

I

Introduction

Turkey is the only Muslim secular-democratic state: the Atatürk Revolution (1923–38) relegated Islam to the private sphere; yet Islam has remained an active force in Turkish society, manifest both in the articulated views of some intellectual elites and in the activities of secretive, grassroots Islamic religious brotherhoods or orders (*tarikats*).¹ But repeated attempts to establish an Islamic political party in the period following World War II ended in failure until the foundation of the National Order Party (NOP) in 1970. An Islamist social movement has achieved unqualified success only since the 1990s. An Islamist successor to the NOP, the Welfare Party (WP) entered the government by securing the highest vote share (21.4%) in the 1995 general elections along with 158 seats in the 550-seat parliament. The most recent in a series of successive Islamist parties, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), is now the party of government as a result of its securing 34.3 percent of the popular vote in the 2002 general elections, entitling it to 363 seats in parliament. The party further increased its support in the 2007 general elections by securing 46.6 percent of the popular vote and 341 seats in parliament, and following the elections, placed its candidate into the presidency of Turkey.

What accounts for the relatively sudden increase, after seventy years, in the political salience of Islam and the success of an Islamist social movement in Turkish politics? The research question of this book, “Why has political Islam, which has been part of Turkish politics since the 1970s, been on the rise only

¹ The Islamic brotherhoods, as the main institutions of Sufism, originally aimed at searching for divine truth and purification of the soul, thus enabling the achievement of the status of *insan-ı kâmil* (perfect human being). See Mustafa Kara, *Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar Tarihi* [History of Sufism and Islamic Brotherhoods], 5th ed. (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1999), 18–19. Yet, Ünver Günay, a divinity professor, argues that the Islamic orders were not immune from the institutional decline of the Ottoman Empire – as a result of which they turned out to be centers of exploitation of the public’s religious sentiments for *tarikat* leaders’ personal economic gains. See Ünver Günay, “Türkiye’de Toplumsal Değişme ve Tarikatlar” [Social Change and Islamic Brotherhoods in Turkey], *İslâmiyât* V, no. 4 (2002): 141–62.

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since the 1990s, but not before?” is an important one, and a review of the existing literature on Turkey reveals that there is a gap in adequately addressing it. The existing literature offers very rich and detailed analyses regarding the components of political Islam in Turkey such as Islamic brotherhoods,² the role of Islamist women in political Islam,³ Islamism in shantytowns,⁴ Islamist intellectuals,⁵ and Islamism as identity politics.⁶ But this literature provides only a partial answer to the research question.⁷

This book views the Islamist mobilization in Turkey as a social movement and uses the political process model (PPM) variant of the theory advanced by Sidney Tarrow, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and others to explain the puzzle.

² Sencer Ayata, “Traditional Sufi Orders on the Periphery: Kadiri and Nakşibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon,” in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, ed. Richard Tapper (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 223–53; Şerif Mardin, “The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey,” in *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 204–32.

³ Yeşim Arat, *Political Islam in Turkey and Women’s Organizations* (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 1999); Feride Acar, “Women in the Ideology of Islamic Revivalism in Turkey: Three Islamic Women’s Journals,” in Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 280–303.

⁴ Jenny B. White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study of Vernacular Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).

⁵ Michael E. Meeker, “The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey,” in Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, 189–219; Binnaz Toprak, “Islamist Intellectuals of the 1980s in Turkey,” *Current Turkish Thought* 62 (Spring 1987): 2–19; Nilüfer Göle, “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-elites,” *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 46–58.

⁶ M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Nilüfer Göle, “Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries,” *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 173–90; and Haldun Güralp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye’de Siyasal İslam’ın Temelleri* [Politics of Identities: The Bases of Political Islam in Turkey] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2003).

