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## Introduction

*National Human Rights Institutions, State  
Conformity, and Social Change*

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## 1.1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty years national human rights commissions and human rights ombudsmen have emerged in every continent and subregion of the world, and in dozens of democratic and dozens of undemocratic states alike. This institutional innovation – a “national human rights institution” (NHRI) in UN parlance – is broadly defined as “a body which is established by a government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically designed in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights.”<sup>1</sup> Accounts of the number of NHRIs now in existence vary from around 120 to 178, established in approximately 130 countries.<sup>2</sup> By conservative measures, since 1990 the population of NHRIs has witnessed a staggering fifteen-fold increase (at the rate of over five new institutions established per year).<sup>3</sup>

The proliferation of NHRIs is part of a broader trend driven by international actors that promote the diffusion of legal and institutional innovations across national boundaries.<sup>4</sup> Beyond the question of why governments create NHRIs, this

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 6; see also R. Carver, *Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions* (Versoix: International Council for Human Rights Policy [hereafter ICHRP], 2000), 3 (defining an NHRI as “a quasi-governmental or statutory institution with human rights in its mandate”).

<sup>2</sup> For NHRI population data, see International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: <http://www.nhri.net/>; Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco O. Ramirez, “National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004,” *Social Forces* 87 (2009), 1326.

<sup>3</sup> M. Kjaerum, *National Human Rights Institutions: Implementing Human Rights* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2003), 5.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, B. Simmons, F. Dobbin, and G. Garrett, *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How

volume builds on existing scholarship by inquiring into why NHRIs matter, how they operate in practice, and, crucially, under what conditions they can effectuate compliance with human rights standards and bring about social change.

The relationship between NHRIs and the global order is multidimensional. NHRIs first gained recognition as potentially important links in the transmission of human rights norms from the international to the domestic level.<sup>5</sup> And the activities of NHRIs along that track have accelerated in recent years. The Universal Periodic Review of state practices by the UN Human Rights Council routinely involves governments' encouraging other governments to establish an NHRI if such an institution does not yet exist in the country. Two of the twenty-first century's first human rights treaties – the Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – create an unprecedented role for NHRIs in monitoring and implementing multilateral treaty obligations.<sup>6</sup> In addition, the UN human rights treaty bodies have begun to rely increasingly on the work of NHRIs in reviewing state reports of compliance, and UN officials increasingly call on NHRIs to address specific subject matters such as multinational corporations and economic and social rights. In short, NHRIs are becoming instrumental in the transmission of human rights norms into domestic systems and ensuring national compliance with global standards.

NHRIs have also emerged as important actors in shaping human rights norms at the international level – both global and regional. Organized as a unified coalition in treaty negotiations, NHRIs from across the world played a significant role in drafting the Disability Rights Convention. They were also directly involved in the negotiations of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (Sidoti,

to Influence States: Socialization and International Law," *Duke Law Journal* 54 (2004), 621–703; R. Goodman and D. Jinks, *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law* (Oxford University Press: forthcoming); Daniel W. Drezner, "Globalization and Policy Convergence," *International Studies Review* 3 (2001), 53–78.

- <sup>5</sup> For recent UN recognition, see Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, "National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights," UN Doc. No.: A/64/320, 24 August 2009; also UN General Assembly, "The Role of the Ombudsman, Mediator and Other National Human Rights Institutions in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights," UNGA Res./RES/63/169, 20 March 2009; UN General Assembly, "National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights," UNGA Res.: A/RES/63/172, 20 March 2009. For practitioner and legal analysis of NHRIs see, for example, K. Hossain (ed.), *Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices: National Experiences throughout the World* (Boston: Brill, 2000); R. Gregory and P. Giddings (eds.), *Righting Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six Continents* (Oxford: IOS Press, 2000); and L. Reif, *The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
- <sup>6</sup> For a recent discussion of these developments and their prospects for closing the compliance gap, see Richard Carver, "A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and the Domestication of International Law," *Human Rights Law Review* 10 (2010), 1–32.

this volume). NHRIs have a formal seat at the table of the UN Human Rights Council, providing them with an opportunity to contribute to standard setting and the development of human rights norms at the global level. And NHRIs, organized in regional associations, have also begun to shape international standards. Consider, for example, pathbreaking work on sexual orientation and gender identity by the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. Indeed, acting as a group, these institutions may be more willing to push the frontiers of human rights norms than acting separately or alone.

