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 Excerpt
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CHAPTER I

Introduction: religion and the body

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A book that invites comparisons between religious traditions does well to declare its ‘interests’ at the outset. This is true, firstly, because the nervousness about ethnocentric imposition of Western categories on the ‘other’ in matters of culture and religion has currently become so intense in some quarters as to make any sort of comparisons across traditions inherently suspect.¹ Hence, secondly, the project of providing parallel essays on a topic of shared (perhaps even universal) interest is open to the scornful objection of a spurious dispassion. It is thus the task of this brief introduction to lay bare the editorial interests and aims of this collection, and to declare what it hopes to achieve and illuminate, as well as what lies beyond its particular scope and intentions.

In clarifying these goals I shall not (as is common in editorial introductions) provide a précised version of each of my contributors’ essays in advance. Rather I shall highlight the ways in which the *ordering* of the book’s contents is intended to lead the reader from the known to the (relatively) unknown: from an analysis of our current Western (and ‘secularized’) obsessions with the ‘body’ (Part I); through a deepening understanding of the ‘Western’ religious traditions that have spawned this (Part II) – and are still, I shall argue, to some extent ironically replicated in it; to the lesser-known territories of ‘Eastern’ religious traditions on the ‘body’ (Part III), themselves increasingly becoming the targets of consumerist Western syncretism.

From this it will be clear that the organization of the volume is unashamedly contemporary and Western in its starting-point, an admission, however, that does not detract from the care with which the scholars whose work appears in Parts II and III have, to the best of their abilities, attempted to ‘bracket the familiarity’ of current ‘body’ dis-

¹ See eds. Clifford and Marcus 1986, for an expression of radical doubt about the possibility of ethnographic objectivity in fieldwork observation; and Said 1978, for an exposé of the projections involved in Western views of the ‘East’.

cussions in their treatment of religious traditions less immediate to contemporary Western attention. When they do import categories or methodologies from these discussions into their exposition (structuralist, symbolic, or Foucaultian accounts of ‘bodiliness’, for instance), the intellectual genesis – and contestability – of these accounts will have already been made clear from the analysis in Part I. In this way the volume can profitably be read as a dialectic between the Parts, as well as a systematic unfolding from Part I to Part III. The final editorial objects (and novelties) of the exercise, however, are these: the clarification, first, of the specificity, oddity, and even repressed *religiosity* of the current secularized debates about ‘bodies’; the complexification and contextualization, second, of the (now often misconstrued and derided) ‘Western’ religious heritages that have formed their backcloth; and the analysis, third, of religious ‘bodily’ practice within metaphysical frameworks beyond the traditional purview of Western eyes.

If this initial division reflects a series of demarcations that are now becoming rapidly outmoded, it is advised; it is precisely the further intent of this book to throw these demarcations into question – to raise implicit questions about the spiritual and philosophical impoverishment of our current ‘body’ obsessions, and yet also about the superficiality of consumerist ‘magpie’ raids on Eastern religious bodily practice. The frantic assemblage of fragments of wisdom from Eastern religious traditions in our culture so often serves a wholly unquestioned narcissistic quest for gratification and pleasure, or a more insidious and pervasive ‘denial of death’.²

WHO OR WHAT IS THE BODY?

This initial statement of intent, however, with its admission of an element of ‘hermeneutical circularity’, has to contend with a more fundamental methodological objection. The notable explosion of thought and literature on the subject of the ‘body’ in the last decades³ has begged a question of definition which is not so easily grasped, let alone answered. It is as if we are clear about an agreed cultural obsession – the ‘body’ – but far from assured about its referent. As Judith Butler has recently put it (Butler 1993, ix), ‘I tried to discipline myself to stay on the

² See Becker 1973, for an influential analysis of this ‘denial of death’.

³ Some idea of this will be gleaned from the bibliographies appended to each of the essays in this volume. For further such bibliographies, see Barbara Duden’s ‘A Repertory of Body History’, in ed. Feher 1989, Part III, 471–554; McGuire 1990; and Csordas 1990.

subject, but found that I could not fix bodies as objects of thought . . . Inevitably, I began to consider that perhaps this resistance was essential to the matter in hand.' Or, as put from a rather different methodological perspective, by Mary Douglas (1966, 122, my emphasis): 'Just as it is true that everything symbolizes the body, so it is equally true that the body symbolizes *everything else*.' But why, then, are 'bodies' simultaneously so ubiquitous and yet so hard to get our 'hands' around?

