

The Globalisation of Crime

Understanding Transitional Relationships in Context

On a contracting world stage, crime is a major player in globalisation and is becoming as much a feature of the emergent globalised culture as are other forms of consumerism. *The Globalisation of Crime* charts crime's evolution. It analyses how globalisation has enhanced material crime relationships such that they must be understood on the same terms as any other significant market force. Trends in criminalisation, crime and social development, crime and social control, the political economy of crime, and crime in transitional cultures are all examined in order to understand the role of crime as an agent of social change. In this first book to challenge existing analyses of crime in the context of global transition, crime is shown to be as much a force for globalisation as globalisation is a force for crime, and an integrated theory of crime and social context is presented.

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*Understanding Transitional Relationships
in Context*

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Preface: Some themes of method

Crime cannot be understood outside its social context. For the analysis which follows context is viewed as physical space, institutional process, patterns of relationships and individual variation. Context is a transitional state within which crime influences, and is influenced by, a variety of social, cultural, political and economic determinants.

Contextual analysis is essentially interactive. As an object of such analysis crime is not limited to people or situations or reactions. Crime is more effectively understood as relationships which develop along with the dynamics of its selected context. Essential for the motivation of these relationships is the representation of crime as choice.

In order to appreciate crime beyond its localised manifestations, a contextual analysis needs to be comparative at many levels. The identified interest in globalisation suggests several dualities (local/global; custom/modernisation; market/enterprise) which dominate the comparative contextual analysis to follow. Initially the comparison will be within context (e.g. crime as a feature of social development internal to a particular transitional culture). Concurrently the comparison of context with context (e.g. locality and globe) will evolve. The latter holds out much for critically appreciating the representations of crime and the interests which promote them.

To achieve its fullest potential within the theme of globalisation, comparative research should, therefore, concentrate within a nominated cultural¹ context; across two or more contexts within the same culture; across time and space within a culture in transition; culture to culture; and (not or) simultaneously at the local and global levels.

Crime assumes a variety of social functions dependent on context. These may co-exist while contradicting or challenging any single understanding of crime. With crime being culturally relative, it has the potential

¹ Culture here is preferred to notions such as society and community because, while culture is a relative concept, it relies on common forms and functions which allow for comparisons of civilisation and social development. In the comparative exercise, referent cultures are a useful locator when examining social relationships and behaviours in transition.

within any particular culture to fragment social order. However, crime's existence and representation at a global level may argue for the unity and generalisation of social problems.

Globalisation is a feature of the current social and cultural condition. As much as any other social entity, crime, its representations and its impact are part of globalisation. However, this has led to further distortion of the representation and utility of crime and control. With the implosion which produces and proves globalisation, crime is moving further away from conventional explanations of criminality.

As with many emergent themes in social science, globalisation has both simple and complex representations. Put simply, it is the collapsing of time and space – the process whereby, through mass communication, multinational commerce, internationalised politics and transnational regulation, we seem to be moving inexorably towards a single culture. One proof is in modern, universal cultural iconography, though this is more likely to represent Coca Cola than universal human rights protection.

The more complex interpretation of globalisation is as paradox, wherein there are as many pressures driving us towards the common culture as those keeping us apart. The resultant move towards globalisation is due to the prevailing nature and influence of internationalised politics and economics.

Globalisation is a reflexive concept. It means modernisation and the marketing of predominant consumerist values. In this respect the influence of modernisation over developing cultures in transition initially destabilises custom and tradition. The benefits and detriments of relentless globalisation, such as crime, should be both important and natural objects for comparative research.

Essential to globalisation and crime is the internationalisation of capital, the generalisation of consumerism and the unification of economies. If crime is to be understood as a market condition, then its place within globalisation becomes more vital as an analytical context for contemporary appreciations of crime and control.

The conventional wisdoms of crime as a product of social dysfunction and marginalisation may be challenged and refined through comparative contextual analysis. Globalisation as a focus for this provides the potential to position crime as a natural consequence of many modernisation paradigms previously considered to be subverted by crime.

Crime is power. Relationships of power and domination which become criminogenic are enlivened through comparative contextual analysis.

An appreciation of crime within globalisation is only partial unless control is considered. Control is more than a response to crime. The

globalised strategies of crime control tend also to reveal the impetus for globalisation.

The crime/globalisation nexus will be explored so as to challenge contemporary representations of crime, engage popular wisdom about the causes of crime, expose the influence of crime over social and cultural transitions, and demystify both crime and globalisation, thereby offering the potential to rationalise control, diminish crime and reconstruct crime relationships and crime choice.

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1 (Mis)representing crime

Crime trends

Late last century Durkheim (1984) proposed, and recent studies seem to confirm (Leavitt, 1992), that increases in the frequency of crime relate to social differentiation as a process of socio-cultural evolution. Put simply, the more artificially divided a society becomes as it develops, particularly as Durkheim saw it in terms of the structure and product of labour, the more common is crime. If this is so, then one might assume increased crime rates as a natural consequence of cultural modernisation or social diversification. Globalisation, therefore, may tend to stimulate or retard crime, depending on whether it is a force for harmony or dissonance. The difficulty with this or any other general assertion about trends in crime is the culturally specific nature of crime and the problems involved in revealing its social reality (see Quinney, 1970). These issues make reliance on crime trends little more than speculation.

Due to the paucity of useful crime data from most countries, it is impossible to generalise on long-term crime trends world-wide. Braithwaite suggests that 'the only generalisation we can make about historical crime trends is one of a general [post-World War II] increase' (1989: 50). There are 'common-sense' expectations regarding the rise and fall of crime rates during particular social periods. These include the assumption that theft increases during economic recession and high unemployment. Such assumptions undermine the cautions which must accompany crime trend analysis. The fact is that during times of economic downturn and contraction of job opportunities, communities which might otherwise be seen as criminogenic tend towards greater homogeneity, and property crime rates within these communities fall (see Braithwaite, 1979). Even so, the popular wisdom continues that poverty causes crime (cf. Currie, 1997).

The political impact of statements about the rise and fall of crime, and the social consequences of this, empowers any institution claiming the ability to quantify crime and the potential to regulate its rate. The state's

monopoly over crime figures gains its power from the bald presentation of empirical 'truth' about crime.