Despite the growing profile of NHRIs in world politics, cross-fertilization of NHRI research across academic disciplines has only just begun.<sup>7</sup> Situating the work of NHRIs within the framework of state compliance and social change, our volume responds to a number of converging developments. The disjuncture between human rights ideals and political reality on the ground presents a direct challenge to the aspirational claim of universal human rights.<sup>8</sup> In response to this compliance gap, institutional mechanisms dedicated to the promotion of human rights norms at the national level have begun to move from the periphery to the center of discussion. By bridging legal scholarship with social science concerns of political contestation and norm diffusion, this book provides a platform for generating new insights and rendering this interdisciplinary knowledge available to a wider community of academics, policy makers, and practitioners.

If the presence of NHRIs in the international human rights regime is becoming a settled fact, the significance of this new class of formal organizations is still undertheorized and not well understood. This lacuna is due, in part, to the recent nature of the NHRI surge. Early debate on the merits of NHRI formation commonly veered between dismissive critique and unmitigated support. Neither position was strongly established in evidence.<sup>9</sup> And the early literature focused on very general trends of diffusion and exceedingly formal features in the design of institutions. Notwithstanding these limitations, a first generation of NHRI scholarship has produced some valuable insights into why and under what conditions human rights institutions are created by states.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See J. Mertus, *Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); S. Cardenas, *Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> See Oona Hathaway, "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *Yale Law Journal* 111 (2002), 1935–2042.

<sup>9</sup> Ian Scott, "The Functions of the Ombudsman in Underdeveloped Countries," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 50 (1984), 212–20.

<sup>10</sup> See Sonia Cardenas, "Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions," *Global Governance* 9 (2003), 23–42; Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco O. Ramirez, "National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004," *Social Forces* 87 (2009), 1321–54.

Less attention, however, has been given to important areas of variation, such as divergent outcomes at the regional and subregional level, and unanticipated consequences of NHRI creation in particular domestic settings. For instance, the creation of an NHRI may have perverse effects – in some cases, actively undermining domestic rights frameworks and risking cooptation by a liberal state. Even the well-motivated establishment of an NHRI can unintentionally crowd out other domestic actors, draining them of political and economic resources (in this volume, Pegram, Chapter 9; Meyer, Chapter 13; Rosenblum, Chapter 12). It is important to consider such effects to gain an understanding of the power and potential of NHRIs in different domestic contexts.

This volume is accordingly in conversation with an emergent “second generation” of interdisciplinary NHRI research.<sup>11</sup> We focus, in particular, on the role of these institutions in state compliance with international human rights norms as well as their role in socialization of domestic actors and institutions. Three principal objectives motivate this study: (1) to contribute to the general literature concerning the transmission of human rights norms between the international and domestic levels; (2) to provide a forum in which interdisciplinary scholars and reflective practitioners can analyze new theoretical and empirical insights related to NHRIs; and (3) to reach some conclusions about the performance and effects of NHRIs within different regional and national settings. Our objective is *not* to reify “a theory of NHRIs” that aspires to a definitive account of their impact upon international and domestic politics. Notwithstanding the challenges inherent in such a task, the nascent state of the academic literature and the rapid proliferation and complexity of NHRIs in real time cautions against imposing too ambitious an agenda. Rather, this book encourages direct engagement with some of the assumptions, claims, and counterclaims that underlie current thinking on NHRIs. It also provides greater insight into the conditions under which NHRIs are more or less effective in promoting human rights.

Under this broad heading, several topics are addressed by the various authors contributing to the book. Broadly conceived, these topics include the definition of NHRIs (Mertus, Reif, and Sidoti), pathways of NHRI diffusion (Cardenas), the conditions for generating NHRI effectiveness (Cardenas, Carver, Reif, and Mertus),<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> See Mertus, *Human Rights Matters*; Cardenas, *Conflict and Compliance*; Obiora C. Okafor and Shedrack C. Agbakwa, “On Legalism, Popular Agency and ‘Voices of Suffering’: The Nigerian National Human Rights Commission in Context,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 24 (2002), 662–720; Thomas Pegram, “Accountability in Hostile Times: The Case of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman 1996–2001,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 40 (2008), 51–82; Fredrik Uggla, “The Ombudsman in Latin America,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36 (2004), 423–50.

