Introduction

The Anchoring Common Sense and the Puzzles of the Law

It might have been struck off in Verona. Or at least, that was the first inference likely to spring to mind, for the statute sounded as though it had been drafted in response to Romeo and Juliet, that it had been framed in contemplation of a city riven by small wars, with factions and families set off against one another. It smacked, that is, of a place “where civil blood makes civil hands unclean.” And indeed, it had come from a city in Italy in the late Renaissance – in the fifteenth century – but it was from Bologna, and it decreed “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity.” Blackstone had noted the case in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, and he reported the judgment, reached after a long debate, that the statute was “not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.”1 That the question should arise at all is a kind of testament to the enduring credulity of human beings – or the powerful need many people have to follow the rigid letter of the law rather than seek counsel in their own judgment, not guided by anything set down in the law.

For many people that diffidence may reflect a proper doubt about their own resources of judgment when left unguided or uninstructed. But the case was cited by Blackstone, and it was drawn in turn from Samuel Pufendorf’s classic study of the law of nations. The example was cited in both of these venerable sources precisely because it was understood at once that the law made no sense when it was applied to the doctor using his arts to save a human life. The case was used, that is, by the classic commentators on the

law, to make a point that runs counter to the doctrines of postmodernism, or to the dressed up versions of moral relativism that put themselves forward in our own time under the title of “theories of law.” The classic commentators understood that the positive law, the law that was “posited,” or written down in statutes, could not exhaust the definition of justice. It could not possibly take account of all of the facts and circumstances that could make a difference for a moral judgment, a judgment on the rightness or wrongness, the justice or injustice, of the situation at hand. The classic commentators knew that there were serious limits to the law, but they also assumed that neither the law nor its practitioners would be witless. The law sprang from deeper principles of justice or moral understanding; and when the law itself, in its narrow focus, seemed to confront a case beyond its terms, or a situation beyond the imagining of its drafters, those deeper principles of the law might still supply guidance. And so, Blackstone offered the example of a law, passed by Parliament, assigning to a certain man the authority “to try all causes, that arise within his manor of Dale”:

\[\text{Yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is a party, the act is construed not to extend to that; because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel.}\]

Blackstone would commonly refer to “the laws of reason and nature” as he sought to explain the grounds of judgment. We know, of course, that there are some tangled philosophic problems behind those innocent terms, “reason and nature.” We know that people could invoke “nature” while not being entirely clear as to whether they were offering generalizations about the way that most men, most of the time, tend to behave, or whether they were offering “first principles” or axioms, which have the quality of “necessary truths.” But in either event, there was a certain confidence that there were things in the domain of moral judgment that were accessible to our reason. Propositions about right and wrong were not merely matters of the most personal and subjective taste. Certain things in this domain were indeed true, which is to say, objectively true, true for others as well as ourselves. And at the very least, a lifetime of reflection on the conditions of justice or the principles of right was not thought to impair judges in the exercise of that judgment. That they were only human, that they were given to mistakes and corruption, merely confirmed the setting and conditions of the law. That state

\[2 \text{ Ibid., at 91.}\]
\[3 \text{ That critical difference is taken up in my book First Things (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), Ch. 4.}\]
of affairs did not call into question the very capacity of human beings to grasp the difference between a plausible and an implausible argument, between a reasonable and a corrupted judgment.

I was delighted, though I shouldn’t say surprised, to find that the example of Bologna was cited by one of my favorite jurists of the nineteenth century, the redoubtable Stephen J. Field. The case was *United States v. Kirby* (1868), and it involved an act of Congress, from 1825, directed against persons who “shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or of any horse or carriage carrying the same.” Kirby, who was prosecuted under the act, was a sheriff in Kentucky. He had been charged with the duty of executing a warrant for the arrest of one, Farris, who had been charged with murder. Farris happened to be a carrier of mail, and on the day of the arrest he was on a steamboat with the mail. Kirby had called to his aid a small posse of men, and together they entered the steamboat with the purpose of arresting Farris. As it was noted later, in the report of the Supreme Court, Kirby and the posse “entered the steamboat Buell to make the arrest, and only used such force as was necessary to accomplish this end; and . . . they acted without any intent or purpose to obstruct or retard the mail, or the passage of the steamer.” When Kirby’s act was set, though, against a literal rendering of the statute – a rendering, that is, detached from any sense of the moral purpose of the statute – Kirby could be prosecuted for “obstruct[ing] or retard[ing] the mail.”

