

Witness Testimony Evidence

Recent work in artificial intelligence has increasingly turned to argumentation as a rich interdisciplinary area of research that can provide new methods related to evidence and reasoning in the area of law. In this book, Douglas Walton provides an introduction to basic concepts, tools, and methods in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence as applied to the analysis and evaluation of witness testimony. He shows how witness testimony is by its nature inherently fallible and sometimes subject to disastrous failures. At the same time, if used properly, such testimony can provide evidence that it is not only necessary but inherently reasonable for logically guided legal experts to accept or reject a claim. Walton shows how to overcome the traditional disdain for witness testimony as a type of evidence shown by logical positivists and the views of trial skeptics who doubt that trial rules deal with witness testimony in a way that yields a rational decision-making process. This book will be of interest to those who work in the areas of analytical philosophy, informal logic, artificial intelligence, and law.

Douglas Walton is professor of philosophy at the University of Winnipeg. An internationally recognized scholar of argumentation theory and logic, he is the author of many books, most recently *Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law* and *Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation*. Dr. Walton's research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Isaak Walton Killam Memorial Foundation.



Witness Testimony Evidence

Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence, and Law

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For Karen, with love.



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