I

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, in the afterglow of the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) which it had hosted the previous year, Indonesia celebrated its fiftieth anniversary as a newly visible power on the international scene. Some believed Indonesia came of age twice then, at a doubly vindicating moment for the regime which had overseen its conspicuously successful thirty-year project of nation-building. Since 1965, the quasi-military New Order state had progressively centralized its political control and implemented an uncontested, long-term project of national development. Under its supervision a Western-educated, technocratic elite had successfully engineered the macrodevelopment which has gained Indonesia newfound stature on the world scene.

From Jakarta, the national capital and nexus of political and economic power, the New Order had progressively spread and deepened its oversight across the Indonesian archipelago. Communities once at the peripheries of the state's jurisdiction, and hardly touched by state institutions, are increasingly engaged with the ideology of nationalism and modernity which it propagates. As state institutions increasingly impinge on everyday life, ideas of modernity, national identities, and obligations of citizenship are increasingly salient in communities which only recently were loosely integrated into the national polity.

The New Order can be seen as fostering a native sense of Indonesianness by "ethnicizing" the Indonesian polity, yet simultaneously working to avoid overtly effacing antecedent ethnolinguistic diversity, or promoting the ascendance of any "native" subnational group. But in fact there is one ethnic group, the Javanese, which looms very large on the national landscape. Javanese dominate demographically in the nation as a whole; sixty million or so live in the ethnic "heartland" of Central and East Java – two of Indonesia's twenty-seven provinces but home to almost a third of its population – and a century of migration has led to the growth of large, distinctively Javanese ethnic communities elsewhere in Indonesia and the world.

Officials of Javanese descent likewise predominate in the state apparatus, and in urban elite circles a new version of "high" Javanese cultural

tradition is being actively reinvented. Upwardly mobile Indonesians, not all of whom are Javanese, are adopting modern versions of a refined "hothouse" culture which flourished during the Dutch colonial era. This new urban elite tradition refers back to a Javanese golden age, and so to the two royal cities of south-central Java: Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Both were once famous primarily for their courtly elites, and as the political and cultural centers of the prenational Javanese heartland. Both cities now count as the originary homes of traditions of the *priyayi* community, which the New Order elite had taken for its cultural if not genetic precursor. (For more on this connection see Anderson 1966; Pemberton 1994; Florida 1987; J. Errington 1986, 1998.)

Through a dynamic which Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1987) appropriately calls priyayization, this small bit of south-central Javanese territory has become a cultural epicenter for the nation at large. It does not seem coincidental in this respect that the national motto, *Bhinneka tunggal ika*, "Unity in diversity," likewise acknowledges the nation's ethnic diversity in a Javanese idiom: its Old Javanese form and nationalistic content together suggest a modern version of ethnic Javanese tradition, which is helping to elide or straddle received distinctions between modern and traditional forms of governmentality (see, e.g., Tsing 1993).

In 1998 the New Order found itself grappling with social upheaval and economic uncertainty in troubled times, which recall for some the circumstances of its emergence more than thirty years ago. International praise for successful New Order development has suddenly begun to ring hollow, and Indonesia's progress toward "national modernity" seems more illusory than real. But these troubled conditions and uncertain successes throw into relief what may prove to be among the New Order's most enduring effects on the Indonesian landscape: its success in propagating Indonesian-ness with and through the Indonesian language.

Every aspect of the New Order's "development" of Indonesia has been subserved by the Indonesian language. As the language of state, Indonesian is infrastructural for institutional development; as the language of the nation, it effaces differences between citizens who live in antecedent, ethnolinguistically distinct communities. At the end of World War II, the artificial administrative Malay which counts as Indonesian's immediate precursor was just one of several dialects of that language, spoken natively by a few million residents of the Dutch East Indies' colonial empire. Now Indonesian is a fully viable, universally acknowledged national language, non-native but also clearly ascendant over hundreds of languages spoken natively among more than two hundred million Indonesians. Notwithstanding difficulties in evaluating the results of censuses which include questions about knowledge and use of Indonesian

(see Steinhauer 1994), such censuses provide grounds for broad consensus that Indonesia is well on its way to solving "the national language problem," and enhancing its status as what Fishman (1978:333) has called a "miraculous" language in the developing world.[1] The slogan "language indicates nationality" (I: *bahasa menunjukkan bangsa*), which once expressed a nationalist hope, seems more and more to describe a national condition (Geertz 1973:315).

