INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, there has been a veritable explosion of Anglo-American interest in the works of Weimar constitutional and political theorist, Carl Schmitt.[1] Even before joining the National Socialist party in 1933,

[1] Recent full-length studies on Schmitt include the reissue of George Schwab's *Challenge of The Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936* (Westport: Greenwood, 1989); Schmitt's intellectual-political biography by Joseph Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); as well as Paul Edward Gottfried's *Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory* (Westport: Greenwood, 1990). Perhaps surprisingly, it has been scholars on the Left who have been the most active in promoting Schmitt in the English-speaking world. The journal *Telos* devoted a whole issue to Schmitt (no. 72, summer 1987) and regularly publishes translations of, and commentaries on, his work by G. L. Ulmen. The following monographs by veterans of the new Left also confront Schmitt's work seriously: Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Paul Hirst, *Law, Socialism and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1986); and Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993). Jürgen Habermas, Stephen Holmes, and Richard Wolin, on the other hand, express dismay over, and advise caution toward, this new enthusiasm for Schmitt. See Habermas, "The Horrors of Autonomy," in *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate,* trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); Holmes, "The Scourge of Liberalism," *The New Republic* 199 (August 22, 1988); and Wolin, "Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism and the Total State," in *The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). For a critical survey of the recent literature on Schmitt, see Tracy B. Strong's "Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt," in the most recent edition of Schmitt's *Concept of the Political,* trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

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Schmitt launched incessant theoretical assaults against liberalism in the twenties and early thirties. He depicted the principles of pluralism, publicity, discussion, and representation; the practices of separation of powers, judicial review, and majoritarian elections; and such institutions as the Western European parliament as misguided and dangerous endeavors that ultimately only paralyze the modern state. Such principles and practices inhibit a state's ability to decide on the unavoidable question of friend and enemy, what he termed "the political,"[2] as well as leave it vulnerable to an unforeseen emergency, which he called the "exception."[3]

Almost concurrently there has been a revival in the treatment of technology as a subject worthy of social-philosophical inquiry. Attention is again being devoted to the theoretical and political implications of technology's seemingly ever-expanding role in contemporary Western postindustrial societies and to the arguments developed to address this issue in twentieth-century German theoretical traditions: recent efforts explicitly draw on Edmund Husserl and phenomenology, Martin Heidegger and existentialism, Georg Lukács and critical theory, as well as the thought of Hannah Arendt.[4]

Yet the two scholarly movements have surprisingly passed each other by. Surprisingly because, as I will demonstrate, the German critique of technology is crucial for understanding the works of Carl Schmitt, especially his criticisms of liberalism. Vice versa, theoretical confrontations with technology, often dismissed as excessively abstract, overly metaphysical, or hopelessly "mystical," might benefit in certain ways by observing how Schmitt incorporated a theoretical engagement with technology into practical-political treatises, as well as by witnessing how the issue of technology can be put to reactionary political ends at particular historical moments. In this way, the conjuncture of the critiques of liberalism and technology in Schmitt's writings may shed fresh light on the once again relevant problem

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2 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (1932), trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), hereafter *CP*.

3 Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (1922), trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), p. 5; hereafter *PT*.

4 For a fair sample of this literature, consult the titles in *The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Technology,* directed by Don Ihde, such as Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); and Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay, eds., *Technology and the Politics of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). Not in this series but also of note are Andrew Feenberg, *Critical Theory of Technology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Roger Fellows, ed., *Philosophy and Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David J. Hess, *Science and Technology in a Multicultural World: The Cultural Politics of Facts and Artifacts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Bruno Latour, *Aramis, or the Love of Technology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

of "technocracy" in liberal democratic regimes and the potential for author-
itarianism that is latent within it.[5] Why does technology become the object
of political-philosophical contestation during times of structural socioeco-
nomic change, such as that of Weimar Germany and our own as well? How
does technology become a rallying cry for both right- and left-wing intellec-
tuals during such moments?[6] What are the continuities between that earlier
moment's ideological debates and those of our own, especially the often-
unacknowledged relationship between interwar German fascism and post-
war American "conservatism?" Is there cause for alarm in the fact that
Schmitt's work has been revived simultaneously with a reemergence of the
kind of right-wing political activity that Schmitt himself endorsed? These
are some of the questions I address in this study of Schmitt, liberalism, and
technology.