The cumulative answer to this question emerges from the analyses of Part I, but can be stated summarily here. A naive approach to ethnography or 'comparative' religion might still imagine that bodies provide us with an Archimedean point, a 'natural' datum of uncontentional physicality upon which religious traditions have then spun their various interpretations.⁴ Structuralists still harbour this language of the 'natural';⁵ and it has a surprisingly persistent mythological power even in the thought of those who have ostensibly forsworn it.⁶ But the question that presses in a post-modern age is this: if we can no longer count on a universal 'grand narrative' to undergird the enterprises of religious and cultural studies, then does not the 'body', too, become subject to infinitely variable social constructions? Indeed the 'body' comes to bear huge, and paradoxical, philosophical weight in post-modern thought: just as its Enlightenment partner, the 'mind/soul' of Cartesianism, is seen off with almost unexamined vehemence,⁷ so, simultaneously, what is left (the 'body') becomes infinitely problematized and elusive.⁸ It is all that we *have*, but we seemingly cannot grasp it; nor are we sure we can control the political forces that regiment it.⁹ Devoid now of religious

⁴ This issue is discussed in more detail by Talal Asad, below. To adopt a (finally) relativistic line on this issue is not of course to suggest anything approaching incommensurability on matters 'bodily' between cultures and religions, especially when different religions (as in India) share many cultural assumptions in common. Further, work such as Ekman's (1982) on transcultural facial expressions suggests strong points of similarity across cultures in the expression of basic emotions, even allowing for significant 'constructed' differences.

⁵ See the opening of Wendy Doniger's essay, below; and Douglas' *Natural Symbols* (Douglas 1970), whose central thesis however undercuts the possibility of a pristine 'natural' state *prior* to symbolization.

⁶ See Keat 1986, for instance, for fascinating evidence that Foucault himself still worked with the idea of a 'natural' (unrepressed) body.

⁷ See Simpson 1993 and McGuire 1990 for two recent disavowals of the effects of Cartesianism on their respective social sciences (sociology and anthropology). In Coakley 1992 I have tried to ask more probing questions, however, about the ultimate roots of this disaffection with Descartes, and what social and political programme it in turn bespeaks.

⁸ On this point see Bryan Turner's chapter below, and also his adjunct piece in eds. Featherstone, Hepworth, and Turner 1991, 1–35.

⁹ This is of course a central paradox in Foucault's work: are our 'bodies' deterministically controlled by state intervention, or is there sufficient (individual) agency in us to repel such intervention? On this paradox, and especially its implications for feminist use of Foucault, see McNay 1992.

meaning or of the capacity for any fluidity into the divine, shorn of any expectation of new life beyond the grave, it has shrunk to the limits of individual fleshliness; hence our only hope seems to reside in keeping it alive, youthful, consuming, sexually active, and jogging on (literally), for as long as possible.¹⁰

As the chapters in Part I of this volume show, then, there is no one regnant definition of 'body' now available to us. Yet each is, in its way, already laden with ideological freight. In testing what is at stake in any such discussion, therefore, it is always worth asking: what is it (on this particular view) that the 'body' is *not*? What is the lurking x-factor 'beyond'? Even if Cartesian *mind/body* dualism is supposedly decried, other disjunctions and contrasts may replicate it. In materialist philosophy of mind, for instance, the 'body' may be everything else except the brain;¹¹ in feminist analyses of pornography and cultural manipulation it represents the female that males seek to control;¹² in both Freudian and Foucaultian accounts of sexuality it becomes the site of either forbidden or condoned pleasures, rather than the more-or-less unconscious medium of all human existence;¹³ and in popular magazine discussions of slimming and fitness it still stands for the rebellious fleshliness that has to be controlled and subdued from some other place of surveillance.¹⁴ Despite the legion cries for *greater* 'embodiedness', for a notion of self as body,¹⁵ the spectres of religious and philosophical 'dualism' die hard.

WHY IS THE 'BODY' SO MUCH ON OUR 'MIND'?

It is for this reason that the pre-Enlightenment religious background to our current *aporias* on the 'body' is so significant a point of reflection. The task of Part II is to provide some guidance in the complex task of charting

¹⁰ For a recent fascinating analysis of the 'consuming' body, see Falk 1994. For the cult of fitness, see especially Glassner 1989, and the discussion by Bryan Turner, below.

