### Author Index

| Acton, J. P. | 421 |
| Anderson, D. V. | 426n12 |
| Anderson, K. P. | 421 |
| Ando, A. | 6, 546 |
| Ara, K. | 163n2 |
| Areeda, P. | 394 |
| Arrow, K. J. | 7, 31, 39, 87n2, 88, 97n13, 102n19, 103n20, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118n4, 119, 120, 123, 126, 130n1, 132n6, 143n1, 174n1, 251n33 |
| Barro, R. J. | 110 |
| Barten, A. P. | 259 |
| Bateman, D. | 498n24 |
| Bear, D. V. T. | 163, 164n4, 165n5 |
| Benassy, J.-P. | 110, 135n9 |
| Bergson, A. | 185n5 |
| Bishop, R. L. | 64n2 |
| Blattenberg, G. | 415n6 |
| Block, H. D. | 31 |
| Bohi, D. | 417 |
| Brauer, A. | 163n2 |
| Brock, G. W. | 370 |
| Brown, J. A. C. | 415n5 |
| Carlson, R. | 433n24 |
| Cartelier, J. | 25n |
| Champspaur, P. | 118 |
| Chasan, D. J. | 426n12 |
| Chernoff, H. | 9, 231 |
| Ciri, C. F. | 488n4 |
| Clower, R. | 38, 110 |
| Coase, R. A. | 521n2 |
| Cohen, M. L. | 488n4 |
| Costello, K. | 433n24 |
| Cullen, C. T. | 487n1 |
| Dantwalla, M. L. | 301, 302n6 |
| Deaton, A. | 263n1, 3, 415n5 |
| Debreu, G. | 31n5, 6 |
| Diamond, P. | 2 |
| Dimitriev, N. | 163n2 |
| Dixit, A. | 257–8 |
| Dorfman, R. | 163n3, 340n13 |
| Doyt, R. W. | 426n12 |
| Drazen, A. | 40n15 |
| Drèze, J. | 118, 132 |
| Dynkin, E. | 163n2 |
| Eckstein, Z. | 522n6 |
| Edgeworth, F. Y. | 29n2 |
| Edmonds, J. A. | 417 |
| Falcon, W. P. | 308n14 |
| Farrell, J. | 370n27 |
| Feinberg, S. E. | 487n1 |
| Feldman, A. | 145 |
| Fellner, W. | 376n39 |
| Fisher, F. M. | 1, 5, 6, 10, 14, 16, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 63, 64, 87, 111, 112, 113, 117, 119, 123, 125–6, 131, 140, 164, 170, 227–9, 245n27, 250n30, 260, 261, 307, 310, 312, 325n2, 326n3, 337n11, 342n14, 353n20, 521, 354n23, 360n9, 391n8, 392n9, 411–12, 417, 452n6, 493n14, 541, 542, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 556 |
| Foley, D. | 44n14 |
| Ford, A. | 433n24 |
| Fox-Penner, P. | 433n24, 435n28 |
| Frevert, P. | 110 |
| Fuller, A. T. | 170 |
| Galnoor, I. | 362n3 |
| Gill, G. S. | 424 |
| Goldman, S. M. | 145, 157n4 |
| Goodman, L. A. | 237n15, 251–3 |
| Gorman, W. M. | 261 |
| Graham, D. A. | 145 |
| Greenwood, J. E. | 372n31, 378n45, 391n8, 554 |
| Grossman, H. I. | 110 |
| Hahn, F. H. | 7, 30, 33n7, 34, 39, 40n14, 45, 60n2, 88, 97n13, 102n19, 103n20, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118n4, 119, 120, 123, 126, 130n1, 132, 143n1, 174n1 |
| Halvorsen, R. M. | 421 |
| Harsanyi, J. | 237n14, 239n20, 253–5 |
Author Index