Schmitt's Weimar works are rightly viewed as some of the most stunning
critiques of liberalism and parliamentary democracy ever penned and cer-
tainly deserve the aforementioned scholarly attention that they have re-
ceived in North America, however late. Yet, although this scholarship does
indeed concentrate on such themes as Schmitt's famous "friend/enemy"
distinction, his fascination with the political "exception," and his claim that
liberalism is incapable of successfully realizing substantive democracy, by
neglecting the technology question in Schmitt's thought, this scholarship
has not completely examined the theoretical grounds for such arguments
and has consequently missed, to some extent, the fuller implications of
Schmitt's critique. For instance, Chantal Mouffe recognizes that Schmitt
criticizes the institutions of "liberal parliamentary democracy" as "mere in-

5   The chief example of how the technological determinism of orthodox Marxism was appro-
    priated in the seventies to justify the revival of traditional values by "neoconservatism" is the
    work of Daniel Bell: see *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1972);
    and *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1978). The attempt to
    impose a cultural asceticism by appeals to supposedly irresistible technological imperatives
    is quite dominant today. For a lucid and now classic account of how state functioning in
    Western mass democracies has become increasingly governed by the questions of efficiency
    and control at the expense of the normative principles of democratic accountability – a
    description that does *not* lapse into neoconservative excess – see Claus Offe, *Contradictions of
    the Welfare State*, ed. John Keane (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). See also the more
    recent book by Carol J. Hager, *Technological Democracy: Bureaucracy and Citizenry in the German
    Energy Debate* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
6   For an early sociohistorical analysis of such questions, see Charles Maier, "Between Taylor-
    ism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the
    1920s," *Journal of Contemporary History* 5 (1970); and for a more recent socio-aesthetic one,
    see the essays contained in Andreas Huyssen, *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture,
    Postmodernism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

strumental techniques"; Ellen Kennedy declares that "the dilemma of modern jurisprudence in Schmitt's thinking is a result of its place between theology and technology"; Joseph Cropsey observes that in Schmitt's worldview, "Liberalism is . . . complicitous with communism in standing for the withering away of the political and replacing it with the technological"; and Keith Tribe observes that for Schmitt politics is "not simply a product of political machinery."[7] Yet despite illuminating other important aspects of Schmitt's thought, these scholars, like most others, neglect to sufficiently follow through on these observations.[8] As already mentioned, the literature dealing with twentieth-century German perspectives on technology has done little to fill this void.[9]

My claim is that Schmitt's critique of liberalism – particularly as it is directed at modern parliamentarism and constitutional law – is based on a broader criticism of modern thought that he sees as having been infiltrated by the technological, which he often equates with the economic and the positivistic. Therefore, the criticisms of liberalism in such influential Weimar works as *The Concept of the Political, Political Theology, Parlamentarismus,* and *Verfassungslehre,*[10] are extensions, or even applications, of the more general criticisms of modernity put forth most powerfully in such less-discussed works as *Political Romanticism, Roman Catholicism and Political Form,* "The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations," and *Theodor Däubler's "Northern Lights."*[11] Thus, to appreciate fully Schmitt's enterprise, one needs

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7   Mouffe, *The Return of the Political,* p. 120. Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School," *Telos* 71 (spring 1987): 41. Cropsey, foreword to Heinrich Meier, *Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue,* trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. x. Tribe, introduction to *Social Democracy and the Rule of Law: Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann,* ed. Keith Tribe (London: Unwin & Allen, 1987), p. 10.

