).

again. In his turn, Fukuyama addressed the failure of Christianity and the collapse and defeat of Marxist socialism: neither is adequate to the requirements of the new epoch after, as he would have it, the end of the age of ideology. In the events of the *Wende* of 1989–90, Fukuyama argues that capitalism had shown itself to be the only viable way of organising the world; but the triumph of capitalism does not, however, in and of itself solve the problem of ideological and mythic exhaustion.

According to Fukuyama, the legitimacy of liberal democracy has so grown through its economic conquest of the rival ideologies of hereditary monarchy, fascism, and now communism, that it may now be regarded as the ‘end point of man’s ideological evolution’, and the ‘final form of human government’.⁸ An immediate implication of this assertion of the ideological finality of liberal democracy is that, ‘while earlier forms of government were characterised by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was free from such fundamental internal contradictions’.⁹ As will become apparent in the following chapter, it has indeed been a core trope of the public discourse of resurgent and triumphant capitalism as rendered by its apologists to represent ‘reality’ as plain, indisputable facts subsisting beyond ideology, in what amounts to a comprehensive ‘reality principle’. Within this framework it will also become clear that whilst some contradictions are deemed essential to socio-economic dynamism, others that do not serve this goal have to be suppressed. Fukuyama acknowledges this problem when he suggests that even after the vanquishing of fascism and communism, liberal democracy may still leave us fundamentally unsatisfied. He poses the question: ‘Are there contradictions that will remain at the heart of liberal order, even after the last fascist dictator, swaggering colonel, or Communist party boss has been driven from the face of the earth?’¹⁰ My response is in the affirmative, but I would also assert that these contradictions are not simply or primarily those associated with Fukuyama’s reintroduction of a domesticated Prometheanism, but run far deeper and subsist at the level of the expropriation and alienation of the sources

⁸ The term ‘liberal democracy’ is not, of course, value-free. I prefer Ralph Milliband’s designation ‘capitalist democracy’. See Milliband’s ‘The Socialist Alternative’, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Revisited* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 112. More representative and less misleading in this connection for English readers is Michael Novak’s preferred term ‘democratic capitalism’. See R. H. Roberts, ‘The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism: A Critique of Michael Novak’, in Jon Davies and David Green (eds.), *God and the Marketplace: Essays on the Morality of Wealth Creation* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1993), pp. 64–81.

⁹ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. xi.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

of socio-cultural and psychological identity-formation, the very springs of humanity itself.

Thus whereas this opening chapter concerns itself with Fukuyama's representation of the human condition after the implosion of communism and the 'triumph of capitalism',¹¹ it also seeks to explore and subvert the discursive seamlessness of the post-socialist condition and its instrumental imposition through global managerialism. Rather in the way that the assertion 'Communism was the riddle of history solved' could become an ideology of non-contradiction in which 'socialist reality' was forced to follow ideology into a fantasy of suppressed contradiction in the former Soviet bloc, so triumphant capitalism can be seen arrogating finality to itself through Fukuyama's assertions. Mockery of the ideology is relatively easy where physical terror is absent. When, however, seamless capitalism proliferates and differentiates itself in the form of managerialism and the universal imposition of performativity, then the 'terror' of which Jean-François Lyotard wrote in *La Condition postmoderne* becomes a pervasive, internalised *habitus* of fear, which, as I shall show in this book, grips ever more sectors of human endeavour. The absence of a plausible 'other', a point of leverage outside the seemingly infinite elasticity of the all-enveloping 'cage' that now represents itself as co-terminous with reality as a whole, presents a great challenge to any mind and heart unsatisfied with the limits of the cage. All critical knowledge becomes deviance at the moment it raises the question of foundations and ventures to suggest that a full human identity that understands itself as 'vocation' or 'call' must seek a grounding beyond the bounds of an all-embracing capitalistic and managerial prerogative. Naturally enough, a major goal of globalised and managerialised capitalism is to suppress or eliminate such deviance by whatever means permissible under any given set of circumstances.

The claims made above do, it should be conceded, pre-empt the fuller argument of this book, and so in this chapter the reader's attention is directed primarily towards grasping the significance of Fukuyama's depiction of the transition from the world of living antitheses and real alternatives to a closure, or 'End', of history. This 'End' is not marked, as Fukuyama would have it, by the advent of universal liberalism, but by

¹¹ The word 'triumph' as used by present-day apologists for contemporary capitalism and the adjective 'triumphalist' are applicable. See my analysis of this form of discourse in R. H. Roberts, 'Rhetoric and the Resurgence of Capitalism', in R. H. Roberts and J. M. M. Good (eds.), *The Recovery of Rhetoric: Persuasive Discourse and Disciplinarity in the Human Sciences* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1993), and chapter 2 below.

an internal colonisation so complete as to eliminate all positive reference to critical counterfactuals and countervalue. Here, however, I provide a broad historical perspective, a context within which both the managerial revolution from above and the re-emergent salience of the religious factor can be more fully understood. Then, in turn, attention may be drawn to both the difficulties and the rewards that flow from the exploration and reconfiguring of the contemporary recomposition of the religious field.