⁷ Sencer Ayata’s, Binnaz Toprak’s, and Birol Yeşilada’s articles and chapters provide in-depth analyses of the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Binnaz Toprak and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay provide rich analyses of the Islamist movement in the 1970s. However, none of these scholars examined the Islamist mobilization in Turkey within the framework of social movement theory. Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey,” *The Middle East Journal* 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 41–57; Sencer Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework,” in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, eds. Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yeşilada (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 51–68; Birol Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party,” *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 62–81; Birol Yeşilada, “Realignment and Party Adaptation: The Case of the Refah and Fazilet Parties,” in *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey*, eds. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 157–77; Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1981); Binnaz Toprak, “Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis,” in *Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey*, ed. Malcolm Wagstaff, Occasional Paper Series no. 40 (Durham, UK: University of Durham, Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1990), 10–15; and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı* [Modernism, Religion, and Party Politics: The Case of the National Salvation Party] (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985). Yavuz’s book *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* is a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Islamic brotherhoods and Islamism in Turkey within the framework of social movement theory. Yet, his generalization of Islamists’ grievances against the secular Turkish state to the entire public is problematic on the following grounds: first, there were no massive public protests against Atatürk’s reforms; and second, an Islamist social movement has achieved unqualified success only since the 1990s. This shows that, in the pre-1990 period, the electorate was attracted by appeals to religion-based grievances only to a very limited degree.

Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.”⁸ The PPM proposes that movement entrepreneurs do not determine their goals, strategies, and tactics with respect to mobilization in a vacuum. Rather, the political context – that is, the presence of a favorable political opportunity for mobilization, along with the movement’s organizational dynamics and the framing of movement activists – plays a crucial role. Drawing upon the PPM, this study argues that the rise of political Islam in Turkey can be attributed to specific actions: the introduction by the military regime in power from 1980 to 1983 of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS – *Türk İslam Sentezi*), a mixture of Sunni Islam and nationalism, as a state policy to counter the leftist movement in Turkey. The TIS was maintained by the center-right Motherland Party (MP), which ruled from 1983 to 1991, and created the first political opportunity structure (POS 1) that was framed by Islamic forces to establish strong organizational networks. This constituted *the first phase of the mobilization of political Islam in Turkey (1980–91)*.

The Islamists, having established strong organizational networks and framed a viable political rhetoric of a “Just Order,” then successfully seized upon the malfunctioning of the state since the 1990s as the second political opportunity structure (POS 2). This constituted *the second phase of the movement’s mobilization*, from 1991 to the present. In the 1990s, the Islamists, unlike the mainstream political parties, exploited this POS 2 to compete successfully in democratic elections.

Movement activists (“entrepreneurs”) may engage in institutional/conventional activities (peaceful protests, lobbying, forming new political parties, petitioning government bodies, or engaging in legal battles) or noninstitutional/unconventional activity, ranging from terrorism to civil disobedience.⁹ Political context determines movement entrepreneurs’ framing activities. As David Meyer and Debra Minkoff argue, “a polity that provides openness to one kind of participation may be closed to others.”¹⁰ The political context – the existence in Turkey of a secular-democratic polity and its acceptance by the majority of its citizens – determined the movement entrepreneurs’ strategies. Thus, the Islamist movement in Turkey is a good example of how movement entrepreneurs frame their strategies according to the existing political context. The Islamists, while utilizing social networks (such as charitable organizations, foundations, economic enterprises, media, Quran courses, dormitories, and schools that belong to Islamic brotherhoods [*tarikats*]) to Islamize the society from below – by changing individual habits and social relations,¹¹ thus mobilizing by developing

⁸ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.

⁹ Edwin Amenta and Michael P. Young, “Democratic States and Social Movements: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses,” *Social Problems* 46, no. 2 (1999): 155.

¹⁰ David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,” *Social Forces* 82, no. 4 (June 2004): 1463.

¹¹ I adopt the term *Islamizing the society from below* from Sheri Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” *APSA, Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 2 (June 2003): 257–72.

an Islamist collective identity – have at the same time managed to increase their political power by founding a political party (in 1970) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the NOP. This book focuses on the dominant form of Islamic activism in Turkey – mobilization through a political party – by analyzing four Islamist political parties (the WP; its successor, the Virtue Party (VP); and *its* successors, the Felicity Party (FP) and the JDP).