8   Jerry Z. Muller and Richard Wolin, on the other hand, present Schmitt as a rather unmitigated *advocate* of technology: see Muller, "Carl Schmitt, Hans Freyer and the Radical Conservative Critique of Liberal Democracy in the Weimar Republic," *History of Political Thought* 12:4 (winter 1991); and Wolin, "Carl Schmitt, the Conservative Revolutionary: Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror," *Political Theory* 20:3 (August 1992).

9   There is little mention of Schmitt at all in the philosophy of technology literature except for Jeffrey Herf's *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), which relies too heavily on the misinterpretation of Schmitt's attitude toward technology put forth by Karl Heinz Bohrer in the otherwise excellent *Die Aesthetik des Schreckens: Die pessimistische Romantik und Ernst Jüngers Frühwerk* (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1978).

10 *CP* and *PT;* Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (1923), trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), hereafter *P;* Carl Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre* ([1928] Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989), hereafter *V.*

11 Carl Schmitt, *Political Romanticism* (1919), trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), hereafter *PR; Roman Catholicism and Political Form* (1923), trans. G. L. Ulmen

to see more clearly – in total, and beyond mere apology and polemic – what it is that Schmitt is actually trying to refute and combat.

Title and Methodology

The title of this book is somewhat deceiving. In the first place, it potentially misleads with regard to the exact status of technology within Schmitt's thought. The German language has several words that may all, to some degree or another, be accurately translated as "technology": *Technik, Technizität,* and *Technologie.* Early in his career, Schmitt employed the first two terms more or less interchangeably but later differentiated between the two, eventually criticizing the second, *technicity,* more intensely than the first, *technology.* I will elaborate on the significance of these distinctions at length in the book, especially in Chapters 1 and 2.[12] What will become clear is that for Schmitt technology is something much more than the commonplace notion of "applied science."

   My title might also lead one to believe that liberalism is Schmitt's chief or sole intellectual-political nemesis, when in fact this may not be so. Socialism, domestically manifested in revolutionary and reformist parties and externally manifested in the Soviet Union, is the political ideology that clearly most rouses Schmitt's ire. However, the fact that to Schmitt's mind liberalism as a hegemonic political theory and as a ruling political order in the Weimar Republic weakened Germany's position vis-à-vis socialism internally and internationally indeed made liberalism an unavoidable object of his

(Westport: Greenwood, 1996), hereafter *RC;* "The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations" (1929), trans. Matthias Konzett and John P. McCormick, *Telos* 96 (summer 1993), hereafter *ND; Theodor Däublers "Nordlicht": Drei Studien über die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualität des Werkes* ([1916] Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), hereafter *N.*

12   Here it can be said that the distinction between *Technik* and *Technizität* for Schmitt corresponds fairly closely to the differentiation discerned by R. L. Rutsky in an analysis of Weimar dispositions towards technology: the former, "a rationalist, functionalist notion of technology" and the latter, "a notion that emphasizes the irrational, chaotic, and even the destructive aspects of technology, that sees it as a dynamic, shocking, almost libidinal force." Rutsky, "The Mediation of Technology and Gender: *Metropolis,* Nazism, Modernism," *New German Critique* 60 (fall 1993). Miriam Hansen and Reiner Schürmann helpfully explicate the use of terms pertaining to technology in the work of two representatives of the intellectual traditions between which I seek to situate Schmitt as a procedural point of departure – T. W. Adorno and Martin Heidegger, respectively: see Hansen, "Introduction to Adorno's 'Transparencies on Film' (1966)," *New German Critique* 24–5 (fall/winter 1981–2); and Schürmann, "Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on 'That Which Saves' in the Global Reach," in *Technology in the Western Political Tradition,* ed. A. M. Melzer, J. Weinberger, and M. R. Zinman (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

critical attention. Moreover, because it is liberalism that stands "victorious" over state socialism today, it is this aspect of Schmitt's project that is my principle focus.

