# GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS

The recent financial crisis proved that pre-existing arrangements for the governance of global markets were flawed. With reform underway in the US, the EU and elsewhere, Emilios Avgouleas explores some of the questions associated with building an effective governance system and analyses the evolution of existing structures. By critiquing the soft law structures dominating international financial regulation and examining the roles of financial innovation and of neo-liberal policies in the expansion of global financial markets, he offers a new epistemological reading of the causes of the Global Financial Crisis.

Requisite reforms leave serious gaps in cross-border supervision, in the resolution of global financial institutions and in the monitoring of risk originating in the shadow banking sector. To close these gaps and safe-guard the stability of the international financial system, an evolutionary governance system is proposed that will also enhance the welfare role of global financial markets.

EMILIOS AVGOULEAS holds the chair of International Banking Law and Finance at the Law School of the University of Edinburgh. He was previously the Professor of International Financial Markets and Financial Law at the University of Manchester. He also holds a number of visiting professorships and has written extensively in the wider field of financial law and economics, behavioural finance and financial regulation, and EU financial services law.

# INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION

Corporate law and financial market regulation matter. The Global Financial Crisis has challenged many of the fundamental concepts underlying corporate law and financial regulation; but crisis and reform has long been a feature of these fields. A burgeoning and sophisticated scholarship now challenges and contextualizes the contested relationship between law, markets and companies, domestically and internationally. This Series informs and leads the scholarly and policy debate by publishing cutting-edge, timely and critical examinations of the most pressing and important questions in the field.

#### Series Editors

Professor Eilis Ferran, University of Cambridge Professor Niamh Moloney, London School of Economics and Political Science Professor Howell Jackson, Harvard Law School

#### Editorial Board

- Professor Marco Becht, Professor of Finance and Economics at Université Libre de Bruxelles and Executive Director of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).
- Professor Brian Cheffins, S. J. Berwin Professor of Corporate Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge.
- Professor Paul Davies, Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law and Professorial Fellow of Jesus College, University of Oxford.
- Professor Luca Enriques, Professor of Business Law in the Faculty of Law at the University of Bologna.
- Professor Guido Ferrarini, Professor of Business Law at the University of Genoa and Fellow of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).

Professor Jennifer Hill, Professor of Corporate Law at Sydney Law School.

Professor Klaus J. Hopt, Director of the Max Planck Institute of Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany.

Professor Hideki Kanda, Professor of Law at the University of Tokyo.

Professor Colin Mayer, Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies at the Saïd Business School and Director of the Oxford Financial Research Centre.

James Palmer, Partner of Herbert Smith, London.

- Professor Michel Tison, Professor at the Financial Law Institute of the University of Ghent, Belgium.
- Andrew Whittaker, General Counsel to the Board at the UK Financial Services Authority.
- Professor Eddy Wymeersch, former Chairman of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), former Chairman of the IOSCO European Regional Committee and Professor of Commercial Law, University of Ghent, Belgium.

# GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS

The Law, The Economics, The Politics

EMILIOS AVGOULEAS



> CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521762663

© Emilios Avgouleas 2012

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2012

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-521-76266-3 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

In loving memory of my father Evangelos

# CONTENTS

Foreword page xiii Preface xv List of abbreviations xx

#### 1 Introduction 1

- The autumn of 2008 1 1
- Why the GFC was not prevented? 2 2
- 3 Why is finance so important?
  - Overview 3.1 4
  - 3.2 Should finance be regulated? 6
- 4 The post-2008 reforms 8
- Whither governance of global financial markets? 5 12
  - The book's subject matter 5.1 12
  - Towards a new governance model 5.2 12
- 6 Book structure 15

#### Financial markets and financial crises Part I

21

- 2 Financial markets and financial crises 21
  - Introduction 1

2.1

- 2 The important functions of the financial system 23 How financial systems foster economic growth
  - 23
  - 2.2 Mobilization, pooling of savings and ease of exchange 24
  - Information production, facilitation of investor (saver) 2.3 monitoring and capital allocation 26
  - Risk management and risk reduction 2.4 27
  - 2.5 Corporate governance 29
  - Evidence of the strong link between developed financial 2.6 systems and economic growth 30
  - FSD, availability of finance and poverty alleviation 2.7 32

ambridge University Press	
78-0-521-76266-3 - Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, The Economics	3,
he Politics	
milios Avgouleas	
rontmatter	
Iore information	

