1 Introduction: the importance of the Kargil conflict

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In the spring of 1999, Indian soldiers patrolling near the town of Kargil about 5 miles on their side of the Kashmir Line of Control (LoC) were ambushed by assailants firing from unseen positions high atop frozen peaks of the Great Himalayan mountain range. After several weeks of confusion, Indian officials realized the intruders were not Kashmiri militants, as they initially had thought, but well-trained troops from Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI), and that the infiltration was much larger and better organized than previously assessed. India then mounted a major military and diplomatic campaign to oust the intruders. After two months of intense fighting at altitudes ranging between 12,000 and 17,000 feet, during which both sides lost several hundred soldiers, Pakistan ordered its forces home, and the crisis ended.¹ Although no territory changed hands – as it had done in previous Indo-Pakistani wars – the Kargil conflict was a landmark event. Occurring less than a year after India and Pakistan openly tested nuclear weapons, Kargil dispelled the common notion that nuclear-armed states cannot fight one another. Like the only other direct military clash between nuclear powers – the Sino-Soviet conflict over Damanskii (Zhenbao to the Chinese) Island in the Ussuri (Wusuli) River starting in March 1969 – the Kargil conflict did not

¹ Some Indian and American analysts call Kargil the fourth Indo-Pakistani war. Certainly, for the soldiers fighting along the LoC, it was a war. But we prefer to call it a “conflict,” or a “near war.” The scale and intensity of the fighting exceeded even the high levels of peacetime violence along the Kashmir LoC, where fierce artillery duels and ten-person-a-day body counts have been all too common. However, the 1999 engagement was confined to a small section of mountainous terrain in Indian-held Kashmir; only a small fraction of each side’s soldiers and weapons was used; and both tried to reduce the risk of escalation by pursuing limited political and military objectives. Moreover, because probably about 750 to 950 soldiers died in the heights near Kargil, this conflict did not meet the classical definition of war as an armed conflict with at least 1,000 battlefield deaths, as per J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972). John H. Gill provides details on Kargil casualty assessments in chapter 4 of this book.
come close to causing a nuclear war. However, we now know that Indian troops were within days of opening another front across the LoC and possibly the international border, an act that could have triggered a large-scale conventional military engagement, which in turn might have escalated to an exchange of recently tested Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons.

Why this study matters

Until now, the debate between those who are optimistic about the operation of nuclear deterrence and those who are pessimistic about the effects of nuclear proliferation was waged largely on theoretical terrain. Observers made assumptions about how new nuclear weapons states should behave, but were unable to provide much empirical evidence to support or falsify competing claims. The Kargil conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare opportunity to investigate how a pair of countries equipped with nuclear weapons entered into, interacted during, and then concluded an armed conflict. Written by analysts and practitioners from India, Pakistan, and the United States, *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* draws extensively upon primary sources, including interviews with Indian, Pakistani, and US government officials and military officers who were actively involved in the fighting and management of the conflict. The level of cooperation from the Indian and the Pakistan governments was unprecedented. In particular, the Pakistani military, which previously had not even acknowledged its role in the conflict, was instrumental in helping us create a detailed account of what happened on the Kargil heights and in the capitals of the concerned powers.

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2 However, it is now known that the risk of an escalatory Sino-Soviet war was a real possibility. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed after the March 1969 border fighting caused several hundred deaths, that “the potential for a war exists,” and that even if Moscow did not launch a conventional attack against Chinese nuclear and missile facilities, as it then was contemplating, “escalation of the conflict will be a continuing possibility.” CIA, “The USSR and China,” declassified National Intelligence Estimate, 11/13-69, 12 August 1969, pp. 6, 9, available on the CIA-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) website, www.foia.cia.gov/default.asp. For background on the crisis, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969,” *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 53–79.