But Justice Field, writing for the Court, found it incomprehensible that Kirby could be charged with any intention of “knowingly and willfully” obstructing the mails. His purpose was not to do anything with the mail, but to make a lawful arrest. The arrest might indeed have caused a certain interference with the mails, but people of ordinary sense could ordinarily make distinctions between interferences that were “justified” or “unjustified.” As Field remarked, then,

> All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.5

This bizarre reading of the law might be dismissed, of course, by some commentators as a throwback to an earlier, less sophisticated time. But they would

4 74 U.S. 482.
be making a notable mistake, for they would discount the way in which the same fallacies show a remarkable staying power among jurists, especially those who are “winging it” in their moral and jural reasoning. The most notable example cropped up in the spring of 2003, as Justice O’Connor wrote for her colleagues in addressing, again, the problem of burning crosses, this time in the case of *Virginia v. Black*. O’Connor recognized that a burning cross was established, quite clearly, in our experience, as a gesture of assault. We might say, from another angle, that the meaning of this symbol was rather firmly established in our “ordinary language,” or the way in which people commonly understand the meaning of words and symbols. In the case at hand, arising from Virginia, youngsters had burned a cross in the backyard of a black family newly moved into Virginia Beach, and in a companion case, a cross was burned at an outdoor meeting of the Ku Klux Klan in Carroll County. A statute in Virginia barred the burning of crosses with “an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” The Court showed its willingness to break away from an earlier decision on the burning of crosses, and acknowledge more readily now that this gesture of assault could be restricted under the First Amendment even though it was a species of symbolic expression.

But in a curious turn, the Court professed to be more willing to sustain convictions in these cases because the statute did not seek to ban speech directed at only certain favored classes of victims. That had been the concern animating Justice Scalia, eleven years earlier, when he wrote for the Court in striking down an ordinance in St. Paul, Minnesota, forbidding the burning of crosses. Faced then with another case, in 2003, the judges found ingredients in the case that meshed with Scalia’s earlier opinion. As Justice O’Connor noted, the burning of crosses had been used in the past against Catholics and Jews, as well as blacks; and the statute did not tie the act of intimidation to any particular group of victims. Still, over the last fifty years, the burning of crosses has been understood rather plainly as a symbol of assault against black people. Nevertheless, the Court decided to strike down the conviction of Barry Black, leading the meeting of the Ku Klux Klan, because the Supreme Court of Virginia had interpreted the statute with this rule of construction: that “the act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to intimidate, will nonetheless suffice for arrest and prosecution.” As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, the instruction offered to a jury did not bar evidence that would overcome the presumption, and permit the defendants to show that they had

---

not intended any act of intimidation. Yet, even Scalia was disposed to send the cases back to get a clearer reading of the intent of the people burning crosses. What made the issue more complicated for Justice O’Connor was the sense that not every act of burning a cross necessarily marked an intent to assault or intimidate. As O’Connor observed, “Cross burnings have appeared in movies such as Mississippi Burning, and in plays such as the stage adaptation of Sir Walter Scott’s The Lady of the Lake.”