¹¹ See, for example, Daniel Dennett's celebrated thought-experiment about a 'brain in a vat' with its (disconnected) 'body' dead underground, in Dennett 1981, 310–23; and compare Mary Midgley's discussion of philosophy and the 'body', below.

¹² See, for example, Bordo 1993; eds. Jaggar and Bordo 1989; and Dworkin 1989.

¹³ The remarks by Starobinski (1982, 38), also quoted in n. 12 of Talal Asad's chapter below, are apposite here: he speaks of the 'considerable narcissistic component of contemporary Western culture' which causes an 'infatuation' with the 'body' (in this self-conscious, sexualized, sense) wholly different from the self's naive (and unselfconscious) 'bodiliness'.

¹⁴ This point is made with particular power by Susan Bordo (1993), who shows how women ironically internalize a ('male') hatred of their own ('female') flesh in slimming and its pathological outcome, anorexia.

¹⁵ See, *inter alia*, Csordas 1990 (the 1988 Stirling Award Essay) for a discussion of the need for a more 'embodied' vision of the self in anthropology, an account that draws on the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and the anthropology of Bourdieu.

traditional 'Western'¹⁶ attitudes to bodily devotion, and thereby to lay the dust on a number of potent mythologies about this heritage, mythologies that continue to lurk influentially even when questioned and corrected by careful scholarship.¹⁷ Current sociological and feminist accounts of the 'body', especially, tend to proceed with a jaundiced (but undifferentiated) vision of the 'Christianity' that their theorizing has replaced: its alliance with 'bourgeois capitalism' in a 'religious (if hypocritical) condemnation of sexual pleasures' (Turner in eds. Featherstone, Hepworth, and Turner 1991, 19), its perception of the sexual body as 'gross' and 'instinctual',¹⁸ or, more generally, its 'blanket of oppression and violence against bodiliness'.¹⁹ But it is far from clear that any of these generalizations (true as any truisms may be) can stand the test of a *nuanced* reading of the complex different strands of thought about 'bodiliness' and its meanings in Jewish and Christian traditions of the pre-Enlightenment era.

It is no coincidence, of course, that contemporary social historians of our 'body'-obsessed culture have turned back, with such evident passion, to watershed periods of change in Western culture (the twelfth to thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, in particular) when profound political upheavals found their correlate, as today, in fascinating shifts in body metaphors and symbolizations.²⁰ But the best of these studies do

¹⁶ I use inverted commas here because of the obvious contestability of the term 'Western' when used, in this volume, to include Eastern Orthodox views of the 'body', but to exclude, for example, Islam. The decision to draw these (ultimately artificial) lines arose from the desire to provide as complete a comparative account as possible of traditional Christian views of the 'body', and to throw them into contrast with the vision of its 'Christian' past spawned by current social science literature. It was this that also led to allocating three chapters to the Christian tradition, and only one to others – a decision taken in full consciousness of the (relative) imbalance of space given to Christianity here, for the reasons already given.

¹⁷ A number of such 'truistic' generalizations were widely vocalized at the original 'Body' conference in 1987, but I trust will have finally been laid to rest by this and other volumes (most notably Brown 1988, in regard to early Christianity). I include in this category: (i) the view that Judaism (*tout court*) is 'positive' about the 'body' whilst Christianity is 'negative'; (ii) the correlative view that Christianity was also thus 'positive' in its early manifestation, until 'Greek' 'dualism' infected it; (iii) the view that strict sexual mores or ascetical practices are necessarily 'negative' towards the 'body'; and (iv) the even more fatuously generalized perception that 'Eastern' religions are more 'positive' about the 'body' than 'Christianity'. It will be clear from these remarks, and from the book as a whole, that I regard the epithets 'positive' and 'negative', when applied to views of the 'body', as wholly question-begging unless carefully contextualized.

¹⁸ From Bordo (1993, 4), writing as a secularized Jew of 'Christian thought' on the 'body'.

¹⁹ A quotation from the feminist theologian and ethicist Grace Jantzen (1988, 31), discussing the 'dualism' of the 'religion of the west' (*ibid.*, 30).