4 Lavoy, “Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation.”
Introduction: the importance of the Kargil conflict

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia is the first rigorous, comprehensive, and objective case study of the causes, conduct, and consequences of the Kargil conflict. It differs significantly from the existing literature on the conflict, in which the most widely cited study, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, is the product of an independent Kargil Review Committee, appointed by the Indian government and chaired by the respected Indian defense analyst, K. Subrahmanyam. Drawing extensively on Indian intelligence and military sources, this committee sought to establish why India failed to detect the massive infiltration across the LoC. When it tried to discern the motivations, assumptions, and objectives of Pakistani planners, however, it resorted to “enemy images” that obscured the true strategic objectives, perspectives, and behavior of the adversary.\(^5\)

Other Indian narratives on the conduct of the Kargil conflict offer important insights but share this bias because they rely almost exclusively on reports from Indian officials and troops.\(^6\) Breaking with the tradition of past Indian service chiefs who generally have refused to write about the military campaigns in which they were involved, former army chief General V. P. Malik has produced the most recent and by far the most controversial Indian book on the Kargil conflict. Labeling the event a “strategic and tactical intelligence failure,” Malik has come down hard on the shortcomings of the intelligence agencies, provoking strong responses from Indian intelligence officials and journalists.\(^7\)

The Pakistani literature on Kargil is even more one-sided. For a long time, there had been no official Pakistani governmental or military account of what took place on the Kargil heights – in part because the story of how Pakistani troops occupied and then withdrew from this territory quickly became intertwined with the civil–military dispute between former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former President Pervez Musharraf, who during the Kargil affair was Sharif’s army chief. The

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few detailed articles and media analyses that have been published in Pakistan are fundamentally flawed in their assumptions about the depth of infiltration and the number of irregular militants involved in the occupying force.\textsuperscript{8} Pakistani defense analyst Shireen Mazari has published a quasi-official account of the Kargil operation, but its value is uneven because of her attempt to reconcile recently available information about the Kargil operation with self-serving statements by Pakistani authorities.\textsuperscript{9}

The publication of former President Musharraf’s autobiography in 2006 has clarified several contentious issues, such as Pakistani concerns about the Indian military buildup in Kashmir in 1998, the scale of the cross-border intrusion (over 500 square miles) into Indian-held Kashmir, and the timing and location of the Pakistan army’s six briefings to the prime minister on the operation between January and June 1999.\textsuperscript{10} However, this book actually has deepened several other controversies, such as the likelihood of an Indian offensive in early 1999 (Musharraf claims that a “planned offensive” was “preempted” by Pakistan’s Kargil operation), the identity of the occupying forces (called mujahideen, or freedom fighters by Musharraf), and, at the time of Nawaz Sharif’s 4 July 1999 agreement to an unconditional withdrawal, the military situation on the ground (deemed “favorable” and “strategically advantageous” to Pakistan).\textsuperscript{11}

Treatments of the conflict by American scholars and former US policymakers generally overemphasize the strategic roles and risks of nuclear weapons in South Asia.\textsuperscript{12} Lurking around every corner of this Indo-Pakistani crisis, American commentators saw the risk of nuclear use and validation of their arguments about nuclear instability in South Asia and, more generally, the perils of nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{13} These concerns, while certainly understandable, contribute to a selective reading of the


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{13} A partial exception is Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, \textit{Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), which appropriately downplays the risk of nuclear war during the Kargil episode and in five other recent Indo-Pakistani crises, but greatly exaggerates the impact of nuclear weapons on Pakistan’s calculations to undertake the Kargil operation.
initiation and termination of the Kargil conflict, which exaggerates warning signs and generally ignores evidence of caution and restraint. Moreover, these accounts fail to bring to light the motivations, political assumptions, and detailed military planning behind Pakistan’s daring Kargil incursion – subjects this book elucidates in print for the first time.

One claim in the American literature on Kargil is that the intrusion was a “limited probe” strategy to challenge India’s conventional deterrence. In reality, the Kargil campaign was a very different kind of military operation, which is best described as a “fait accompli” strategy. Alexander George and Richard Smoke discuss each of these strategies in their classic *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. A limited probe occurs “when the initiator creates a controlled crisis in order to clarify the defender’s commitments.” In the spring of 1999, the Pakistani leadership had no doubt about India’s commitment to defend its territory along the LoC, and it certainly did not want to create a major crisis. Rather, it tried a “quick, decisive” military operation to take key mountain peaks across the LoC before the Indians could organize an effective defense or counterattack.