I do however believe that my title, *Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology,* specifies certain crucial aspects of Schmitt's thought that I wish to emphasize in this study. The oppositional preposition "against" reflects the confrontational quality of the theorist of the friend/enemy distinction. "Politics" has a special connotation for the theorist of "the political," which in Schmitt's sense implies the ever-present possibility of conflict that modern "technology," as a supposedly neutral force, attempts to suppress. As I will show, Schmitt explicitly equates liberalism – that is, governmentally, the constitutional and institutional guarantee of limited government and individual rights; culturally, the emphasis on compromise over conflict, and the individual over the group – with this neutralizing technical force. I do not use "critique" in the sense of mere criticism but rather in the philosophically dialectical sense of analyzing something from within its own categories, such that the rational core of the object of investigation is preserved. As I hope to show, Schmitt's critique of liberalism does indeed indicate elements that are potentially problematic with the theory and practice of liberalism, *as well as* that which ought to be preserved from liberalism in changing historical contexts. This last fact will come as a surprise to many, as it certainly would have to Schmitt himself. Furthermore, my own critique of Schmitt will indicate not only the elements of his theory that are not adequate to modern democratic theory but also that which is worth taking seriously in his thought. In my estimation, the North American reception of Schmitt's work has been too often characterized by an insufficiently theorized staking of positions. Schmitt is either denounced almost out of hand from a liberal or neoleftist standpoint[13] or positively appropriated perhaps a bit too unreflectively for a leftist or rightist political agenda.[14]

In the course of this study, it will often appear as though I merely recon-

13 See Martin Jay, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable?" *Telos* 71 (spring 1987); and Jeffrey Herf's contribution to "Reading and Misreading Schmitt: An Exchange," *Telos* 74 (winter 1987–8).

14 The editors of the journal *Telos* draw on Schmitt to fill the apparent lacunae in the state theory of the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory, and Chantal Mouffe deploys Schmitt in a poststructuralist critique of liberalism in *The Return of the Political*. See Richard Bellamy and Peter Baehr, "Carl Schmitt and the Contradictions of Liberal Democracy," *European Journal of Political Research* 23 (February 1993) for a left-liberal use of Schmitt. The major effort to revive Schmitt for a contemporary right-wing theoretical orientation is Gottfried's *Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory*.

struct Schmitt's arguments in relatively mute agreement. However, I actually hope to allow Schmitt's theoretical categories to emerge themselves through my textual explication so that I may criticize him more fundamentally by negating these categories against each other further along in my analysis. I choose not to "refute" him from an a priori liberal or leftist standpoint that holds him up to some external ideals to which he never held himself. I hope to avoid such a potentially artificial method of critique that unfortunately characterizes most of the literature on Schmitt by proceeding more immanently to his theory – even if initially risking the perception that I stand in silent agreement with all that he claims, often fantastically. By the conclusion of each chapter, I hope to have shown how one can better criticize Schmitt by reading him against himself, rather than by holding him up to, for instance, a Kantian standard derived from either of its currently predominant Rawlsian or Habermasian varieties. However, this does not mean that I will fail to hold Schmitt accountable for the many distortions and misrepresentations of the Enlightenment tradition to which he so often resorts in his writings. On the contrary, there is much to be learned from such misreadings; however, they will not be the major source of my criticisms of Schmitt.