<sup>12</sup> Discussion on NHRI effectiveness has received sustained attention within both academic and policy circles. This discussion marks a departure from earlier contributions, which focused more narrowly on the legal form of NHRIs. Important initial advances in descriptive accounts can be found in

and the embeddedness of NHRIs within the United Nations and other global institutions (Carver and Sidoti). Further contributions reflect on political accountability and informal powers of NHRIs (Pegram, Peruzzotti, and Ugglá) as well as relationships between NHRIs and social movements and advocacy networks (Okafor, Meyer, and Rosenblum). The volume also addresses important variation at the regional and domestic level. The contributions include analysis of the growing importance of regional networks of state and nonstate actors in the Asia Pacific region (Renshaw and Fitzpatrick), and features of NHRIs in Central and Eastern Europe (Carver), Latin America (Pegram), and Africa (Okafor).

## 1.2. SETTING THE AGENDA

In the following discussion, we reflect on three themes that run throughout the volume. We elaborate upon their significance for the study of NHRIs and human rights more generally. Each of these themes recurs in separate chapters. A consensus among the contributors emerges with respect to some issues. Productive disagreement characterizes the rest. We explain the significance of major points of agreement and disagreement with respect to the three themes.

### 1.2.1. *Refining the Concept of NHRIs*

Debate surrounding the definitional boundaries of NHRIs is addressed, explicitly and implicitly, by a number of contributions in this volume. Despite a growing body of academic interest and empirical research on NHRIs, these organizations remain underconceptualized and ill-defined. This volume does not attempt to close those gaps authoritatively. We, however, seek to refine the terms of debate and to forge greater understanding of the underlying points of disagreement over defining, more or less broadly, what has become something of a term of art.

The current departure point for discussion of NHRIs is the Paris Principles, devised in 1991 and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993.<sup>13</sup> The Principles reflect the codification of decades of intermittent attention to analogous entities, and they ultimately provide an internationally recognized standard for such institutions. However, as Linda Reif notes in this volume, the Paris Principles do not

R. Carver, *Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions* (Versoix: ICHRP, 2000); L. Reif, *The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004); R. Carver, *Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions* (Geneva: UNHCR ICHRP, 2005); Rachel Murray, "National Human Rights Institutions: Criteria and Factors for Assessing Their Effectiveness," *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 25 (2007), 189–220.

<sup>13</sup> "Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions," UNGA Res. 48/134, UN Doc. A/RES/48/134 (1993), art. 1.

contain a definition of an NHRI, and only refer to the basic functional principle that “[a] national institution shall be vested with competence to promote and protect human rights.”<sup>14</sup> Reif proceeds to map different models of NHRIs. Through her contribution and others, the volume enhances the conceptual and terminological precision concerning two types of NHRIs – (1) multimember commissions and (2) ombudsmen – while also highlighting the increasingly blurred lines between these models. Importantly, the book also explores the “politics of re-defining NHRIs.” That is, the volume examines the benefits and hazards in refining the concept of NHRIs through formal or informal modifications of the Paris Principles.

Indeed, considerable attention has focused on the limitations of the Paris Principles as a formal marker of the standards that an NHRI ought to meet. In a pioneering study, Richard Carver characterizes the Principles as a “vital reference point,” but nevertheless notes that “they are curiously inadequate in a somewhat paradoxical way.”<sup>15</sup> That is, the Principles demand too much and too little. Carver observes:

On the one hand [the Paris Principles] lay down a maximum programme that is met by hardly any national institution in the world.... On the other hand, the Paris Principles do not even take it as given that a national institution will deal with individual complaints, which most observers and practitioners in this field would probably regard as an essential characteristic.<sup>16</sup>

Carver’s observation is recast and developed in his own contribution to this book, among others.

Dissatisfaction with the Paris Principles is not confined to academics and outside observers. Certainly the most explicit criticisms of the Paris Principles have emerged from human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activists. However, dissatisfaction with the original framework set forth in the early 1990s is also revealed in the practice of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC),<sup>17</sup> and in the orientation of many NHRI officials. The ICC has not discarded the Principles, but it has seen the need to elaborate and expand upon the original framework through dynamic interpretations of the Principles in the process of reviewing NHRIs for accreditation (discussed further later in this chapter). And a concern among many NHRI officials is whether particular national institutions – for example, those that are primarily dedicated to research and consultancy – should enjoy equal membership in their club, if included at all.

<sup>14</sup> See Linda Reif, Chapter 3 in this volume.

<sup>15</sup> See Carver, *Performance and Legitimacy*, 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> The ICC was created in 1993; it is the coordinating body for NHRIs globally and represents these institutions at the UN.