Hausman, J., 455–6, 472–4
Hayashi, F., 110
Hemphill, R., 43n24
Henry, C., 118
Hicks, J. R., 7, 28
Higgins, R. S., 404
Hildreth, C., 237n14, 251–3
Hitch, C., 328n4, 333n10
Houthakker, H. S., 175n3, 415
Hurwitz, L., 31, 87n2
Iwata, G., 374n37
Jenner gen, L. P., 145
Jorgenson, D. W., 259
Kagawa, A., 33n7
Kaysen, C., 15, 390n6, 411–12, 417, 553
Kenen, P., 245n27, 541n3
Khakhatse, D. R., 301–2
Klevorick, A. K., 361n2
Kohn, M. G., 337n34
Koopmans, T. C., 51, 87n2, 552
Kuga, K., 33n7
Lamb, R., 426n12
Lawrence, A., 421n11
Leigland, J., 426n12
Leijonhufvud, A., 110
Leonard, N., 11, 267
Leroux, A., 11, 270
LITTLE, I. M. D., 183n2, 216
Liu, T. C., 545
Long, W. F., 372n29, 404
Luce, R. D., 237n15
Lukes, S., 362n3
Lypounov, A., 31n4
McFadden, D., 7, 30n3, 170n1, 172
McGowan, J. J., 372n29, 31, 378n45, 381n49, 391n8, 554, 556
McKean, R., 328n4, 333n10
McKenzie, L., 163, 166, 168n7
McManus, M., 60n2
Maddala, G. S., 424
Madden, P., 5, 35n8, 143, 145, 146n2
Malenbaum, W., 287n2
Mantel, R., 31n9
Markowitz, H., 237n15, 251–3
Metzler, L., 30, 174n2
Miller, J. C., 322, 323
Mines, M., 426n12
Mirrlees, J. A., 263
Mitchell, B. M., 421
Mooz, W. E., 421
Morton, A. S., 310, 315, 317, 318, 325n2, 326n3, 337n11, 342n14, 353nn20, 21
Mosbacher, R. A., 490n9
Mow, C. S., 421
Mowll, R. S., 421
Muehlbauer, J., 259, 263nn1, 3, 550
Mueller, W. F., 390n6
Mulry, M. H., 498n23, 24, 506n39
Negishi, T., 30, 34, 51n1, 60n2, 71n7, 87n1, 88n4, 106n22, 111, 117, 174n1
Newman, P., 170n1
Newmark, C., 372n33
Nikaido, H., 97n13
Nitzberg, D. M., 310, 312, 317, 318, 325n2, 326n3, 337n11, 342n14, 353nn20, 21
Norman, V., 257–8
Ogukuchi, K., 60n2
Oi, W. Y., 323
Olson, R. O., 301–2
Parti, M., 421n11
Painkin, D., 41, 110
Peretz, I. L., 265
Peterson, D. W., 145
Pheelps, E. S., 282n10
Pigou, A. C., 261
Pollok, R. A., 263n3, 282n10
Posner, R. A., 15, 390n6, 404, 407, 409n3, 410n6, 5
Prest, A. R., 325n1, 346n15, 350n18
Quandt, R. E., 60n2
Rader, T., 145
Radford, R. A., 132
Raitha, H., 237n15
Ravenscraft, D. J., 372n29
Rennhack, R., 415n6
Robinson, J., 547
Rodriquez, C. A., 373n34
Rogerson, W. P., 408n1
Rosenstein-Rodan, P., 12
Rothenberg, J., 10, 245n27, 253n34, 255n37, 261
Rothschild, M. Z., 63, 41n13, 63n1
Salandana, F. M. C. B., 40n12
Samuelson, P. A., 28, 30, 163n3, 183n1, 219n16, 237n14, 246n28, 541
Searl, H., 3, 31–2
Schmalensee, R., 14, 361–62
Schultz, H., 52n3
Schultz, T. W., 297–9, 301
Schumpeter, J., 46, 542
Scott, J. T., 373n34
Sen, A. K., 9, 10n14, 260, 261, 263n1, 265
Shapiro, C., 370n27, 371n28
Shell, K., 10, 260, 548, 549, 550
Shugart, W. F. II, 404
Silberberg, E., 270n1
Author Index

