

Contents

Introduction	<i>page 1</i>
PART 1 DECISION THEORY FOR COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING	
1.1 On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers	17
1.2 Decisions Without Ordering	40
1.3 A Representation of Partially Ordered Preferences	69
PART 2 THE TRUTH ABOUT CONSEQUENCES	
2.1 Separating Probability Elicitation from Utilities	133
2.2 State-dependent Utilities	149
2.3 Shared Preferences and State-dependent Utilities	169
2.4 A Conflict Between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book	194
2.5 Statistical Implications of Finitely Additive Probability	211
PART 3 NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING, INFERENCE, AND LEARNING WITH SHARED EVIDENCE	
3.1 Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games	235
3.2 Equilibrium, Common Knowledge, and Optimal Sequential Decisions	246
3.3 A Fair Minimax Theorem for Two-Person (Zero-Sum) Games Involving Finitely Additive Strategies	267
3.4 Randomization in a Bayesian Perspective	293
3.5 Characterization of Externally Bayesian Pooling Operators	314
3.6 An Approach to Consensus and Certainty with Increasing Evidence	333

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Table of Contents
[More information](#)

3.7 Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion	349
3.8 When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion	369
<i>Index of Names</i>	383
<i>Subject Index</i>	386