Political Islamists, though differing in their means (violent and nonviolent), regard the individual and collective return to the *Asr-ı Saadet* – the age of happiness during the Prophet Muhammad’s era – as the solution to the political and socioeconomic problems of Muslim societies. Islamist terrorist organizations continue to exist in Turkey (e.g., *Hizbullah*, the *İBDA-C* [Islamic Great Orient Fighters Front], the *Hizbu’t-Tahrir*, and the Islamic Jihad). These seek to bring the rule of Islamic law (*Sharia*) to Turkey by initiating an Iranian-style, top-down revolution. Beginning in the 1990s, a number of prominent professors (Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, and Necip Hablemitoğlu) and journalists (Uğur Mumcu and Çetin Emeç), who wrote and spoke openly about the dangers of an Islamist threat to secularism in Turkey, were assassinated. Yet, the existence of a secular-democratic state structure and the acceptance of secularism by the majority of citizens¹² have marginalized these terrorist groups in Turkish society. More mainstream political Islamists in Turkey therefore have been pursuing a more cautious and effective strategy to challenge secularism and democracy in the country.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION

The existing literature on political Islam in the Muslim world focuses on cultural¹³ and socioeconomic factors¹⁴ underlying the movement’s mobilization. Furthermore, as Quintan Wiktorowicz notes, most publications on the Islamist

¹² According to a comprehensive survey that was conducted in 1999, 77.3% of the Turkish people support Atatürk’s reforms and the present secular character of the state. See Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* [Religion, Society, and Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000), 16–17.

¹³ Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); François Burgat and William Dowell, “Islamism as the Language of Political Reaction to Western Cultural Domination,” in *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, eds. François Burgat and William Dowell (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, 1993), 63–85; and Leila Hessini, “Wearing the Hijab in Contemporary Morocco: Choice and Identity,” in *Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, and Power*, eds. Fatma Müge Göçek and Shiva Balaghi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 40–56.

¹⁴ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Philip S. Khoury, “Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab World: An Historical Appraisal,” in *Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society*, ed. Ibrahim Ibrahim (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1983), 213–36; and Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis,” in *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*, ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 93–126.

movement do not go beyond descriptive analyses of the ideology, structure, and goals of various Islamic actors or the histories of particular movements.¹⁵ From the perspective of social movement theory, however, grievances – the existence of social strains or relative deprivation, giving rise to claims against the existing social and political order – are “a necessary but not a sufficient condition of social protest.”¹⁶ Herbert Kitschelt, in his analysis of the mobilization of antinuclear movements in four democracies (France, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany), finds that even though citizens of these countries expressed similar grievances, the mobilization of the antinuclear movement in these countries developed in distinct ways, shaped by the overall political structure: that is, whether the political *input* structure was open or closed and whether the political *output* structure was weak or strong. From this perspective, grievances by themselves cannot explain variations in the mobilization of social movements.¹⁷

Along the same lines as Kitschelt, Eric Hobsbawm finds that Peruvian peasants’ age-old land grievances did not lead to collective action against landlords; rather, it was the struggles for power between elites seeking the support of subaltern classes – what Tarrow calls unstable elite alignments – that led to the peasants’ collective action.¹⁸ Social movement theory suggests the mobilization of citizens suffering from grievances is contingent on two factors: people must perceive that their situation is amenable to change; and, more importantly, movement entrepreneurs must successfully generate motivation, resources, and political opportunities for collective action.¹⁹ “Even under the most extreme conditions of human misery and exploitation,” Carrie Rosefsky Wickham notes, “the emergence of collective protest is not assured.”²⁰

This book argues that grievance-based explanations alone cannot explain the mobilization of political Islam in Turkey. Cultural explanations, which are based on grievances, regard political Islam as a protest movement against modernity and Western colonial domination. As will be argued in Chapter 2, this, too, is inadequate in the Turkish case. Atatürk established the secular

¹⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 3–4.

¹⁶ Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” *British Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (January 1986): 59.

¹⁷ Kitschelt finds that “political opportunity structures functioned as ‘filters’ between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment.” In *ibid.*

¹⁸ Sidney Tarrow, “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Peasant Land Occupations,” *Past and Present* 62 (February 1974): 120–52.

