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Introduction

CAROLE FINK, PHILIPP GASSERT, AND DETLEF JUNKER

Nineteen sixty-eight, the year of global crisis halfway between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, has yet to establish a solid position in contemporary history – either in the recollections of the participants or in the interpretations of two generations of scholars. The memories of witnesses to the events of this *annus mirabilis* are still fragmentary and colored by partisanship, personal injury and defeat, or nostalgia for a heroic time, whereas historians have barely begun to treat "1968" as a coherent historical phenomenon.

The events of 1968 happened within national contexts yet took place across the globe – from Berkeley to Berlin, Bangkok to Buenos Aires, Cairo to Cape Town, Paris to Tokyo. In addition, many contemporaries – particularly students and intellectuals – believed that their actions were linked to a global revolt against capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism that spanned the First, Second, and Third Worlds. People everywhere recognized and responded to photographs, films, tales, and written accounts that spread around the world by word of mouth, in newspapers, or over radio and television, depicting wars and civil wars, strikes and protests, student demonstrations, and police repression.

Although no organized international movement existed in 1968, there were many informal links of sympathy and support among the hundreds of protest movements that sprang up around the world. Yet despite the widespread contemporary belief that the year was one of global crisis, scholars studying this year have focused more on its national than on its international elements. There are relatively few comparative studies of the rise and fall of protest movements from a regional or global perspective[1] and scarcely

1 Gianni Statera, *Death of a Utopia: The Development and Decline of Student Movements in Europe* (Oxford, 1975); Cyrill Levitt, *Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties: A Study of Student Movements in Canada, the United States, and West Germany* (Toronto, 1984); George Katsiaficas, *The Imagination of the*

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any comprehensive accounts of 1968 as a global phenomenon.[2] To date, no work has incorporated the ruptures in world politics within a systematic analysis of the events of 1968.

Until recently, 1968 has largely been the domain of social and cultural historians. In this book, the editors and contributors have tried to integrate international relations, the role of the media, the cross-cultural exchange of peoples, and the history of ideas into a wide-ranging examination of that tumultuous year. By interpreting 1968 as a global or transnational phenomenon, we propose to explain the simultaneity of the crises that erupted throughout the world. By stressing the international dimension, we hope to stimulate further comparative research on the global history of 1968.[3]

This book represents a collaborative effort by an international group of historians. It presents diverse perspectives on 1968, including some that dispute each other and even challenge our major theses. In this introduction, we suggest four theses that underscore the significance of international and transnational developments.

First, the events of 1968 unfolded at a crucial phase in the Cold War. The long bipolar rivalry between the two superpowers had created a peculiar linkage between domestic and international affairs, between social and cultural developments, on the one hand, and world politics, on the other. As a result of the complex set of relationships that existed in the international system, fundamental shifts on the local, national, or global level resonated with and grew out of each other.

Second, 1968 was a global phenomenon because the mass media – television and the press in the First World, radio and film in the Second and Third Worlds – exerted a powerful influence and became instruments of social movements worldwide. The media created transnational and inter-

New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Boston, 1987); Ronald Fraser, *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt* (New York, 1988); Peppino Ortoleva, *Saggio sui movimenti del 1968 in Europa e in America* (Rome, 1988); Philip G. Altbach, ed., *Student Political Activism: An International Reference Handbook* (New York, 1989); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Rebellion in the University,* with a new introduction by the author (New Brunswick, N.J., 1993); Ingo Juchler, *Die Studentenbewegungen in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sechziger Jahre: Eine Untersuchung hinsichtlich ihrer Beeinflussung durch Befreiungsbewegungen und -theorien aus der Dritten Welt* (Berlin, 1996).

2 David Caute, *The Year of the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968* (New York, 1988); Robert V. Daniels, *Year of the Heroic Guerrilla: World Revolution and Counterrevolution in 1968* (New York, 1988); Etienne Francois, *1968 – ein europäisches Jahr* (Leipzig, 1997).

3 *Historical* comparisons of the movements of 1968 are still very rare. Most comparative studies take a social scientist approach; see Friedhelm Neidhart and Dieter Rucht, "The Analysis of Social Movements: The State of the Art and Some Perspectives of Further Research," in Dieter Rucht, ed., *Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA* (Boulder, Colo., 1991), 421–64.

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cultural linkages, giving the "1968ers" the impression that they were part of a united political front.

Third, activists throughout the world operated as part of formal and informal networks of communication and collaboration. Thus, 1968 was a global phenomenon because of the actual and perceived cooperation among protest movements in different countries.

