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0521790328 - Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi  
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## Democracy and Development

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experiences of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamics of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several of them quite surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not tend to generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. The type of political regime has no impact on the growth of total national income, and political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes rise more rapidly in democracies because populations increase faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have greater effects on demography than on economics.

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