As Feroz Hassan Khan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Christopher Clary point out in chapter 3 of this book, the planners of Kargil believed that a military fait accompli across the LoC could not be reversed because of the unique high-altitude terrain in the Northern Areas of Kashmir. They further judged, as George and Smoke would expect, that this strategy was the least risky under the circumstances. James J. Wirtz and Surinder Rana show in chapter 8 of this book that the Kargil operation was launched when the weaker party played down the extreme risks inherent in the effort to benefit from surprise because of the prospect of achieving gains that otherwise were beyond its grasp. Although the Kargil operation turned into a major military crisis, this was not the intent of its planners. Moreover, the fact that they were so poorly prepared to deal with a major military crisis provides further evidence that they did not intend to create a crisis to test India’s deterrence commitments.

**Controversies clarified**

Because the Indian, Pakistani, and American authors of this book conducted extensive fieldwork and graciously subjected their analyses to

14 Ganguly and Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry*, 152.
16 *Ibid*. 536–537.
multiple rounds of review and refinement, they were able to identify and overcome implausible stories, gaps in evidence, and contradictory interpretations. There are at least five important, controversial issues on which this book brings forth major, original findings.

Mujahideen cover

First, prior to our research, it was widely believed that mujahideen, or civilian “freedom fighters” involved in a Muslim war or struggle, played a significant part in the Kargil intrusion – a falsehood caused by the initial confusion of India’s civilian and military intelligence services, a carefully planned Pakistani denial and deception campaign, and opportunistic Islamic militant groups. The Indian Kargil Review Committee, which was highly dubious about the role of militants in the conflict, still concluded that “the regular/irregular ratio may well have been in the range of 70:30, if the overall numbers are taken into account.” Our interviews with Pakistani and Indian ground commanders revealed that local civilians played only minimal reconnaissance and logistical roles in the operation. In fact, numerous Pakistani officers and soldiers told us they did not encounter a single civilian combatant during the conflict.

Eight years after the event, Pakistan still officially maintains that freedom fighters and not the Northern Light Infantry conducted the cross-LoC intrusion. Former President Musharraf states in his 2006 memoir that the “freedom fighting mujahideen occupied the Kargil Heights that the Indian army had vacated for the winter.” Three reasons can be offered to explain why Pakistan concocted the mujahideen cover and why it maintains this façade even today. First, until the Kargil operation, the Pakistan army did not consider the Northern Light Infantry at par with regular troops. Being locals of the area, most NLI soldiers came from villages near the LoC, which even today do not have the legal status as being a full part of the Pakistan nation-state. Therefore, it was easy for

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17 Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning*, 97. V. P. Malik has written that well into the conflict, the heads of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) believed that the composition of enemy forces was 70% jehadi militants (mujahideen) and 30% Pakistan regulars. After Malik challenged this assessment, the NSCS secretary reversed the estimate to 70% Pakistani regulars and 30% militants. See Malik, *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory*, 111; and the detailed treatment of this issue by C. Christine Fair in chapter 9 of this book.

18 However, he creates some ambiguity by admitting that he had ordered “FCNA to improve our defensive position in coordination with the freedom fighters to deny access to the watershed by India,” and that “five battalions [were involved] in support of freedom fighter groups.” Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 87, 91.
government officials to refer to these soldiers as freedom fighters as opposed to regular army troops.