At the heart of Fukuyama's argument there is what may be called a New Hegelian metanarrative. The latter is based upon a construal of post-socialist, mature liberal democracy as the part calculated, part spontaneous resolution of *thymos*. For Fukuyama, thymic drives are the defining feature of humankind. They are manifested in an insatiable lust for 'recognition', the prestige-seeking impulse that constantly subverts and transcends the mere needs, wants, preferences and desires associated with biological subsistence and the consumerist settlement of 'post-history'. According to Fukuyama, human identity ultimately consists in an ambiguous and risk-fraught tendency to seek recognition and prestige. Given the historic failure and contemporary anachronisms of the slave moralities of Christianity and Marxism, the rehabilitation of *thymos*, a manly 'spiritedness', is the core value of Fukuyama's vision.

In the most general terms Fukuyama (in a way similar to Michael Novak) appropriates and inverts Marx: the *spiritual* ultimacy of liberal democracy is to be substituted for the *material* (pseudo-) finality of communism. In order to effect this substitution, Fukuyama reverts to Hegel; and in attempting such a recovery he draws down two descending arms of history into the sides of a circle. Post-Enlightenment Christian theology and Marxist socialism stem in large degree from Hegel, and when we return to the latter the inadequacies of both are exposed. Yet, it does not require profound historical knowledge to become aware that both traditions have already engaged in this apparently regressive, yet in reality emancipatory, dialogue with Hegel. Fukuyama's argument ranges far and wide, and it includes, not least in his account of Hegel (largely derived from Alexandre Kojève¹²), much which could well be contested in detail. Such a deconstructive scholastic exercise would be pointless at this juncture, and it is of more value for present purposes to construe *The End of History* as a cultural artifact in need of interpretation that should be read as an aspirant mythopoeic symbol of its time. What Fukuyama

¹² Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (New York: Basic Books, 1969); see also Barry Cooper, *The End of History: An Essay on Modern Hegelianism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); and Michael S. Roth, *Knowing and History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

would intend is thus a new paradigm in the Kuhnian sense,¹³ a statement of the transcendental principles of the total context of construal and interpretation, and so it is in these terms that the truth and utility of his efforts may also be assessed.

As already noted, central to Fukuyama's vision is a re-Hegelianisation of cultural principles; in particular this is achieved through a refunctioning of the parable of Lord and Bondsman taken from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* of 1807 and its representation as the contemporary analogue of Platonic *thymos*, the lost warrior spirit. It is the grandiloquent and capitalised 'History' of Hegel, that is 'history understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times',¹⁴ that really interests Fukuyama. The 'post-history' which now appears to succeed its hypostatized and capitalised form is a form of fallenness, a lessening of the grandeur that is the human prerogative. What many of those who first heard of Fukuyama's ideas at second or third hand not infrequently imagined is that he endorsed such a de-Historicisation. In reality, the contrary is the case, for he purports to give an affirmative answer to the question 'Whether, at the end of the twentieth century, it makes sense for us once again to speak of a coherent and directional History of mankind that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy?'¹⁵ There are, he asserts, two reasons for such a progression, the first economic, the second concerning the 'struggle for recognition' and the pursuit of prestige as the main components of human identity.

The former ground for a coherent and directional view of history is not in fact expanded on a basis of purely *economic* progress as such, but in terms of the 'Mechanism', that is the reified 'logic of modern natural science [which] would seem to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism'.¹⁶ Fukuyama recognises, however, that overall coherence in history (and society) is guaranteed by instrumental, applied scientific reason. Fukuyama's notion of the 'Mechanism' is interestingly reminiscent of the *demiurge* of Plato's *Timaeus* and a de-organised version of the 'hidden hand' of a residual and vestigial Providence preserved in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Eschewing, however, both the quasi-providential 'hidden hand' and the ruthless excision of sentimentality

¹³ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

¹⁴ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. xii.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. xxii–xxiii.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

characteristic of Thatcherism, Fukuyama lays the foundation for qualified mythopoeisis. The modernisation associated with technology increases wealth and maximises human satisfaction and leads to ever greater homogenisation of human societies. Centralisation of the state, urbanisation and the displacement of traditional forms of social organisation by economic rationality are not simply to be reported, but to be celebrated. Global markets and a consumer culture will become universal.¹⁷ There is nothing particularly remarkable about Fukuyama's general characterisation of modernisation¹⁸ and of globalisation processes.¹⁹ Unlike, however, the prominent Roman Catholic apologist for 'democratic capitalism', Michael Novak of the American Enterprise Institute, Fukuyama concedes that there is no 'economically necessary reason why advanced industrialization should produce political liberty'.²⁰ He acknowledges that authoritarian capitalism (like that of the 'four little dragons' of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore and other countries on the Pacific Rim) may well be the most efficient form of economic organisation. A little ironically, perhaps, the Asian economic crisis was not foreseen by the author of *The End of History*. The mere existence of the Mechanism is not enough to explain the emergence

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. xiv–xv.

