

Introduction

Religion and politics are two fundamental dimensions of human society, and yet they are often at loggerheads. Religion appears to belong to a different realm, signifying matters that are permanent and enduring, residing beyond the everyday. Politics appears to involve the secular struggle for power and influence, being driven by interest. I use this verb (to appear) because in fact religion and politics are almost inevitably entwined and they are both deeply concerned with the control or regulation of everyday affairs. Max Weber at the very beginning of *The sociology of religion* (1966b) said that religion is fundamentally concerned with the things of this world such as health and wealth. He went on to argue that politics inevitably involves power and violence, but that religion (at least organized forms of religion) also involves symbolic violence. Excommunication would be one obvious example of symbolic violence. These claims may not appear to be immediately self-evident, since surely religion also involves the gentle cultivation of the soul, while politics involves the development of the citizen in the public domain. Weber's sociology is ultimately tragic because religion as a universal ethic of brotherly love is inevitably at odds with 'the world', and religion is almost always compromised or defeated by the forces of this world.

In classical thought this relationship between politics and religion was analysed in terms of an important distinction between state-craft and soul-craft. The Good Society required both a successful management of public affairs through the wise leadership of the state and an inner discipline of the citizen to harness passion and to direct interest for the public good. In the modern world we are in danger of losing both. With the growth of the mass media in electoral democracies, politicians are driven by the need for high ratings in opinion polls, and seek celebrity rather than wisdom. We judge them in terms of their performance in economic terms such as the rate of unemployment, and rather less in terms of their religious beliefs and their moral standing. Their policies are typically short term, because in democracies they need to win elections,

and hence their political tactics are often based on the findings of the most recent focus groups rather than on the long-term needs of society. The lack of serious attention to the environment as a long-term strategy and willingness to support ‘fracking’ for oil and gas despite its negative effect on the water supply in the United States is a case in point. The idea of ‘politics as a vocation’ in Weber’s famous lecture of 1919 has been overtaken by ‘politics as a game’ (Weber, 2009a), and all too often citizens are driven by consumerism rather than by self-discipline. Perhaps only a simultaneous revival of the religious as collective practice and the political as vocation can restore the importance of ‘the public’ to our otherwise exclusively private lives?

This book addresses the core issues of rulership in classical politics: the One, the Many and the Other. Politics concerns the enduring question: can a unity be forged out of the inevitable diversity of a society that has arisen with the Many, especially when in modern societies with the growth of ethnic diversity and multiculturalism the majority often believes it is confronted by minorities (the Other)? In classical antiquity diversity in the *polis* was thought to emerge from family and gender differences, namely particularistic interests that appeared to confront the unity that underpinned the emergence of the city-state. With conquest there was another diversity arising from the presence of slaves and strangers. In *Fear of diversity* Arlene Saxonhouse (1992) proposed that the very foundation of politics had its origin in these differences which threatened the possibility of the One. Heraclitus spoke of the *nomoi* or the walls of the city as the basis for the rule of the One, but also saw this principle of unity as a metaphor for the order of nature. This idea is the root of the sociological concept of *anomie* or a crisis in the normative ordering of the modern city. In the modern world social diversity has increasingly focused on religious differences emerging from the presence of minorities whose existence in the mega-city is a consequence of a pattern of global labour migration. Jacques Derrida (2000) in a series of seminars and in conversation with Anne Dufourmantelle around the question of hospitality in Greek politics explored the issue of the Foreigner and the City, and the emergence of a pact with such strangers. This democratic debate about the Other and the Many has since 9/11 focused almost exclusively on the growth of Muslim minorities in the West, but in fact the divisions around religious identity are more general than simply a conflict between Christianity and Islam. Indeed, excessive attention to Islam by the

media has become part of the problem rather than a contribution to any solution.