¹⁹ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 7–8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

state in Turkey in the aftermath of the War of Independence (1923). The goal of infusing Turks with Western liberal ideas was to create a new type of citizenship, and hence a modern society, rather than an *umma* (Islamic community of believers), where there would be no room for individualism. It should be noted that the Turkish experiment in secularism represented not a gradual change but a drastic one, which also included a degree of forceful state imposition. The revolutionary movement headed by Atatürk aimed at removing Islam from public affairs and relegating religion to the private sphere through state control; thus, religious institutions were not just separated from the state, but became subservient to it. The dismantling of the sultanate, the caliphate, the *ulema* (the religious class), and the Islamic brotherhoods disestablished institutional Islam in Turkey.

Despite this forced expulsion of Islam from public life and its restriction to the private realm – and the subsequent introduction of a series of reforms aimed at modernizing and Westernizing the country – there was no popular Islamist mobilization in Turkey. Rather, political Islamists were reduced to a marginal group. The Islamic brotherhoods that were antithetical to secularism in the country were forced underground, in the form of Quran courses beyond state control.²¹ As Verta Taylor argues, movements that are confronted with a nonreceptive political and social environment do not disappear; they develop “abeyance structures.” According to Taylor, when a movement loses support, its activists become isolated to establish alternative structures in order to keep the movement fresh. A “movement in abeyance” develops, in the form of a group of activists who find a niche for themselves and who ensure the continuance of the movement by maintaining activist networks, goals, and tactics along with a collective identity. Thus, abeyance structures maintain the movement and play a crucial role in later rounds of movement mobilization.²²

The Islamic brotherhoods and the illegal Quran courses they organized played an important role as abeyance structures in maintaining the Islamist movement in Turkey in the form of an Islamist collective identity. As abeyance structures, the Islamic brotherhoods sustained Islamist perspectives and aspirations. Thus, they served as the breeding grounds for the creation of an Islamic elite that later not only seized upon existing POSs, but also created new ones. Since the transition to a multiparty system in Turkey, the Islamic brotherhoods have pursued three basic strategies vis-à-vis political parties: they have supported by electoral means the leading center-right parties,²³ voted for the

²¹ Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, 1–2; Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey], 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 532–52; Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), 2; and Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 173–203.

²² Verta Taylor, “Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance,” *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 5 (October 1989): 761–75.

²³ Taylor suggests that movements in abeyance structures “may have little impact in their own time and may contribute, however unwillingly, to maintenance of the status quo.” In *ibid.*, 762.

political Islamist parties,²⁴ and provided the organizational basis for the formation of political Islamist parties, beginning with the NOP.

Cultural explanations that regard political Islam as a protest movement against Western colonial domination are inappropriate in the Turkish case. Turkey was never subjected to Western colonial domination. The Turkish Revolution, which introduced a secular state, was a successful struggle to forestall Western imperialism and domination.²⁵ Thus, unlike the case of Arab countries, where there was simultaneously Western colonial domination and endeavors to install a Western type of state, in Turkey there was both independence and secularism. The Turkish Revolution's goal was achieving secularism for the sake of preventing any future Western domination. Furthermore, there were no massive social demonstrations against modernization attempts in the country.

If the secular Turkish state cannot be regarded as a political remnant of colonialism, then what *are* the factors that have led to the rise of political Islam in Turkey? Analyses that focus on socioeconomic factors, which emphasize the absence of economic prosperity, provide only a partial explanation in the Turkish case. Turkish citizens who regard political Islam as offering them an effective vehicle for the expression of their anger at the government, and as a way to exert pressure for political and economic change, do support political Islam.²⁶ To a certain degree, the rise of political Islam is therefore a response to the malfunctioning state in Turkey. But the Turkish state began to malfunction long before the rise of political Islam. Moreover, the malfunctioning state by itself cannot explain how the Islamist movement could establish the well-organized and resource-rich networks, formal and informal, that enabled it to address the ills of the secular state in the 1990s.