Simon, H. A., 546
Slesnick, D. T., 259
Smith, Adam, 402
Solow, R. M., 6, 161, 163n1, 164, 546
Sonnenschein, H., 31
Spencer, B. D., 498n23, 24, 506n39
Stahl, D. O., 42, 132
Starr, R. M., 145, 157n4
Stewart, J. B., 391
Stigler, G. J., 53n6
Stocking, C. W., 300n6
Strotz, R., 9–10, 230–55
Taylor, L. D., 415
Temen, P., 373n34
Theocharis, R. O., 60n2
Thomas, T., 433n24
Tollison, R., 404
Tsai, A. D., 5

Turner, D., 390n6, 394
Turvey, R., 325n1, 346n15, 340n18
Uzawa, H., 34, 97n13, 132n6, 143n1, 175n4, 176n6
Varian, H., 110, 120
Veendorp, E. C. H., 110
Wales, T. J., 263n3
Walker, D. A., 270n1
Walker, F. A., 487n1
Weintraub, E. R., 145
Weiss, L., 372n32
Willig, R. D., 14, 361–82
Wolf, A., 522n4
Woltman, H. F., 498n24
Youngblood, A., 433n24
Zimmerman, M. D., 417n9
Subject Index

accuracy of census: criterion used, 494–8; loss function related to, 496; using statistical methods to measure, 490–4
agriculture sector: of countries importing food surpluses, 296, 307–8
airline industry See also computer reservation systems (CRSs): competition and predation in, 395–7; computer reservation systems within, 450–1; deregulation, 451; proving injury related to reservation systems’ display bias, 453–6
Alcoa case. See United States v. Aluminum Company of America (1945)
antitrust policy: in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 378–80; related to oligopoly behavior, 398–402; related to single-firm monopolies, 385–98 arbitrage: with disequilibrium, 35; effect on prices, 43–4; opportunities for, 26; in stability analysis, 46–7
Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium, 33, 41, 42
Arrow-Hahn price-adjustment model, 88, 90, 93, 95n11, 104, 105–7, 111 auctioneer: in price-adjustment model without, 88–91; price adjustment without, 87–108; role in markets of, 29, 87
Baker v. Carr (1962), 497
barriers to entry: arising through government action, 408–9; conditions for existence of, 392–3 benefits: discounting of, 348; point of view related to, 354–7; use of measures for, 346–7
boundedness of prices: in Hahn process models, 119–20; in price adjustment without auctioneer, 99–101
buyers (consumers): in price-adjustment model, 52–60
Cellophane case. See U. S. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (1956)
census adjustment: Bureau of the Census recommendation for, 488; counting the states, 503–17; decision of Secretary of Commerce against, 488–9, 503–7; loss functions related to, 494–502; measurement of accuracy, 490–4; testing null hypothesis of, 502–3; understanding decision of Secretary of Commerce, 506–14
coalitions: of agents in Edgeworth process assumption, 143–4
Coase theorem, 521n2
Cobb-Douglas utility function: weak gross substitute property, 178
competition: among airline computer reservation systems, 478; convergence to competitive equilibrium, 80–6; models of competitive equilibrium, 87
competition policy. See antitrust policy
computer reservation systems (CRSs): airlines’ individual proprietary systems, 451–2; architectural bias in, 475; change in ownership structure (1986), 476; of combined airline industry, 450–1; effect of display bias in SABRE system, 456–61; effects of display bias on APOLLO bookings by time of departure, 468–71; estimation of propensity to book in advance, 463–8; proposed self-enforcing mechanism for, 479–81; regulation related to display bias in, 452, 475, 478–9; revenue diversion from display bias, 474; SABRE, APOLLO, and PARS display algorithms, 451, 454–79
constraints: in cost-benefit analysis, 332–42; disequilibrium with quantity, 110–11; in making public policy, 332–4, 340–2; related to water availability, 528; shadow price of cost constraint, 328–9; shadow price of water consumption, 525–6, 528; in substitution between men and capital, 335