Religious conflict may occur when incommensurable claims to a special way of life (the Truth) collide in the same space, and when the secular framework of the state (such as the rule of law and egalitarian citizenship) fails to secure a level playing field between minorities and the majority. These tensions are often magnified when religion becomes deeply embedded in ethnic identity and is further galvanized by the force of nationalism. Many of these conflicts are the legacy of European colonialism, especially in South Asia and Africa, where state borders have little relevance to the complex geography of ethnic communities on the ground. In *The new religious intolerance* Martha Nussbaum (2012) considers many examples of religious intolerance, but the preponderance of cases is concerned with intolerance towards Islam. In fact, her argument about democracies typically comes down to the idea of a 'level playing field', namely that one basic requirement of tolerance is that all religions should be treated equally (by the state) in the public arena, unless there is 'compelling state interest' to do otherwise. She offers many examples where the state in democracies appears to support majorities against minorities, thereby failing to protect the need for tolerance in multicultural and diverse societies. One example concerns permission for religious minorities to construct their own places of worship. In Switzerland a popular referendum voted to ban the building of minarets despite the fact that only 4 out of 150 mosques have minarets. In Chicago the zoning board of DuPage County turned down a plan to build a mosque at Willowbrook despite the fact that the board had already allowed the construction of a Buddhist meditation centre, a Chinmaya mission and an Orthodox church. However, her primary example of discrimination through urban planning is the case of Park51 in New York, in close proximity to Ground Zero (Nussbaum, 2012: 188–239), where the plan by Muslims to build an inter-faith cultural centre in which there would be a facility for Muslim prayer caused a national debate. This issue is complex because even people who supported the site in principle on the basis of tolerance thought that the choice of this specific site was insensitive, and probably unwise. However, Nussbaum points out that the same urban area contained strip clubs, an off-track betting facility, liquor stores, restaurants and so forth. Given that Ground Zero has become a sacred space, why not also object to such facilities rather than concentrating on Park51? Nussbaum

proposes that we need to respond to such conflicts not just with laws and public vigilance, but with imagination, insight and sympathy. I propose that we call this imaginative response ‘cosmopolitan virtue’, which I shall discuss in the final chapter, suggesting that in complex societies we require some degree of personal irony in order to be able to understand our own prejudices in the light of other cultures. Cosmopolitanism in modern societies is one possible response to the eruption of the Many and the challenge of the Other.

With globalization, these historical tensions are further inflamed by conflict over scarce resources, especially the material resources of oil and water. Social conflict is often magnified in circumstances where a majority feels it is threatened by a minority; much of the Islamophobia in Europe has assumed this character. In both Norway and Britain Muslims represent a minority of the population, but in both societies right-wing movements – the Norwegian Defence League and the English Defence League – have drawn enough support, typically from the urban working class, to be able to suggest that there is a cultural threat from the alleged growth of the *shari'a*. Martha Nussbaum also draws attention to differences in response to minorities in the United States and Europe. Societies such as the United States, Canada and Australia are by origin societies of migration and difference, but in European societies membership is defined more in terms of a shared ethno-religious culture than of shared political values. In the United States there has been relatively little public hostility to veiling by Muslim women, whereas in parts of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium there are regulations preventing public employees from wearing the headscarf. However, in 2011–12 in the build-up to the selection of Republican presidential candidates there was growing evidence of hostility to the *shari'a* in the United States. These developments raise obvious questions about the future of multiculturalism and about the role of civil religion in providing a cultural framework within which religious diversity need not be corrosive of the social fabric. Some of these issues relating to the law and religion are discussed in Chapters 11 and 13.