¹⁸ Perry Anderson, 'Marshall Berman: Modernity and Revolution', in *A Zone of Engagement* (London: Verso, 1992), ch. 2; R. N. Bellah, 'Meaning and Modernization', *Beyond Belief* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1970), pp. 64–73; R. N. Bellah, 'New Religious Consciousness and the Crisis in Modernity', in Charles Y. Glock and Robert N. Bellah (eds.), *The New Religious Consciousness* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1976), pp. 333–52; Peter L. Berger, *Facing up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Marshall Berman, *All that is Solid melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (London: Verso, 1982); Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, 'The Concept of Enlightenment', in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Allen Lane, 1972), pp. 3–80; Agnes Heller, *Can Modernity Survive?* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); Scott Lash, *Another Modernity: A Different Rationality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Bryan S. Turner (ed.), *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity* (London: Sage, 1990); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); Gianni Vattimo, *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988); Sam Whimster and Scott Lash (eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

¹⁹ Roland Robertson, 'The Globalization Paradigm: Thinking Globally', *Religion and Social Order*, 1 (1991), 207–24; Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1990); S. Gill and D. Law (eds.), *The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies* (London: Harvester, 1988); Anthony King, *Culture, Globalization and the World System* (Binghampton, NY: SUNY, 1989); R. Peet, *Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal Development* (London: Routledge, 1991); L. Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System: Social Changes in Global Perspective* (London: Harvester, 1991); W. H. Swatos, Jr (ed.), *Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

²⁰ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. xv.

and the growing universality of liberal democracy; for that something further is required, an adequate doctrine of human nature, for, he asserts, 'economic interpretations of history are incomplete and unsatisfying, because man is not simply an economic animal'.²¹ Fukuyama's response to this deficit implies the relativisation and supercession of 'the Mechanism', for, he argues, 'Hegel's understanding of the Mechanism that underlies the historical process is incomparably deeper than that of Marx or of any contemporary social scientist. For Hegel the primary motor of human history is not natural science or the ever expanding horizon of desire that powers it, but rather a totally non-economic drive, the *struggle for recognition*'.²² We may agree with this ascription of depth to Hegel, but we have to inquire whether Fukuyama has dug deep enough.

If we concede a measure of plausibility to *The End of History*, then what is humankind likely to be? It is in answer to this question that Fukuyama turns to Hegel's early philosophical anthropology and the parable of Lord (*Herr*) and Bondsman (*Knecht*), and here his spade turns as it strikes bedrock: modernity contains no 'Beyond', beyond Hegel. Yet informing Hegel's thought there are the societally contextualised partitions of the soul to be found in Plato's *Republic*. Here Fukuyama locates the lost treasure of *thymos*, the 'spiritedness' of the warrior or guardian class who stand between the philosopher kings and the plebeian producers. Whereas all animals seek food, drink, shelter and self-preservation, the utter distinctiveness of the human consists in the fact that:

Man differs fundamentally from the animals, however, because in addition he desires the desire of other men, that is, he wants to be 'recognised'. In particular, he wants to be recognised as a *human being*, that is a being with a certain worth or dignity. This worth in the first instance is related to his willingness to risk his life in struggle over pure prestige.²³

The struggle for self-transcendence, the attainment of higher, abstract principles and goals, lifts man above basic animal instincts. It is worth noting that feminism and feminist theory have a minimal presence in Fukuyama's argument, and it is scarcely necessary to be a convinced feminist to be aware that his line of argument would seem masculinist in the extreme when he traces the doctrine of a generic human nature to conflict and resists any form of holistic resolution. Fukuyama's identification

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

of the human concern with identity with a search for 'pure prestige' is somewhat constricted when the desire for recognition is contained within the closure of history, and his reading of Hegel is both mythologising and curiously literal:

According to Hegel, the desire for recognition initially drives two primordial combatants to seek to make the other 'recognize' their humanness by staking their lives in a mortal battle. When the natural fear of death leads one combatant to submit, the relationship of master and slave is born. The stakes in this bloody battle at the beginning of history are not food, shelter, or security, but pure prestige. And precisely because the goal of the battle is not determined by biology, Hegel sees in it the first glimmer of human freedom.²⁴

