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Introduction to Citizenship

> There is no more dynamic social figure in modern history than
>   The Citizen.
> For centuries now, [s]he has been member and motor
>   of rising social groups:
>   of the urban propertied class in feudal society,
>   of the new industrial class in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . . .
>   of those who liberated themselves from dependence and deprivation –
>   villeins and subjects, colonial dependents, minorities of many kinds,
>   women.
>
> <div align="right">Ralf Dahrendorf (1974, p. 673)</div>

The use of rights and citizenship has exploded with groups of many different types demanding and in some cases obtaining new rights. Many complain of a cacophony of rights claims and the comparative silence on obligations and duties to fulfill those rights. At the same time, immigrants in many countries clamor at the gates of industrialized nations with claims for a new citizenship that will socially and politically integrate them into a society with opportunities to live and prosper. Rights and duties are trumpeted and denounced with great emotion, diverse definitions, shallow usage, and uncertain relationships between concepts. What can citizens, politicians, and social scientists make of these claims for inclusion, obligation, and rights of citizenship?

Although most advanced industrialized countries cover nearly all of their inhabitants with at least some legal, political, and social rights, citizenship rights clearly remain contentious. Citizens and subjects demand rights, but their success depends on the ebb and flow of the power of contending political parties, interest groups, and social movements. Many libertarian conservatives and radicals see citizenship obligations as overly enforced, but communitarians and neo-conservatives see obligations as being in steep decline. On the one hand, Freeden sees rights as being overwhelmingly accepted: "The concept of rights has become

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one of the most reputable and positively connoted in political theory. The desirability of promoting in principle the ideas represented by the concept is far less controversial than, for example, the promotion of equality, democracy or even liberty" (1991, p. 1). On the other hand, Etzioni asks for an emphasis on obligations: "We should, for a transition period of, say, the next decade, put a tight lid on the manufacturing of new rights. The incessant issuance of new rights, like the wholesale printing of currency, causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims" (1993, p. 5). Clearly, positions differ widely on the status of rights and obligations, which is one of a number of reasons why understanding the rights terrain is so difficult.

The claiming of rights involves many questions that would seem to be hard to deny. In terms of legal rights, one may ask today whether ethnic minorities and immigrants have freedom from attack and harassment from majorities; whether citizens can defend themselves against robbery and attack on the streets and in their own homes; whether women have the right to walk outdoors at night or to control their own bodies in clinics and hospitals; and whether developmentally delayed persons have rights to attend regular schools, to work for pay, and even to procreate. Concerning political rights, one may ask when only half the eligible citizens vote in America, are their rights really operative? When the third generation of guestworkers in Germany are denied the right to vote, how can such exclusive principles of citizenship be justified? Questions about social rights focus on whether poor or middle-income persons have rights to health care, and whether children with AIDS may attend school. We may ask whether government bureaucracies serve or simply ignore clients, and whether government workers have adequate representation on their jobs. We may ask what rights workers at private corporations have to job security, safe working conditions, and abilities to set the terms of work, rest, and production. In sum, what status do rights have in post-industrial societies, and how can they be measured and explained?

The silences about obligations appear to be irresponsible. Nearly all citizens rigorously claim the right to a trial by jury, but many avoid serving on juries for other citizens (Etzioni 1993, p. 3; Janowitz 1983). In terms of political and social obligations, many citizens demand government money from entitlement programs, yet loathe paying taxes to support entitlements for others. Some citizens feel content to watch deficits grow despite their uneasiness about the growing burdens that are being placed on future generations. Many people want protection against fraud and crime, but cannot approve measures that would prevent or inhibit lawlessness such as national identity cards, sobriety checkpoints, drug testing, and disciplinary measures in the schools. Cit-

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izens want public defense in their communities and around the world, but are shy or afraid of serving on community watches in neighborhoods, and in the military or its more peaceful alternatives. The provision of rights to immigrants involves obligations that many native citizens easily deny. How can social scientists conceptualize, measure, and explain the creation, enforcement, or neglect of these and other obligations?