viii

## CONTENTS

	3	Evolution of global markets and financial
		innovation 35
		3.1 Complex instruments and international financial markets 35
		3.2 The different classes of derivatives contracts 36
		3.3 Securitization and structured finance 40
		3.4 Credit derivatives 47
		3.5 Shadow banking 51
	4	Efficient markets, inefficient markets, adaptive
		markets 54
		4.1 Introductory remarks 54
		<ul> <li>4.2 Efficient Markets Hypothesis versus Behavioural Finance 57</li> </ul>
		4.3 Other puzzles 61
		4.4 Adaptive markets 62
	5	The neo-liberal consensus policies and the growth
		of global financial markets 64
		5.1 The Jackson Hole Consensus 64
		5.2 Deregulation 67
		5.3 Washington Consensus policies 70
	6	Financial markets and financial crises 72
		6.1 The Asian Crisis 72
		6.2 The Global Financial Crisis 74
		6.3 Are financial markets inherently unstable? 79
	7	Summary of findings 88
3 The causes of the Global Financial Crisis 89		e causes of the Global Financial Crisis 89
	1	Introduction 89
	2	Macro-causes 92
		2.1 Global trade imbalances and lax monetary
		policies 92
		2.2 The flawed use of financial innovation 96
		2.3 Failed government policies 106
		2.4 Neo-liberal economic doctrine and deregulation 110
		2.5 Irrational exuberance and other behavioural causes 121
	3	Micro-causes: the issue of misaligned incentives 126
		3.1 Executive compensation and corporate governance failures 126
		3.2 The 'originate-to-distribute' model 129
		3.3 The flawed information content and use of credit

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-76266-3 - Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, The Economics,
The Politics
Emilios Avgouleas
Frontmatter
More information

			CONTENTS	ix
	4		regulations 133 pital and investor protection regulations 133	
		4.2 'To	poo-big-to-fail' institutions and lack of cross-border ecial resolution regimes 134	
	5		t failure, regulatory failure and the financial	
		revolut	ion 136	
			alternative explanation of market and regulatory lure? 136	
		5.2 Co	mplexity, emergence and the GFC 142	
		5.3 The	e role of insider rent-seeking 146	
		5.4 Ak	knowledge revolution 150	
	6	Conclu	iding remarks 154	
			he evolution of governance structures for nal finance	
4	ть	o ovoluti	ion of global financial governance and	
4			ent of International Financial Regulation 157	
		-	6	
	<ol> <li>Introduction 157</li> <li>The Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods</li> </ol>			
	4	phase	159	
		-	roductory remarks 159	
			onetary stability – financial stability and the IMF 162	
			e origins of TRNs and of standard setting 165	
		2.4 The	e most important TRNs of the post-Bretton Woods riod 168	
		-	construction, development and the World Bank 179	
		2.6 Tra	ade liberalization and financial services: from the ITO the WTO 182	
	3	Interm	ediate phase: a 'New International Financial	
			ecture' (1998–2008) 185	
			overview of the NIFA 185	
		3.2 The	e evolution of standard setting bodies and financial	
			ndards during NIFA 189	
		3.3 Im	plementation – monitoring and the FSAP surveys 199	
		3.4 A c	critique of NIFA 203	
	4		erging architecture 204	
		4.1 Int	croductory remarks 204	
		4.2 The	e emergence of the G-20 205	
		4.3 The	e IMF 206	

> х CONTENTS 4.4 From the FSF to the FSB 207 4.5 The supervisory colleges 209 5 Summary and concluding remarks 210 5 The 'softness' of soft law and global financial governance 213 Introduction 1 213 2 What is international financial regulation? 217 2.1 Regulation rationales 217 2.2 The advantages of soft law and TRNs in the context of global financial governance 221 Soft law shortcomings 2.3 225 2.4 The issue of legitimacy 232 Can soft law financial governance meet the challenges? 3 Lessons from the GFC 236 3.1 Introductory remarks 236 The flaws of the Basel capital framework 3.2 237 3.3 Regulatory arbitrage through asset transformation, credit ratings and other follies 238 The systemic implications of neglecting liquidity 3.4 Flawed risk models and procyclicality 3.5 243 Supervisory failures, cross-border crisis management 4 and 'too-big-to-fail' institutions 246 4.1Overview of the issue 246 4.2 A closer look at the Kaupthing, Fortis and Dexia cases 249 4.3 Lack of cross-border resolution regimes and