Fourth, 1968 was a global phenomenon because the protagonists believed in a common cause: They struggled in opposition to the domestic and international status quo in East and West as well as in North and South, and in support of freedom, justice, and self-determination. In the Communist world, they fought against authoritarian governments and for liberal democracy; in the West, they fought against social repression, hierarchical structures, the tyranny of consumption, for personal emancipation and "true" participatory democracy.

WORLD POLITICS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

Nineteen sixty-eight was a major watershed in the history of the Cold War, marking the climax of a period of confrontation and the beginning of the era of détente. "Tet" and "Prague" forced both superpowers and their allies to weigh the consequences of American and Soviet imperialism, to examine the framework of the postwar order, to rethink their own national interests, and to renew efforts to strengthen international stability.

With the double shocks of Tet and the United States's mounting financial problems, the Johnson administration was compelled to face the realities of imperial overstretch and the huge costs of its global foreign policy. The validity of the two sacred maxims of America's Cold War diplomacy, the Truman Doctrine and the domino theory, were called into question. Since 1947, the first had provided justification for intervention against communist threats; and the second, harking back to the "lessons of Munich" that aggressors must be stopped early on and on all fronts, became a rigid formula that presumed military force to be the only option.[4]

As George C. Herring has written, it was the founding fathers of containment policy – Acheson, Clifford, Harriman, Nitze, and others – who tried during the crisis of March 1968 to convince Lyndon B. Johnson to

4 Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif., 1992); Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994).

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alter his policy on Vietnam. Arguing against the hawks and the military, which wanted to commit more troops, they urged the president to withdraw gradually from Vietnam and concentrate on America's strategic interests in Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and Latin America.[5] This realpolitik critique of the Manichaean Cold War perspective provided the basis for Richard Nixon's concept of American diplomacy. Faced with an unwinnable war, Nixon and his foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, proceeded to revise the dogmas of containment policy and bipolarism.[6] In order to establish a more stable international order and reduce America's burdens, they forged a "triangular diplomacy" that aimed to create a new multipolar structure that would include the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Europe.[7]

In 1968 Johnson still lacked the will and the imagination to break with containment policy because he feared becoming the "new Chamberlain." When the "wise men" of the Cold War changed their minds about the war in Southeast Asia, he protested bitterly that "the establishment bastards have bailed out."[8] As he had done throughout his long political career, Johnson sought a middle ground between hawks and doves. As a concession to the hawks, he slightly raised the number of troops in Vietnam, and as a concession to the doves and the general public, he ordered a partial halt to air attacks over North Vietnam and prepared new peace initiatives. Hoping to mollify domestic opinion, Johnson withdrew as a candidate for a second term. Thus, the massive, if ultimately unsuccessful, Tet Offensive by the combined North Vietnamese and Vietcong, coupled with the economic shocks that shook the United States in March 1968, not only aroused public opinion and instigated a major debate over strategy but also prepared the way for a fundamental reevaluation of America's role in the Cold War.[9]

At the same time as the domino theory was losing its plausibility and moral legitimacy in Vietnam, the Soviet Union ordered the tanks and troops of the Warsaw Pact into Prague, Czechoslovakia, in August 1968. Acting

5 See the essay by George C. Herring (Chapter 1) in this book.
6 Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C., 1985), 25–36; Robert D. Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York, 1989); Richard C. Thornton, *The Nixon-Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of America's Foreign Policy* (New York, 1989); Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York, 1994), 147–207.
7 On the new "triangular diplomacy," which was by and large grounded in Kissinger's view of nineteenth-century history, see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994), 703–32.
8 See Herring's chapter, 44.
9 Robert D. Schulzinger, "'It's Easy to Win a War on Paper': The United States and Vietnam, 1961–1968," in Diane B. Kunz, ed., *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s* (New York, 1994), 183–218; Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (Cambridge, 1994).

