

In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the six major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operational performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organization, and styles of operations.



# MILITARY INNOVATION IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD



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Edited by

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

Horner Professor,

Marine Corps University

ALLAN R. MILLETT Mason Professor, The Ohio State University





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To Professor Donald Kagan, Yale University, and the late Professor Harry L. Coles, Jr., who taught us the challenges and satisfactions of historical inquiry into the mysteries of mankind's military affairs



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But in the end we must take responsibility for whatever weaknesses yet remain. We can only hope that this volume makes some small contribution to a complex subject: how do armed forces change?



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