- 'too-big-to-fail' institutions 2.52
- What should be done? 5 256

#### Part III Regulatory reform and a new governance model for global financial markets

- Regulatory and supervisory reform: US, EU, BCBS 261 6
  - Introduction 261
    - 261 11 Overview
    - 1.2 Summary of reforms 262
  - 2 Critical aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act 272
    - 2.1 Supervision of SIFIs and systemic risk oversight under the Dodd-Frank Act 272

1

240

> CONTENTS 2.2. Regulation of derivatives markets under the Dodd-Frank Act 280 Registration of hedge fund advisers 288 2.3 3 Regulatory and supervisory reform in the EU 289 The first attempt to reform EU financial regulation 3.1 289 The European system of financial supervision 3.2 302 4 The new Basel capital and liquidity framework 321 4.1 Minimum capital requirements and composition of capital 321 4.2 Capital buffers 324 4.3 Containing leverage 330 Liquidity ratios 332 4.4 Risk management and supervision 4.5 341 Evaluation of Basel III 344 4.6 Global reform of the 'too-big-to-fail' institution and the 7 new resolution regimes in the US and the EU 348 Introduction 348 1 2 FSB principles for the supervision of SIFIs 351 Targeting bank size and speculative banking 3 activities 352 3.1 The Volcker Rule 352 3.2 Ban on proprietary trading 354 Limited sponsoring or investing in private equity and hedge 3.3 funds 356 3.4 The regime for non-bank financial companies 358 UK proposals on the structure of the banking industry 3.5 359 4 Increased capital requirements for SIFIs and **G-SIFIs** 360 Contingent capital instruments 4.1360 Capital surcharges 4.2 368 BCBS-FSB principles on cross-border SIFI 5 370 resolution What is the problem? 5.1 370 BCBS, FSB and IMF recommendations on cross-border 5.2 resolution 373 The Dodd-Frank Act resolution regime for SIFIs 381 6 Enhanced supervision and failure prevention 6.1 381 Orderly Liquidation Authority 6.2 384

> > 6.3 Evaluation 393

xi

ambridge University Press
78-0-521-76266-3 - Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, The Economics,
'he Politics
Emilios Avgouleas
rontmatter
Iore information

xii

### CONTENTS

- 7 The proposed EU crisis management and resolution framework 394
  - 7.1 General principles 394
  - 7.2 Preparation, early intervention and prevention 396
  - 7.3 Recovery plans and group recovery plans 401
  - 7.4 Resolution plans 403
  - 7.5 Early intervention powers 407
  - 7.6 Resolution powers and tools 409
  - 7.7 Financing resolution 422
  - 7.8 Evaluation of the EU resolution regime 424
- 8 Summary and conclusions 425
- 8 An evolutionary model for global financial governance 429
  - 1 Introductory remarks 429
    - 1.1 Overview 429
    - 1.2 Summary of the proposal 432
  - 2 The proposed global regulatory framework 435
    - 2.1 General principles: the importance of shared values 435
    - 2.2 The global macro-prudential supervisor 440
    - 2.3 A global micro-prudential authority 442
    - 2.4 Global financial policy, regulation and risk knowledge authority 447
    - 2.5 A global resolution authority 451
    - 2.6 Other advantages of the proposed governance system 454
  - 3 Conclusion 457

Index 460

# FOREWORD

Walter Bagehot's classic, *Lombard Street*, was his response to the financial crisis sparked by the collapse of the Overend Gurney bank and to what he saw as the enormity of the potential liabilities of the City of London, which accompanied its great wealth. He wrote: '[W]e must examine the system on which these, great masses of money are manipulated, and assure ourselves that it is safe and right'. Professor Avgouleas has penned an equally authoritative study of the background to the financial crisis which began in 2007 and the ameliorative steps subsequently taken. He too inquires whether the system is now 'safe and right'. The answer is not totally reassuring as regards the international operation of the world's financial giants and the financial revolution they have spawned. In his view what is necessary is a new system of global financial governance, underpinned by an umbrella international treaty.

But this is to anticipate. The detailed and careful analysis which precedes Professor Avgouleas's conclusion begins with a lucid account of the structures and operation of financial markets, identifying their contribution to economic growth but also highlighting their risks and instabilities. Market phenomena such as bubbles and herding feature regularly but in the modern age there have also been developments such as derivatives transactions and shadow banking. That leads to a cogent dissection of the crisis itself and what proved to be the frail machinery available to handle it, not least in its cross-border dimensions. The context of the crisis, as Professor Avgouleas explains, was what he characterizes as the financial revolution of the preceding decades - liberalized markets, technological advances and financial innovation, all accentuated by a public policy shot through with neo-liberalism. On reading Professor Avgouleas's account of this financial revolution, one draws the obvious parallel with the Industrial Revolution and correlative financial change of Bagehot's day. The financial revolution, misunderstood and badly managed, was fertile ground for a crisis when coupled with factors such as the excessive rentseeking by those associated with finance, their lobbying against effective

xiii

xiv

#### FOREWORD

capital requirements and other prophylactic regulation, and their promotion of a climate where 'light touch' regulation was the order of the day.