Citizenship rights were not always widespread, and at earlier points in history, citizenship rights applied to less than a tenth of the population in many nations. Rights developed through nation-building with barons gaining access to legal rights (e.g., the Magna Carta in Britain). They developed further with the bourgeoisie obtaining legal and political rights in various legal codes and constitutions during the Industrial Revolution. Many see the unique Western Enlightenment as the ideational motor of citizenship because of the rise of rational individualism, but others see it as a specific system of rights based on individualism that does not apply to other cultures (Bridges 1994, p. 6). Yet citizenship rights have widely diffused to many intellectuals and educated workers in non-Western cultures. With the world wars of the twentieth century, rights advanced for the working classes, especially after they served in the military. And rights continue to grow for gender, racial, ethnic, and ability groups. None of these processes were particularly smooth, and most were surrounded with considerable conflict, but from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries, citizenship rights have advanced in most industrialized countries. Nonetheless, the explanations for this advance are in critical need of development.

A theory of citizenship, properly conceived, should provide the tools to explain the development and balancing of public rights and obligations in advanced industrialized societies. The promise of citizenship theory is that it will also illuminate a large range of behaviors and processes concerning rights and obligations in industrialized societies.

THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING
CITIZENSHIP THEORY

Since Marshall (1964) first crafted citizenship as an explanatory framework to explain legal, political, and social rights, a wide variety of distinguished scholars have used his theory.[1] This usage ranges from employing the concept of citizenship as part of other arguments to the more extensive explanation of citizenship, including the development of rights over decades and centuries given the inevitable conflict of capitalism and citizenship. Yet "there is still nothing which could be described as a *theory* of citizenship" (Barbalet 1988, p. 108).[2]

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Marshall's tradition of theorizing about citizenship has a number of gaps that this book intends to fill. Since the mid- to late 1960s, progress toward a full theory of citizenship has been slow. In the last ten years, three important political changes have raised concerns involving citizenship: (1) the threats to social rights brought by the increasing public and even governmental attacks on the welfare state, (2) the breakdown of communist control in Eastern Europe, and (3) the increasing international claims on citizenship by immigrants and refugees. The first change concerns the internal or domestic protection of citizenship rights for poor and disadvantaged citizens, while the second change involves the re-creation of citizenship and civil society in the transition to democracy and capitalism. The third change questions the rights of nation-states to protect citizenship enclaves within country boundaries from foreigners of different racial and ethnic groups, especially when these foreigners seek relief from economic duress and political threats. Other issues are also of significance to citizenship. National identity is again prominent with new identities being molded with the unification of the European Community and the disintegration of communist regimes. And many previously subordinated citizens have increasingly moved toward new and greater rights, which has led to some backlash against those diverse citizens and particularly against foreigners. Marshall's theory of citizenship has not been adequately extended to explain many of these emerging questions of rights and obligations.

Why is there no adequate *theory* of citizenship? Citizenship can be treated simply as a concept in measuring rights and obligations. This makes citizenship part of other political theories. For instance, Bendix (1964) presents only a partial theory of the development of citizenship rights in Germany and the United Kingdom, and then drops citizenship from his analysis of Japan, India, and Russia, where he focuses more on economic development. However, the elements of a theory of citizenship exist for much wider application. Marshall provides a developmental sequence of rights for the United Kingdom, and connects this development to social forces of the bourgeoisie and then labor. Turner (1986a) provides a theory based on social movements and conflict, and Mann (1988) looks for broad causes of citizenship rights development in elite structures. Marshall, Turner, and Mann are not simply using a concept but are creating a sociological theory of the political development of rights and obligations that incorporates social movements and group conflict. Despite the presence of theories of sequencing rights, conflicts between citizenship rights and capitalism, and social movements developing identities of citizenship and rights for oppressed groups, more is needed. The requirements for an adequate theory of citizenship include clarifying the nature of citizenship rights and obligations, proposing the-

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ories of development capable of reversals, identifying how societies and citizens balance rights and obligations, explaining domestic and external membership in the nation-state, and integrating each area into an over-arching framework. Consequently, three major problems need to be ad-dressed to advance a theory of citizenship.

First, *rights and obligations* are not adequately grounded. Not only do sociologists such as Anthony Giddens (1982) and Ramesh Mishra (1981) take citizenship rights as a hodgepodge of disparate concepts, but social advocates invoke the "currency of rights" in popular discourse for a wide range of phenomena and in return are criticized for using inflated and overblown concepts. And of course, both researchers and citizen advocates are often reminded of their frequent amnesia concerning cit-izen obligations. An adequate theory of citizenship must provide a much better conceptual substructure before a more dynamic theory can be developed.