This reading of Hegel in terms of 'self-esteem' – and its *denial* precipitating *anger*, *individual failure* leading to *shame*, and *correct evaluation* issuing in *pride* – assumes the emergence of an initial differentiation of the human race in terms of those, the masters, who were willing to risk their lives, and those others, the class of slaves, who gave in to their fear of death. In a literal, but ironically paradoxical transition from *ancien régime* to modernity (supremely enacted in the French Revolution) this antithesis is overcome. According to Fukuyama, in modernity, slaves have become their own masters through the principle of popular sovereignty and the rule of law.²⁵ Thereby universal and reciprocal recognition through *rights* supersedes the unequal recognition of masters and slaves. Likewise on the international plane, Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy lessens the likelihood of wars based on the pursuit of pure prestige. Hegel's parable is in this way absorbed and partially domesticated into a renewed metanarrative of modernity. The question of the durability of narrative is a subject to which we later return in considering the 'hypernarrative' or transcendental principles of societal constitution as successor to failed and fragmented metanarrative. Almost needless to say, Fukuyama's argument once more tends to present the reader with a rather facile dissolution of Marx's conception of the proletariat, the class outside all classes as the hammerhead of historical inevitability – and the 'negation of the negation'. In the new, post-socialist situation, rendered by Fukuyama (echoing Nietzsche) as the 'End of History', there emerges the 'last man', a hollow-chested non-entity produced by liberal democracy, the appearance of which provokes the urgency in Fukuyama's question as to what *is*? – what *will be* the human? The universal domestication of

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Ironically, what this book shows is that what slaves become is their own slave-masters.

primal struggle into a regularised global bourgeoisie and the resolution of transcendence does not preclude the need for the contemporary equivalent of the 'Lord', a theme to which we return later.

Yet, contrary to Fukuyama, it would be plausible to argue that Hegel's representation of Lord and Bondsman in the *Phenomenology of Mind* can and should resist ready reduction and resolution into any fixed or sequential historical transition.²⁶ The loci of lordship (*Herrschaft*) and bondage or slavery (*Knechtschaft*) are 'moments' (*Momente*) in a dialectical *coincidentia oppositorum*, a coincidence of opposites, the outcome of which is not pre-determined or assured as Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*, or indeed, as Fukuyama would have us believe, resolved in the emergence of global 'liberal democracy'. To imagine otherwise of Hegel would be to risk regarding liberal democracy, the bourgeois condition, as amounting to *Aufhebung*, the transition that itself constitutes ultimate supercession – even the onset of transcendence. If, of course, Fukuyama's interpretation of Hegel were to be conceded, then it would naturally follow that the extension of the liberal capitalist triumph into all aspects of the human condition, including the domain of the spirit, would be real, rational and legitimate. In more aggressive terms, does not Fukuyama's interpretation of Hegel achieved through the appropriation of Alexandre Kojève's reading of the parable of Lord and Bondsman (that of a future European Community bureaucrat) amount to the *embourgeoisement* and domestication of a thinker whose radicality even now outruns the limits set by those who acknowledge his authority as mentor?²⁷ In effect, Fukuyama

²⁶ George Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes Towards the Re-definition of Culture*, T. S. Eliot Memorial Lectures (London: Faber, 1971); L. S. Stepelevich, *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); K. Barth, 'Hegel', *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century* (London: SCM, 1972), pp. 384–421; G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, tr. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1971); G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. J. B. Baillie (London: Macmillan, 1910); G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); P. C. Hodgson, 'Hegel', in N. Smart et al. (eds.), *Nineteenth-Century Religious Thought in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 17–40; Q. Lauer, *Hegel's Concept of God* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976); Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Mark C. Taylor, *Journeys to Selfhood, Hegel and Kierkegaard* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); J. E. Toews, *Hegelianism: The Path toward Dialectical Humanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Rowan Williams, 'Hegel and the Gods of Postmodernity', in Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (eds.), *Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 72–80.

²⁷ This radicalism has not been lost on second- and third-wave feminist theorists who, following Simone de Beauvoir's assimilation of the *Phenomenology of Mind* through Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, repeatedly return to the parable in their representation of the condition of womankind under conditions of patriarchy. Male humankind has much to learn from feminist theory. See

is a right wing but non-theistic Hegelian who extends and transposes the latter's equation of the real and the rational in the *Philosophie des Rechts* from the Prussian state to the global totality.