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on its own domino theory, the politburo in Moscow and its Eastern European allies were increasingly concerned over the possible spread of an "antisocialist bacillus" into Poland, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, and the other Eastern European states as well as into Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, the Baltic states, and perhaps even into Russia itself. Brezhnev suspected that the students and intellectuals of the Soviet Union would form the counterrevolutionary vanguard.[10]

Moscow also feared that some of the more independent members of the Warsaw Pact were on the verge of establishing closer ties with the West, particularly with "revanchist-capitalist" West Germany. Moreover, there was the danger that a weakened Czechoslovak army, less controlled by the Soviet Union, would be incapable of guarding a sensitive stretch of the Iron Curtain and might even endanger the planned stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons on Czechoslovak soil. As Mark Kramer makes clear in his chapter, the Prague Spring threatened to create a "spillover" effect involving the vital interests of the Soviet Union and the future of socialism. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union cemented the status quo in Eastern Europe without solving – and to some extent even exacerbating – its security and economic problems. Thus, like the United States, it was now prepared for a shift in its foreign policy, replacing its hard-line stance toward the United States and its allies with steps that would lead to détente.[11]

Perhaps the most striking example of the interconnectedness in world politics and of the links between foreign and domestic policy in 1968 was China's reaction to both Tet and Prague. One month after Mao Zedong ordered his Red Guards to reduce the chaos of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which had already claimed millions of casualties, he expressed shock at the invasion of Czechoslovakia and at the subsequent proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The leadership in Beijing feared that their country's weakness might encourage Moscow to apply its new doctrine by sending Soviet troops into the contested northern border areas, making nuclear threats, and generally threatening China's independence and international status. According to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, it was the invasion of Czechoslovakia that convinced Mao to back away from the Cultural Revolution.[12]

10 See the essay by Mark Kramer (Chapter 4) in this book; Wladimir K. Wolkow, "Sowjetische Parteiherrschaft und Prager Frühling 1968," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B36, Aug. 28, 1992, 11–17.
11 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 36–53.
12 See the essay by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Chapter 6) in this book. On Sino-Soviet Relations in the aftermath of Prague, see also Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 200–13.

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At the same time, the Chinese leadership began its search for a powerful diplomatic ally, the enemy of its enemy so to speak, following "the ancient tradition of using barbarians to control barbarians."[13] In the bipolar world of superpowers, there was only one barbarian capable of neutralizing the Soviet threat and easing Beijing's concerns over the security of its northern frontier: the United States of America. Although the U.S.-Chinese confrontation in Vietnam might have hindered this rapprochement, the scaling down of American involvement after Tet was duly registered in Beijing. Thus, China's invitation to the United States in November 1968 to resume talks in Warsaw marked the beginning of a significant change in its diplomacy, culminating in Nixon's sensational journey of 1972, the first visit of an American president to China, indeed to Communist China.[14]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia also had important strategic consequences in the heart of Europe, especially for the Federal Republic of Germany. The Germans, other Europeans, and the Chinese – as well as the Russians – were astonished by the extraordinarily mild reaction of the United States to this naked display of Soviet power. Indeed, when Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin personally delivered the news to President Johnson, he was relieved to discover that Johnson's chief concern was the danger to his scheduled summit meeting with Brezhnev, which had been planned to coincide with his departure from office. Apparently Johnson never considered using American troops for a "rollback" in East-Central Europe.[15]

Nineteen sixty-eight confirmed once again what the world had learned during the East German uprising in 1953, the risings in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, namely, that the United States was unprepared and unwilling to risk a world war, or even a nuclear war, to assail the Iron Curtain. Indeed, after the dual crises over Berlin and Cuba between 1958 and 1962, the United States increasingly defined its strategic interests in terms of accepting the status quo in Europe and pursuing arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Shortly before the invasion of Czechoslovakia both superpowers, together with Britain, had signed what was perhaps the most important status quo agreement of the Cold War. In the Nonproliferation Treaty of July 1, 1968, these three countries had attempted to secure their nuclear monopoly and

13 See Tucker's chapter, 202.

14 On Nixon's carefully staged journey to China and the secret negotiations since 1968, see Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York, 1992), 333–54; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 213–40; Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, 187–91.

15 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York, 1995), 180ff.

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prevent the uncontrolled proliferation of atomic weapons in order to create a rational system of deterrence. For example, the three powers were united in opposition to granting West Germany access to nuclear weapons.[16]

According to Gottfried Niedhart, the United States' tacit acceptance of the Soviet invasion convinced the Bonn government that the question of German unification had vanished from the agenda of world politics, a sacrifice for the benefit of European security and harmony between the two superpowers.[17] If the invasion of Czechoslovakia strengthened West Germany's resolve to revise the strategic orientation of its diplomacy, it also enabled the Soviet Union to embark on substantive talks with Bonn. The kernel of the Federal Republic's new Ostpolitik, which by 1972 produced a series of major treaties, was a subtle dialectic that even Kissinger did not completely understand. West Germany's diplomacy toward Eastern Europe followed the model Gustav Stresemann had successfully applied to Western Europe in the 1920s, that is, to undermine the status quo over the long term one had to acquiesce in the short term.[18] By acknowledging existing realities, the Federal Republic was able to establish itself as one of the leading forces of détente; at the same time, it also bound the Soviet Union to a relationship that might eventually lead to German unification.[19] Moreover, Ostpolitik not only enhanced the flexibility of West Germany's diplomacy toward East and West but also gave Bonn a small measure of independence vis-à-vis the United States and its other NATO allies.[20] Thus, although the world political events of 1968 appeared to reinforce the rigid structure of the Cold War, they also prepared the basis for its end two decades later.