As we have tackled these definitional issues, one lesson that has emerged from the contributions in this volume is the importance of *legitimacy*. First, consider the legitimacy of the Paris Principles in setting the recognition rules for NHRIs. That is, the Principles serve as a normative template establishing the criteria for international acceptance of an NHRI. Indeed, various states have apparently revised their domestic institutions to meet prevailing interpretations of the Principles – whether to obtain membership in the club of internationally recognized NHRIs (e.g., the United Kingdom) or to avoid ouster from it (e.g., France, Malaysia).

Second, consider the significance attached to the fact that NHRIs have been directly involved in the creation of the Principles, the subsequent elaboration of those Principles and related global standards, and the monitoring of compliance with these standards. In particular, the Principles enjoy special legitimacy because they were originally drafted by a group of NHRI representatives – rather than by states per se or foreign diplomats. Indeed, the “founding moment” of the meeting of NHRIs in Paris has amplified the attraction of the Principles for many stakeholders. According to a leading expert writing in this volume (Sidoti), the legitimizing effects associated with the NHRIs’ authorship of the Principles provide strong reasons against reopening the Principles to revision in international fora that are vulnerable to capture by states.

The Principles accordingly constitute a highly political agreement – the product of a particular, historically contingent process of creation. Indeed, the location of the meeting in Paris is said to have influenced the outcome document such that European national institutions (and the French in particular) were sure to be covered by the Principles.<sup>18</sup> The standards embodied in the Principles were thus diluted, according to this line of criticism, to accommodate (read: legitimate) weaker institutional forms. Thus, direct NHRI involvement in the creation of the Principles has potentially expanded their influence and reach, but has also compromised the strength of their criteria.

That said, NHRIs have become directly involved in elaborating the Paris Principles through dynamic interpretations (Sidoti, this volume) and in developing more rigorous standards for evaluating NHRIs. The ICC is a self-governing body composed of NHRIs from around the world. Through the work of its Subcommittee on Accreditation and the issuance of General Observations, the ICC has produced interpretations and elaborations of the Principles gradually over time. These interpretive practices have overcome some of the limitations of the original text. They have also been supplemented by the development of “soft law” on specific subject areas. Consider, for example, the Nairobi Declaration on National Human

<sup>18</sup> B. Burdekin with J. Naum, *National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2007), 23.

Rights Institutions and the Administration of Justice, issued at a world conference of NHRIs organized by the ICC.<sup>19</sup> The power and effects of these actions depends on the legitimacy of the ICC. And the source of legitimacy for the ICC derives in large part from its working methods and the participation of leading national institutions from different parts of the globe.

The ICC also functions as a gatekeeper (Sidoti, this volume) in reviewing NHRIs and determining their accreditation status. And NHRIs guard their ability to “define their own” through this multilateral process. The ICC’s Sub-Committee on Accreditation reviews the applications of candidate and current members in accordance with the Paris Principles and ICC guidelines. Success of an NHRI in the accreditation process is not only formally required for an institution to participate in particular UN meetings; success (or failure) also implicates the legitimacy of the NHRI more generally. For example, the ICC’s demotion of the Sri Lankan commission helped to delegitimize the Sri Lankan state’s interference with the independence of that institution. And the ICC’s demotion of the Fiji commission helped expose the dereliction of core responsibilities on the part of the commission’s chairperson. At least one regional organization – the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions – has exercised a similar gatekeeping function and with similar results (Renshaw and Fitzpatrick, this volume).

The significance of setting criteria for evaluation and determining the international standing of NHRIs is certain to appreciate in the future. As NHRIs become further enmeshed in the human rights system, formal accreditation – and international validation more generally – will become increasingly important. The costs of exclusion are also likely to rise. NHRIs have now begun to collaborate as a unified group in international negotiations. As they work together in such coalitions, the definition and composition of their membership will become more important. In those contexts, debates among NHRIs over the legitimacy and status of a research institute or an NHRI under the control of its government will likely become more heated. Finally, the ICC accreditation process is sure to draw heat as well. University centers (e.g., Columbia Law School) and transnational advocacy organizations are increasingly reviewing the establishment and performance of NHRIs. The ICC accreditation process may appear conservative from their perspectives, as it may seem ambitious from the perspective of some states. The degree to which the ICC demonstrates outward transparency and reasoned decision making may be the key to insulating it from criticism. Otherwise the ICC could become a site of political contestation. Whichever path it follows, the ICC is sure to become a subject of

<sup>19</sup> The Nairobi Declaration, “National Human Rights Institutions and the Administration of Justice,” The 9th International Conference for National Human Rights Institutions, Nairobi, Kenya, 24 October 2008.

academic intrigue – it is undoubtedly an important case of global administration and networked governance more generally.<sup>20</sup>

As this volume clearly shows, these topics do not simply concern “academic” disputes over definitions. Rather, the debate about the Paris Principles and the classification of NHRIs involves a fundamental disagreement over three key issues: (1) the status of various institutions; (2) the standards for evaluating them; and (3) the most appropriate institutions for interpreting and applying those standards. These controversies have significant implications for human rights politics and practice.<sup>21</sup> And an interdisciplinary lens is, in our view, critically needed to take stock of the debate and to inform contemporary commentary and practice.

