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Paula Gottlieb
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THE VIRTUE OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

While Aristotle's account of the happy life continues to receive attention, many of his claims about virtue of character seem so puzzling that modern philosophers have often discarded them, or have reworked them to fit more familiar theories that do not make virtue of character central. In this book, Paula Gottlieb takes a fresh look at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean. She shows how they form a thought-provoking ethic of virtue, one that deserves to be developed and refined. The first part of the book addresses the nature of virtue and the virtues, illuminated by the doctrine of the mean. Building on the conclusions of this analysis, the second part explains the mentality of the good person and the type of society that will allow such a person to flourish.

Paula Gottlieb is Professor of Philosophy and Affiliate Professor of Classics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. She was educated at Oxford and Cornell. The author of an analysis and commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* I and II for project Archelogos, she has received fellowships from the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, DC, and the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

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To Sybil and Bernard

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Preface and Acknowledgments

In his ethical works, Aristotle presents an extraordinarily nuanced and insightful account of the different aspects of the good human being and the good human being's life. Yet many of Aristotle's claims about ethical virtue seem so puzzling that modern philosophers have often discarded them, or reworked them to fit more familiar modern theories that do not make ethical virtue central. My aim in this book is to re-examine Aristotle's puzzling claims, especially the much-maligned doctrine of the mean, showing how together they form a thought-provoking ethic of virtue, one that deserves to be developed and refined. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the most important of his ethical treatises, appeals to anyone interested in ethical character and thought, including undergraduates, graduates, specialists in ancient Greek philosophy, and modern virtue ethicists. I should be pleased if this book does the same.

There is a fine line between a work on Aristotle's ethics and a work on Aristotelian Ethics, the former being more closely tied to Aristotle's texts, the latter going into new territory, inspired by Aristotle's ideas. While I have approached Aristotle's texts from a less familiar perspective, bringing out elements in his philosophy that have not received their due, and considering them in the light of ancient and modern debates,¹ I have refrained from venturing too far from his original views. The exception is Chapter 4, where I consider possible virtues that Aristotle himself does not consider, but, even there, I keep comments on the particular virtues short and to the point.

¹ See the discussion of philosophical scholarship in Section 4 of the Introduction.

The passage of more than two thousand years has yielded a wealth of scholarship about Aristotle's work, and the last thirty years has seen burgeoning interest in Aristotle's ethics, with new books and articles published every year. While I should like to be able to address every line of thought in detail, I have had to be selective. I have addressed the views of particular philosophers at length where those views clearly advanced my general argument, or were crucial in showing how I wished to change the terms of reference of a particular debate. Otherwise, I have relegated references, extra qualifications, and further more-detailed scholarly philosophical comments to footnotes.

Different readers respond to different styles of writing. Some like frequent summaries and recapitulations; others want to read an uninterrupted flow. For the first type of reader, I have provided summaries and a table of contents that allows one to see at a glance the main points of each chapter. The second type of reader may skip the table of contents and summaries.

The select bibliography is very select. It is intended mainly to give references to specific secondary literature cited in the text, although other influential works have been included as well. For a recent comprehensive bibliography, see Lockwood 2005. Translating Aristotle is difficult. Although some of my interpretations of the texts may be original, the translations are quite conservative so as to be intelligible in the light of available translations and past scholarly literature. Here, I am indebted to Ross and Irwin.²

I first encountered Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in the gap year between high school and university more than thirty years ago. Since then, I have benefited from discussions of Aristotle's ethics with teachers, colleagues, and students. I have received many challenging questions about my interpretation of Aristotle from specialists in ancient philosophy, modern philosophers, classicists, and other professors in the Humanities, and have incorporated many of their suggestions into the text. Although I criticize various lines of thought in my book, I have learnt a great deal from their proponents. My book has also been improved by the rigorous scrutiny and generous suggestions of anonymous readers of earlier versions of particular chapters and of the whole work.

² Ross 1923 and Irwin 1985 and revised version, 1999.

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Some of the central ideas of my book stem from 1992–3, when I had the opportunity to take up a fellowship at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, DC, to study the unity of the Aristotelian virtues. A Sabbatical leave for 1997–8, awarded by the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin–Madison, allowed me to crystallize Aristotle's distinctive ethic of virtue as the general theme of my book, and to compose a detailed outline of the chapters and further work to be done. I am grateful to the Institute for Research in the Humanities in Madison for a fellowship to continue work on my book in the fall of 2001, and the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin–Madison for several summer grants.

My earliest debts are to my teachers at Oxford and Cornell, especially Jean Austin, Michael Woods, and Terry Irwin. The present work on Aristotle's ethics is part of a continuing attempt to answer the difficult questions they posed many years ago. Thanks also to Julia Annas, David Charles, Gail Fine, David Lyons, and Nick Sturgeon for their support.