A second explanation, as the FCNA commander told CCC researchers in 2003, was that the army never intended to turn the *mujahideen* ruse into a cover story. NLI troops, who are often deployed to isolated posts for months at a time, prefer to wear tracksuits and light, athletic outer garments (usually clothing left over by Western climbers and then resold in local markets) instead of Pakistani army jackets that feel heavy and unwieldy to them. FCNA says the Indians first claimed that the occupiers were Kashmiri *mujahideen*. The Pakistan army intended for Indian intelligence initially to believe that these soldiers were civilian combatants – for this would create confusion and delay India’s eventual military response, perhaps until well into the summer, after which there would be little time for India to mount a suitable counterattack before the fall snows stopped the fighting. But when the Indians persisted in believing that the intruders were *mujahideen*, Pakistan simply continued the deception because it compounded Indian confusion and took on a whole life of its own in the Pakistani media. As the FCNA Commander told us, “We are not obliged to clarify to the enemy.”

This still begs the question as to why Pakistan maintained the façade after NLI soldiers had been captured and proof of their involvement was abundant. As strange as it may seem, the reason rests largely in the legality of the position. The Pakistan government concluded that it could not have admitted occupation by Pakistani troops across the LoC because the area was demarcated under the 1972 Simla Accord and covered under the 1949 Karachi Agreement, and Pakistan’s admittance of the cross-LoC operation was judged in Islamabad to be tantamount to admitting aggression. The legal context differed significantly from that of India’s 1984 Siachen military occupation, which India had been able to justify because Siachen was a contested area that was not demarcated with the rest of the LoC. To the Pakistanis, however, Siachen violated the Simla Accord, as pointed out in chapter 2 by Zafar Iqbal Cheema. Although Siachen was still a major Pakistani grievance, Pakistan’s Foreign Office believed that an admission of regular troops crossing the defined LoC would be difficult to justify internationally. In its assessment, continuation of the *mujahideen* story, along with a narrative that defensive positions were improved, would preserve some degree of plausible deniability.

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20 Interviews with Pakistani officials knowledgeable about various Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) deliberations in May and June 1999.
Pakistan’s perpetuation of the mujahideen deception may have provided a thin veneer of legal deniability and a face-saving formula, but in the end it severely damaged Pakistan’s credibility both inside and outside South Asia, as C. Christine Fair discusses in chapter 9. It also altered the standing of Kashmir insurgency. Instead of being regarded internationally as a “freedom struggle,” the Kashmir insurgency came to be seen after Kargil (and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States) as “terrorist” activity. If Pakistan had hoped the Kargil operation would stimulate international focus on the Kashmir issue, this was not the intended result.

Asymmetric warfare

The second controversy we clarify relates to the provocative title of the book, *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia*. Many Pakistanis will take issue with the assertion that the LoC operation was an asymmetric military strategy, claiming instead that “nibbling of the posts” is a time-honored practice of conventional forces not only in Kashmir, but also at many other times and places where armies meet. This contention is true in part: the Kargil intrusion was only the most recent in a long series of military maneuvers in the Northern Areas that began in 1947, escalated in 1965, and saw Indian troops cross the LoC and establish military posts in the Chorbat La sector in 1972, the Siachen Glacier area in 1984, and the Qamar sector in 1988. However, the Kargil operation was quite different too. In terms of the scope, scale, and objectives of the plan, it dwarfed other attempts to alter the territorial disposition of forces in the Northern Areas. But more significantly, it embodied the three features that have come to define asymmetric conflicts.

First, the Kargil conflict was a classic case of asymmetric warfare because the relative balance of power of the forces involved differed so vastly. The fact that India had a two-to-one advantage in soldiers over Pakistan (1 million to 500,000) had little bearing on the planning or conduct of the Kargil gambit. In fact, Musharraf boasts in his autobiography of Pakistan’s ability to tie down disproportionately large numbers of Indian forces on the Kargil heights: “Considered purely in military terms, the Kargil operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan army. As few as five battalions in support of the freedom fighter groups were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions,” deplete artillery sources from strike formations, and force them to “mobilize

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21 Information provided in a Pakistan Defence Attaché briefing document, dated 14 August 1999, Washington, DC.
their entire national resources, including their air force.”