Fukuyama reinforces the legitimacy of his reading of Hegel by the inclusion of *thymos*, a word which originates in Homeric epic,²⁸ where it had a semantic range that extended from 'soul' to 'anger'. These meanings do not, as it happens, adequately express what was intended by the Greek term,²⁹ and contextual analysis of its use is important. Studies by Erwin Rohde,³⁰ Joachim Bohme,³¹ Bruno Snell³² and R. B. Onians³³ carry the investigation of *thymos* into the most distant Greek antiquity. The possible meanings of *thymos* – 'soul', 'spirit', the 'principle of life', 'feeling' and 'thought', especially of strong feeling and passion,³⁴ and such more concise expressions as 'life-soul' and 'life-breath' – clearly surface in Fukuyama's understanding of both the *Republic* and the *Phenomenology of Mind*. E. D. Francis' articulation of *thymos* as 'that which animates and endows the human being with consciousness, air blown into the lungs by the winds',³⁵ suggests that 'life-soul' might be an appropriate translation. Yet as Caroline Caswell observes at the conclusion of her synchronic formulaic analysis, 'Modern English can supply no better than crude approximation, either linguistically or conceptually.'³⁶ Such rich, wide-ranging resonance makes *thymos* an ideal vehicle for Fukuyama's venture into mythopoeisis.

In the specific setting of Plato's thought the tripartite division of the psyche in terms of desire (*to epithumetikon*), spiritedness (*to thumoeides*) and reasonableness and practical skill (*to logistikon*) appears in the

R. H. Roberts, 'The Reception of Hegel's Parable of Lord and Bondsman', *New Comparison*, 5 (1988), 23–9 and Roberts, 'The Chthonic Imperative: Gender, Religion and the Battle for the Earth', in Joanne Pearson, Richard Roberts and Geoffrey Samuel (eds.), *Nature Religion Today: Paganism in the Modern World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. 57–73.

²⁸ See the brief monograph by Caroline P. Caswell, *A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic, Supplements to MNEMOSYNE* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰ Erwin Rohde, *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks* (London: Kegan Paul, 1925).

³¹ Joachim Bohme, *Das Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos mit einem Anhang: Vergleich mit dem Glauben der Primitiven* (Leipzig, 1929).

³² Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953).

³³ R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951).

³⁴ Caswell, *Thumos*, p. 11.

³⁵ E. D. Francis, 'Virtue, Folly, and Greek Etymology', in C. A. Rubino and C. W. Shelmerdine (eds.), *Approaches to Homer* (Austin, 1983), pp. 89–103.

³⁶ Caswell, *Thumos*, p. 62.

Phaedrus-myth (*Phaedr.* 246 ff.) and the *Republic* (*Rep.* II.275b; IV.435 ff.; IX.580 ff.).³⁷ In the *Timaeus*, *thymos* is associated with *philotimon*, the love of honour (*Tim.* 70). The abstract noun *thumoeides* and the cognate adjective *thumoeides* apply to the ‘virtue’ (*andreia*) of the Guardians.³⁸ This provides one source of that conception of manly *vertu* that is later recast in the proto-realpolitik of Machiavelli’s *The Prince*,³⁹ and eventually in the self-realisation of the Hegelian Lord in the *Phenomenology of Mind* and the fateful Nietzschean ‘Will-to-power’ (*Die Wille zur Macht*) itself.⁴⁰ Whilst Fukuyama endorses the necessity of *thymos* as the condition of social and economic vitality, he also attempts to address the ethical failure associated with the de-contextualisation of the will to live and to secure recognition. Without a supportive framework, human identity assertion slips into the abyss of rampant nihilism.⁴¹ There is an interesting parallel here between Fukuyama’s line of argument and that pursued by the anthropologist Charles Lindholm with regard to ‘charisma’ and its role in identity-formation to which we shall return later.⁴²

A further preliminary conclusion can be drawn from this that affects the direction of the argument to be pursued in this book. A fundamental dilemma has begun to emerge: if, on the one hand, society is de-traditionalised and main-line religions cease to operate effectively in facilitating basic processes of socialisation, and if, on the other, all charismatic action or shamanistic experience is perceived as malign in its consequences, then societal renewal through the ritual function⁴³ dies away and humankind is condemned to what Stjepan Mestrovic represents as ‘post-emotional society’ in which basic human needs for communion will never be adequately met other than through the inadequate means (as I here argue) of control and consumption.⁴⁴ This, however, is to leap forward into concerns to be unfolded later in the course of this book. For

³⁷ ‘[Plato] is looking for just those factors in the soul that will explain the three kinds of character (*tria gene phuseon*) which will enable different men to fill successfully the three vocations necessary for the efficient working of the state’, N. R. Murphy, *The Interpretation of Plato’s Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 30.

³⁸ See *Plato’s Republic: The Greek Text*, tr. B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), pp. 328–9.

³⁹ See Machiavelli, *The Prince and Other Writings* (London: Dent, 1995).

⁴⁰ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. 314.

