

Cambridge University Press 0521790085 - Political Parties, Games and Redistribution Rosa Mule Table of Contents More information

Contents

| | List of figures | page 1X |
|---|--|---------|
| | List of tables | xi |
| | Acknowledgments | xiii |
| | Introduction | I |
| | Welfare state expansion and retrenchment | 4 |
| | The argument of this book | II |
| | Comparative strategy | 14 |
| | The Luxembourg Income Study | 24 |
| | The structure of the book | 27 |
| I | Political parties, games and income redistribution | 32 |
| | Traditional redistributive games: median voter, political business cycle | Ü |
| | and partisan model | 33 |
| | Advances in the theory of party politics | 35 |
| | Party goals: trade-offs and priorities | 38 |
| | Party competition: arithmetical particularism and Director's Law | 40 |
| | Party organisation: pivotal players, strategic disagreement, sequential | |
| | elections and correlated strategies | 42 |
| | Conclusion: political slack and redistributive policies | 49 |
| 2 | Opposition effects, blackmail and u-turns under | |
| | Pierre Elliot Trudeau | 52 |
| | Political background | 52 |
| | Social cleavages and redistribution | 54 |
| | Electoral incentives for redistribution | 58 |
| | The New Liberals and expansionary policies | 61 |
| | Why the guaranteed annual income proposal failed | 62 |
| | The NDP challenge and the 1971 unemployment scheme | 66 |
| | The blackmail game | 68 |
| | The u-turn | 71 |
| | Income inequality: demography, markets and income transfers | 74 |
| | Conclusions | 81 |

vii



Cambridge University Press 0521790085 - Political Parties, Games and Redistribution Rosa Mule Table of Contents More information

viii Contents

| 3 | The arithmetics of politics under Margaret Thatcher | 8 ₂ |
|---|---|----------------|
| | Political background Electoral incentives for redistribution | 89 |
| | Explicit games and the antiegalitarian crusade | 95 |
| | Sequential elections | 93 97 |
| | Breaking the internal alliance on social security policies | 105 |
| | Income inequality: demography, markets and income transfers | 107 |
| | Conclusions | 113 |
| 4 | Right-wing ascendency, pivotal players and asymmetric | |
| | power under Bob Hawke | 116 |
| | Political background | 116 |
| | Electoral incentives for redistribution | 122 |
| | Political renewal shapes social policies | 128 |
| | The Centre-Left as a pivotal player in redistributive games | 132 |
| | Two-stage game over redistributive policies | 136 |
| | The acquiescence of trade unions: consensus or imbalance? | 140 |
| | Asymmetric bargaining and social security reforms | 143 |
| | Income inequality: demography, markets and transfer policies | 145 |
| | Conclusions | 155 |
| 5 | The demise of the federal social safety net under Clinton | 158 |
| | Political background | 158 |
| | The evolution of policies towards low-income groups: electoral and | |
| | institutional determinants | 162 |
| | Strategic disagreement and the stalemate of welfare reform, 1992–1994 | 167 |
| | The Paternalistic-Deterrence game | 169 |
| | 'Deserving and undeserving poor' | 176 |
| | Conclusions | 179 |
| 6 | Conclusions | 181 |
| | Comparative analysis | 181 |
| | The redistributive logic in liberal democracies | 182 |
| | Distributive elites, institutional context and opposition effects | 185 |
| | Comparing redistributive games | 191 |
| | Reassessing the party-policy link | 196 |
| | The future of redistribution | 201 |
| | Technical addendum | 205 |
| | Bibliography | 213 |
| | Index | 244 |
| | | 1 1 |