But in ethnically homogeneous areas, like south-central Java, Indonesian is little used across self-evident lines of ethnolinguistic difference. Speakers there have no native models to emulate because, as ethnic Javanese, they are not in contact with a native-speaking Indonesian community. They are learning to speak Indonesian not by emulating the concrete verbal "practice[s] of . . . specific group[s] of [Indonesian] speakers" but instead by assimilating an underdetermined, "vague ideal norm" to local, native ways of dealing with coethnics (DeVries 1988:125).

So in Central Java, at least, Indonesian is not so much a non-native language learned from or used with members of some linguistically distinct group. It is more an *un-native* language, whose forms and uses are being acquired and used in interaction with otherwise native (-speaking) Javanese. As an outgroup language without an outgroup, Indonesian carries no immediate sense of social "otherness"; it can be said – with apologies to Gertrude Stein, and prior to discussion in chapter 10 – that for Indonesian there is no native (-speaking) "they" there.

Indonesian's modernity

Indonesian's un-nativeness crucially enables and informs its place in the Indonesian national project. As Benedict Anderson recognized in the 1960s, it makes Indonesian a "*project* for the assumption of 'modernity' within the modalities of an autonomous and autochthonous social-political tradition" (1966:89). Anderson wrote these words on the eve of the fall of President Sukarno, in 1965, but they are still apposite for considering here Indonesian's broadest political cultural saliences in the 1990s, and in communities well beyond the elite circles which he discussed.

As New Order development has been superposed ("from above") on communities which were recently peripheral to state control, Indonesian territory has become the scene of many such "projects of modernity." These can be thought of as emerging situations of "contact" – between local community and national polity, between citizen and authoritarian state – which are mediated and shaped by the Indonesian language. At the same time, Indonesian is an increasingly common way of talking in

the "ordinary" interactional engagements which make up much of the fabric of everyday interactional experience. Among the many institutions which subserve New Order power and oversight over Indonesians' lives, Indonesian is uniquely available for appropriation to the most self-interested purposes, which can be entirely at a remove from state interests or venues. For this reason, Indonesian can be considered a state-fostered institution which is subject to situated appropriation "from below."

On one hand, then, the Indonesian language is quite transparently part of a state system, that is, a "palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure, extensive, unified and dominant" (Abrams 1988:58). On the other hand, Indonesian talk, situated in conversational contingencies of everyday life, can mediate a "state idea" of Indonesian-ness as it is "projected, purveyed, and variously believed" (ibid.). Indonesian can figure in such interactional self/other relations as the intimate vehicle for a *doxa* – "diffuse, full, complete, and 'natural'" (Barthes 1989:121) – of modernity and nationalism. This point of convergence has been recognized by observers other than Anderson who see Indonesian as "perhaps the most important single ingredient in the shaping of the modern [Indonesian] culture" (Liddle 1988:1).

This book frames bilingual Javanese and Indonesian usage as mediating this divide between nation-state and everyday life, the "realm of institutional politics" and "order[s] of [verbal] signs and [conversational] practices" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:23). It describes ongoing "contact" between the Indonesian and Javanese languages on a shifting, south-central Javanese landscape; in it I seek to read language use as a point of dynamic convergence between institutional hierarchy and the "individualized, familiar, habitual, micro-climactic of daily life" (Jelin 1987:11, translated in Escobar 1992:29).

My expository strategy for sketching this scene of "contact" between Javanese and Indonesian is two-sided in ways signaled by the book's systematically ambiguous title. On one hand, the phrase "shifting languages" resembles "language shift," the sociolinguistic term of art used for patterns of historical change in the knowledge and use of two languages within communities. Typically, language shift occurs as a community's native language (usually minority or "ethnic") is progressively displaced by or relinquished for another (usually majority or "national"). These are cumulative, "long-term" processes which occur among collectivities of speakers, and as such can sometimes be read as mediating the effects of "large-scale" forces – political, cultural, economic – which shape broader senses of collective identity. As a rubric for collective phenomena, more sociohistorical happenings than intentful doings, "language shift" corresponds to a grammatically intransitive reading of "shifting languages."

On the other hand, "shifting languages" is a phrase which can be used to describe what happens in interactional process when bi- or multilingual speakers juxtapose elements (minimally phrase-long) of two languages. Such transient bits of conduct, more commonly called instances of code switching, are particulars of talk in the "real time" of social life, concrete enough to leave traces (in recordings and transcriptions) for retrospective scrutiny. This is the sphere of language as immediate, situated, other-oriented self-conduct. As other-directed social practice in which speakership presents at least the guise of communicative agency, code switching corresponds to a transitive reading of "shifting languages."