In an effort to assess the world position on crime and trends in crime both from a spatial and temporal perspective the United Nations has been interested in international crime surveys since 1972 (see General Assembly Resolution 3021 (XXVII), 18 December 1972). To date, five international crime survey exercises have been carried out by UN agencies¹ at differing levels of empirical sophistication, achieving various degrees of success. The UN has also sponsored international crime (victim) surveys (see Zvekcic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995), international surveys on crimes against business, and a transnational organised crime survey. Each of these has involved differing methodologies and has produced results which range in empirical conviction. Perhaps more significantly, the efforts by the UN to produce even such very qualified and unrepresentative data on world crime trends are evidence both of the interest in crime as a national and global problem and the international concern over crime trends. While the utility of this 'world-view' on crime may be challenged, the significance of the discourse which surrounds it is undeniable.

In analysing the results of the third UN survey,² attempts were made, in the face of considerable methodological difficulties, to discuss changes in recorded crime over the period of the first three surveys (1970–85). The results might seem disappointing in their generality:

- Over the period there was a considerable increase in reported crime in all parts of the world (5 per cent per year, which is well beyond the rise attributable to population growth).
- There was an overall upward trend in recorded crime between 1975 and 1980, followed by a more universal rise in the period 1980 to 1985. (From 1980 to 1985, 81 per cent of respondent areas and countries reported an increase in crime rates.)
- The total per capita crime figures tend to be higher in Western Europe and North America (these variations may be largely a factor of administrative and reporting practices).
- There was a more general tendency to report to the police crimes which occurred.

¹ The UN Survey of Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems is a regular collection of statistics provided by member states, to the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division. The rounds of the survey have covered the periods: 1970–75; 1975–80; 1980–85; 1985–90, and 1990–94. The sixth survey period will be for 1994–97, and from then on it is intended that they be every two years and supplemented by topical surveys (e.g. prison conditions).

² For a detailed discussion of the Third UN Survey of Crime Trends, see UN (1993).

- As countries attain higher levels of socio-economic development (e.g. more telephones, more goods insured), the rate of reporting crime increases.
- Violent crimes are more likely to be reported in situations where criminal justice authorities show themselves to be more sympathetic to the victim.
- In the periods 1975–80 and 1980–85 there was a marked increase in the rates for drug crimes and robbery. In both periods the increase in rates for drug crimes was greater than for any other offence.
- In both these periods theft accounted for the largest percentage of reported crime, with more thefts per capita in developed countries.
- Some countries experienced a decrease in certain types of crime. For instance, in Canada and Sri Lanka fewer drug crimes were recorded.
- There was a small decrease in non-intentional homicides, and the per capita rate of intentional homicides rose slowly.

In concluding the overview of the third survey the UN report observed (UN, 1993: 53):

The global picture is not an encouraging one. There has been an increase in the overall crime rate; and there is the difficult issue of the interrelationship between 'higher' and 'lower' crime rates in the context of socio-economic development. The future may be even more gloomy, as some projections seem to indicate.

So without the complete picture on crime throughout the world, broad patterns of criminality are said to have emerged across time and place which provide some opportunity to discuss 'trends'. This might be more convincing, at least in societies in comparable phases of development (see Heidensohn and Farrell, 1991), if as we suggest development and modernisation are criminogenic (see chapter 2).

Where trend analysis of crime (such as in the UN surveys) has been attempted, patterns in crime are mainly considered in either a temporal or spatial sense (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984). Indices of comparison are also not restricted to official statistics on crimes reported to state agencies.³ For example, Walker (1994) utilises the data provided through the initial two United Nations Crime Victims Surveys (1989 and 1992) to compare criminal activity as reported by victims, over a range of offences, throughout twenty countries. The conclusions which may be drawn from even a cursory examination of these data may provide the opportunity to discuss crime trends from region to region, or country to country, in different stages of socio-economic development. For example, car theft seems to have been a more significant problem of victimisation in West-

³ For a discussion of the difficulties involved in the use of official crime (justice) statistics as a measure of crime see Hogg (1983).

ern than Eastern Europe (as it then was), and this might have something to do with different levels of car ownership and patterns of use across the two regions. Furthermore, those countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA, where households are usually privately owned, suburban, detached-style dwellings, are those where burglary is at its highest. From this one might speculate that as patterns of the ownership, occupation and use of private property develop, so too the patterns of associated property crime will change. Therefore a variety of specific and influential social indicators remain hidden behind the bald face of crime rates, and as a result the explanatory potential of these is ignored in a discussion of raw figures and trends.

From another dimension Walker utilises similar data to plot and compare reported rates of crime (homicide, robbery and motor vehicle theft) from twenty-two different urban regions and cities. The analysis reveals that homicide and robbery figures could be associated with levels of urbanisation, while motor vehicle theft data exhibits no such obvious connection. The bigger the city the more likely it is that its citizens may be robbed. The question here is whether the context of urban environments, urbanisation or the social diversification which is a feature of city life tend towards crime.

Added to urbanisation as a potential influence on crime, Walker states the impact of certain legislative restrictions. Homicide rates in US cities, for example, vastly outstrip those from cities in countries where gun laws are more restrictive. Is gun ownership and use affected by legislative regulation and does such ownership and use facilitate and stimulate crime? Is the context of firearms violence inextricably bound to gun ownership and how does the medium for violence determine the manner in which it is ultimately appreciated beyond the bounds of popular wisdom and 'gun culture'?

A close look at these examples will reveal a wide range of limitations inherent in considering crime data out of its social context. Even so, the figures have an impact and the endeavour to present and analyse trends in their development emphasises the desire of people to know how safe their city is or how criminal their community. Representations of crime are all too often constructed with one eye on such public expectations and the other on global concerns, rather than advancing the contextual complexities which might make simple and persuasive causal analysis more conditional. For example, it is one thing to promote the blanket allegation that unrestricted gun ownership leads to violent crime; it is another to challenge gun use and advocate selective and successful restrictions through comparisons with the data on who commits violent crimes with guns, against whom and where (see Zimmering and Hawkins, 1997). Clearly,

in 'gun cultures' such as the United States, the significance of gun ownership largely remains debated at the level of ideology. Attacks on the gun rely on generalised causal assumptions about guns, violence and crime, while the ideological power of the constitutional right to bear arms is unchallenged. Trend analysis based on primitive frequencies and causal connections derived from popular wisdom may produce misleading representations of crime, rather than affording a detailed consideration of crime in context (problematic as that may prove).

At this point it might be worthwhile reiterating that the levels of contextual analysis envisaged in this work have several useful forms, each essentially comparative. The examination of crime and control, and their representations within cultures, may be analysed against other significant triggers for social transition. External to this are the features of globalisation which lend themselves to comparison with culturally specific representations of crime. If the analysis addresses these levels concurrently, then any apparently contradictory or disparate representations of crime can be reconciled.