But with that move of seeming open-mindedness to the world, the Justice detached herself from the moral reasoning that must ever be a part of the common sense that is incorporated in statutes – as in the case of Bologna in the fifteenth century. In the classic case of **Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire** (1942),8 Justice Murphy described that category of insulting or “fighting words” – “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or incite to an immediate breach of the peace.”9 They were words or symbols, once again, clearly fixed in our language, at any given time, words such as “nigger,” “kike,” “wop” (and, not so clearly, words like “meter maid” or “telemarketer”). Even people unbedecked with college degrees, people who made their livings, say, in driving trucks or digging ditches, show the most acute sense of when they are being insulted or even subtly disparaged. And yet, at the same time, people commonly understood what linguistics also taught: context was utterly necessary to meaning. Justice Murphy caught that sense of things when he referred to words spoken “without a disarming smile.” A person of ordinary wit would understand the difference between people cavorting in Nazi uniforms at the annual satire of the Harvard Lampoon, as compared with a bunch of scruffy characters parading with Nazi banners and uniforms in a Jewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois. In the same way, people could grasp, at once, the difference between a hostile mob and the crowd that welcomed home the Boston Red Sox after they had won the World Series. When a statute bars the burning of crosses, targeted at classes of persons, no one with a modicum of wit could suppose that the statute was doing anything but condemning and forbidding. What it figured to forbid were wrongful acts, acts animated by the intention of assaulting or intimidating. And no one could have supposed for a moment that the statute meant to forbid, say, the burning of crosses in a theatrical production or a film such as “Mississippi Burning.”

In other words, the legislators were not acting in a random way, without moral common sense – and neither, as it turned out, had the assailants. Mark Russell once told the story of a family of Unitarians who moved into

---

8 315 U.S. 568.
9 Ibid., at 571–72.
Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths

a southern town. In the middle of the night some bigots burned a large question mark on their lawn. Something like that might have taken place if the young men in Virginia Beach had chosen, say, to paint swastikas on the house of the black family. There would have been an act of defacing property, but the assailants might have been counted as too witless to know what they were doing in carrying out acts of intimidation. The assailants in Virginia did not suffer that distraction or confusion, and they did not choose at random from the symbols available to them in our language. They chose a burning cross, planting it in the yard of a black family, and that joining of moves should have been sufficient to mark the understanding of what they were plainly doing. The Supreme Court in Virginia had not slipped then into carelessness when it offered as a presumptive rule that “the act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to intimidate, will nonetheless suffice for arrest and prosecution” – with the defendants free, of course, to rebut that presumption. And unless justices of the Supreme Court were consumed with theories so refined that they apply only to a closed system of their own, there should have been no need to send the cases back for clarification in a lower court. The meaning of the act should have been plain enough to be judged by people of ordinary sense, who find themselves every day making discriminations among the acts that are threatening or harmless, justified or unjustified.

And so, in a scene quite familiar, a person arrives home from work and discovers that the street containing his house has been blocked off, and his entrance barred. It makes the most notable and elementary difference as to whether it was barred, say, by the fire department, because firefighters are putting out a blaze; or whether it was barred through the obstruction of a gang, closing off the street to its enemies. In common parlance, we can distinguish between cases in which the access is temporarily barred for a purpose that was justified or unjustified. The Constitution does not seek to bar all searches and seizures, but only searches that are unreasonable or unjustified. As I sought to show then in another place, the task of judgment, in our constitutional law, persistently moves us away from the text, or from a gross description of the act, and it moves us to the commonsense understanding of the principles that guide these judgments: the principles that help us in making those distinctions between the things that are justified or unjustified.

As we make that move to the ground of our judgments, we find ourselves moving back to those deeper principles that informed and guided the judgment of the Founders as they went about the task of framing the
Constitution. I argued sometime back, in a book called *Beyond the Constitution*,\(^\text{10}\) that there was a need to appeal beyond the text of the Constitution to those “first principles,” those principles antecedent to the Constitution, if we were to apply the Constitution sensibly to the cases that arise in our law. As I sought to argue, that kind of move requires a certain practice, or a kind of reflection that is distinctly philosophic. It involves a certain style of principled reasoning, a style that was cultivated quite handsomely by the jurists in the Founding generation, and even by jurists in Abraham Lincoln’s generation, even though many of them did not have the advantages of formal schooling.