Professor Avgouleas then turns to international financial governance, with a thoughtful history of the Bretton Woods settlement in practice, and of the measures following the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis a decade later. As would be expected, the IMF and the constellation of Basel institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board (née Forum) feature prominently. The role of state-to-state groups like the G-20 is also traced. The weaknesses in standard setting and its enforcement post-Asian Crisis are explored, in particular the Basel II standards for bank capital, which in their formulation were captured by the industry. Basel II is also illustrative of the drawback to the soft law approach to international financial regulation. The meat of Part III of the book is Professor Avgouleas's outline and critique of post-Global Financial Crisis measures at national, regional (European Union) and international levels. The reasons for the differences in approach are touched on, as is the constitutional background to the new European Supervisory Authorities and supervisory colleges. Fraught issues are explained such as the countercyclical buffer in Basel III. The reform of the 'too-big-to-fail' financial institution and the new resolution regimes are deservedly given extensive treatment.

This is a book of great scholarship. The wealth of learning is astonishing. It is drawn from a range of disciplines as varied as finance theory, economics, international relations and law. Not everyone will agree with the solutions proffered. In one sense they appear radical but a contextual reading reveals that, like most sensible reforms, they build on what has gone before. Anyone pondering the way forward for global financial governance will need to engage with the considerations Professor Avgouleas advances, based as they are on the mature reflections of a leading authority. The book deals with matters which concern ordinary people; as Professor Avgouleas notes, it is they who have reaped the consequences of the international havoc wrought by the Global Financial Crisis in terms of job losses and economic hardship. Deliberation by public policy makers on the contents of the book will inevitably lead them to conclude that vested interests cannot be allowed to continue with 'business as usual'.

Sir Ross Cranston FBA

## PREFACE

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was just the high point of a crisis that started in mid-2007 and continues until this day. This came to be known as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Policy-makers, regulators, the industry, academics and other stakeholders throughout the world have been grappling with its root causes and consequences on a daily basis for the past four years. The Eurozone debt crisis is only its latest manifestation/ transformation in a dramatic chain of events that has also led to the near collapse of the world's biggest financial institutions and their costly public rescues, a major economic recession and heavy over-indebtedness for most Western countries.

Many of the questions raised following the eruption of the GFC have been answered only in part. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges this work has faced was the possibility of fashioning a new epistemological reading of the causes of the GFC. This new reading had to build on those causes of the GFC that have already been well explained, such as, for instance, trade imbalances, misaligned incentives and unsustainable debt accumulation. But it also had to try to identify the missing link that allowed those causes to be correlated in open global markets with catastrophic consequences.

The eruption of the GFC showed that the preceding regulatory frameworks in the US and the EU were more or less built on sand, when it came to crisis management, especially cross-border crisis management. In addition, the global financial architecture of the pre-crisis era, largely based on a thick network of soft law bodies, lacked the institutional capacity required to deal with a cross-border financial crisis. The rules and standards of those bodies were built on flawed assumptions, which, especially in the case of capital standards, allowed financial institutions to over-leverage their balance sheets operating on a perilously thin equity base. They also did not take into account system-wide developments. Thus, capital adequacy standards intensified rather than contained asset bubbles that in most cases precede financial collapses. Other

xvi

#### PREFACE

failures and loopholes clearly observed in the system in the pre-GFC era were narrow representation, lack of accountability and a significant failure to address the problems created by the integration of global financial markets, including issues of regulatory coverage. National, regional and international regulatory systems, largely informed by neo-liberal ideology, left outside of any meaningful public oversight the global OTC derivatives markets and the shadow banking sector, namely, the two most important laboratories/sources of financial innovation and generators of interconnectedness.