Second, the *balancing of rights and obligations* has been totally ig-nored. At the macro-level, overall packages of rights need to be related to similar packages of obligations. Theories need be proposed as to why some nations have higher or lower levels of citizenship. At the micro-level, we need theories about how citizens balance their own rights and obligations in relation to their own identities, and what range of behav-iors and attitudes citizens may assume.

Third, the *development of citizenship rights and obligations* needs to be formulated at both the macro- and micro-levels. A macro-theory needs to go beyond Marshall's linear focus on rights to include obliga-tions. Such a theory must also address the diverse patterns that nations take from the slow and relatively steady progression of citizenship rights at low levels of obligation in the United Kingdom to a mixed and some-times reversing sequence of legal, social, and political rights with higher levels of obligations in Germany.[3] A micro-theory needs to look at how rights and obligations are acquired over the life course, especially for children, teenagers, middle-aged adults, and senior citizens.

The theory of development requires further attention to internal and external membership. At the domestic level, this involves how dependent or disreputable groups become citizens. Who among the subjects of a nation may be accorded rights and obligations from elites to the masses and from the "normal" to the stigmatized? At the international level, this involves how nations conceptualize their own national identities, and how they frame the actualities or possibilities of integrating strang-ers from other countries and continents.

Finally, to be a general theory, the hypotheses of these three areas need to be put together into an overarching framework. Marshall and others have used the working classes' battle with capitalism as the mo-

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tive force of citizenship. Class explains important aspects of citizenship, but this motive force is not an effective vehicle for gender, race, and ethnic groups. Turner (1990) and Janoski (1990) have proposed using both class and status as the motive force. Maslow's (1970) hierarchy of needs is sometimes seen as a motive force, and others look at rationality or social exchange. From any viewpoint, however, a theory of citizenship needs more than just class as an overarching framework.

In what Bryan Turner calls a "revival of interest" in citizenship (1990, p. 190), theorists are now responding to the challenge of extending citizenship rights into a systematic and comparative theory.[4] This book is a contribution to these efforts to build a theory of citizenship by contributing to the three areas listed above that prevent current work from becoming an adequate theory of citizenship. Illuminating citizenship requires a more penetrating and complex theoretical searchlight. In the next sections, I begin this process by framing and defining citizenship and by placing citizenship in a context of civil society. After reviewing three traditions of citizenship and choosing Marshall's approach, I present and then connect three approaches of political theory – liberalism, communitarianism, and social democratic theory – to three parallel political regimes – liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). These political theories and regime types will be used throughout the book. Consequently, this introduction places citizenship within a broader context in order to explain the burgeoning undergrowth of demands for rights and obligations we are now experiencing.

THE THEORETICAL TRADITIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Three entirely different groups of theories have dealt with phenomena related to citizenship – Marshall's theory of citizenship, the Tocqueville/Durkheimian approach to civic culture, and the Gramsci/Marxist theory of civil society. In response to early studies of citizenship that focused on the concept of the citizen and political socialization, Thomas H. Marshall proposed in 1949 what most call the first sociological theory of citizenship by developing a theory of citizenship rights and obligations (Marshall 1964).[5] In a discussion of the United Kingdom, Marshall proposed a typology of citizenship rights – legal, political, and social rights – in a developmental order and balanced them with citizenship obligations – taxes, military service, and other service to the nation. Citizenship rights emerged as the result of the conflict between capitalism and equality (i.e., markets and politics). Although Marshall mainly focused on the United Kingdom, scholars subsequently applied his work to a number of other nations.

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One of the most extensive applications of Marshall's theory came at the hands of Reinhard Bendix (1964), who applied citizenship rights to the United Kingdom and Germany. Following Marshall, Bendix wrote on the transformation of these rights in the face of class inequalities caused by industrialization. His major focus was on the extension of citizenship to the working classes through rights to association, education, and the franchise. Rokkan (1966) made further contributions to studying the extension of the franchise, and both Bendix and Rokkan took what was a theory based on one nation and applied it in an explicitly comparative perspective.