Temporal and spatial patterns

The 'geography' of crime has been the fascination of social statisticians since the earliest experiments with 'mapping' features of societies and communities (social mapping) (see Fitzgerald, 1981: Part I). To justify the proposition that crime was largely the province of particular social classes, cities were explored to reveal the sites of crime. However, as both cities and crime are dynamic social entities, this geographic analysis employed generalised historical and interactive social dimensions which necessitated that its conclusions would be equivocal (Downes, 1989).

Spatial analyses of crime are not limited to comparisons across local, urban, regional or national boundaries. Material indicators of socio-economic development have also provided sites for analysis (see Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Zvekic, 1993; Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995). The difficulties associated with treating this type of socio-economic data as if it relates to material, temporal or spatial contexts centre around the assumption that crime is as easily located in 'places' and 'situations' as it is in the transitions of communities and cultures.

Spatial analyses of crime may focus on absolute locations, mapping techniques, relative 'sites' and flow data. Problems arise with the spatial units of measurement, such as relative size and standardisation (see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984: chs. 9 and 10). In addition, the difficulties of generalisation across locations will always temper the comparative utility of spatial analysis.

'Crime and the city' is of particular interest for spatial analysis, as it is employed in supporting social policy development. Urban crime research provides the basis for the growing literature and array of policy initiatives based on 'situational crime prevention'. Here the environmental determinants of crime are manipulated in order to reduce its prevalence and alter its location (Evans and Herbert, 1989: 108, 315).

Temporal patterns of crime are regularly extrapolated in order to criticise crime as a feature of nominated cultural contexts. In addition, such patterns may be used to suggest commonality across cultures in terms of the development of crime trends and their duration within constant stages of transition or development. This is particularly useful in triggering the search for comparable socio-cultural factors or contexts which may explain why common crime trends arise across distinctly different historical periods. For example:

Conditions in the less developed countries have exhibited many similarities to those that suddenly produced extensive crime a century or more ago in Europe. Today the process of development is bringing pronounced changes, and amongst the more serious is the general increase in crime. In fact, one measure of the effective development of a country probably is its crime rate (Clinard and Abbott, 1973: v).

A central purpose for studying crime patterns over time is to discover 'themes' which assist in understanding the historical and cultural 'place' of crime, as well as how it has come to be so. In considering crime as a pattern or trend it is less difficult to conclude that while the social, legal, political, economic and demographic structures of society change over time, essential social relationships and the opportunities which they invite move as with the dynamics of crime. This has become a resounding theme in the globalised treatment of crime, wherein the nature and impact of the crime problem is emphasised through its constancy and universality across time and space.

Relating temporal changes in crime to temporal changes in other aspects of society is a potentially powerful explanatory technique. The indices of comparison, however, are regularly not selected by policy analysts with sufficient care, and such comparisons commonly become strained (see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984: chs. 6 and 7).

The search for long-term patterns in crime recognises the significance of crime's historical and developmental perspectives. Obviously the variation in data sources to enable long-term pattern analysis requires a more creative appreciation of 'folk' history than official statistics of today might invite (see Cohen, 1985). Flexible approaches to the utility of data sources developed through an appreciation of historical analysis become

particularly relevant for comparative studies between cultures at significantly different stages of administrative development. Through the application of a more integrated and interactive method of crime measurement, trend analysis will have a potential to consider the dynamic nature of crime within transitional social and cultural contexts. In addition, a critical approach to official statistics on crime and their by-products (crime rates) may go towards indicating what is not being measured, as well as what they are actually measuring, rather than accepting what they are said to represent (see Hogg, 1983).

The analysis of crime should not simply be confined to a search for trends in actions and behaviours. The reactions to crime from within communities, institutions and states, must also receive spatial and temporal consideration. Much of the expanding literature on criminal justice policy and administration contains a wealth of information on the 'official' context of crime from the perspective of those required to 'deal' with it. Yet too often this is simply represented as a measure of criminal activity and behaviour rather than as an indication of the essential relationships between crime and control.

Often particular reactions to crime arise from anticipated as well as experienced crime. Shifts in expectations about crime, therefore, may have as great an impact on the quality of social life as measurable real trends in crime. The fear of crime has been identified as a greater threat to the quality of life in many communities than the prevalence of criminal behaviour. Expectations about crime and its control, therefore, will have an impact on the representation of crime as social harm. While such representations based on expectation emerge and develop, they readily diverge from and ignore the realities of crime within society (see Hall *et al.*, 1978). Irrespective of this disjuncture, the impact of victimisation through fear can be as significant as that which results from a crime 'event'.

Challenges of measurement

Braithwaite (1989) suggests that an adequate explanation of crime must address the following findings:

- Crime is committed disproportionately by males.
- Crime is perpetrated disproportionately by fifteen to twenty-five-year-olds.
- Crime is committed disproportionately by unmarried people.
- Crime is committed disproportionately by people living in large cities.
- Crime is committed disproportionately by people who have experi-

enced high residential mobility and who live in areas characterised by high residential mobility.

- Young people who are strongly attached to their school are less likely to engage in crime.
- Young people who have high educational and occupational aspirations are less likely to engage in crime.
- Young people who do poorly at school are more likely to engage in crime.
- Young people who are strongly attached to their parents are less likely to engage in crime.
- Young people who have friendships with criminals are more likely to engage in crime.
- People who believe strongly in the importance of complying with the law are less likely to violate the law.
- For both women and men, being at the bottom of the class structure, whether measured by socio-economic status or socio-economic status of the area in which the person lives, being unemployed, or being a member of an oppressed racial minority, increases rates of offending for all types of crime apart from those for which opportunities are systematically less available to the poor (i.e. white collar crime).
- Crime rates have been increasing since World War II in most countries, developed and developing. The only case of a country which has been clearly shown to have a falling crime rate in this period is Japan (e.g. Braithwaite, 1989: 44–9).

As with the analysis which posits the significance of social integration for crime choice and crime relationships, social bonds are an early casualty in socio-economic development. Braithwaite's social features of criminality may equally arise as common and predictable characteristics of modernisation and development (see chapter 2).

Except for the variables of age and gender, these 'truisms' say as much about the conservative socialising potential of legitimate relationships as they do about contextual triggers of crime. Attachment to parents and the family, marriage, school commitments and patterns of authorised occupation evidence an involvement in the non-deviant community, and an implication in structures and institutions of authority. There is more to risk and lose if an individual so connected challenges or rejects any of these relationships. Braithwaite is simply identifying the causal connection between crime and marginalisation, marginalisation and crime. Marginalisation through modernisation is a consequential, criminogenic theme of socio-economic development.