A gigantic reform effort is underway in the US, the EU and globally trying to address the aforementioned loopholes in order to minimize systemic risk and contain the impact of the 'too-big-to-fail' institution. Requisite reforms have also led to the establishment of a number of new systemic regulators and financial supervisors at all levels. The mandate of these bodies is often complex and their effectiveness remains unverified. Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that most of these reforms are in the right direction and will close major loopholes in the regulation and supervision of global finance. However, this effort is bound to be undermined by the absence of formal global governance structures dealing with: (1) the supervision of large cross-border financial institutions, so-called Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIS); (2) the resolution of large cross-border financial groups; (3) the extension of global supervisory oversight to the shadow banking sector; and (4) the building of knowledge-based standard-setters for international finance that would closely co-operate and supervise the most effective of the existing soft law bodies, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, on a legally binding basis.

The Eurozone debt crisis entered its critical phases after the completion of the manuscript. As a result, it is not given full consideration in the book. A weak and severely under-capitalized banking sector is again at the heart of the problem, making several of the obvious solutions, such as large-scale sovereign debt restructuring, unsustainable. Arguably, developments in the Eurozone give additional force to one of the central arguments of this book as regards the need for impartial and effective supra-national governance structures to regulate and supervise global markets and especially large cross-border financial institutions, strengthening the force and effectiveness of ongoing regulatory reforms.

The writing of this book started at the beginning of my study leave in September 2008. A week later Lehman Brothers collapsed and any meaningful writing effort paused for at least two years. In the meanwhile,

#### PREFACE

xvii

the world of global finance changed forever. The scholarly and policymaking analysis of global markets and of the global financial crisis that has emerged since 2008 has been fragmented but yet in many cases it has been of peerless quality. In addition, the bulk of relevant analysis has been immense and probably beyond the ability of a sole researcher to read, save understand, what was said there. At the same time, reform was taking shape in a number of areas, especially the regulation of systemic risk and 'too-big-to-fail' institutions, at rapid pace and at all levels: national, regional, international. As a result, keeping up with developments became an impossible task and the idea of dropping the project altogether came to my mind several times. Nonetheless, the immense challenges the modern world presents are inextricably tied up with the good workings of global finance, which since 2007-8 seems to have fallen into a state of irremediable disrepair. Thus, the desire of joining other (much more influential) voices in offering an analysis and possibly a workable first solution to the problem was one of the reasons that kept me going. My mother's great example of fortitude in the face of personal loss and her unfailing support was the second major reason. The third was the encouragement, support and immensely helpful advice I received from very distinguished scholars. Charles Goodhart has frequently shared his invaluable insights with me and shed light on many areas of global markets and their regulation that looked incomprehensive. This work would have been much poorer without being able to 'drill' into his vast well of knowledge in the field of global markets and global finance reform. Joe Norton, one of the founders of international financial regulation as a distinct academic discipline, proved to be the mentor and friend only the most fortunate ever have in their academic lives. In email after email Joe gave me constructive advice, sense of direction, access to his work and incredible emotional support following the death of my father in March 2010. Steven Schwarcz, one of the giants of modern financial law, not only was the kindest of hosts during my stay at Duke Law School, but also has been a good friend and colleague, who has provided inspiration with his original scholarship and work ethic. Eilis Ferran, one of the founders of this series, and a scholar of the highest order in the field of corporate and financial law, was both very supportive in the planning stages of this book and a source of rational and constructive advice during the research and writing stages. Cambridge University Press editor, Kim Hughes with her strict adherence to deadlines constantly reminded me that this book, like any other, should have a completion date and for everything that comes next there is always the possibility of a second edition. I am immensely grateful to all of them.

xviii

#### PREFACE

Special thanks must go to Sir Ross Cranston for finding the time to read the manuscript and provide the foreword for this book. I am also grateful for his advice about the timing and contents of this book and his invaluable insights on global financial reform. Once again it has been an immense privilege to be able to benefit from discussions with Sir William Blair on various aspects of this book.

I had immensely informative and constructive discussions on various parts of this book with a number of distinguished scholars and good friends, especially Douglas Arner, Lawrence Baxter, Ross Buckley and Heracles Polemarchakis. Doug, Larry, Ross and Heracles repeatedly gave me access to their unpublished work and dedicated hours of email and face to face discussions to our mutual effort to understand the whirlwind developments unfolding in front of our eyes and make (scholarly) sense of them. I am deeply indebted to all of them. Similarly I am indebted to my Manchester colleagues, Dora Kostakopoulou and William Lucy, for similar discussions and much appreciated editorial advice. I have also held very stimulating discussions with colleagues from other UK universities and especially Iain MacNeil, Joanna Gray and Dalvinder Singh. I am grateful to them for sharing with me their insights and scholarly work. The same applies to Eva Hupkes of the FSB for kindly giving me access to her unpublished work.