A malfunctioning state creates inequalities and a sense of relative deprivation that are structural conditions providing a basis for grievances. But for a successful movement mobilization, movement entrepreneurs must turn these conditions into popular grievances by framing a viable political rhetoric that encourages a sense of unfairness. In the Turkish case, the WP entrepreneurs successfully framed the "Just Order," which created a perception of unfairness in the minds of the electorate. Thus, for grievances to lead to a successful social movement mobilization, there must be present both a POS and movement entrepreneurs who successfully frame an existing POS by establishing a dynamic relationship among movement networks, framing processes (movement entrepreneurs'

²⁴ Ayata, "The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework," 61.

²⁵ Ernest Gellner also notes that Turkish achievement of political modernity was not an alien imposition, but was a result of endogenous development. See Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 81–91.

²⁶ Mark Tessler makes this argument for Arab states. This book demonstrates that it is equally true of Turkey. See Mark Tessler, "Democratic Concern and Islamic Resurgence: Converging Dimensions of the Arab World's Political Agenda," in *Democracy and Its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East*, eds. Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 280.

shared understandings, goals, and tactics), grievances, and the POS. Both grievances *and* a social movement must exist in order for a successful social movement mobilization to occur.

The social movement literature focuses on the impact on movement mobilization of shifts in POSs, movement organizations, ideational factors such as culture, and social interaction. Such inquiry yields explanations that provide a more comprehensive framework for the analysis of the rise of political Islam in Turkey than grievance-based explanations alone. But social movement scholarship has focused on analyzing cases from Western Europe and the United States. The literature presents cases about civil rights movements operating in the context of civil states, where such movements have goals compatible with the values and norms of the state. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly note that there is a gap between studies of social movements in liberal democratic polities and those of social movements in the rest of the world.²⁷ Along the same lines, Bert Klandermans, Suzanne Staggenborg, and Tarrow point out the lacuna in studies of social movements, by using similar methods and theoretical concepts, outside the range of Western democracies.²⁸

The Muslim world is almost entirely absent from the social movement literature. It provides a few analyses from the Iranian Revolution and pays some attention to the mobilization of political Islam in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.²⁹ This book applies social movement theory to a non-Western case. The Turkish case also presents a unique example of the mobilization of a social religious movement – that is, a noncivil movement – that challenges to the very definition of the state, which in the Turkish case is civil and secular. Analyses of

²⁷ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution,” in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, eds. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 142.

²⁸ Bert Klandermans, Suzanne Staggenborg, and Sidney Tarrow, “Conclusion: Blending Methods and Building Theories in Social Movement Research,” in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, eds. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 320.

²⁹ Charles Kurzman, “A Dynamic View of Resources: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution,” *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 17 (1994): 53–84; Misagh Parsa, “Conversion or Coalition? Ideology in the Iranian and Nicaraguan Revolutions,” *Political Power and Social Theory* 9 (1995): 23–60; Mohammed Amjad, “Rural Migrants, Islam and Revolution in Iran,” *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 16 (1993): 35–50; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Sheri Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” *APSA, Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 2 (June 2003): 257–72; Janine A. Clark, “Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal Nodes of Activism,” in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*, 164–84; Jillian Schwedler, “The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Polity,” in Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism*, 205–28; Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State in Jordan* (New York: SUNY Press, 2001); and Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

Islamist mobilization in the Muslim world (such as those relating to Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen) provide examples of the mobilization of a noncivil movement in the context of noncivil states: the Turkish case thus not only analyzes the applicability of the PPM to the non-Western world, but also presents a valuable test-case examining the impact of a civil context on a noncivil movement. Expanding the research agenda on social movements by applying the literature to a majority Muslim country with a secular-democratic structure permits a better understanding of the mobilization of political Islam in the Muslim world – a movement that is likely to remain strong in the region for years to come.

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT LITERATURE

Because the social movement literature has been developed by analyzing cases from Western liberal democracies, it exhibits some important deficiencies with regard to explaining the mobilization of political Islam in Turkey, and hence needs to be amended in certain ways. First, with a few exceptions,³⁰ the literature equates mobilization of a social movement with social protest activity – that is, moving the masses to challenge the authorities through demonstrations, boycotts, or other actions aiming at changing a specific policy. Hanspeter Kriesi argues that “the crucial element of a social movement is its overt challenge to authorities.”³¹ Similarly, William Gamson regards movement participation – which, he argues, is riskier than more conventional types of political action – as consisting of actions aimed at achieving political goals that are undertaken when conventional and institutionalized means such as voting are not available.³² This approach neglects the possibility that social movements may also utilize conventional means to enable or enhance mobilization.