Even if the pun is clumsy, it helps here to thematize the expository counterpoint I try to develop in the following chapters between institutional and interactional aspects of Javanese and Indonesian language in change and use. It provides a way of framing distinct issues while avoiding either a prejudicially unitary metatheoretical profile, or juxtaposed, disjoint sketches. I try instead to develop a dynamic tension between these institutional and interactional perspectives, a tension which is a bit like the one linking yet separating these two readings of "shifting languages." To read the phrase in one sense does not cancel the other possibility; instead it binds them in an asymmetric, "both/and" relation of foregrounded and backgrounded element. I can outline this double strategy here by showing how it helps me to work against the grain of accounts which are predominantly weighted to the side of macro institutional forces, and residualize micro interactional processes.

Certainly the figures on language use cited earlier are easily mobilized for predictions of massive social and language change which will lead to a shift from Javanese to Indonesian. Here is one such vision of Java's linguistic future, taken from the writings of Yoshimichi Someya (1992:61–62):

> Indonesian will spread . . . like a tide to rural areas . . . eventually replacing Javanese [which] is gradually becoming incompatible with such values as directness, clarity, effectiveness, and speed of communication – necessary conditions for the national unity, the "blending" of Indonesian ethnic groups, democracy, modernization, and rationalization required by today's Indonesian government, industries, education, arts, and sciences.

However much some New Order officials would deny it, this allusion to Indonesian "values" resonates strongly with the state's own ideology of development. Because he emphasizes the homogenizing effects of "large-scale" institutional forces, operating uniformly across Javanese territory and communities, Someya likewise echoes writings on "language engineering" dating from the heyday of development (see, e.g., Fishman et al. 1968). Predictions like these center Indonesian among the various state-

fostered institutions which will presumably become social grounds and taken-for-granted frames of reference in everyday life.

Before critiquing this politically fraught position and its ideological grounds in chapter 4, I can quickly consider it here in terms of the complicating factors which it elides and which I address in the following chapters. Each point of criticism can be thought of as an upshot of tacit assumptions about the autonomy of the Indonesian language: as a structured linguistic system, as a social institution shared within and across communities, and as a verbal instrument mobilized for situated communicative ends. So too each of these issues can be broached preliminarily here with an eye to its correlates in Javanese language structure, political culture, and interactional dynamics.

Language, territoriality, and ideology

Someya tacitly dissociates Indonesian's "values" from its role as an instrument of New Order oversight; he similarly brackets any relevance which Javanese might have for contemporary, national political culture. I seek to avoid such simplifying assumptions in this book's first chapters, where I foreground aspects of language use which mediate and legitimize authority. To this end I contrast Javanese and Indonesian with an eye to recent work at the juncture of human geography and critical theory (see, e.g., Peet and Thrift [1989]), which provides a way to consider each language as integrally bound up with a distinct mode or strategy of *territoriality*. In this way, each language can be considered as institutionally and ideologically bound up with one of two distinct strategies to "affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over geographic area" (Sack 1986:19).

Chapter 2 provides a territorially framed, language-centered sketch of ongoing change in upland village communities of south-central Java where I spent time. It juxtaposes Javanese and Indonesian as extensions and symbols of two distinct modes of lowland territorial power, and in shifting perceptions of the modes of territoriality which bind these rural peripheries to cities, where prenational Javanese and national Indonesian authority have both been centered.

Someya's top-down picture of Indonesian's spread likewise ignores any possible salience which antecedent, ethnic, social, and linguistic conditions might have for a national future. It presupposes, rather, that Indonesian language and culture are autonomous with respect to "local" language and traditions, and so together will effect a quantum leap which leaves the prenational era to recede on the rear horizon of history. It matters little from this broadly epochalist point of view that prena-

tional south-central Java has for centuries been far from a social or linguistic *tabula rasa* onto which New Order institutions and language are now being straightforwardly superposed.