568
Subject Index

convergence: to competitive equilibrium, 80–6; to Walrasian equilibrium, 119–25 Convexity Postulate (Strotz), 232, 235–6 cost-benefit analysis: alternative criteria to be maximized in, 328–32; constraints in, 332–42; of defense manpower planning, 337–42, 345–6; levels of aggregation or disaggregation for, 350–4; overview, 326–8 costs See also social cost: discounted value of future spending for U.S. Navy re-enlistment incentives, 316–18; discounting, 345–6; of monopoly firm, 404–10; over time, 342–50; point of view related to, 354–7; related to Navy reenlistment incentives, 310–11 core-stabilization, 105–8 CSRs. See computer reservation systems (CRSs)
defense manpower planning: aggregate and disaggregate analysis, 350–4; cost-benefit analysis in, 337–42, 345–6; discounting costs in, 345–6; time effects in, 342–4 demand: functions in condition of exchange, 174; income-constant demand curves, 178; in price-adjustment model without auctioneer, 93; price elasticity of demand for electricity, 415 discounting: choice of rate for, 327; costs in defense manpower planning, 345–6 disequilibrium: agents’ consciousness of, 126; deterministic disequilibrium awareness model, 131–6; with quantity constraints and spillovers, 110–27; in trading process, 131 disequilibrium analysis: requirement for, 26, 47–8; stability question in context of model for, 42–5 Edgeworth–Bertrand oligopoly model, 64 Edgeworth process, 3–5; assumption of, 34–5; non-tâtonnement assumption of coalition of agents, 143–4; simple and compound trades in, 146–9; standard t-trades, 149–53 electric utilities: demand analysis (Fisher–Kaysen), 416–21; demand analysis (Houthakker), 415; forecasting demand for, 412–15; forecasting demand for electricity (1970s), 421–6 equilibrium: competitive, 91–3; quasi-, 91–3; equilibrium analysis, 25, 27; comparative statics as tool of, 32; Patinkin problem, 41; Walrasian or non-Walrasian, 30, 144–5 equilibrium model: combined with price-adjustment model, 80–6 exchange See also trades; trading processes: demand function with, 174; in deterministic disequilibrium awareness model, 131–40; with quasi-stability, 113–19 firms: in Edgeworth–Bertrand oligopoly model, 64; as sellers and price setters in price-adjustment model, 52–60, 64–72; single-firm monopolies, 385–98 first-order systems: basic theorem for, 163; matrix with shift of units in, 164–6 Fisher–Feller Theorem, 7, 170–3 Food for Peace program, 286 food surplus: effect of imports on domestic agriculture, 296–308 food surplus disposal plan, proposed: agency’s alternative buying and selling operations, 288–9, 290, 294, features of, 286–8 forecasting: of demand, 411–12; of electric utility demand, 412–15; of industrial electric utility demand (1970s), 421–6 goods, normal, 270 Hahn process, 3–4, 34; boundedness of prices in models, 119–20; defects in, 41–2; incorporation of quantity constraints and spillovers into, 112; individual’s excess demand, 93; money in models of, 39–41; of non-tâtonnement adjustment, 111; orderly market assumption, 36, 38, 117; target utilities in, 37, 101–4 Harvard Middle East Water Project, 18, 520, 534 higher-order systems: consistent units in, 166–8 household, the: demands under Walrasian equilibrium, 113, 117–19; in simple and compound trades, 146–59; utility function of, 270–1; value judgment required for household equivalence scales, 261–5, 267–9 IBM case. See United States v. International Business Machines Corporation (1969) incentives: costs related to U.S. Navy re-enlistment, 310–11; in U.S. Navy re-enlistment package, 316

