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978-0-521-76457-5 - Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing

Orit Kedar

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Voting for Policy, Not Parties

How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing

Voting for Policy, Not Parties proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Orit Kedar argues that voters are concerned with policy, and therefore their votes reflect the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote.

Kedar develops her compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Drawing on institutional variations in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data from a broad cross section of elections in democracies.

Orit Kedar is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at MIT. Her dissertation, on which this book is based, was the winner of the Noxon Toppan Award for Best Dissertation in Political Science at Harvard University. Her work has appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Electoral Studies*, and *Political Analysis*. She also serves on the editorial boards of *Electoral Studies* and *Political Analysis*.

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