Such crime 'findings' reflect societies where certain cultural bonds

could be seen as complex or developed (e.g. school, marriage, socio-economic class, employment, cities, etc.). Thus it might be argued that as universal 'predictors' of crime they are limited and conditional. Yet what they do advertise in a general sense is that the principal relationships of social interdependency have an impact on criminal potential and behaviour. In this respect any rounded consideration of social development needs to examine the dynamics of crime and the relationships on which it depends. It is not enough to concentrate on the characteristics of potential offenders while largely ignoring the transition of crime in a developing world and in the context of development.

Modernisation has created new frameworks for material and social opportunity. The collapse of both autocratic political and economic structures, and the flight from neo-liberalism in world orders, has led to a hiatus of legitimate control relationships throughout many world cultures. Investment in the nation-state has been transformed. Involvement and implication in conventional politics and government is now section-alised; many feel worthless and unable to improve their daily lot.

Globalisation, like the political discourse of internationalism at the turn of the century, assumes, and is fostered by, the breakdown of rigid political and economic alignments. New commodities and avenues for trade in information and expectations have accompanied other structural adjustments to such change. In the wake of incipient democratisation, the incursions of free-market economics, and the proliferation of mutual assistance, social 'problems' such as crime have assumed universal as well as transnational dimensions. The 'new' political context of crime is now global, as is the stage for its control.

For example, the Western press (European in particular) has recently been full of scaremongering about the Russian 'Mafia', and the rise of black market economies in former Warsaw Pact states:⁴ 'The sexy Russian Mafia provides journalists and their [American] readers with a relatively unthreatening, European model of crime – a revisited Marlon Brando world of *consigliere*, *caporegima* and soldiers. At least that is the model which is appealingly seductive, although quite inaccurate' (Rosner, 1995). Irrespective of the accuracy of these reports, they recognise the potential for crime to develop as might any other economic process in times of political transition, particularly where black markets have survived the centralised economy to offer the only accessible and reliable site

⁴ The conservative interest group 'Freedom Forum' recently held a conference for European news journalists on the press coverage of the rise of organised crime in Central and Eastern Europe. The report of the conference (Freedom Forum, May 1994) confirms that widespread mafia stereotypes are encouraged in the reporting of crime particularly in Russia and Poland.

for consumerism.⁵ In this regard it is misleading and inaccurate (but profoundly politically powerful) to talk of the black market as the new invention of crime syndicates recently arrived to prey on the nascent free market.

Further, the representation of organised crime in the old communist states as a profound threat to the success of free-market economics and the liberating influence of democratic government locates crime control amongst the essential armoury of international political reform and stability. It juxtaposes 'good' (the free market) against bad (the black market), while fundamentally confusing the motivation for the latter by representing it as crime rather than economy.

The problem with this analysis is that it misunderstands the existence of organised crime within the context of the communist closed economy, its transformation during the breakdown of communist government, and its position within the freer market economies which have emerged. Of the 'Mafia phenomenon' in the Soviet Union, Anderson (1995) observes: 'Two of the three conditions historically related to the development and growth of mafias – excessive bureaucratic power and illegal markets – were characteristic of the Soviet Union before its break-up at the end of 1991.' In the Gorbachev era, law reform which freed up the labour market and allowed for the privatisation of some co-operatives⁶ created a new context for organised crime. The price rises which initially accompanied privatisation added to the attraction and then the profits of the black market; co-operatives were infiltrated and taken over; extortion was exacted from others. The new lending agencies created to service the privatised co-operatives were corrupted in the same fashion as government bursars had been in earlier years.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union many more crime gangs have emerged to 'compete for control of illegal markets and the territories for protection rackets' (*ibid.*). Associated with the significant inroads of organised crime into banking and commerce in Russia have been violent attacks and contract killings. Apologists for the present position of organised crime within corporate Russia argue that this is nothing more than a predictable feature of the early stages of capitalism (Scammell, 1993). A more relevant view is that which recognises the aspirations of the larger criminal enterprises in Russia to monopolise their hold over both licit and illicit markets. In this regard they resemble the Soviet state within its centralised economy. 'The greatest risk of the Mafia phenomenon in

⁵ In some respects the black markets might be viewed as the new centralised economy from the way they rely on monopolisation and exclusion to ensure their profit and overall market presence.

⁶ The Law on Individual Labour Activity (1987) and The Law on Co-operatives (1988).

Russia is that an entrenched alliance between central and local officials and mafia groups will prevent competition in many markets and greatly reduce the benefit of the fledgling market economy' (Anderson, 1995). What Anderson overlooks here is the perpetuation of criminal enterprise across Soviet and Russian market models as an indication of the prevailing opportunities for crime choice and crime relationships offered throughout the wider social context of modern Russia.⁷

In analysing the 'phenomenon of interest in the Russian Mafia' and the function of that image within the former Soviet Union, Rosner (1995) observes:

The function of defining newly-permitted business activities in the former Soviet union as Mafia organised crime and lawlessness, while continuing to participate in such activities, determines the social standard of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in a country where beating the system was part of the system . . . For the newly formed democratic order in the former Soviet Union to begin to examine and set boundaries in a free enterprise system, it must define legality not only in terms of social and business acceptability, but also determine who is conducting himself and a business in a socially acceptable fashion, and what is normative behaviour.

As for the function of the Mafia image outside Russia, it ensures the maintenance of the 'evil empire'. Previously this was feared in a political context; now it is seen as attacking the sanctity of free-market capitalism.

This representation of the crime wave in Russia as a rejuvenation of long-standing black markets and the syndication of international organised crime avoids any potential to criticise legitimate market economies as generating a crime by-product. Such a representation would suggest the focus on crime as a competing market strategy, even a contesting form of government, places crime as squarely opposed to democracy and free-market economy. If one takes the next step of agreeing that these crime 'forms' are as bad as, or even worse than, the totalitarian systems that democracy replaced, then market economics is conferred with an impression of 'goodness' which it need not earn. Crime, its personalities and institutions, become demonised and any criminal consequences of market economies are ignored (see Anderson, 1995).

A more critical appreciation of the impact which market economics has had on these transitional cultures reveals crime as inextricably linked to social development and modernisation. The particular nature of such development determines the form which crime assumes and the manner

⁷ The transformation of both market structures and criminal enterprise, as well as their interrelationships, presents an interesting example of displacement and replacement which is detailed in chapter 7.

in which communities apprehend its consequences. In a global sense crime problems eventuate as inevitable consequences of 'Westernisation'. This is essentially political.