This politically fraught assumption is thrown into question in chapters 2 and 3 alike, which center on some enduring political and cultural saliences of Javanese as a mediator and symbol of authority. I sketch there the Javanese language's role in the territoriality or geosocial control which was exercised by the colonial-era kingdoms based in Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Language and social hierarchy were then linked in obvious and complex ways through Javanese linguistic etiquette, best known as the "speech levels."[2]

These speech styles, as I prefer to call them, are still hallmarks of elite Javanese tradition, and still famous for their extensive vocabularies of "crude" and "refined" elements. In use, these styles serve as interactionally nuanced and very conspicuous mediators of status and intimacy between people. But in chapter 3 I focus less on their overt interactional saliences than on their broader institutionally grounded roles as naturalizers of sociolinguistic inequality, within and across lines of territorial hierarchy. In this way they can be considered as the idiom of non-national imagined communities of persons, linked in asymmetric "nets of kinship and clientship" (Anderson 1991:6) which were centered on south-central Java's "exemplary centers" (Geertz 1980) or "galactic polities" (Tambiah 1976). (See in this regard also Cohn and Dirks' discussion [1988:224] of "theater[s] of power.")

Finally, Someya's prediction of language shift is overtly teleological, like New Order development rhetoric. It promotes a secular, ameliorative vision of profound social change, framed as a broad transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, or from mechanical to organic divisions of social labor. This developmentalist ideology accords to language a special place in social change, which I consider in chapter 4 with an eye to the striking fit between New Order development ideology on one hand, and Ernest Gellner's (1983) functionalist account of nationalism on the other. Because of the privileged place of standard languages in his account of nationalism, Gellner helps to explicate the consequences of un-native Indonesian's curious social history, and what Someya calls its value for "directness, clarity, effectiveness, and speed of communication" (Someya 1992:61). Someya's specific assertion, together with Gellner's general account, speaks to the broadest, tacit assumptions of New Order development ideology regarding the "meanings" which accrue to Indonesian, over and against ethnic pasts and languages. In this way the ideological correlates of Indonesian's institutional grounds can be explicated, and its perceived privilege as the vehicle of abstract, rational thought can be foregrounded.

Syncretic usage

Over and against such sweeping pictures of sociohistorical change stand the modest particulars of everyday life, including talk: the fabric of situated, face-to-face relations cocreated among persons who are each others' consociates, and share the social biography of "a community of space and a community of time" (Schutz 1967a:163).

Even statements as broad as Someya's carry implicit predictions about such situated transiencies of Indonesian and Javanese usage. By imputing autonomy or separateness to Indonesian in relation to Javanese, he makes it easy to figure particulars of "mixed" Javanese–Indonesian usage as historically transitional in an epochal shift between languages and eras, as socially residual in everyday life, and as structurally interstitial with respect to two distinct, autonomous language systems.

This book's middle chapters speak to this position through descriptive particulars which reflect indirectly, narrowly, but (I hope) revealingly on considerably more complex shapes of sociolinguistic change. In chapters 5 through 8 I rebut such epochalist positions with sketches of usage, ranging from authoritative public discourse to everyday conversation, in which Javanese and Indonesian intimately shape each other in discourse. These can be read as syncretic in two broad senses of that term.

"Syncretism" recurs in writings about Javanese culture as a notion which has proven malleable enough for self-conscious framings of ethnicity in the nation (e.g., former minister of education, Professor Priyono 1964:23), for ethnographic description (e.g., Geertz 1960), for analysis of political culture (e.g., Anderson 1972), and for quasi-prescriptive social criticism (e.g., Mulder 1978). In such contexts, "syncretism" can intimate a sense of Javanese tradition as being mutable but coherent, accommodative yet resilient, perduring in the distinctive manner in which it incorporates "outside" influences. But in this way "syncretism" can also license essentialist understandings of Javanese culture's unity and autonomy in the face of variation across geosocial space, and change across historical eras.

In chapter 5 I try to read "syncretic" dimensions of Javanese *cum* Indonesian political culture from a few transcribed specifics of authoritative public talk. Framed with an eye to the preceding chapters' sketches of shifting territoriality, a few tiny texts of official Indonesian and formal Javanese speech are considered as more or less efficaciously representing Indonesian authority to peripheral Javanese publics. This is an account of public speech, speakers, and audiences which locates such talk in triadic relations created and presupposed between sources of territorial authority, the speakers who im-person-ate it, and the collective addressees who count as an audience. The ways public Indonesian

business is sometimes done in Javanese, and in which Indonesian sometimes figures in otherwise markedly Javanese ceremonial occasions, show such "mixed usage" to be constitutive of emergent, syncretic understandings of authority.