In this volume I argue that in discussion of the political we also have to take into account the core issue of religion, which involves the continuous reproduction of the social through a ‘chain of memory’ (Hervieu-Léger, 2000). In classical sociology Émile Durkheim saw the role of religion as forging a basis for social solidarity in human societies. Indeed, more fundamentally in his *The elementary forms of religious life*

(2001), the social can be said to have erupted out of the sacred. He took as his basic model for the contrast between the sacred and the profane the symbolic world of the Aborigines of northern central Australia, but modern society no longer enjoys the dense solidarity – or ‘mechanical solidarity’, in Durkheim’s terminology – of such forms of the One. Durkheim never found an entirely satisfactory answer to the question: where are the sources of social solidarity in modern complex societies? He was influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea of a ‘civil religion’, which Rousseau had described in 1762 in the conclusion to his *Social contract* (1973). For Rousseau Christianity could not satisfy the needs of a modern society, and he envisaged a secularized form of religious belief and practice that could provide citizens with a common framework. In contemporary sociology this idea was developed to great effect by Robert Bellah in a variety of articles on the civil religion in America (Bellah and Tipton, 2006). The issue of civil religion is explored in Chapter 7 in the context of a debate about the sources of political legitimacy in democratic societies.

However, in a complex modern society, especially where there has been some fragmentation of the social world, the idea that civil religion could balance the domination of One and the democratic diversity of the Many, while also including the Other, looks unpromising as a solution to the problems of late modernity. In the contemporary world the prospect of a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1997) is an obvious threat to civil stability, and the rise of religious conflict looks as likely as the flowering of civil religion. There are many sources of diversity in Western societies: the growth of substantial minorities, the political experiment with multiculturalism, the development of legal pluralism, the fragmentation of national educational curricula by the development of separate religious schools, and the privatization of many public utilities. In much of Europe we have also weakened or destroyed public institutions that once contributed to a public world or ‘commonwealth’ such as universal military conscription, a common and unified system of taxation, the common law, the Christian calendar, the welfare state and public broadcasting. There is a widespread belief among sociologists that the communal roots of society have been undermined by urbanization, secularization and the decline of the family (Nisbet, 1990). The emphasis on the market to increase efficiency, expand consumer choice and control prices (assuming these objectives can be realized by free markets) does nothing to create social solidarity. There are of course

many policies to counteract such tendencies towards social fragmentation including support for ‘group rights’, more flexible forms of citizenship, more generous conditions for the naturalization of migrants, legislation against discrimination on racial grounds and, more broadly, the promotion of normative belief systems that celebrate diversity such as cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2009). By extension, it is argued that human rights offer certain solutions to communal tensions that are institutionally superior to the social rights of citizenship, which have an inevitably exclusionary character. The ‘right to have rights’ is seen by many philosophers as the baseline for recognition of membership in a shared community (Benhabib, 2004). In Chapter 3 I look at the history of rights against the background of religious conflict and war. Recent literature on the history of human rights has drawn attention to the importance of Christianity in shaping the contents of human rights values and legislation. In particular, I argue that a sociology of human rights regards these rights as manifestations of what Norbert Elias (2000) called ‘the civilizing process’. We can regard the expansion of human rights as an example of ‘the civilizing process’, offsetting the negative consequences of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’. There are many examples to suggest that violence (as illustrated by homicide, rape, lynching, domestic violence and so forth) has declined in the late twentieth century as a result of this civilizing process (Pinker, 2011). Nevertheless, the balance between social solidarity, social differentiation and cultural diversity is unstable, if not precarious.

The deeper issue behind both the advocacy and criticisms of human rights, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism as responses to the Other is the question of secularization. Taking the separation of church and state as a minimal definition of secularization, we can ask whether this constitutional separation, which to some extent had its origins in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, is an essential precondition of social harmony. Is liberal secularity capable of securing a peace between contending traditions in the public sphere? There are many who argue that, while liberal secularism achieved a religious peace between Protestants and Catholics, this version of secularization is no longer relevant to a modern society in which there may be an array of religious traditions that cannot be accommodated within these liberal conditions (Spinner-Halevy, 2005). One liberal answer to these dilemmas was developed by John Rawls who, especially in *Political liberalism* (1993), identified a set of conditions that must be

met by any community that aspires to be a decent, liberal society with a system of meaningful deliberation and consultation between citizens. This framework has been further elaborated by Jürgen Habermas (2006) in the idea of a post-secular society as a framework for situating religion in the public sphere. In such a society secularists have to take religious beliefs seriously and religious citizens have to give public reasons for their faith. This form of dialogue can contribute to democratic cultures through mutual recognition.