In the big cities of America, for example, new levels and locations of violence are apparent as the structural opportunities for young Afro-American and Hispanic males contract and as violence increasingly becomes a way of negotiating power and opportunity in urban slums. Interdependency around violent associations becomes more significant for crime control than other general forces of socialisation, such as the school and the family, which are the first casualties of this contraction and re-adjustment of opportunity structures. Individuals may be socialised towards crime as well as away from it.

Braithwaite's findings suggest, more particularly, that the social conditions for a reduction in, or avoidance of crime are similar to those for communitarianism and interdependency:

For a society to be communitarian, its heavily enmeshed fabric of interdependencies therefore must have a special kind of symbolic significance to the populace. Interdependencies must be attachments which invoke personal obligation to others within a community of concern. They are not perceived as isolated exchange relationships of convenience but as matters of profound group obligation (Braithwaite, 1989: 85).

It is in the conceptualisation of interdependency and communitarianism that the relationship between crime and social integration becomes problematic. Globalisation advertises the widest range of social relationships and interdependence. The global community, with its irreversible commitment to modernisation and development, superimposes institutions and obligations of interdependence over constant pressures towards marginalisation through material division. In such a profound context of contradiction crime has evolved into an essential mechanism of compromise and resolution. Where motivations and consequences of development produce such ambiguity, crime control commitments are not the necessary consequence of communitarian consensus.

Individual interdependencies and relationships which promote or eschew crime require interpretation within a framework of group loyalties. For communitarianism, either cultural or global, to be a force against crime these loyalties should reflect a strong, but illusive, moral consensus. Communitarianism in this sense, while obviously closely connected to more individual interdependency, implies an aggregation of dependencies at a societal level. A fundamental flaw with this reliance on communitarianism to defeat crime is with the ideology of this consensus, or whether it is actually possible within societies in states of transition (see

chapter 7). Where individual or group interdependencies oppose or reject a more societal or domineering communitarianism, the latter must lose its potency as a framework for social re-integration, and the crime control consequences which are expected to flow.

Conflict theorists (see Parker, 1974; Taylor *et al.*, 1973), being those who see society as forced together through relationships of domination and oppression, would hold that the very existence of crime daily defies any possibility of communitarian consensus. Class theorists (see Chambliss, 1978; Hall, 1978; Miller, 1973) might challenge the consensus itself and applaud any resistance to it. The multiple moralities evidenced in youth sub-cultures, for example, may identify the inevitability of dissensus in modern heterogeneous or pluralist societies. Braithwaite replies that the tension between social conflict theories of crime and consensus-based theories of control 'can be reconciled by a realistic perception of how isolated, but nevertheless important, criminal sub-cultures are in the wider society' (Braithwaite, 1989: 43).

Whatever one's view of the social bonds required for effective crime control, there is now little argument in criminology that social disorganisation, alienation and anomie are influential over criminal associations and behaviours. Where theories are in dispute is over how responsibility for crime is principally to be determined, and from this what is the meaning of crime.

Theories of crime and measurement

It is difficult to introduce a consideration of crime 'trends' without first locating crime within some theoretical context. This admission is not proposed as some form of ritual oblation to theory which has become almost obligatory in contemporary social science research. Rather it recognises the reality that representations of crime are essentially dependent on the manner in which crime is explained. The 'facts' we seek about crime are more likely a reflection of where we anticipate crime to occur than a natural result of criminalisation. And all this in turn largely depends on theories about crime (see Young, 1971).

Even popular wisdom about crime and the representations it promotes is usually suggestive of theoretical predispositions which would scarcely be recognised as such by their proponents. For instance, the idea that crime and broken families are causally connected demonstrates a confidence in social determinism which would not be out of place in the Chicago school of deviancy theory (see Park and Burgess, 1925).

Western crime theory has developed either around the concern to explain types of behaviour, or to understand the social reaction to them. To a large degree theories of crime are determinist (i.e. they see either

features of the individual or the environment as essentially influential over crime), and the question at issue is, out of what context do the influences of social or behavioural determinism develop.

- Is it the mind or the personality of the offender which generates criminality?
- Is it the response of the state in determining something to be criminal which initiates a spiral of secondary deviance (i.e. deviance which flows on from an initial deviant occurrence)?
- Is it the structure of society which stimulates the formulation and expression of crime choices?

Some theories have recognised that both individual and social determinants combine to create 'criminal careers' (where crime constitutes the work and the structure of material gain). Or else they attempt to explain why sub-cultures emerge with crime as a focus. Other theories prefer to explore the offender's interpretation of what he or she is doing rather than to speculate on causes of behaviour (see Young, 1981).

Parochialism, however, has been a burdensome feature of the development of crime theories. Sumner's criticism (1982: 1) that 'western criminological theory is virtually silent on crime in underdeveloped countries' as it has 'never been much concerned to locate crime and justice within broader patterns of social development' remains largely true today. If crime is a socio-political concept rather than a universal type of behaviour, then Lopez-Rey (1970) was right to observe that criminological theory says little about the bulk of crime and overemphasises those forms of crime with which the formal agencies of criminal justice are concerned.

Braithwaite (1989), in his recent attempt to develop a 'grand theory' of crime, argues that a global explanation is possible:

notwithstanding the diversity of behaviour subsumed under the crime rubric . . . There is sufficient in common between different types of crime to render a general explanation possible. This commonality is not inherent in the disparate acts concerned. It arises from the fact that crime, whatever its form, is a kind of behaviour which is poorly regarded in the community compared to most other acts, and behaviour where this poor regard is institutionalised (2-3).

Critics of this position do not accept that criminality is a quality of the act in question, or simply of the moral or consensual reactions to it. Some hold that to focus on acts and behaviours of the criminal is to undervalue the important power relations which determine crime. To understand crime one needs to consider the reactions to the act as much as the act itself. And a consideration of reactions must go beyond approbation and examine the structures and interests around which such approbation is

broadcast. Quinney (1970), for one, concentrates on how criminal definitions are formulated and applied, how behaviour patterns develop in relation to criminal definitions, and how criminal conceptions are being constructed. In this way the social reality of crime is constantly being constructed.

It is the social reality of crime with which we are presently concerned. Theories of crime and its causation need to be able to explain the social context of crime and its ramifications, as indeed to interpret behaviours and expose perpetrators. The theoretical explanations applied to the analysis of crime that follow are those which recognise the social, economic and political reality of crime, as well as its historical development and its comparative significance on a variety of levels. To this extent crime will be understood in a further three-dimensional fashion; with a history, social presence, cast and community, and with an impact on social development. This framework provides the theoretical context for indicators of crime which we will propose as available for measurement.