Bryan Turner (1986a) pushed the developmental theory of citizenship toward conflict theory with an explicit focus on social movements as the dynamic force leading to the development of citizenship rights. Although both Marshall and Bendix included trade unions as a pressure group for extending citizenship to the masses, conflict was sometimes transparent in the development of specific rights in their theories. Turner made the role of conflict more dominant (see Mann 1986, 1988, 1994; Barbalet 1993, 1988; Kitschelt 1985; Turner 1986a, b, 1990, 1993).[6]

Second, a group of Durkheimian theories addresses the question of civic virtue. Beyond the citizenship sanctioned by law, another aspect of citizenship exists in the public sphere. It represents volunteerism in non-profit and private groups in civil society. The state does not necessarily sanction volunteering; that is, although it may be encouraged or ignored, people do not face subsequent state penalties for not volunteering. Volunteerism and civic virtues have been seen as a major component of civil society from de Tocqueville in the early 1800s to the communitarian critiques of the late 1900s (see Bellah et al. 1985, 1991; Etzioni 1993; Galston 1991; Walzer 1983, 1990; Waldron 1981; Wuthnow 1991a, b).[7]

The third group of theories related to citizenship involves Marxist theories related to reconstituting civil society, and world systems theory involving colonialism. Civil society in this tradition was introduced by Hegel and then Marx, but Gramsci significantly revised it in the 1920s (Bobbio 1988). Given the fall of communism and a distaste for state socialism, contemporary Marxian theorists are fashioning Gramsci's writings on civil society into a theory that protects against both state abuses and the greed of the market. It centers on complex democracy, social movements, and the attempts by Habermas and others to improve democratic communication (Keane 1988a, b; Cohen and Arato 1992; Hall 1995). In a sense, this approach stands between the state-centered citizenship approach of Marshall and the society-centered civic virtue approach of the Durkheimians. However, at this time, it is not entirely clear in what directions this new theory may lead (see Arato and Cohen

1984; Cohen 1982; Cohen and Arato 1992; Keane 1987a, b, 1988a, b, 1991; Seligman 1992; Sales 1991; Hall 1995).[8]

Closely related to Marxian theory is world systems theory, which links national attempts to bestow citizenship in core countries to the lack of rights in peripheral countries or with indigenous peoples. Often, the state's movement toward citizenship requires an ideology of nationalism to promote military exploitation. The obligations of citizenship may be connected to nationalism through military service to *defend* the core nation. In many ways, the state formation process is an act of closure concerning other nations and indigenous peoples (Turner 1990; Brubaker 1992, pp. 27–31; Seligman 1992). The process of achieving personhood frequently requires acts of allegiance to the nation-state, which entails the rejection or downplaying of past cultural or national memberships. Turner paraphrases Anthony Smith on this issue: "the creation of citizenship within the *gesellschaft*-like political space of the modern state may well require the subordination, or even eradication, of *gemeinschaft*-like membership within an ethnic primary group" (Turner 1990, p. 196). While citizenship subordinates ethnicity to universality within the nation-state, it may emphasize a membership in one particular state with strategies of colonialism, nationalism, and even racism. In an external manner quite distinct from civil society, these world system processes of nationalism, colonialism, and allegiance hit at the heart of citizenship development: who from inside and outside the nation may become a citizen (Janoski and Glennie 1995; Brubaker 1992; Hammar 1990; Hollifield 1992; Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik 1992; Wallerstein 1989)?[9]

Although relying more on Marshall and Turner, I will take elements of each of these major theoretical approaches – citizenship rights and obligations from Marshall, solidarity and generalized exchange from Durkheim, civil society from Marx and Gramsci, and colonialism from Wallerstein – and put them to good work in my framework of citizenship.

DEFINITION OF CITIZENSHIP

What is citizenship? Although it is the lingua franca of socialization in civics classes, as well as the cornerstone of many social movements seeking basic rights, and a key phrase in speeches by politicians on ceremonial occasions, oddly enough, citizenship has not been a central idea in the social sciences. Six major social science surveys or dictionaries show no listing for "citizenship" or "citizen."[10] Other sources reveal definitions that reflect legal, normative, and social scientific perspectives. The social scientific definition provides the more useful conception of citizenship for my purposes of reconstructing citizenship theory.[11]

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Citizenship is passive and active membership of individuals in a na-tion-state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality. Each aspect of this definition requires discussion, es-pecially since it can be applied at both the national and individual level.