The second deficiency of the literature is that it usually regards social movements as institutions separate from political parties. In this view, social

³⁰ Hans De Witte and Bert Klandermans, “Political Racism in Flanders and the Netherlands: Explaining Differences in the Electoral Success of Extreme Right-Wing Parties,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26, no. 4 (October 2000): 699–717; Schwedler, “The Islah Party in Yemen,” 205–28; Helmut Anheier, “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–30,” in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–74; Ronald Aminzade, “Between Movement and Party: The Transformation of Mid-Nineteenth-Century French Republicanism,” in *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, eds. J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 39–62; and Wiktorowicz, “Introduction,” 1–33.

³¹ Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on Their Mobilization,” in Jenkins and Klandermans, *The Politics of Social Protest*, 196.

³² William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990). See also Paul Burstein, Rachel L. Einwohner, and Jocelyn A. Hollander, “The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective,” in Jenkins and Klandermans, *The Politics of Social Protest*, 275–95.

movements try to realize their goals by *influencing* political parties.³³ Craig Jenkins and Klandermans focus on the three-way struggle between social movements, political parties, and the state. Political parties, not social movements, according to this analysis, are the agents that deal directly with the state.³⁴ This line of reasoning also excludes noncivil social movements that mobilize *in the form of* political parties with the goal of transforming a civil state into a non-civil one. McAdam is, accordingly, correct when he argues that the role social movements play in reshaping the institutional structure and political alignments of a given polity is an underdeveloped area of research.³⁵ As will be shown in the following text, the Islamist movement in Turkey is a clear example of a social movement utilizing conventional means, in the form of a political party, to mobilize against a civil state – in this case, to replace a secular-democratic state structure with an Islamist one.

Third, most of the literature examines social movements that take place in the context of Western liberal democracies (such as feminism, environmentalism, and civil rights) and social movements for democratization in the former communist states.³⁶ There is also an overwhelming emphasis on civil movements operating in the context of civil states. This has resulted in a tendency toward a positive normative bias in the literature: all social movements are assumed to share goals compatible with Western liberal ideas. Wiktorowicz notes, “Dominated by empirical research on the United States and Western Europe, social movement theory building has been heavily contextualized by liberal democratic polities and Western societies, thus narrowing the generalizability of findings and conclusions.”³⁷ In the social movement literature analyzing mobilization by Islamist movements, there seems to be tendency to focus primarily on the political context (democratic, semidemocratic, or authoritarian).

³³ There are a few studies that examine the mobilization of a social movement in the form of a political party. For these studies see Paul Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers, and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties,” *Party Politics* 6, no. 2 (April 2000): 175–85; Kent Redding and Jocelyn S. Viterna, “Political Demands, Political Opportunities: Explaining the Differential Success of Left-Libertarian Parties,” *Social Forces* 78, no. 2 (December 1999): 491–510; De Witte and Klandermans, “Political Racism in Flanders and the Netherlands,” 699–717; John K. Glenn, “Parties Out of Movements: Party Emergence in PostCommunist Eastern Europe,” in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 147–69; and Manali Desai, “From Movement to Party to Government: Why Social Policies in Kerala and West Bengal are so Different,” in Goldstone, *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, 170–96.

³⁴ J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, “The Politics of Social Protest,” in Jenkins and Klandermans, *The Politics of Social Protest*, 3–13. See also Diarmuid Maguire, “Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partners or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and Reform?” in Jenkins and Klandermans, *The Politics of Social Protest*, 199–228.

³⁵ Doug McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 35–6.

³⁶ Regarding the normative bias in the social movement literature, an analogous issue is the underemphasis on left-wing movements and their analyses by employing theories to understand right-wing protest.

³⁷ Wiktorowicz, “Introduction,” 4.