### 1.2.2. Norm Diffusion and State Compliance

A significant body of interdisciplinary scholarship focuses on how human rights norms spread across the world.<sup>22</sup> This volume engages that literature by exploring the mechanisms and conditions that have fostered the transnational spread of NHRIs.<sup>23</sup> The volume also explores how NHRIs, in turn, function as vehicles

<sup>20</sup> For texts in the field of global administration and networked governance, see B. Kingsbury et al., “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (2005), 15–61; A. Slaughter, *A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); A. Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); see also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” *International Organization* 63 (2009), 559–92.

<sup>21</sup> The implications of some of these questions of institutional design – for example, whether to create multiple NHRIs within a country, the capacity of classical ombudsmen to serve particular human rights victims – are also usefully discussed in Richard Carver, “One NHRI or Many? How Many Institutions Does It Take to Protect Human Rights? – Lessons from the European Experience,” *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 3 (2011), 1–24; Linda Reif, “The Ombudsman and the Protection of Children’s Rights,” *Asia Pacific Law Review* 17 (2009), 27–52; Christopher P. M. Waters, “Nationalising Kosovo’s Ombudsperson: Implications for Kosovo and Peacekeeping,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 12 (2007), 139–48; and Amanda Wetzel, “Post-Conflict National Human Rights Institutions: Emerging Models from Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Colombia Journal of European Law* 13 (2007), 427–70.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, Harold H. Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” *Yale Law Journal* 106 (1997), 2599–659; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Law,” *Duke Law Journal* 54 (2004), 621–703; R. Goodman and D. Jinks, *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); T. Risse et al., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); M. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); B. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Sonia Cardenas, “Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions,” *Global Governance* 9 (2003), 23–42.

for promoting the diffusion of international human rights norms into domestic political systems.

Important questions concern how international institutions promote the spread of NHRIs and the – intended and unintended – consequences of that support. It is valuable in this regard to study how various international forces have affected the specific types and timing of NHRIs. By way of analogy, consider a leading study by political scientist Martha Finnemore examining the role of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in promoting the worldwide adoption of national science bureaucracy boards, including in states where such organizational structures met little or no functional need. Finnemore explains that UNESCO convinced national-level actors that such commitments to the promotion of science constituted an important feature of modern statehood.<sup>24</sup>

The rapid spread of NHRIs may have followed a similar path.<sup>25</sup> As reflected in this volume, close observers credit the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for helping to convince national-level actors to establish NHRIs in all regions of the world. Sidoti, in Chapter 5, discusses the Office of High Commissioner and how its leadership has been succeeded by UN treaty bodies promoting the establishment of NHRIs in all member states. Meyer, in Chapter 13, identifies “mimetic pressures” that lead to the construction of similar NHRI structures and missions, in part, because “each new NHRI comes into existence nested in a set of supranational bodies pursuing human rights.” In a critical vein, Reif, in her chapter, contends that the High Commissioner’s Office has promoted a narrowly conceived model of NHRIs for global production and bestowed legitimacy on this particular form regardless of regional and subregional variations in political and institutional demands. Rosenblum contends that the Office of the High Commissioner, and the resolve of leading norm entrepreneurs in that office, have promoted a “one-size-fits all” template that considers NHRIs valuable in almost every country. He contends that some countries would benefit from different organizational formations, which are crowded out by the establishment of an NHRI. In short, none of the contributors doubt the importance of the UN human rights machinery in the rapid establishment of NHRIs across the globe. They do, however, draw different conclusions and highlight different second-order effects of that promotion campaign.

NHRIs have also helped to replicate themselves – by way of global and regional networks. At the global level, the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs, as discussed previously, serves as a gatekeeper. Through accreditation procedures,

<sup>24</sup> M. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

<sup>25</sup> For extended analysis of NHRI diffusion, including organizational emulation, see Sonia Cardenas, “Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions,” *Global Governance* 23 (2003), 23–42; Thomas Pogram, “Diffusion across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 32 (2010), 729–60.