So much of political theory of the last twenty years – particularly that associated with the question of liberalism – has followed a by-now-tired course: One inevitably turns to *A Theory of Justice*[15] and either proceeds to employ it as a yardstick by which to measure a liberal-challenging alternative or, conversely, holds Rawls's political philosophy up to some other standard so as to judge liberalism's adequacy for that particular agenda (e.g., Aristotelianism, communitarianism, perfectionism, utilitarianism, neoconservatism, feminism, environmentalism).[16] Again, this is not the mode of procedure of this project. I will not be comparing and contrasting Schmitt's theory with that of any liberals to whom he did not explicitly compare himself in the hope of demonstrating the respective advantages and deficiencies on each side. Rather, I attempt to carefully read Schmitt's Weimar texts in light of the many kinds of thinkers from his "context," broadly defined, to help demonstrate the fuller ramifications of his thought for the relationship between

15   John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
16   Robert Nozick began this trend with *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), after which followed countless "critiques" of "Rawlsian" liberalism. It should be noted here that Mouffe and David Dyzenhaus undertake challenging theoretical juxtapositions of Schmitt and Rawls; see Mouffe, *The Return of the Political;* and Dyzenhaus, "Liberalism after the Fall: Schmitt, Rawls and the Problem of Justification," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 22:3 (1996).

technology and liberalism, technocracy and fascism.[17] Most often I read
Schmitt in light of his Weimar contemporaries, liberals like Hans Kelsen, as
well as others on the Left and the Right, including Georg Lukács, Martin
Heidegger, T. W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin, or intellectual figures from
a previous era whose influence still resonated in Weimar, such as Karl Marx
and Friedrich Nietzsche. Sometimes I read Schmitt in light of his own
curiously self-understood "contemporaries" from earlier ages, such as
Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Throughout the work, however, I
make constant reference to a figure who had perhaps the most profound
influence on Schmitt and to whom Schmitt referred as that "German pro-
fessor of liberal provenance," Max Weber (*RC*, 5).[18] I hope that what might
superficially appear as a rather cluttered collection of cross-readings will be
theoretically justified by what follows in the study and that it will help bring

17   In this way I hope that the study will serve as what Axel Honneth calls "a history of theory
     with systematic intent"; see Honneth, *The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social
     Theory,* trans. Kenneth Baynes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), p. xiii. Of course I do
     not wish to emphasize *intellectual* context to the exclusion of *social* context. Among the
     major historical works consulted in the research of this study are David Blackbourn and
     Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-
     Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die
     Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie*
     (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984); Gordon A. Craig, *Germany, 1866–1945* (Oxford: Oxford
     University Press, 1980); Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and
     Political Change after Bismarck* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Charles S. Maier,
     *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World
     War I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable
     Past: History, Holocaust and German Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
     1988); Heinrich August Winkler, *Weimar 1918–1933: Die Geschichte der Ersten Deutschen
     Demokratie* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1994); Geoff Eley, ed., *Society, Culture, and the State in
     Germany, 1870–1930* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Hans Mommsen,
     The Rise and Decline of Weimar Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
     1996); and especially Detlev Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity,*
     trans. Richard Deveson (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992).
18   For examinations of the issue of Weber's liberalism, see David Beetham, "Weber and the
     Liberal Tradition," and Tracy Strong, "Max Weber and the Bourgeoisie," both in *The
     Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the Twilight of Enlightenment,* ed. A. Horowitz and T.
     Maley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). The work of Stephen Holmes, which
     has had a profound impact on this book, perhaps best exemplifies a contemporary
     "Weberian" liberalism: Holmes prioritizes as a central task of liberal politics the contain-
     ment and redirection of the multifarious expressions of human irrationality, in *Passions
     and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
     1995), and he ruthlessly assails romantically inclined critics of liberalism and the Enlight-
     enment whom he identifies as dangerous expressions of this irrationality, in *The Anatomy of
     Antiliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). These are aspects of
     Weber's political orientation and Schmitt's reception of them that will be discussed and
     criticized in the course of this book.

to the fore the issues of technology and politics more provocatively than a crude comparison and contrast of Schmittianism and liberalism.[19]