With regard to the world economy, 1968 signaled the close of the postwar economic era. Although economic trends and cycles cannot be linked directly to politics, certain political decisions that were made between 1968

16 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1989), 91–5; Matthias Künzel, *Bonn und die Bombe: Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

17 See the essay by Gottfried Niedhart (Chapter 5) in this book.

18 On Stresemann's foreign policy see Marshall Lee and Wolfgang Michalka, *German Foreign Policy, 1917–1933: Continuity or Break?* (Leamington Spa, 1987), 73–85; Manfred Berg, *Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Weltwirtschaftliche Verflechtung und Revisionspolitik 1907–1929* (Baden-Baden, 1990); Christian Baechler, *Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929): De l'impérialisme à la sécurité collective* (Strasbourg, 1996), 469–902.

19 As Egon Bahr, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt's foreign policy advisor, wrote in a memorandum on October 1, 1968, "The Soviet goal is to legalize the status quo. Our goal is to overcome it. It is a real conflict of interest." Quoted by Niedhart in Chapter 5 of this volume; on Brandt's and Bahr's foreign policy, see also Andreas Vogtmeier, *Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage: Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung* (Bonn, 1996).

20 Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe*, 195–219; Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London, 1993); Frank Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945*, rev. ed. (New York, 1995), 136–43.

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and 1973–4 undoubtedly precipitated the end of the unparalleled growth of the post–World War II period. It was not possible to explore fully these issues in greater detail in this book, but it should be noted that within the crucial half decade between 1968 and 1973 the first visible signs of a major change in the world economy became apparent. After the Six-Day War of 1967, the oil-producing countries seized the initiative from the powerful multinational corporations in defense of their own national economic and political interests.[21] The oil-price shocks of 1973–4 marked the end of a quarter century of growth and the "easy affluence" to which Western societies had become accustomed.[22]

The economic turbulence of 1968 represented a major challenge to America's dominant position in the world economy. In 1968 the world saw "the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression."[23] As Diane B. Kunz notes, President Johnson had committed the United States to costly domestic and military expenditures without raising adequate revenue through taxation. Through the international capital markets, America's European and Asian allies paid for Washington's mounting budget deficits. The results – rising prices, a weakened dollar, and chronic trade and payments imbalances – threatened the stability of the international exchange and currency system that had existed since 1945.[24]

America's growing weakness had become manifest as early as the summer of 1967, when Washington asked Bonn not to exchange its dollar reserves for gold.[25] Although the United States remained Western Europe's military shield against the Soviet Union, it could not prolong its beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies, which French President Charles de Gaulle had already challenged. The dramatic gold crisis of March 1968, coupled with the Tet Offensive, forced the United States to devise temporary alterations that ultimately led to the end of the Bretton Woods system.[26] It was

21 Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York, 1991); Jens Hohensee, *Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973/74: Die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa* (Stuttgart, 1996).

22 Hermann van der Wee, *Prosperity and Upheaval: The War Economy, 1945–1980* (London, 1987); Robert M. Collins, "Growth Liberalism in the Sixties: Great Societies at Home and Grand Designs Abroad," in David Farber, ed., *The Sixties: From Memory to History* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994), 11–44; see also the essays by Diane B. Kunz (Chapter 3) and Alan Brinkley (Chapter 7) in this book.

23 Robert M. Collins, "The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the 'American Century'" *American Historical Review* 101, no. 2 (April 1996): 396.

24 See Kunz's chapter; Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich and Hans-Otto Schötz, *Vom Weltgläubiger zum Weltschuldner: Erklärungsansätze zur historischen Entwicklung und Struktur der internationalen Vermögensposition der USA* (Frankfurt am Main, 1988).

25 On this so-called Blessing-Brief, see Diane B. Kunz, *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy* (New York, 1997), 173–4.