First, citizenship begins with determining *membership* in a nation-state. Internally, this means establishing "personhood" within a defined geographical territory. Out of the totality of denizens, natives, and sub-jects of a territory, "the citizen" is given specific rights. Personhood usu-ally begins with a restricted group of elite citizens (e.g., the wealthy citizens of Athens, or the barons of thirteenth-century England) and then may develop to encompass a larger portion of nation-state residents (e.g., the 80 to 90 percent of residents in advanced industrialized countries).[12] There are two perspectives on studying membership. The *internal ap-proach* examines how non-citizens within a nation-state achieve mem-bership, that is, how non-citizens – stigmatized ethnic, racial, gender, class, or disabled groups – gain rights and recognition as citizens. The *external approach* analyzes how aliens from outside the nation-state ob-tain entrée and then become naturalized as citizens with attendant rights and obligations. Bottomore differentiates between internal and external citizenship by calling membership "substantive citizenship" and possess-ing rights "formal citizenship" (1992, pp. 66–73; 1993, p. 75).

Second, citizenship involves *active* and *passive* rights and obligations. Dennis Thompson (1970) sees citizenship as passive rights of existence and active rights that include present and future capacities to influence politics. Passive and active rights are very different in their theoretical implications. With passive rights alone, a beneficent dictator could rule with limited legal rights and extensive social rights in a redistributive system of income payments. Active rights bring citizens in a democracy to the foreground in politics and even economics. When citizens become directly active in citizenship rights, social scientists will be concerned with measuring the levels, causes, and consequences of participation. A good empirical example is Almond and Verba's (1965) comparative work on the various roles that citizens play one at a time or even si-multaneously: the parochial or self-interested family person, the subject of the state, and the active citizen participating in the community. Thus, a stress on an active conception of citizenship may be normative, but also social scientific in that it helps construct a more complex theory of citizenship involving political and economic democracy, sometimes op-posing the state (Nagel 1987, pp. 145–80). The next chapter will em-phasize this distinction between active and passive rights.

Third, citizenship rights are *universalistic rights enacted into law and implemented for all citizens*, and not informal, unenacted, or particular-istic.[13] Groups can advance unenacted rights as claims or proposals for

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citizenship rights, but since these rights often derive from norms within subcultures and are enforced by social pressures or group rules, they often conflict with norms in other subcultures. The process of enacting citizenship rights is an attempt to iron out these conflicts through universalistic rights. Further, many claims may be labeled as rights that could never be universal citizenship rights. As Giddens states, persons may have their own or group "moral imperatives" or more simply "customs" that lack universal application or state legitimation (1987, p. 320). For instance, employees working for IBM or kings of the Gypsies may enjoy specific group rights, but these rights are not citizenship rights unless they are universally applied within the country and backed by the state.[14]

Fourth, citizenship is a statement of *equality*, with rights and obligations being balanced within certain limits. The equality is not complete, but it most often entails an increase in subordinate rights vis-à-vis social elites. This equality is mainly procedural – the ability to enter the public forums of courts, legislatures, public bureaucracies, and private councils – but it may also include payments and services that have a direct impact upon substantive equality. The extent of rights actually used by citizens may also vary considerably with class and status group power (Somers 1993, pp. 602–6).

This definition differs from other conceptions of citizenship in four major respects.[15] Legal definitions of citizenship focus on simple membership which often turns on naturalization processes (Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1992). These definitions based on the acceptance of immigrants are too narrow and will be countered by a conceptualization of internal and external membership (see Marshall 1964, p. 92; Svarlien 1964; Plano 1979). A number of other definitions focus on "being a good citizen," which consists of knowing citizenship rights but also tending to volunteer for activities (Roelofs 1957). They tend to be value-laden and are most often applied to students and newly arrived immigrants. The definition used here precludes this conception of citizenship but uses it as the separate idea of "civic virtue" in civil society.

In another direction, Turner (1990) goes too far by including "competence" in his definition of citizenship. Although "active" rights may require competence, "passive" rights (legal and social rights) do not. Consequently, competence cannot be a defining characteristic of citizenship. Mentally disabled or citizens in a coma may be incompetent for some political and participation rights, but that does not mean that they do not have legal and social rights. Deleting competence from the definition of citizenship also avoids Turner's focus on citizenship being "participation," a concept I will use in a different way in the next chapter (1990, pp. 189–90).[16]