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Subject Index

income, real: defined, 185; measurement of real, 184
income distribution: assumptions in analysis of real and money income, 186–7; circumstances for making value judgments about, 233; model and definitions of money and real income, 188; of money income, 185–6; of real income, 185–6; Strotz’s paradox in ethics of, 230–6; value judgments related to, 183–5
individual welfare, 190
industrial organization: organizing principles in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 366–75
inequality measurement, 259
information: of agents in trading process, 131, 144; required for formation of agent coalitions, 143–4
In Re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Systems Antitrust Litigation (1988). See also computer reservation systems (CRSs): 450n2
Institute of Naval Studies (INS) study, 310
International Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc. (1993), 395
Isomorphism Postulate (Strotz), 231, 235–9
Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion for welfare, 183, 191, 209, 220
loss functions: choice of, 496; defined, 496; used by Bureau of the Census, 496, 498–502
Lyapounov function: in Edgeworth process, 34, 37; in Hahn process, 37; sum of target utilities as, 104–5, 124; working in tâtonnement, 33–4
Lyapounov’s Second Method, 30–1, 124
market definition: in Cellophane case, 389–90; debate related to, 390–1; IBM case, 391
markets See also barriers to entry: concentration related to oligopoly, 400; Hahn process assumption of orderly, 36, 38, 117; Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of concentration in, 400; price-adjustment model, 64–72; price setting in, 29; market share tests for monopoly, 388, 391
Marshallian cross, 52
money: in Arrow–Hahn model, 88, 100, 104, 105n21; in Hahn process models, 39–41; in stability analysis, 39
monopoly: costs of (Posner), 404–10; government-induced, 408–9; predatory pricing, 393–8; structure of, 386–93
monopoly power: of airline computer reservation systems, 478; identification of, 392; measurement of, 391
New Welfare Economics, 237
No Bankruptcy condition, 113, 126
No Favorable Surprise assumption: in stability analysis, 47
non-tâtonnement: agents’ formulation of demands under, 130; Edgeworth process assumption of coalition of agents, 143–4; Hahn process, 111
non-tâtonnement processes. See trading processes
non-Walrasian equilibrium: conditions for, 121–3
non-Walrasian equilibrium, 30, 144–5
No Swindling assumption, 33–4, 118
oligopoly: behavioral standards in, 400–402; market concentration related to, 400; structural standard in, 398–400
Pareto optimality: in trading mechanism, 34–5, 144–5
Putkin problem, 41
peace treaty, Israel-Jordan: settlement of water issues in, 525
predation: Areeda-Turner test of predatory pricing, 394–6; predatory behavior, 393–4
preferences: in Edgeworth-process compound trades, 144; Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, 31
price adjustment: requirement for adequate theory of, 51–2; role of auctioneer, 29; in stability analysis, 45–8
price-adjustment model, 52–61; combined with equilibrium model, 80–6; of single market with customer search and firms’ adjusting prices, 64–72
prices: agents’ acceptance of under tâtonnement, 130; boundedness of, 99–101, 119–20; in deterministic disequilibrium awareness model, 131–40; in Edgeworth-Bertrand oligopoly model, 64; effect on demand for electricity (Fisher-Kaysen), 416–21; effect on demand for electricity