⁴¹ See Charles Lindholm, *Charisma* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). Lindholm provides an excellent interdisciplinary account of the study of ‘charisma’, but his evaluation of the phenomenon is unfailingly negative.

⁴² See chapter 11 below.

⁴³ Roy Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴⁴ Stjepan G. Mestrovic, ‘The Disappearance of the Sacred’, *Postemotional Society* (London: Sage, 1997), ch. 5.

the present it is important to note how Fukuyama attempts to resolve the tension between the moribund societal banality of liberal capitalist democracy and the risk-fraught, but stimulant intoxication of *thymos*, the ancestral will-to-power. But any fuller assessment of this depends in turn upon an alternative reading of the parallel post-Hegelian traditions of Marxist socialism and Christianity, both of which are, in Fukuyama's estimation, outmoded slave moralities unsuited to the requirements of post-history.

Marxism⁴⁵ and Christianity, and above all, the successive stages in the evolution of both Marxist theory and Protestant Christian theology, have exhibited an interesting and often catastrophic mutual alienation since the death of Hegel. Christianity and Marxism are often conceived as polar opposites; in fact they not only share common roots in the Western Jewish and Christian traditions but are also constitutively influenced by the Enlightenment, and, above all, they share the context of the final flowering and subsequent disintegration of German philosophical idealism. The theoretical enlargement of both traditions flows out of the end of classical German philosophy as it was explored by left- and right-wing Hegelians following the sudden death of Hegel in 1831. This mutuality could be explored in a number of ways, but that most salient to present purposes is to construe the complex and differentiated developments of both Marxism and Christian Protestant theology as affording different resolutions of the Hegelian dialectic of lordship and bondage which is a central feature of Fukuyama's vision of the 'End of History'.

It is neither feasible nor necessary at this juncture to trace the complex Western dialectics of knowledge, power and being to their origins with, not least, Augustine of Hippo's *De Civitate Dei*.⁴⁶ Taking up a hint

⁴⁵ Eve Tavor Bannet, 'Marx, God and Praxis', in Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (eds.), *Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 122–34; E. Kamenka, *The Portable Karl Marx* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983); Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism* (3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), vols. 1–3; N. L. A. Lash, *A Matter of Hope: A Theological Reflection on the Thought of Karl Marx* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981); G. Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964); D. McLellan, *Karl Marx: An Introduction to his Life and Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1975); D. McLellan, *Marxism and Religion: A Description and Assessment of the Marxist Critique of Religion* (London: Macmillan, 1987); D. McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1971); Karl Marx, *On Religion* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1957); Karl Marx, *Capital* (London: Swan & Sonnenschein, 1903); Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, tr. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974); Istvan Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (London: Merlin Press, 1975); B. Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); R. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961; 2nd edn, 1972); P. Worsley, *Marx and Marxism* (Chichester: Ellis Harwood, 1981).

⁴⁶ See Karl Andresen (ed.), *Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985ff.).

from Herbert Marcuse, Luther's *Urtext* of German and Reformation consciousness, *The Freedom of a Christian Man* (*Die Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*) of 1521 can be taken as a milestone in the evolution of consciousness: here a theologian and the father of the German early modern *mentalité* articulated the agonistic and ambiguous consciousness that is free, yet simultaneously enslaved.⁴⁷ Both subsequent German philosophy and Christian theology may thus be understood as working themselves out within the possible resolutions of the dialectic of Master and Slave. One of the few cultural critics to have grasped something close to the full and dire implications of this dialectic of power is George Steiner, who writes of the Hegelian (and Western) 'dialectic of aggrandisement' that characterises the mode of self-identity formation quintessentially expressed in the parable of Lord and Bondsman.⁴⁸ This is a theme which will, in various guises, return throughout this book in relation to theology, religion and societal power. Rather than, as is the case with Fukuyama, the parable of Lord and Bondsman being resolved within the narrative of triumphant capitalism, it is this narrative that has to be reinterpreted within the trans-historical parable.

In broad terms, processes of secularisation that were both inaugurated and accelerated by the Reformation were to consolidate the progressive marginalisation and privatisation of religious consciousness in ways which increasingly cut the latter off from the wider human realm, and eventually banished theology into both institutional and intellectual isolation.⁴⁹ In Feuerbach's reductive critique of Lutheran Christianity and Hegelian thought, Marx found the key by which he could, as he thought, free the mind from the incubus of religion and its attendant fantasy and deception and thus allow it to unlock the causal processes and interconnection in the fabric of human social reality. Indeed, as Leszek Kolakowski reminds us, Karl Marx was first and foremost a German philosopher⁵⁰ whose materialism grew out of dissatisfaction with and rejection of the speculative philosophy which interpreted, but failed to change, the world. As regards the dialectic of lordship and bondage, Marx's inversion of Hegel comprised the relocation of the focus of causality in material relations. A revolution in consciousness could only take

⁴⁷ H. Marcuse, *Studies in Critical Philosophy*.