The late *Kaiserreich* and the Weimar Republic itself were characterized intellectually by a divide between forms of neo-Kantianism and strands of what can be identified for heuristic purposes as kinds of neo-Nietzschean *Lebensphilosophie*. There was the abstract concern with normative formalism, on the one hand, and with existential substance as such – that is, positivism versus existentialism – on the other. The two poles can be interpreted as reactions to a changing political and socioeconomic situation from the laissez-faire arrangement of state and society of the nineteenth century to the state-interventionist scenario of the early twentieth, in which technology was perceived in varying ways as the agent of change.[20] This scenario should not sound altogether unfamiliar to students of the political philosophy, social theory, and intellectual history of the last twenty-five years in North America and Europe. In the midst of a present transformation from a welfare-state configuration to what has been variously described as a postindustrial, post-Fordist, flexible accumulation, or economically globalized configuration, in which technology has again been assigned a central role,[21]

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19   Recently published or forthcoming monographs that situate Schmitt within the broader context of other Weimar constitutional lawyers, such as Kelsen, Hermann Heller, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, Rudolph Smend, and Richard Thoma, are Peter C. Caldwell, *Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997); David Dyzenhaus, *Truth's Revenge: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and William E. Scheuerman, *Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994). See also, Arthur J. Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, eds., *Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

20   For one of the most profound accounts of this shift, see Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, trans. T. Burger with the assistance of F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).

21   As just a small sampling of the literatures on post-Fordism, multilateralism, internationalization, and, most fashionably, globalization, see Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Alain Lipietz, *Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Ash Amin, ed., *Post-Fordism: A Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994); and Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Miller, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). A recent grappling with the broader intellectual ramifications of these changes is Moishe Postone, "Contemporary Historical Transformations: Some Theoretical Considerations," unpublished manuscript, Department of History, University of Chicago (1995).

we have likewise witnessed a revival of Kantian normative theory in the
political liberalism of Rawls and the communicative social democracy of
Habermas, as well as a resurgence of Nietzsche- or even Heidegger-inspired
neoexistentialism in the form of the deconstruction and postmodernism of
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and many of their devotees.

Besides ossifying these two intellectual antinomies, the first industrial
transformation in this century also opened up the opportunity for Hegel-
derived theoretical attempts that did not merely opt for one of the opposing
Kantian/Nietzschean poles of the changing dynamic but rather sought to
mediate the two antitheses and embed them within the historical transfor-
mation itself and understand the technological change for neither the
irresistible "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationalization or abstract normative
imperatives, nor the opportunity for expressing a concrete primordial will –
the extremes expressed by the two formerly mentioned modes of think-
ing.[22] It is my hope that an analysis of a central figure of that initial transfor-
mation in its German context, Carl Schmitt, and the place of technology in
his thought, will aid in the ever more pressing theoretical apprehension of
the scope and ramifications of the present technological, intellectual, and
political change, including the possibility for progressive democratic prac-
tice as well as the danger of reactionary, authoritarian regression.[23]

Carl Schmitt, rivaled perhaps only by Martin Heidegger, is commonly
understood as the representative par excellence of one wing of the dualities
just mentioned: Nietzschean existentialism or *Lebensphilosophie* and the will-
driven project to seize technology in a supernationalistic reactionary
project. This is not an altogether inaccurate characterization, but it is cer-
tainly a rather undifferentiated account of Schmitt's theoretical efforts. I
attempt to show that Schmitt quite often simultaneously sought the route of
a Hegelian mediation of the intellectual poles of modernity and their rela-
tionship with technology, alongside the more commonly acknowledged

22   The left-Hegelianism of Lukács and his "Western Marxist" heirs are perhaps the best
     representatives of this methodology that sought to overcome the Kantian/Nietzschean
     divide. For excellent general accounts, see David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory:
     Horkheimer to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Martin Jay, *Marx-
     ism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of
     California Press, 1984), and Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the
     Frankfurt School* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
23   Two accounts of left-Hegelian methodology that preserve its viability as a contemporary
     theoretical-political orientation are Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of
     Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Moishe Postone,
     Time, Labor and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory (Cambridge:
     Cambridge University Press, 1993).