Liberalism can be regarded as an ideal or even utopian characterization of the relationship between religion and politics. In this study we need to keep in mind two significant historical departures from this liberal model, namely Caesarism and theocracy. When the state draws religion into its own sphere we get a form of combined power, or 'Caesarism'. When organized religion draws the state into its orbit we have a theocratic power. Throughout this work, but especially in Part II, I consider a number of different case studies in order to grasp the complexity of the relations between political power and religious institutions, including the Buddhist monarchies of Thailand, Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism in China, Japanese Shinto and emperor worship, and authoritarianism from the Russian state to the soft authoritarianism of Singapore. To take one example, Chinese Communism tried to destroy the religious traditions of ancient China. In particular, Maoism sought to weed out the legacy of Confucianism and feudalism, but paradoxically Mao himself became a god-like figure and the Cultural Revolution had all the hallmarks of religious enthusiasm. In modern-day China I explore in Chapter 9 the revival of religions following the reforms of Deng Xiaoping and also pay attention to the regulation of 'cults' such as Falun Gong. In the West, liberalism attempts to solve these issues by separating religion and politics, but I shall attempt to demonstrate in this volume that the state adopts a 'management of religion' as a strategy to avoid religious conflict in the public sphere. The state management of religious activity, which has been historically described in the Christian tradition as Erastianism, is discussed in the final chapter as a response to problems relating to civil conflict.

In *Religion and modern society* (Turner, 2011c) I explored many contemporary issues surrounding citizenship, secularization and religion. Given the problems raised by religious and cultural identities in societies with sizeable minorities, the state has exercised a management of religion to secure social peace. This strategy involves, as a minimum, various

legislative responses such as precluding hate speech in public or censorship of controversial publications; but these interventions can go far deeper into religious life by regulating religious practice – most dramatically by banning the Muslim *burqa* in public spaces. In the final chapter I argue that in the United States and Great Britain the intervention of the state into religious dress, tribunals, and leadership in Muslim communities has the effect of creating an ‘Official Islam’ (Rascoff, 2012).

In Chapter 1 I take up the issue of the ‘fear of diversity’ by looking at the Norwegian tragedy of July 2011 when Anders Behring Breivik killed seventy-seven people on the island of Utoya. In his Manifesto he imagined this attack as part of a crusade against Muslims and a warning against the imminent Islamization of European civilization. This tragic event provides me with the pretext for a more general consideration of the political problem in modern Europe, where a majority feels threatened by a minority and where as a result there has been widespread increase in state security and often a departure from previous government policies in support of multicultural diversity. In Chapter 2 I return to the intellectual roots of many of these debates, namely Max Weber’s theory of charisma. This sociological framework is developed by looking at aspects of popular religion and the state in the struggle between Fascism and socialism in Italy in the first half of the twentieth century. The chapter looks at two examples – Mussolini and Padre Pio – to develop the theory of charisma via an inquiry into the body and manifestations of the sacred. Both the state and the official religious hierarchy attempt to control the manifestation of charisma, which is inevitably a challenge to established conventions. The body also plays a large part in popular religious movements, where the embodiment of religious charisma is a special source of power. This discussion raises a general problem regarding the burial of charismatic figures.

In Chapter 3 I turn to the history of citizenship by taking three formative moments in the growth of rights: the writing of St Augustine’s *The City of God*; the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia; and the proclamation of the Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. The background to the emergence of rights has often been violent – the sacking of Rome, the Wars of Religion, and the Second World War – and each of these texts addressed issues about the Other. In the case of Augustine, it was the Jews; in the Westphalian Treaty, the conflict between Catholics and Protestants; and in the twentieth century, the industrialization of warfare.