Even though Musharraf concedes that India recaptured several posts, he takes pride in the fact that such a small number of Pakistani troops forced India to expend vast military and economic resources, which in itself was seen as a victory. As Rizvi points out in chapter 13, this David and Goliath dynamic has been a persistent theme in Pakistani strategic culture. In a full-scale war the strategy of tying down large numbers of forces makes sense as it would deplete troops from other sectors, which Pakistan could exploit; however, this strategy invited disaster in 1999, for India had abundant resources to escalate the conflict vertically and even horizontally.

Second, the Kargil operation could only succeed through the use of asymmetric strategy and tactics, but this ultimately caused its undoing. Weak states sometimes can prolong and ultimately win wars against stronger states if they employ asymmetric strategies to deflect or mediate the stronger state’s use of its material advantages in resources, but time is generally not on their side. As Wirtz and Rana explain in chapter 8, Kargil was a classic case of a weak opponent perceiving great incentives to surprise its stronger opponent using military means (concealment, cunning, deception) that the stronger opponent would not expect. The Kargil planners believed that a combination of surprise, military fait accompli on superior terrain, and a well-considered denial and deception strategy would inhibit India from dislodging the occupying troops before the onset of winter, which would freeze the forces in place, thus enabling Pakistan to restock its forward posts and lock in its territorial gains across the LoC. What the army leadership did not foresee was India’s will and capacity to “conventionalize” the unconventional conflict. Gill explains in chapter 4 that because Pakistan was unable to sustain its asymmetric strategy, India was able to apply its vast military resources to force key posts to fall. Initially Pakistan beat back Indian assaults, forcing India to bring in more troops and firepower, but relentless attacks on the outposts were too much for the NLI troops. The capture of Tololing broke the myth that ground once lost on such heights could not be regained and entirely changed the battle scenario. If Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir during the 1990s “succeeded” in using militants to tie down Indian forces in a costly counterinsurgency campaign, Kargil ultimately tested India on its strong suit: its conventional military superiority.

22 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 93.
Third, Kargil can be seen as an asymmetric conflict because Pakistan was willing to sacrifice such a great deal – the lives of its NLI soldiers, tactical military advantages that could have been exploited in a major war, and its international reputation – in order to achieve the smallest of victories in the contest for Kashmir and its perceived struggle for existence with India. Much like suicide bombers today forfeit their lives in the interest of a supposed greater cause, Pakistan historically has been willing to sacrifice virtually every resource at its disposal in order to sustain the Kashmir dispute. Musharraf is quite categorical about the value of Kargil in upholding this cause: “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict.” This episode should be a lesson to India and the international community that Pakistan would be willing to sacrifice even more than it did in 1999 to defend its stake in Kashmir and more generally protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The role of nuclear weapons

The impact of nuclear arms on the Kargil crisis is another big controversy. The debate revolves around three competing narratives. First, US officials assert that Pakistan made some nuclear preparations at the later stage of the conflict and generally tried to manipulate the fear of nuclear war to alter the territorial status quo in Kashmir. As Bruce Riedel writes in this book and former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott states elsewhere, President Clinton received credible, unambiguous intelligence of Pakistani nuclear preparations shortly before meeting with Nawaz Sharif in Washington on 4 July 1999. As a result, Clinton demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from across the LoC and refused to allow Sharif to leave the negotiations with a victory that might validate nuclear brinksmanship in the post-Cold War era. Second, Pakistani authorities flatly deny readying their nuclear arsenal for use,

24 In our numerous discussions with Pakistan army officers not directly associated with the Kargil operation, the strongest criticism was that Pakistan squandered its ability to conquer large portions of militarily significant territory in the Northern Areas, which military intelligence had shown to be one of its greatest wartime opportunities. Not only did Pakistan gain precious little, but India recognized its weaknesses in the area, redoubled its defenses, and turned the northern LoC into yet another area where it now had the military advantage.

25 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 98.

26 Talbott, Engaging India, 161–162.

27 Musharraf called the claim “preposterous.” See In the Line of Fire, 98.