In the course of making that argument, I offered as a dramatic case in point the original argument over the Bill of Rights. It seems to have slipped from the memory of most of our people—indeed, if it was ever lodged in that memory—that there was quite a serious debate about the Bill of Rights at the time of the Founding. The reservations about a Bill of Rights did not spring from people who were hostile to rights, but quite the reverse. There was a serious concern, held by some of the most thoughtful among the framers, that the Bill of Rights would have the effect of narrowing, or truncating, the rights that were protected under the Constitution. And it would have that effect mainly because it would misinstruct the American people about the ground of their rights. It has become quite common in our own time to hear people speak of “those rights we have *through* the First Amendment.” But the understanding contained in that passage reveals precisely the problem. When we speak of those rights we have “through the First Amendment,” does that not rather imply that the Amendment was the source of those rights? In the absence of the First Amendment, would we not have had those rights?

The Bill of Rights ran the risk of shaping the understanding of citizens and lawyers to this fallacy: that our rights did not spring from nature, from the things that marked our character as human beings, but that they arose merely from the law that was “posited” or written down. The rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights would be thought to have then the standing of rights, or their claim to solemnity, precisely because they had been written down, or stipulated in an inventory of “rights.” The assumption would engage itself slowly, but steadily, that the things written down were far more important as rights than the things left unmentioned. In this subtle shift we find the essential move from natural rights to positive rights, from rights grounded in the nature of human beings as “moral agents,” to the sense rather of rights that have standing as rights because we have decided, as a people, to confer

them on one another. In the age of a relativism so portable and facile, so deeply absorbed that it is rarely even noticed, many people by now have made the shift to the latter understanding without being aware that they had made any shift at all. Much less are they aware that they had made a decisive moral break from the premises of the American Founders.

In recovering this sense of the problem, I was trying to make the case for recovering at the same time the understanding of that Founding generation, for those lawyers and political men revealed furnishings of mind quite strikingly different from those of our own day. Consider the contrast: on the one hand a group of lawyers who have memorized a list of rights, set down in the first eight amendments to the Constitution; on the other hand, a generation of lawyers who had cultivated the art of tracing their judgments back to first principles and anchoring truths. There is no need for me here to renew the argument over the Bill of Rights; but there is ever a need to restore the remarkable capacity of that first generation of jurists to trace judgments back to first principles. My purpose in this book is to draw again on that perspective, cultivated long ago, for the sake of casting new light on parts of our Constitution that have remained in a curious shadow. These clauses, or doctrines, in the Constitution have become obscure to us, not because they are hidden and unfamiliar. They have become obscure, rather, because they have been placed beyond our sight, or beyond the kind of sight that looks closely, in a probing way, as though it were looking for the first time. These parts of our constitutional law have become hidden to us, even before our eyes, because they have been closed off to our inspection by understandings too quickly and complacently settled. But if we looked upon these clauses or doctrines with a fresh eye, or if we treated them as puzzles, we would find that they bear a certain mystery that beckons us in. If we respond to that beckoning, we would find, I think, that we would be drawn back to the root, to the philosophic ground of our understanding, before we could finally unlock the puzzles here, in the parts of the Constitution that we have thought, in the past, most firmly and serenely settled.

To take one notable example, the question arose during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia as to whether the framers should descend to the exercise of specifying particular kinds of rights, such as the right not to suffer the imposition of laws made “ex post facto.” Roughly speaking, those were laws made after the fact, imposing penalties or enlarging them. And with this kind of a move, the law would make punishable something that had not been considered wrongful before the passage of the law. Or at least that was, by and large, the sense of the problem with “ex post facto laws.” And yet, when the proposal was made to mention ex post facto laws explicitly, in the
body of the Constitution, both Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson entered some rather refined reservations. It was not that they doubted in the least the wrong of ex post facto laws. It was rather that the wrong was so obvious, and so widely known, that it was almost embarrassing to set it down as though the framers were proclaiming news.\textsuperscript{11}