More recently, I have benefited from discussions with colleagues and numerous tutorials with students at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. I should like to thank Terry Penner for invaluable, but sceptical, comments on various chapters of the book; Claudia Card for helpful conversations and comments; Russ Shafer-Landau and Elliott Sober for generously commenting on particular chapters; Noël Carroll, Berent Enç, Dan Hausman, and Leora Weitzman for helpful discussion of the general project; and Bill Hay and Lester Hunt for bibliographic help.

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An earlier version of Chapter 2 was published as “Aristotle’s ‘Nameless’ Virtues” in *Apeiron* 27.1, March 1994, 1–15. I should like to thank Academic Printing and Publishing for allowing me to reprint it here. A revised version of “Are the Virtues Remedial?” in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, 2001, 343–54, is printed here as Chapter 3 with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media. I should also like to thank Koninklijke Brill NV for allowing me to publish a revised version of “Aristotle on Dividing the Soul and Uniting the Virtues” in *Phronesis* 39.3, 1994, 275–90, as Chapter 5. I thank Blackwell for allowing me to use material from “The Practical Syllogism”, published in *Blackwell's Guide to Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Richard Kraut, 2006, 218–33, for Chapter 8.

Over the past years, I have presented fledgling parts of my book in many places. An earlier version of Chapter 1 was presented at Georgia State University and at the University of Georgia in March 2001. A shorter version was presented at the annual meeting of the Central American Philosophical Association in May 2001. I should like to thank May Sim, the commentator, for her very helpful remarks. I should also like to thank those who raised questions in Georgia, especially Edward Halper, Steve Strange, Beth Preston, and David Weberman. Thanks also to Howard Curzer for helpful written comments on my paper, and to Lesley Brown for answering a question about her view.

Special thanks to Terry Penner, Constance Meinwald, and Nancy Sherman for very helpful discussion and criticisms of the original draft of Chapter 2. I have also benefited from the comments of Claudia Card, Berent Enç, Mark Munn, Roger Shiner, Elliott Sober, Jan Van Ophuijsen, Leora Weitzman, and Keith Yandell.

Ancestral versions of Chapter 3 were presented to “the Greeks” in Madison and at the Chicago Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, 1996, and at the University of St. Andrew’s, 1998. Many thanks to the following for a host of helpful questions and suggestions: in Chicago, Constance Meinwald, Richard Kraut, Ken Alprin, Elizabeth Asmis, Ian Mueller, Nathan Nicol, Meredith Williams, Michael Williams, and Edyta Imai; in Madison, Terry Penner, Ruth Saunders, William Courtenay, Christopher Rowe, and Leora Weitzman; and in Scotland, Neil Cooper, Bonnie Kent, Paul Markwick, and Leslie Stevenson. Thanks also to Dale Jaquette and, most recently, to Russ Shafer-Landau for written comments.

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The first version of Chapter 8 was presented at a conference on *Nicomachean Ethics* VI at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1997, the latest at the Berlin workshop on the practical syllogism, 2007. I should like to thank the following for detailed comments on earlier versions of this chapter: Norman Dahl, Mark Gifford, R. J. Hankinson, Rachana Kamtekar, John Longeway, Terry Penner, Ruth Saunders, Elliott Sober, and Leora Weitzman. Special thanks to Richard Kraut for a host of helpful suggestions.

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Many thanks to Susan Sauvé Meyer and an anonymous referee, whose comments on details of chapters and on the general themes of the entire work have led to numerous improvements.

I continue to benefit from the help and encouragement of the Publishing Director for the Humanities at Cambridge University Press, Beatrice Rehl.

Finally, I should like to thank Henry, with love.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations for Aristotle's works are as follows:

<i>A Post.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>
<i>A Pr.</i>	<i>Analytica Priora</i>
<i>de An.</i>	<i>de Anima</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>Ethica Eudemia</i>
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
<i>Fr.</i>	<i>Fragmenta</i>
<i>HA</i>	<i>Historia Animalium</i>
<i>MA</i>	<i>de Motu Animalium</i>
<i>MM</i>	<i>Magna Moralia</i>
<i>Mem.</i>	<i>de Memoria</i>
<i>Metaph.</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i>
<i>Ph.</i>	<i>Physica</i>
<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politica</i>
<i>Rb.</i>	<i>Rbetorica</i>
<i>SE</i>	<i>Sophistici Elenchi</i>
<i>Sens.</i>	<i>de Sensu</i>
<i>Top.</i>	<i>Topica</i>

Aristotle's works are cited by book, chapter and Bekker page, and column and line numbers. Plato's works are cited by dialogue, Stephanus pages, and columns. *CAG* refers to *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae: Berolini typis et impensis Georgii Reimeri, vols. 19–20, 1889. Abbreviations for other works are included in the Select Bibliography.