²⁰ For the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see most recently Bynum 1995, but also the debates spawned by the earlier discussion of the (so-called) twelfth-century 'invention of the individual' (see especially Morris 1972). For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see the work of Laqueur (Laqueur 1990, and eds. Gallagher and Laqueur 1987), which charts the *novelties* of the perception of male and female 'bodies' and sexuality achieved at the Enlightenment and in its aftermath. The comparative lack of application of similar ('body'-related) methods and questions to the

not merely import our own current obsessions about sexual pleasure, gender, and social constructionism; rather they painstakingly unpick the nexus of 'body' associations that we may all too easily have repressed, in our desire to see off both 'dualism' and death.²¹

If Part II succeeds in its goals, then, it will throw into a new light the cultural specificity, and still lurking religiosity, of our present 'bodily' interests (as outlined in Part I). For these interests arise from particular post-*Christian* and post-*Enlightenment* twists in 'body'-history: the loss of belief in a 'true body' (*verum corpus*) as both transcendent and socially binding;²² the simultaneous demise of belief in an eschatological 'body' – the perfected 'body' of the life beyond;²³ the destabilizing of a unified, forensic notion of responsible 'selfhood' in twentieth-century Western thought;²⁴ the anxieties caused by medical power and intervention in contemporary society, as well as by the limitations of that power (symbolized potently by the AIDS epidemic);²⁵ the riddles of personal identity that arise from the capacity to swap body-parts;²⁶ the manifold challenges of secular feminist theory and feminist theology: the questioning of an identification of woman with the (despised and subordinated) 'body', or of the hegemony of 'masculinist' reason over the 'body';²⁷ the assertion of women's medical rights over their own 'bodies', and the exposure of the falsifying pressures of consumerism on women's self-image;²⁸ the rediscovery and exploration of (female) 'thinking through the body';²⁹ the canvassing of 'gay rights' and the

Reformation and its political upheavals is somewhat puzzling (though see, for example, Roper 1989, for transformations in women's status and opportunities in the Reformation in Augsburg; and David Tripp's programmatic discussion, below).

²¹ On this point, see especially Bynum's survey essay, Bynum 1991.

²² On this, see Andrew Louth's discussion of medieval Western eucharistic theology, below (and also plate 3, for a pictorial illustration of the 'true body' in this sense).

²³ Bynum's analysis (Bynum 1995) of the intense interest in the reassemblage of bodily parts at the resurrection evidenced in early scholasticism, makes a fascinating contrast with today's discussion of personal identity and the medical transplantation of bodily parts (in which thoughts of eschatology play no part).

²⁴ See Douglas' essay 'Thought Style Exemplified: the Idea of the Self', in Douglas 1992, 211–34, in which Douglas explores the erosion of a Lockean 'forensic' notion of the self as responsible agent under the impact of modern psychoanalytic categories of the 'unconscious'.

²⁵ See both Bryan Turner's and Talal Asad's discussion of these themes, below. For reflection on cultural 'exclusion' techniques which have bearing on the fear occasioned by AIDS in our present society, see Douglas 1991.

²⁶ On this issue see especially the much-debated Parfit 1984.

²⁷ See, *inter alia*, ed. Suleiman 1986 and Bordo 1993 (for women's 'bodily' self-images); and Lloyd 1984 (for an analysis of the 'Man of Reason' in Western philosophy).

²⁸ See, for example, Martin 1987; eds. Jacobus *et al.* 1990; and (again) Bordo 1993.

²⁹ See Gallop 1988; and (somewhat differently, from the perspective of French feminist response to Freud and Lacan) Irigaray 1985a and 1985b.

arguments of 'queer theory';³⁰ and last, but far from least, the grave anxieties caused by the redrawing of the 'body'-map of the political world: the uncertainties about what is now 'Left' and what 'Right', what friend and what foe.

It is no wonder that these 'body' matters so exercise us; for the quest seemingly encoded in them is for a unifying, and *socially cohesive*,³¹ point of reference that will give mortal flesh final significance. It is no wonder that 'body' studies can be published only as *Fragments*,³² since there is no longer a eucharistic presence to 'gather them on the mountains'. And yet, whilst the Western resources for religious orientation have been largely abandoned, ironic, secularized ghosts from that past continue to haunt us. What have elsewhere been called the 'cultural contradictions' of contemporary life (Bell 1976) are no less evident in matters of the 'body': the 'body' is sexually affirmed, but puritanically punished in matters of diet or exercise; continuously stuffed with consumerist goods, but guiltily denied particular foods in aid of the 'salvation' of a longer life; taught that there is nothing *but* it (the 'body'), and yet asked to discipline itself from some other site of control; flaunted everywhere, yet continuously disappearing on the cybernet.³³

Do we see here the perverse replication of a (desacramentalized) Christian asceticism, or is it the last smile on the face of a *Cartesian* Cheshire cat?³⁴

³⁰ See especially Butler 1990 and 1993.