In structural linguistic description, "syncretism" has a distinct technical sense which was introduced to the study of bilingualism in Jane Hill and Kenneth Hill's work on "mixed" language use in upland communities of central Mexico (1986). In chapters 6 and 7 I broach similar particulars of bilingual usage with an eye to their adaptation of Kurylowicz's structurally grounded definition of syncretism as the "suppression of [system internal] relevant opposition[s] under certain determined conditions" (1964:40). My interest, like theirs, is in "mixed" usage which suppresses the social relevance of oppositions *between* systems, and in which the provenances of talk's elements – native Javanese, or un-native Indonesian – are interactionally muted.

Chapter 6 deals with personal pronouns and kin terms, resources for speaking of the speech partners, interactional selves and others, who cocreate the intersubjective grounds for conversation. Javanese Indonesians have common recourse for such acts of reference to kin terms, which are interactionally focal and broadly syncretic. That such usage represents a point of convergence between interactional and institutional identities is obvious enough, but has unobvious social implications. Formerly Javanese kin terms have been subjected to institutional treatment in Indonesian venues; they have been assimilated to new hierarchies and understandings of status. In use, then, they count as "small-scale" transiencies of talk which reflect "large-scale" shifts in status, class, and territoriality; they mediate face-to-face relations in ways which are tacitly shifting along with understandings of collective identity on an ethnic yet national landscape.

Personal pronouns, on the other hand, are indexically grounded in the interactional identities assumed by persons, speaker ("I") and addressee ("you"), to whom they refer. In chapter 6 I also focus on unobvious but interactionally salient patterns of *non-use* of Indonesian pronominal resources. Javanese speakers tacitly but consistently avoid using a full stylistic range of (prescribed) Indonesian pronominal reference, and so seem to create rather than merely accept a sense of interactional "flatness" in their national language. This interactionally keyed "anti-syncretism" makes Indonesian relatively de-situated in comparison with stylistically nuanced Javanese; it is part of the reason why Indonesian can be counted over and against Javanese as a "third person" or im-personal language which is relatively uninflected for self/other relations.

I believe that these narrow but revealing aspects of usage represent points of purchase in everyday life for the developmentalist ideology of

language, explicated in chapter 4. If such otherwise negligible patterns of (non-)use mark a point of entry for national modernity into everyday conversational life, then it shows that conversational practice can, as Woolard and Schieffelin put it (1994:70), "distort . . . [Indonesian] in the name of making it more like itself."

Chapter 7 deals with two other, more disparate patterns of syncretic language use involving discourse particles on one hand, and lexical items on the other. Extensive repertoires of discourse particles serve Javanese Indonesians as means for marking feelings about and stances toward conversational topics, contexts, and participants. Their non-referential, crucially situated significances appear to make them peripheral for speakers' awarenesses relative not just to their encoded linguistic functions (Silverstein 1976, 1981), but also with respect to their various provenances as well. For this reason their use takes on an osmotic quality across categorical, prescriptive boundaries between the codes of Javanese and Indonesian.

Lexical borrowings from Indonesian into Javanese, on the other hand, are conspicuous in what Javanese themselves sometimes call "salad language." But I suggest in chapter 7 that grammatical and phonological homologies between the two languages enable intimate borrowing from Indonesian to Javanese which recalls stylistically "mixed" Javanese usage sketched in chapter 3. Considered in light of antecedent patterns of Javanese usage, even these conspicuously bilingual ways of talking can be seen as tacitly syncretizing un-native lexical resources into otherwise native interactional dynamics.

Chapters 6 and 7 together frame particulars of everyday Javanese Indonesian bilingual usage to elude broadly epochalist visions of language shift like that quoted earlier. Such syncretic aspects of usage, considered to be "sedimentation[s] of practices that incorporate extralinguistic social . . . factors" (Hanks 1996:195), provide clues to broader, partial accommodations between native and un-native languages. As points of interactionally situated language "contact," they provide structural insights into interactional dynamics of the bilingual usage I sketch in chapters 8, 9, and 10. They are oriented to talk as it is shaped by native senses of Javanese conversational practice on one hand, and an un-native Indonesian language ideology on the other.

Javanese conversation and Javanese–Indonesian code switching

Code switching is a central topic in sociolinguistics, but deserves broader attention among students of social change as a point of convergence between social life and social history. On one hand, code switching emerges in the transient, interactionally situated micro-phenomena of