If there was any principle of constitutional government that had, for the Founders, a necessary force and a crisp definition, it was the principle that barred ex post facto laws. And yet, as I will try to show, there is a certain puzzle about the meaning of “ex post facto” laws, which emerges as soon as we look more closely into the subject. We come to discover, for example, that there are many instances, in our experience, of laws applying retrospectively. The fact that they administer surprises, and catch people unaware, has not been regarded as a decisive count against them. Consider – as we will later – that unlucky fellow, the first man to be sued because he had given herpes to his partner in sex. There had been no statutes or laws on the subject. No court had found people liable in the past for affecting others with the virus. And yet, courts came to the judgment \textit{that he should have known}. What exactly he should have known and how he should have known it – those things I’ll consider in due course in the opening chapter. I would also underscore the point that the law had placed these burdens of “knowing,” not on people trained in the law, or people in high office, but on ordinary folk, of no special distinction, who were simply functioning in the world. Yet, stories to tell in the ranks of the celebrities as well. During the 1980s, some rather important people, in offices of state, were embarrassed by certain laws, bristling with moral consequence, which were enacted and enforced \textit{after the fact}. It is curious that even the engagement of celebrities did not seem to draw much attention to the fact that they had become the targets of ex post facto laws. The matter seemed to go strangely unnoticed by the world of law – but on that, more later.

I would suggest, then, that we treat the matter as the puzzle it is, and open ourselves to the mystery contained in the problem. For when we do, we find that the strands or the paths of reflection will lead us back to a philosophic root that runs even deeper. In the course of following out those paths, we may also illuminate something more about the conditions of constitutional government and that creature who is destined, by nature, to live in a \textit{polis}, an association governed by law. To deepen the problem, I’d suggest that some of the same points of fascination can be found by treating, as problematic, other

Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths

notions that have been long settled. One such famous notion, passing from concepts into legend, has been the notion of “prior restraints” on publication. That term achieved a remarkable standing only in 1931, in the classic case of Near v. Minnesota. But by the time we reached the Pentagon Papers case in 1971, it was clear that the term had a near iconic standing. In that sweep of development, all too uncritical, something of moral substance was lost. I propose to take another, critical look at those cases, with the willingness to argue that the decisions in those cases might actually have been wrong; that there really could not be a plausible principle of constitutional law that rules out, categorically, all species of restraints in advance of publication. In that respect, I find myself running against the dominant lines of interpretation, which have hardened now into orthodoxies in the schools of law.

And just to make that point even clearer, I take the occasion, in one chapter, to offer, not an apology, but a defense of Lochner v. New York (1905). That case seems to inspire an even-handed condemnation, from the political Right as well as the Left. Yet, if we could detach ourselves from the slogans built up over the years, and look at the case again, it would become apparent, I think, that the cast of argument in Lochner, with Justice Rufus Peckham’s opinion, marks the cast of our law today. For Justice Hugo Black and the judges of the New Deal, it became important to reject Lochner and discredit its principles. But after Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, the Court brought forth a new jurisprudence, grounded in notions of “privacy” and personal autonomy, and that new doctrine would soon encompass a “right to abortion.” Justice Black was a notable dissenter in the Griswold case, and it should have been apparent to anyone with the slenderest acquaintance with the law that the decisions on privacy and abortion had to rest on the most thoroughgoing rejection of the liberal jurisprudence of the New Deal. That is not to say that the jurisprudence of Rufus Peckham and the Old Court would have brought forth a “right to abortion.” But it does suggest that any serious defense of rights will find its way back to the logic of natural rights, and there the understanding of Peckham and the Old Court would provide a more coherent fit. In fact, if we look again, and look anew – if we look with a willingness actually to read Peckham’s opinions – we would find, in Peckham and his so-called conservative colleagues, a far more expansive view of personal freedom than the view we associate with the liberal judges of the New Deal. And if the question of the case arose for us in another form – say, in restricting the hours of work for assistant professors, or for people spending long hours over keyboards – the response of the judges is virtually certain to follow the lines of Peckham’s understanding in Lochner. Peckham and Lochner are remarkably closer to us than most commentators seem willing