³¹ See Mary Douglas' observation (repeated often elsewhere) that 'doctrines which use the human body as their metaphor . . . are likely to be specially concerned with social relationships' (Douglas 1970b, 71; cited in Gager 1982, 347).

³² See ed. Feher 1989, for contemporary 'fragments'; the allusion to eucharistic fragments gathered together by Christ at the (eschatological) banquet is from the early Christian document, the *Didache*, section 9.

³³ Bryan Turner discusses some of these 'contradictions' on the 'body', below. On the last point (the 'disappearance' of the 'body' in the computerized world), see Taylor and Saarinen 1994: in the section 'Body Snatching', 8+9, the question is put, 'Where do I meet my body in the net?', and the comment made: 'Why has the body become the preoccupation of so many in our culture? . . . In virtual worlds, the body disappears or is displaced by a so-called artificial prosthesis. As the materiality of experience vanishes, the need to reaffirm it grows intense.'

I am grateful to my (1993) teaching assistant Kimerer LaMothe for an illuminating discussion that helped me clarify the nature of some of these 'bodily' contradictions.

³⁴ The philosopher of mind John Searle has recently suggested (in eds. Warner and Szubka 1994, 279) that mainstream contemporary philosophers of mind have been lured to the 'physicalist' extreme by a profound resistance to the *religious* implications of the alternatives. And yet they are also 'deeply committed' to the 'traditional vocabulary and categories' ('dualism', 'materialism', 'physicalism', etc.), which Cartesianism spawned: 'They use these words with neither embarrassment or irony.' In another context (that of feminist analysis of consumerist visions of the 'body'), Susan Bordo (1993b, 266) comments on how our bodies are now meant to be infinitely malleable or 'plastic' to our desires (through surgery, dieting, and other forms of intervention): 'In place of God the watchmaker, we now have ourselves, the master sculptors of that plastic . . . [which

RELIGIONS AND THE BODY

It will be clear by now that this editorial introduction is not free of value-laden, indeed religious, assumptions; but then nor is any attitude to ‘bodiliness’, as it has been my task so far to underscore. The contributors to Parts II and III of this volume, however, were not invited to toe any particular ideological or theological line. Rather they were asked to choose some limited number of (especially characteristic) ‘bodily’ *practices* or attendant mythologies from the tradition they represented; and then to face the question explicitly: can we assume that we know what the ‘body’ (so-called) means in this different cultural and religious context? To throw light on the complexity and cultural embeddedness of this question, the essayists were asked to make reference to adjunct matters of ‘bodily’ interest, to throw light on the *total* significance of the religious practices in question: attitudes to food, authority, sexual relations, nakedness, pleasure and pain, medicine and healing, and the use of ‘body’ metaphors at *micro-* and *macro-*levels in the religious society. The question being pressed here was: *how*, exactly, do corporeal ‘practices’ mediate social meanings and even transform them (or *vice versa*)? – a matter not always sufficiently attended to, perhaps, in the heady rush to utilize Bourdieu’s vogue categories of ‘practice’ and ‘habitus’.³⁵

Inevitably some essayists chose to range wider in the choice of their material than others (the editorial whip has its limits!); and the restriction of the focus of this book to literate religions was a decision made with some regret. But the (first) cumulative effect of this collection should at least be to give *pause* to the idea that ‘bodily’ practices from other religious and ritual contexts can be taken over merely for the purposes of undemanding relaxation and restoration. Particular body practices imply (no less particular) metaphysical and cultural commitments, and may indeed finally induce them. As Thomas P. Kasulis has remarked (Yuasa 1987, 7, my emphasis), ‘Religious beliefs are embodied *through* religious practices. In fact the practices may be said to precede the beliefs’. In other words, devotional ‘practice’ is no optional frill attendant on metaphysical theories acquired somewhere else; rather it is the very

bespeaks [a] disdain for material limits, and [an] intoxication with freedom, change and self-determination.’