What are measured as crime indicators?

In many instances where crime is advanced as evidence of social disintegration, it is treated as rather non-problematic. Politicians refer to the rise and fall of the crime rate as if they were talking about something finite like the accurate daily fluctuations in temperature. The police point to reductions in the number of reported crimes as an indication of their efficiency. An increase in crime, on the other hand, evidences the need for more police resources. Judges seek to influence the flow of criminals before the court through sentencing practice.

Yet where particular political and administrative interests may desire certainty in the empirical representation of crime, there are risks in assuming too much from official statistics on crime (see Hood and Sparks, 1970). Such statistics might indicate more about the development and activity of the formal criminal justice system than they do about 'real' criminal activity (see Hogg, 1983). Alternatively, crime rates may vary significantly, depending on a community's confidence in reporting crime to the authorities. Therefore, a low official figure for crime might mean any of the following:

- an inactive police-force;
- a suspicious or cynical public;
- frightened victims;
- an underdeveloped criminal justice sector;
- a disorganised or under-resourced collection of statistics; or
- a low occurrence of crime.

Much has been written about the problems with official crime statistics (e.g. Hood and Sparks, 1970; Jupp, 1989). These problems are exacerbated when this data forms the basis of legal jurisdiction (see Alvazzi del Frate *et al.*, 1993). However, the desire to quantify crime and talk of trends in terms of rates is an important feature of criminal justice policy. Predictions about public safety, expectations for crime control, and expenditure on criminal justice will continue to rely on crime figures, no matter how loud the warnings from criminologists regarding methods for enumerating crime. The political impetus behind such representations is too strong, and the community expectations regarding crime 'numbers' tend to overlook their rubbery nature.

Victimologists, and the 'left realists' (see Young, 1992), who have come full circle from their renunciation of the positivist and behaviourist task of empirical crime research, have accepted community desires and political imperatives to numerically represent crime. It seems that crime figures are the common ground for contemporary crime research and the conflict is only over how the figures are produced, who has control over their interpretation, and what they represent.

The empirical representation of crime has experienced recent refinements with the development of crime victimisation surveys (where the consequences of crime rather than the characteristics of offence and offender are measured: see Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995) and 'self-report' studies (where respondents are invited to identify their past criminal activity: e.g. Jones *et al.*, 1986). The modern method for quantifying crime arises from the recognition of crime as a dynamic social relationship, rather than the result of any single institutional intervention or of a simple cause and effect scenario. However, the more sophisticated and sensitive the empirical measure, the more it will rely on the statistical capabilities of the jurisdiction within which it is carried out.⁸ It is no accident that, with a small number of exceptions (see Alvazzi del Frate *et al.*, 1993; Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995), adequate statistical evaluations of crime only appear in modernised states. For the remainder of the world, if crime is measured at all, it may be a rather 'hit and miss' affair.

Methodological difficulties aside, the socio-cultural specificity of crime adds a new dimension to the complex task of measuring it, as well as attempting comparative analysis of crime trends on a country or regional basis. Crime is neither a universal nor unequivocal social fact. What

⁸ When looking at the limitations on comparative analysis within the international victimisation surveys, Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate observe: 'the problem of cultural interpretation remains particularly relevant in the comparative perspective. . . several issues are at stake here and they are somewhat different from previous [qualitative comparative experience]' (1995: 13).

comprises crime will largely depend on what a community and its structures of authority designate crime to be. Most societies agree that certain acts of personal violence, or the violation of property rights should be criminal. But the way in which these 'crimes' are determined, and the consequences which flow from these determinations, may vary to such an extent that the establishment of a common typology of crime is problematic. Add to this the variety of attitudes in respect of the aetiology of crime, along with the significant variations in ranking crime seriousness, and the task of measuring crime becomes more daunting. For instance, in cultures where state and religious prohibitions are closely connected and share structures of penalty, adultery may be considered a serious crime. In neo-liberal, pluralist states such behaviour may not even be sanctioned by the criminal law. Also, consistent with the great variation in corporate culture throughout the world, it was only recently in the United States that 'insider trading' became unacceptable as shrewd business competition, and has been criminalised at State and Federal levels. In other corporate cultures this form of competition 'rigging' has long been recognised as serious and penalised as a crime with other types of industrial espionage.

But measure we must if we are to raise an appreciation of crime beyond cracker-barrel common-sense. In any case, figures will continue to be thrown about to represent increases in crime or its control, irrespective of their validity. What should be attempted, in order that some comparative trend analysis might proceed, is the establishment of a broad and non-controversial taxonomy of crime (see Braithwaite, 1989), and a method of measurement which is not dependent on the activity of formal criminal justice agencies alone. To this end the data available on crime should not be limited to that which is quantifiable, or at least only numerically so. The wider the range of available data on crime the more likely it is that indicators will emerge which are not entirely reliant for meaning on their cultural location.

How far can crime and justice data be detached from specific social, political and economic contexts?

It might seem contradictory to emphasise the cultural specificity of crime, while at the same time to encourage its comparative analysis at a range of levels. However, the search for the social context of crime allows for the consideration of structural and functional issues, such as youth homelessness and unemployment, which may be more open for comparison than random instances of criminal behaviour. In this respect the context of the act or actor becomes the medium for comparative analysis. With this in mind, the results of comparative analysis will act as indicators of those

contextual factors and relationships which influence and are influenced by crime. Ultimately, discussions of pattern and trend may then be reinterpreted into specific socio-political and economic contexts. To some extent the current discourse on the globalisation of crime has emerged from a similar process of interpretation, but one in which the specifics of context have merged within claims to uniform materialist and political aspirations which outstrip culture and diversity.

Contextual re-interpretation is particularly necessary when crime is considered as economy (see chapter 5). For an economic analysis of crime, a macro perspective may be helpful in signposting those considerations which construct the concerns of micro-analysis (see Findlay and Zvekic, 1988). Crime as economy means specific patterns of exchange, set relationships of power, people doing things to the property and security of others for profit. These images are firmly grounded in designated socio-cultural contexts, and complemented in the discourse of globalisation by rarely contested economic models as the framework for contrast (i.e. free-market capitalism).

In a globalised crime context, analysis is taken to the macro level while representations of crime and crime problems appear as 'culturally' designated as if they were local issues. Such issues, in fact, sacrifice their locality under the weight of uniform economic models. This is even so if we explore specific or individual economies of crime. The global 'market' and its influences over crime relationships and crime choices are expressed as if the market is a homogeneous entity, and its aspirations are uniform. Thus for drugs and crime it is simply assumed that the global priorities of prohibition and control represent the views of the members of the 'global community'. However, at the level of politics arguably they do not.

