

Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics

This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker. The essays then trace out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics.

There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of "partially ordered" preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling rules and Bayesian dynamics for sets of probabilities.

The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, and to statisticians, mathematicians, and economists.



Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory

General editor: Brian Skyrms

Advisory editors: Ernest W. Adams, Ken Binmore, Jeremy Butterfield, Persi Diaconis, William L. Harper, John Harsanyi, Richard C. Jeffrey, Wolfgang Spohn, Patrick Suppes, Amos Tversky, Sandy Zabell

Ellery Eells, Probabilistic Causality

Richard Jeffrey, Probability and the Art of Judgment

Robert C. Koons, Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality

Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interactions

Patrick Maher, Betting on Theories

Cristina Bicchieri, Rationality and Coordination

J. Howard Sobel, Taking Chances

Jan von Plato, Creating Modern Probability: Its Mathematics, Physics, and Philosophy in Historical Perspective

Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms (eds.), *Probability and Conditionals* Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms (eds.), *The Dynamics of Norms*

Patrick Suppes and Mario Zanotti, Foundations of Probability with Applications

Paul Weirich, Equilibrium and Rationality

Daniel Hausman, Causal Asymmetries

William Dembski, The Design Inference

James M. Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory



Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics

JOSEPH B. KADANE
MARK J. SCHERVISH
TEDDY SEIDENFELD





PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA http://www.cup.org 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain

© Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, and Teddy Seidenfeld 1999

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1999

Typeface Times Roman 10.25/13 pt. System QuarkXPress [BTS]

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kadane, Joseph B.

Rethinking the foundations of statistics / Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld.

p. cm. - (Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-521-64011-3 (hbk.). – ISBN 0-521-64975-7 (pbk.)

1. Bayesian statistical decision theory. I. Schervish, Mark J.

II. Seidenfeld, Teddy. III. Title. IV. Series.

QA279.5.K36 1999 519.5'42-dc21 98-48322

CIP

ISBN 0 521 64011 3 hardback ISBN 0 521 64975 7 paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2004



To our families:
Caroline
Nancy, Margaret, and Meredith
Janice, David, and Adina

and to Jimmie Savage and Morrie DeGroot



Contents

	Introduction	page 1
	PART 1 DECISION THEORY FOR COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING	
11	On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian	
1.1	Decision Makers	17
1.2	Decisions Without Ordering	40
1.3	A Representation of Partially Ordered Preferences	69
	PART 2 THE TRUTH ABOUT CONSEQUENCES	
2.1	Separating Probability Elicitation from Utilities	133
2.2	State-dependent Utilities	149
2.3	Shared Preferences and State-dependent Utilities	169
2.4	A Conflict Between Finite Additivity and Avoiding	
	Dutch Book	194
2.5	Statistical Implications of Finitely Additive Probability	211
	PART 3 NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING,	
	INFERENCE, AND LEARNING WITH SHARED EVIDENCE	
3.1	Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games	235
3.2	Equilibrium, Common Knowledge, and Optimal	
	Sequential Decisions	246
3.3	A Fair Minimax Theorem for Two-Person (Zero-Sum)	
	Games Involving Finitely Additive Strategies	267
3.4	Randomization in a Bayesian Perspective	293
3.5	Characterization of Externally Bayesian Pooling Operators	314
3.6	An Approach to Consensus and Certainty with Increasing	
	Evidence	333

ix



3.7	Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion	349
3.8	When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion	369
	Index of Names	383
	Subject Index	386