³⁵ See Bourdieu 1977. Kleinman and Kleinman (1994, 708) comment: ‘Pierre Bourdieu . . . repeatedly invokes a dialectic between habitus and social structures as the source of social incorporations into the body almost as an article of faith. That resonant model of a connection between the corporeal and the social, which has gained the support of many anthropologists, is left largely unanalysed by Bourdieu and other theorists, however – the equivalent in social theory of psychosomatic medicine’s “mystical leap” between mind and body.’

medium of such belief, ultimately transcending the thought/action divide.³⁶ Or to put it conversely, in Talal Asad's acute observation, the inability 'to enter into communion with God' may well be 'a function of untaught bodies'.³⁷ One of the notable features of 'taught' religious bodies, indeed, is the relative lack of interest shown by them in self-conscious theorizing about the *nature* of the 'body'; immersion in ritual or meditative practice, it seems, allows these anxious questionings in large part to fall away. The individual 'body' has found its place in a divine drama, and can cease from its anxious self-examination.

The essays by religionists gathered in this volume form a *praeparatio* for the infinitely complex task of 'comparative' study between (and within) traditions on the 'body'. But this can only proceed piecemeal, and with the sort of careful attention to context to which this book as a whole has aspired. To move from careful exegetical and phenomenological accounts (the stuff of this book) to detailed comparisons across religious boundaries, however, is a demanding matter in which crass generalizations have little legitimate place, and for which separate monographs are required.³⁸ The discerning reader of this volume, none the less, will note recurring themes of connection (all of them somewhat alien to the contemporary secularized mind), as the essays unfold: the intense ambiguity of the individual body as locus both of potential sanctification and of defilement, and the careful regulation of points of entry and exit; the transformative and fluid capacities of human bodies to pass into the divine (sometimes at various levels), and of divine bodies to appear in the flesh; the reverence accorded to physical objects representing divine bodies; the stories of divine actors as *foci* for the playing out of the ambiguities of the body; the denial and chastening of naive bodily satisfactions for the sake of a transformed and transindividual state; and the correlation of bodily meditations with societal and cosmic effects.³⁹

³⁶ This point is made forcefully (in relation to ritual theory) in Bell 1992. Similar lines of argument are found in Csordas 1990 and McGuire 1990.

³⁷ See Talal Asad's essay below, and also his illuminating (and related) discussion of medieval attitudes to pain and asceticism in Asad 1993, chs. 3 and 4.

³⁸ Some of this work has been helpfully started in Yuasa 1987 and ed. Kasulis 1993.

³⁹ Some of these productive points of comparison are also suggested in the long review article Sullivan 1990. Sullivan ends that article with the rhetorical question (*ibid.*, 99): 'Since the body is so often demonstrated to be a primary instrument of knowledge, and since the understanding of the body can vary markedly from one culture and epoch to another, we may have to add to our customary list of hermeneutical reflections yet another question: What kind of challenge is our own bodily existence to the study of religion?' This current volume should not only raise that question, but also – and perhaps more pressingly – its obverse: What kind of challenge is the study of religion (and the 'body') to our own bodily existence?

I am grateful to Lawrence Sullivan for a useful discussion of these matters.

None of these (superficially stated) points of connection between traditions, however, can be sustained without attention to the form of culture that attends them. As Mary Douglas' work has so insistently reminded us, it is a society of a particular sort that guards its personal apertures with care, and likewise a society of a particular sort that provides a strong community sense of self, transcending the individual.⁴⁰ The nostalgic longing for such reassuring boundedness and security in matters 'bodily' is perhaps what (unconsciously) drives our own culture's obsession with the matter; but to choose such 'hierarchical' options would now be 'counter-cultural',⁴¹ making (literally) all the difference in the 'world'.

If this volume serves to highlight such points of connection and contrast, even in a preliminary way, it will have performed its function, and paved the way for a more richly informed interdisciplinary discussion of the many 'bodies', secular and religious, that press upon us.

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⁴⁰ See again Douglas 1966 and 1970a; and, for 'cosmic effects' and the body in more detail, see Douglas 1990.

⁴¹ For this use of the category 'hierarchy', and its lack of attraction in an individualistic 'enterprise culture', see Douglas 1992. In this volume Douglas suggests a new fourfold typology of visions of self-and-culture: 'hierarchy', 'enclave', 'enterprise/individualism', and 'isolate'.