Therefore, in the representation of crime it is not merely the tendency to universalise crime problems which stretches the reality of culturally generated crime data. The transfer of crime representations into the context of globalisation and the 'global community' tends to distort the reality of crime relationships and the manner in which they are appreciated within diverse and disparate economies.

One way out of this difficulty is to consider the more general indicators of crime across cultures, in order to ascertain whether a truly transnational or international picture of crime relationships and crime choices will emerge from whatever economic context. This is a different process to that in which an artificial 'global community' context is created and crime is problematised within it. However, crime as universal depends on a reconsideration of globalisation, wherein diversity of particular economies can be contrasted with the push for some uniform commitment to preferred economic models.

Can crime indicators be compared internationally?

The report on the Third UN Survey of Crime Trends and the Operations of the Criminal Justice System (UN, 1993) rather optimistically concluded:

According to the analysed data, there is a basis for comparison [of crime and justice data] between national experiences not only with regard to the extent and patterns of the crime problem, but also with regard to the national response to it. That comparative perspective, in turn, provides a basis for determining how each country evaluates the relative success or shortcomings of its crime prevention system and how countries may learn from each other.

On the extremely conditional data emerging from the UN world crime survey initiatives, some would say this confidence in comparative analysis was more heart-felt than confirmed.

Unfortunately for the comparative analysis of crime, the preoccupations of European and American criminologists have been focused largely on local concerns. An 'internationalist' or global perspective on crime problems is rarer in research than politics, and when it does arise in the research literature it is concerned more with control issues such as policing drug-trafficking (affected as they are by international treaty obligations and law-enforcement instruments). It is not simply that the nature of criminal enterprise in these special instances is appreciated as transnational and as such requires an 'internationalist' response. With drug-trafficking in particular, global crime control obligations and initiatives are predicated on a developed globalised political agenda regarding drug marketing and trade, as well as the recognition that co-operative crime control is essential to minimise harm at a local and transnational level. The international obligations towards control have designated certain crime problems and as such both domestic investigation agendas and international rights issues may stand compromised beyond the globalisation of crime and control (see Findlay, 1995).

It is perhaps not surprising that when comparative crime analysis does take place it ignores 'problems' which have little negative impact in one jurisdiction but which are significant in international political terms, because of their negative impact in another more politically powerful context. For instance, in certain economies in South America the commercial advantage of the illicit drug trade may far outweigh the social and moral 'cost' of drug abuse amongst their relatively small proportion of local drug users. However, these states are required to be involved in international drug control politics by other more powerful states which face far more deleterious consequences of the drug trade at home.

International comparisons inevitably involve the collection of data

from diverse social, economic and political contexts, which influence the manner in which this data can be treated. Does such data report on comparable events, or does the context out of which ostensibly similar data arise make these events dissimilar?

The issue here is whether crime indicators (data) from various cultural settings are addressing the same thing. Absolute parity in cross-cultural measurement is impossible if one holds that social meaning is culturally specific. Therefore, in order to advance a comparative endeavour, one must seek sufficient similarity around which trends may be viewed. A creative consideration (and application) of the nature of the data to be employed for the purpose is vital if comparative analysis is to advance beyond theoretical frameworks (see Findlay and Zvekic, 1993). Vagg (1993) identifies four 'main approaches' in the comparative exercise over recent years:

- (a) attempts to link crime trends or problems to common social, economic or political denominators;⁹
- (b) direct comparisons of questions, and several countries;¹⁰
- (c) attempts to produce broad generalisations and generate policy recommendations;¹¹
- (d) examinations of particular regional developments.¹²

What is missing in this overview of the comparative analysis of crime and justice are those studies which draw on a wide range of data from a variety of regional and cultural settings in order to propose and test workable cross-cultural models of crime and control (see Findlay and Zvekic, 1988; 1993). The comparative dimension in such work is advanced through a framework of analysis which, while recognising the culturally specific nature of crime data, tests styles, trends and indications of crime and control possible for generalisation.

Preoccupations with the developed world

The comparability of crime data becomes more suspect when crime is expected to indicate levels of socio-economic development. The mean-

⁹ See Shelley (1981) discussing the use of industrialisation and urbanisation; Sumner (1982) analysing decolonisation and underdevelopment.

¹⁰ See Downes (1988) for a comparison of penal policies across countries with economic similarities but cultural differences.

¹¹ See Hood (1989) for a summary of a large body of international practice on the death penalty.

¹² See Heidensohn and Farrell (1991) wherein they indicate the range of consequences or problems which flow from particular developments.

ingfulness of correlating crime with economic development, for instance, is dependent on the application of models of development which can account for differences in the 'make-up' of development within particular socio-cultural settings. Further, contextual issues which indicate development may correlate with expectations about crime. Therefore, the issue of which leads to what may become confusing when analysing the nexus between crime and development issues. To avoid such temporal sequence problems, we suggest that the social context of both be examined for common themes, and then the interrelationship between these themes should be considered within concepts of economy (see chapter 5).

In this respect the most successful analytical focus is one which recognises the peculiar features of social development and crime within it, while drawing on familiar connections between crime and society. The balance between generalisation and specificity (while difficult to establish) is perhaps easier to maintain when the analysis avoids any uncritical reliance on particular paradigms of crime or development. Such paradigms present a tendency to unnecessarily constrain the parameters of analysis within a specific political or economic ideology.

In considering the problems associated with measuring and representing crime, the analysis of crime as a relationship presents an important interpretative dimension. The appreciation of crime as a relationship avoids constraining analysis to 'the baleful doctrine of social facts' (Watts, 1996: 134). Understanding crime as rates and numbers through the testing of causal or correlative independent variables gives these rates and figures the appearance of reality and fact. But the explanation of crime through a statistical artefact is neither puzzling nor without its own political logic. While the crime rate may be a fact, it does not refer to what it represents as fact. 'And the pursuit of an explanation for why a set of numbers changes over time or is different between this society and that . . . [will] like Hesse's Glass Bead Game fill up many hours of the day and confer great prestige on the players' (*ibid.*).

Crime, however measured and represented, is real. And statistical generalisation may be a valid epistemic objective. As Braithwaite declares: 'I think crime is real. I also think two crimes is the sum of two real things and therefore counting them can be a sensible and illuminating activity' (Braithwaite, 1996: 144).

For those troubled by the perplexing questions of what crime figures represent, and how better to measure crime, a new look at the direction and object of inquiry holds out possibilities. Rather than concentrating on the product of criminal justice agencies, or the under-accounting of crime situations, an evaluation of crime relationships offers a more satisfying

potential for understanding crime. With this approach it is not essential to chase, estimate or pretend empirical accuracy. The examination of relationships allows for viewing crime situations as dynamic types rather than static indices.