26 Kunz, *Butter and Guns,* 192–222.

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no coincidence that President Nixon in 1969 curtailed the grand project epitomizing the optimism of the early 1960s, namely, the Apollo space program, after public and congressional support for the immensely costly manned space program had waned and after the rivalry between the superpowers had given way to a more cooperative approach.[27]

Ironically, the Soviet Union reaped few benefits from these convulsions in the world economy. Since the early 1960s it had been forced to purchase the compliance of its allies – and their populations' grudging acquiescence – by a "goulash communism" that substituted consumer benefits for a personal and national freedom. After 1968, Moscow finally had to bury its hopes of equaling or surpassing the West. The invasion of Czechoslovakia further strained the economic and military resources of the Soviet empire and would ultimately contribute to its collapse.[28] Thus, the global economic upheaval begun in 1968 reduced both superpowers' room for maneuver and reinforced the trend toward cooperation, bridge-building, and détente.[29] After Tet and Prague, the two Cold War empires moved closer together out of mutual need to scale down their huge commitments while maintaining control over their respective allies. This had the paradoxical result of encouraging new forms of independence among the latter and of enabling the former vanquished countries, particularly Germany and Japan, to emerge as new global economic players in their own right.[30]

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

In 1968, the crises in the institutions of military, political, and financial power and the growing opposition movement in the streets, factories, and universities was covered by a media with an almost global reach. The events of Tet and Prague, Chicago and Tokyo, as well as the images of Ho Chi Minh and Dubček, Lyndon Johnson and Charles de Gaulle elicited instant recognition and immediate responses by people in places far and near. The protest movements adopted and transformed these icons in and through

27 Walter A. McDougall, . . . *the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York, 1985), 421–3.
28 See Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Transformation of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," *International Organization* 39 (1984–5): 1–46; Randall W. Stone, *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade* (Princeton, N.J., 1996). See also the chapter by Kramer.
29 Keith L. Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore, 1995).
30 See Lothar Kettenacker, *Germany Since 1945* (Oxford, 1997); Paul John Baily, *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present* (Oxford, 1996).

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their chants and posters. Even when the students' demands addressed issues specific to their own country, they were expressed and disseminated through global means of communication.[31]

In Western countries, the media, traditionally pillars of the establishment, became powerful instruments of protest movements. The participants, with their graffiti and slogans, their strikes and boycotts, their sit-ins and teach-ins, their marches and demonstrations, their happenings and audacious antics, relied on the media to reinforce and spread their messages. As Konrad H. Jarausch points out, the mythic events and collective memories of 1968 were often the joint creation of sensationalist media and manipulative demonstrators, which used each other for self-enhancement.[32]

In the West, the dominant medium in 1968 was television. This was particularly true for the United States, which during the 1960s had become a "televisual society."[33] Eddie Adams's photograph of the execution of a Vietcong suspect by the police chief of Saigon, reproduced millions of times in newspapers and on television, became a major factor in undermining the shaky domestic consensus on the Vietnam War.[34] In Asia, the American army and its South Vietnamese ally were engaged in a slow and painful, but in the end successful, military counteroffensive against the North Vietnamese. At home, however, the widely disseminated photographs of Tet undermined Johnson's policies and, ultimately, his presidency. Lyndon B. Johnson, the most powerful figure in the world, who had amassed some of his fortune in the media, utterly miscalculated their power. This despite the fact that Johnson had been the guiding political spirit behind the Apollo program, one of America's greatest technological and public-relations triumphs. Johnson, who in his optimistic press announcements of 1967 had prematurely raised expectations of "victory," lost control of the media debate in 1968.[35] The result of the coverage of Tet was not simply a change in U.S. public opinion and a renewed intensity of the anti–Vietnam War demonstrations. By remaining an almost passive

31 Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley, Calif., 1980); Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, "Über die Bedeutung der Massenmedien für soziale Bewegungen," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 42 (1992): 642–62.

32 See the essays by Konrad H. Jarausch (Chapter 18) and Stuart J. Hilwig (Chapter 12) in this book.

33 Chester J. Pach Jr., "And That's the Way It Was: The Vietnam War on the Network Nightly News," in Farber, ed., *The Sixties*, 92.

34 See the reproduction of this photograph in the essay by Chester J. Pach Jr. (Chapter 2) in this book; Robert Hamilton, "Image and Context: The Production and Reproduction of the *The Execution of a VC Suspect* by Eddie Adams," in Jeffrey Walsh and James Aulich, eds., *Vietnam Images: War and Representation* (New York, 1989), 171–83.

35 On the debate over the role of the media in Vietnam, see the introduction to Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, *The Tet Offensive* (Westport, Conn., 1996).

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