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Subject Index

(Houthakker), 415; predatory pricing of monopolist, 393–8; price setting by firms in price-adjustment model, 52–60; quasi- and competitive equilibria, 91–3; in water allocation model, 528
property rights: related to ownership of water, 521, 524–5; value related to water, 525
public policy See also antitrust policy: choosing criteria for cost-benefit analysis, 528–32; constraints in making, 332–4; effectiveness constraint in, 340–2; effects of, 354–7; environment for decision making, 332; using cost-benefit analysis to find efficient, 333
quantity constraints: incorporated into Hahn process, 12
quantity-rationing, 132
queue-rationing, 132
rationing: queue-, coupon-, and quantity-rationing in trading mechanisms, 132–3
rents: scarcity rents for water, 529–30
research agenda: in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 375–8
sellers (firms): in price-adjustment model, 52–60
shadow prices: of constraints, 328–9, 333–4; of constraints on water consumption, 528; of water, 528–30; in water allocation model, 525–6, 528
shocks, exogenous, 46
Simple Simon, 38–9
social cost, 521n2
social welfare function: Fisher’s model of, 255; Goodman’s and Markowitz’s model of, 252–3; Harsanyi’s model of, 253–5; Hildreth’s model, 251–2; Strotz’s model of, 230–31
Slovà’s Theorem, 6, 161–2
spillovers: disequilibrium with, 110–11; incorporated into Hahn process, 112
stability: of adjustment process, 119–25; Hickian perfect, 30; pure exchange with quasi-stability, 113–19; related to tâtonnement, 31–2
stability analysis: dynamic model in, 28; introduction of money in, 39; No Favorable Surprise assumption in, 47; purpose of, 46; under quantity constraints, 110–27; question of equilibrium in, 27; tâtonnement analysis in, 29
substitution: at aggregate level of units in the military, 353–4; among different types of labor and personnel types, 335–7; among personnel in small units, 351–2; gross substitute process, 174–9; between men and capital, 334–5; substitutability of demand and supply, 388–9; trade-offs related to personnel with, 338–40
target utilities: in Hahn process, 37, 101–4
Lyapunov function from sum of, 104–5, 124
tâtonnement See also auctioneer; non-tâtonnement; price adjustment: agents’ acceptance of prices under, 130; defects and failure of, 29–33; in Lyapunov function, 33–4; in stability analysis, 29; treatment of agents’ behavior in models of, 28–9
time: costs and benefits over, 342–50
trade-offs: in substitutions among personnel, 338–40
trades: analysis of compound, 155–9; analysis of simple, 150–3; in determinstic disequilibrium awareness model, 131–40; in Edgeworth process, 34–5; in endowments, 32–4; number of participants in Edgeworth-process, 143–59; out of equilibrium, 32–6; Pareto-improving, 34–5, 144–5; in price-adjustment model without auctioneer, 96–9; simple and compound Edgeworth process, 144–59
trading processes See also non-tâtonnement; tâtonnement: agents’ demands based on understanding of, 131; disequilibrium in, 131; Edgeworth Process, 3–5, 33–6; Hahn Process, 3–4, 36–42; No Swindling assumption, 33–4, 118; price-adjustment equation in, 33; quantity constraints in, 110–11; queue-, coupon-, and quantity-rationing in, 132
Subject Index

United States v. Aluminum Company of America (1945), 385–7, 407–8
United States v. United States Steel Corporation, et. al. (1920), 385
utilities See also electric utilities; target utilities: in Edgeworth process, 37
utility function: estimates for Navy, 311–15; with gross substitute property, 174–9; of household, 270–1
value judgment: basis for income distribution, 234–5; circumstances for making income distribution, 233;
conditions for acceptance or rejection of value judgment A, 215–16, 227–8; effect of compensating, 223–5; factors applicable to value judgment A, 219; of income distributions, 191–7; in model of real and money income distribution, 188; nontroughed, 218–19; required for household equivalence scales, 261–5, 267–9; situation (A) as better than situation (B), 191–208; of totally compensating income distribution, 197; welfare economics based on, 190–1
Walrasian equilibrium, 30–1; convergence to, 119–25; household demands under, 113, 117–19; inability to decompose, 123
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS): history prior to litigation, 426–33; model to analyze demand uncertainty of, 433–43
water: desalination of, 524; issues in Israel-Jordan peace treaty, 525; ownership and usage, 519–21, 524–5; recycled, 522; scarcity rent of, 529–30; shadow price of, 528–30; social and private value in Gaza Strip of, 521–2, 524; social and private value of, 520–1, 522, 524, 527–8, 530; sources in Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian entity, 522–4
water allocation model addressing social and private goals, 525–8; efficiency in, 529; including effects of policy; permit system for non-owners of water, 526; planned additions to, 530–2; shadow prices in, 525–6
water management: development of water allocation model for, 533; problems of, 526
welfare See also income distribution; New Welfare Economics; social welfare function; value judgment: of individual, 190; Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion, 183, 191, 209, 220; of society opposed to the individual, 216
welfare economics See also New Welfare Economics: assignment of weights in, 184; based on value judgment, 190–1