⁴⁸ Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*.

⁴⁹ A process that culminates in the theology of the great Swiss German Reformed theologian Karl Barth. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie*, 4th edn (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1976). See chapter 7 below and also R. H. Roberts, *A Theology on its Way?: Essays on Karl Barth* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992).

⁵⁰ Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 1, p. 1.

place as a consequence of revolution in material relations of production. As Protestant theology became aware of the problematic nature of power as it painfully detached itself from Catholic Europe in the setting of early modernity and then the Enlightenment, so it also became conscious of the discrepancies within the Christological discourse of the God-Man Jesus Christ that lay at the very heart of the theology incarnated in the structures of the hierarchical church.

Hegel's parable comprises all these dynamics, and he confronted in a most remarkable way the power-play etched into the indelibly theological essence of ancestral European identity. In the aftermath of Hegel's death, therefore, a remarkable exchange took place: the theological essence expressed in the redemptive 'negation of the negation' effected by the infinite God who negates himself in order to permit finite consciousness to experience its true nature migrates from the ambiguous intellectual and spiritual realm of *Geist* to that of material relations. Thus Marx's depicts the apotheosis of the proletariat as agent and bearer of the 'negation of the negation', and the location of the revolutionary transformation of history in the narrative of the class that is no class (the societal *Unding*). This excluded class will rise up and overwhelm a 'Lord' now represented by the owners of private property and capital, and thereby overcome and 'sublate' history. Correspondingly, and to a marked degree paradoxically, Protestant theology found itself embarrassed by the Promethean Christology of the superhuman God-Man that was its questionable inheritance. Thus the apotheosis of the proletariat can be juxtaposed, even correlated, with the increasingly secularised and downgraded representation of the Christ figure, who in losing his divine attributes of the Lord (*Herr*), becomes the self-emptied servant Christ (*Knecht*) of Lutheran kenotic Christology, the One who takes upon himself the form of the slave.⁵¹ To pretend, as Fukuyama appears to do, that this dramatic inheritance is somehow obsolete, a reality leached out of European culture by the advent of liberal capitalism, is as spurious and implausible as were the former claims made on behalf of Marxist socialism that communism was a fulfilled existence free of contradiction, to which socialist reality had to conform. This book is directed, not least, at the exposure and decipherment of claims that Fukuyama presents in strident, vivid, yet rather superficial terms. The tools that Fukuyama provides for his own analysis are, it must be said, rather limited in scope; the manufacture

⁵¹ In an extended exposition of Philippians 2. This theme is treated at length in theological and sociological terms in chapter 5 below.

and manipulation of reality in a globalised, managerial and commodified world is, by contrast, subtle and comprehensive. Fukuyama recalls Socrates' words:

What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which also has great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?⁵²

Fukuyama opts for the 'great spirit', the active, value-creating existence of the exceptional human being, the man possessed of *megalothymia*. Such individuals

will deliberately seek discomfort and sacrifice, because the pain will be the only way they have of proving definitively that they can *think well of themselves*, that they remain *human beings*.⁵³

The creation of a New Hegelian metanarrative and thus the recovery of a 'totally non-materialist historical dialectic'⁵⁴ requires careful refunctioning of thymotic man.⁵⁵ In fact such a refunctioning is already taking place, often, perhaps, at a more popular level than all theorists like to admit. Thus, for example, in the power feminism of Naomi Wolf,⁵⁶ in the more radical management training programmes of the enterprise culture, in Robert Bly's mythic recovery of the Wild Man,⁵⁷ and in countless New Age rituals (often using First Nation or Native American practices) the 'Warrior' is making many a return. How this may be correlated with the 'gentle nature' of which Socrates speaks is less than obvious. Moreover, there is much more that can and ought to be said about the nature and formations of human identity, not least, it might be added, when the ritual function of embedded cultures is more fully understood.

Fukuyama is most of all concerned with the revitalization of *thymos* as the means capable of inhibiting the inner rot to which liberal democracy is prone. Decadence becomes apparent in the mass production of the effete, weak 'Last Man' who calculates all and ventures nothing in a risk-aversion society. The contradiction that exists between *megalothymia* and *isothymia* is one between those who are willing to endorse and exemplify the seeking of legitimate human grandeur through risk

⁵² Glaucon replies to Socrates in Republic II, 375: Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, tr. B. Jowett (2 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1871), vol. II, p. 57.

⁵³ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. 329.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁵⁶ See Naomi Wolf, 'The Feminine Fear of Power', *Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How it Will Change the 21st Century* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), ch. 17.