I would also like to thank all the academics and students that have attended my lectures and seminars on several themes of this book in the past three years at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Duke, Copenhagen and Hong Kong. The participants of the conference 'Greening Humanity', held in Athens at the Eugenides Foundation in October 2010, and especially my colleagues in Manchester and co-organizers of this conference John Harris and Jon Sulston (Nobel Prize, Med. Sci., 2002), have taught me a great deal about the moral dilemmas facing our modern world and its multi-faceted challenges. Discussions with them and with OLMMOG are responsible for planting into my mind one of the central ideas of this book.

In writing this book I have also incurred a number of institutional debts. First, I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support I have received from the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) by means of a study leave research grant. I would also like to thank Manchester Law School and its then Head of School Andrew Sanders for granting me a year-long study leave upon re-joining the law school. I would also like to thank Duke Law School and its Dean David Levi for hosting me as a Global Capital Markets Fellow during the

#### PREFACE

xix

AY 2008-2009. Last but not least I would like to thank the production team at Cambridge University Press and especially Sarah Roberts for their great work in turning my manuscript into the book you hold in your hands.

The book considers global financial developments up to 20 July 2011 and discusses regulatory proposals issued until that date with only minor updates for follow ups. Furthermore, every effort has been made to state the law as it stood on 30 June 2011.

# ABBREVIATIONS

ABCP	A cost De alza d Commencial Dan on
-	Asset Backed Commercial Paper
ABS	Asset Backed Securities
AIFMD	Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
AMH	Adaptive Markets Hypothesis
BCBS	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BHC	bank holding company
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
BoE	Bank of England
CBO	Collateralized Bond Obligations
CBRG	Cross-Border Resolution Group
CCP	central counterparty
CDO	Collateralized Debt Obligation
CDS	Credit Default Swap
CEBS	Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CESR	Committee of European Securities Regulators
CFTC	Commodity Futures Trading Commission (US)
CLN	Credit Linked Note
CLO	Collateralized Loan Obligation
CoCo	Contingent Capital Instrument
CRA	credit rating agency
CVA	credit valuation adjustment
EAD	exposure at default
EBA	European Banking Authority
EBRD	European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ECB	European Central Bank
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIOPA	European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority
EL	Expected Loss
EMH	Efficient Market Hypothesis
ESA	European Supervisory Authority
ESFS	European System of Financial Supervisors
ESMA	European Securities Markets Authority
	-

#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

xxi

ESRB	European Systemic Risk Board
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FANNIE MAE	Federal National Mortgage Association
FATF	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FRB	Federal Reserve Board (US)
FREDDIE MAC	Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
FSA	Financial Services Authority (UK)
FSAP	Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSB	Financial Stability Board
FSD	Financial Sector Development
FSF	Financial Stability Forum
FSOC	Financial Stability Oversight Council
FSSA	Financial Sector Stability Assessment
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G-20	Group of 20
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GSE	Government Sponsored Enterprise
G-SIFI	Globally Systemically Important Financial Institution
IAASB	International Auditing and Assurance Board
IAIS	International Association of Insurance Supervisors
IASB	International Accounting Standards Board
IASCF	International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFAC	International Federation of Accountants
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFS	International Financial Standard
IIF	Institute of International Finance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOSCO	International Organization of Securities Commissions
IRB	Internal Ratings Based Approach
ISDA	International Swaps and Derivatives Association
ISMA	International Securities Market Association
ISSB	International Standard Setting Body
LCFI	Large Complex Financial Institution
LCR	Liquidity Coverage Ratio
LGD	Loss Given Default
MBS	Mortgage Backed Securities
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

VV11
AAH

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAV	net asset value
NIFA	New International Financial Architecture
NSFR	Net Stable Funding Ratio
OBSE	off-balance sheet entity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLA	Orderly Liquidation Authority
OTC	Over the Counter
PCA	Prompt Corrective Action
PD	probability of default
PSE	Public Sector Entity
RMBS	Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
ROSC	Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
RWAs	risk-weighted assets
SDRs	Special Drawing Rights
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission (US)
SIFI	Systemically Important Financial Institution
SIV	Special Investment Vehicle
SPE	Special Purpose Entity
SPV	Special Purpose Vehicle
TARP	Troubled Assets Relief Program
TRN	Transnational Regulatory Network
TRS	Total Return Swap
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WTO	World Trade Organization