In Part II I continue with the theme of diversity and unity in the contemporary world by turning attention to a set of comparative case studies which show how and why the state intervenes in religious life in Western societies. These chapters cover the interaction between religion and politics in the creation of kingship, taking as my illustration the rituals that have surrounded investiture. Coronation rituals in the United Kingdom provide a useful example of the role of public liturgies, and raise further questions about the role of religion in public life and in secular society. The persistence of constitutional monarchies presents troublesome questions about the separation of church and state. Some of these issues can be usefully explored by reference to the secular constitution of the United States. Chapter 4 recognizes the fact that liturgical practice has declined in Western democracies and prayer has become increasingly private and personal, playing little role in secular societies as a public activity. Chapter 5 examines the modern paradox of marriage. In the modern world engagement and marriage are typically interpreted as the outcomes of individual romantic choices that are private, but marriage as an institution is also profoundly public. The state has had an interest in marriage for the obvious reason that it is an institution for legitimate reproduction and the stable transition of property. However, many societies have now reached 'sub-optimal fertility'. With low and declining fertility rates, many states are closely and directly involved in monitoring the sex lives of citizens with a view to stimulating higher fertility. With secularization, marriage is both declining and changing profoundly – for example, to include same-sex marriage. In the absence of adoption, same-sex marriage will by definition not contribute to national fertility rate, and we might reasonably ask: why is the state concerned with such arrangements? One trivial answer is that any redefinition of marriage gives rise to considerable conflict in society between evangelical Christians who vigorously oppose these developments and liberal lobby groups who see gay rights as consistent with individual liberties. Same-sex marriage is defended mainly on the grounds that gender should not be a consideration in a marriage contract between two consenting adults. Why not go further in redefining marriage? Recent legislation in the state of New York has recognized gay marriage. Could a liberal society go further to recognize polygamy? In any case American society has a history of polygamy in various stages of the evolution of Mormonism and in contemporary sectarian offshoots such as the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ

of Latter-Day Saints. Feminist critics also argue that polygamy is difficult to regulate, because men will often form secret marriages with other women or have mistresses, thereby creating a form of de facto or informal polygamy. These developments raise an issue about the redefinition of marriage by the state. Can the state and the churches work together, for example in supporting ‘covenant marriage’, and should the definition of marriage be handed over to the churches?

Chapter 6 looks at the problem of conversion as a disruptive force in both traditional and modern societies. Because religious identity is powerfully interconnected with political identity, religious conversion has inevitable consequences for secular affairs. For example, the Jews were a problematic minority in the history of Western Christendom, and many attempts were made to convert them by the force of law. There are many other examples of conflicts surrounding conversion, and I take as a modern example the problem of Christian conversions in Indonesia. While conversion raises questions about public identities, there is also a debate about the authenticity of conversions that emerge as a result of legal constraint or the threat of violence. This chapter also examines many of the theoretical issues arising in the study of conversion. Through a discussion of the legacy of the pragmatic psychology of William James, I consider modern debates about the intentionality and emotionality of conversion. In the anthropology of religion the notion of conversion has been repeatedly challenged by anthropologists, who claim that these features (intentionality, individualism and emotionality) are not general or universal aspects of religious change. The history of Christian missions in Asia and Australia raises interesting problems about ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’ as general categories. The chapter concludes by looking at the problem of free will (or intentionality) in Christian doctrine, pointing to ironic similarities between Augustine’s theory of habit and intention and Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas of habitus, embodiment and hexis.

Chapter 7 examines issues about legitimacy in modern societies in which the authority of natural law and the church has been replaced by a dependence on more secular sources of authority. Max Weber’s theory of authority or legitimate domination (charisma, tradition and legal rationality) is developed into a model that argues that modern legitimate domination can draw on three basic sources: legitimacy, legality and performance. In modernity these three are typically secular forms of legitimacy, but they are confronted by serious limitations. In modern democracies citizens are suspicious of claims to legitimacy and