⁵⁷ See Robert Bly, *Iron John: A Book About Men* (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1990).

and sacrifice and those who seek equality at all costs, the covert collectivists, who whilst enjoying liberal democracy undermine its dynamism by subverting difference. Fukuyama seeks out a new path in the renewal of 'History' that takes the form of an outlet for legitimate human aggression between what J. A. Schumpeter called the 'utopian emotionalism' of the intellectuals and the 'unromantic and unheroic civilization' of capitalist time-servers.⁵⁸ In this scenario other contradictions like that between wealth and poverty scarcely feature; they are secondary to the cultural contradiction between the strong (and effective) and the weak (and burdensome).⁵⁹

Rather than resort to what Fukuyama regards as the 'perfectly contentless formal arts of Japan'⁶⁰ or other creative risk-laden diversions we (that is those with thymotic drive) need once more to live dangerously as free and unequal human beings:

For as Hegel teaches us, modern liberalism is not based on the abolition of the desire for recognition so much as on its transformation into a more rational form. If *thymos* is not entirely preserved in its earlier manifestations, neither is it entirely negated. Moreover, no existing society is based exclusively on *isothymia*; all must permit some degree of safe and domesticated *megalothymia*, even if this runs contrary to the principles they profess to believe in.⁶¹

After the 'End of History', licensed *megalothymia* will become the new *via media*, realisable in a future value-creating humanity existing in the New Hegelian order. As a matter of simple realism Fukuyama argues for a similar domestication of the past risks of religion and nationalism:

If nationalism is to fade away as a political force, it must be made tolerant like religion before it. National groups can retain their separate languages and sense of identity, but that identity would be expressed primarily in the realm of culture rather than politics. The French can continue to savor their wines and the Germans their sausages, but this will be done within the sphere of private life alone.⁶²

Humanity must recognise that although all humankind is on the same 'wagon train'⁶³ of post-history and heading west towards a common goal;

⁵⁸ J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd edn (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 160.

⁵⁹ See Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976) and Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Art* (London: Methuen, 1981).

⁶⁰ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. 320. This is a rather puzzling observation, not least, perhaps, for those with first-hand experience of Japanese martial arts.

⁶¹ Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man*, p. 337.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 338–9.

some will crawl slowly whereas others will struggle with pride towards it. In effect, let us, Fukuyama urges, reward those who struggle and sacrifice – even as we may have to tolerate the calculating crawlers. Thus Fukuyama (and, he would have us believe, Hegel and Plato) requires us to rehabilitate *thymos*, the basis of the virtues, but let it be ruled by reason and made an ally of desire. Rather in the way the chairman or chief executive of a corporation might seek to promote a ‘company culture’, so in *The End of History* Fukuyama translates corporate image-making onto the global level. This book is thus a true cultural artifact of its age, a presentational exercise intended to capture the more exploratory minds of the generation that sets out in ‘post-history’, and which needs to have its energies safely channelled into the pursuit of pure prestige. In such a brave new world order the function of democracy is not so much political as anthropological:

it would seem natural that liberal democracy, which seeks to abolish the distinction between masters and slaves by making men masters of themselves, should have different foreign policy objectives altogether. What will produce peace in the post-historical world will not be the fact that major states share a common principle of legitimacy. This state of affairs existed at times in the past, for example when all the nations of Europe were monarchies or empires. Peace will arise instead out of the specific nature of democratic legitimacy, and its ability to satisfy the desire for recognition.⁶⁴

Whilst Fukuyama may have successfully, but in part, crystallised a moment of historical transition, his interpretation of such a passage as the above is misleading. A mythologised recoding of the human condition represses and obscures the dialectical core of human self and societal experience as it is focused in the task of identity-formation in the modern/postmodern condition. It is not too difficult to dispute the adequacy of both Fukuyama’s reading of the meaning of Hegel’s resonant image of lordship and bondage (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*) and of the Hegelian history of Marxist socialism and Christian theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More significantly, *The End of History* does, however, confront the reader with more profound issues that relate to the representation of the triumph of ‘liberal democratic capitalism’ as a state of existence subsisting beyond real contradiction.

The assertion made by the Right, and represented in mythopoeic terms by Francis Fukuyama, that the true sublation of history and of the human condition is enacted in the triumph of capitalism is now no matter

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

of assent or dissent, but an untruth incorporated in a myriad of cultural practices and suffused through reality in a differentiated and managerially enforced *habitus* and societal transcendental which continues to invade and replicate itself across all areas of civil society. In what follows we investigate some of the manifestations of the ‘triumph of capitalism’ that underpins the assertion of the ‘End of History’. When understood in this setting, the present state of the interface between religion, theology and the human sciences opens up areas of intense concern for closer inspection: the future of the human is at stake.