Crime affects people and communities, and therefore the harm caused by crime is another possible context in which crime can be understood. A crucial player in crime relationships is the victim, and victimology is a feature of the globalised discourse on crime.

Victimisation and crime control – its significance for the measurement of crime

Recently, the exploration of crime relationships beyond the act or the perpetrator to the victim and the harm done has opened up new potentials for understanding crime as a social relationship (see Zvejkic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995). In their earlier forms, victimisation surveys in the USA arose out of a social democratic criminology where causes of crime were seen within the relative deprivation of the modern city. Both the offender and victim were located in the same socio-structural context – the lack of opportunities in a society with high ideals of achievement yet very limited social mobility.

The political and theoretical link between an interest in the causes of crime, and crime victims was short-lived. Control-centred criminology emphasises offenders and potential offenders rather than harm arising out of the offence. Its compatibility with conservative political movements prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s overtook victim methodology and relegated it to efforts at crime ‘mapping’ and the spatial measurement of criminal activity as a technique for control.

Victimology and the advancement of the rights of victims has posed a strong conservative, and sometimes contradictory influence over the development of criminal justice policy. It has employed radical political concerns, such as the status of women and the protection of the child, towards the development of tendencies against due process and liberalism in matters of public morality. For example, certain feminist argument tends to advocate restricting freedom of expression if it amounts to pornography. Similarly, those who might otherwise support the protection of a defendant’s rights struggle to protect child victim witnesses from vigorous defence challenge in child abuse cases. In addition, the early focus of victimology on violent crime against the person tended to marginalise other concerns with crimes of the powerful.

However, a consideration of victims has also developed as an essential plank in the theory and methodology of radical criminology (see Jones *et*

al., 1986). The victimisation studies which chart the high victimisation rate of women in terms of male violence immediately raise the problems of:

a patriarchal social criss-cross cutting problems of class. The insistent findings from conventional victimology of the intra-class and intra-racial nature of crime pointed to a degree of disorganisation, particularly within the working class, which creates self inflicted wounds outside those already generated by the corporations, the police and the courts. It was in this theoretical context that radical realism arose within criminology. At heart this started from the premise of taking people's fear of crime seriously and arguing that these were more realistic than either radical or conventional criminologists made out (*ibid.*: 3).

When looking at victim data the relationships of crime had a distinctly discriminatory perspective and appeared as abuses of power and status as well as attacks on individual safety and integrity. Further, the complexity of any class analysis of crime was exposed through the fears and apprehensions of the victim rather than the motivations of the offender.

Now it can be said of even state-sponsored victim studies that they present an audit of people's experiences, anxieties and problems about crime. They have expanded from surveys of victims to a critique of the provision of criminal justice services and community attitudes to penalty (see Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate, 1995). Above all else victimisation studies have fleshed out critically the utility of official crime statistics. Records of the activities of criminal justice institutions and agencies no longer stand alone as the authorised picture of crime. And this has not only influenced the preparation of crime data in the more developed nation-states. The most recent United Nations world crime survey has emphasised the victim's perspective and amassed comparative data on 'world crime' in terms of victimisation (see Alvazzi del Frate *et al.*, 1993).

International victimisation surveys

The UN International Crime (Victim) Survey (1992) involved countries and cities which differed greatly in many respects.¹³ Therefore, the differences in samples and territorial coverage did not allow for straightforward comparisons. What analysis has been carried out is of one year's victimisation rates and attempts towards comparison have been made (see Zvekic, 1993). Some general conclusions from the data are:

¹³ The 1996 International Crime Victimization Survey in industrialised countries measured victimisation in the previous year and covered eleven countries. Five of these had been involved in the two previous surveys and another five in the second survey. Nineteen thousand interviews were conducted: see Mayhew and Van Dijk (1997).

- Developing countries evidence higher rates of victimisation for almost all selected types of crime surveyed.
- Urban areas in industrialised countries appear to be at lower risk in comparison to both developing and Eastern/Central European countries for theft of personal property and sexual incidents.
- The smallest difference between the groups of countries relates to assault/threat, for which developing and industrialised countries show equivalent risks.
- The blight of corruption in the developing world is particularly debilitating, with it often being nominated as the common form of victimisation.
- On average, consumer fraud rates were much lower in industrialised countries.
- Public satisfaction with police response to crime was most favourable in industrialised countries. Citizens in developing countries were less satisfied with police performance in controlling crime.
- Judgements about the police are often negative in countries where more people feel the need to take precautions against street crime at night. Less favourable judgements are also found in countries where victims who report crime are dissatisfied with their treatment by police.
- Public attitudes to punishment seem to reflect and support established sentencing traditions.
- Some ex-communist countries/cities have much higher levels of crime than indicated by the police-recorded crime figures, which may show an undercount of crime due to victims' reluctance to report.
- Crime is a heavy burden for some with, for instance, one in five respondents in the last year experiencing at least one incident of theft or damage to property or some form of aggressive behaviour. Levels of actual risk are far from negligible, whether or not these are softened by insurance systems or social support.
- With the exception of Switzerland and Japan, all industrialised countries suffer from an appreciable level of property and aggressive crime, particularly in more urbanised areas.

Certain trends have been noted (Zvekic, 1993) between the first and second international victimisation surveys carried out in 1989 and 1992 respectively. In the European countries taking part in both surveys, the risk of crime had generally increased, particularly in thefts of and from cars. The risk of many crimes in the USA did not appear to have varied significantly, and risks in Canada and Australia also remained stable.

The policy implications of victim surveys (such as their consumer satisfaction perspective) ensure their dominance in crime measurement

methodology. With the nomination by communities of the fear of crime as a vital social concern, victim surveys have obvious political ramifications. The interconnection of law and order politics with the fear of crime produces a potent political imperative. Methodologies with the potential to make fear real and register its fluctuation will demand recognition in political discourse on the crime problem.

In globalisation terms, rates of victimisation provide a more fertile field of comparative analysis than other conventional measures of crime. In addition, the notion of 'generic' or 'nation' victims is of relevance for policy development and control strategies. Through the implication that mass victimisation is now a feature of crime in its global context, the shift in responsibility and authority for control tends to endorse generic representations of criminalisation. This then affects the jurisdictional context of criminal sanctions, the traditionally national focus of policing, and the local focus for prevention, control and punishment agendas.

Trends in criminalisation and the processes of crime control

The state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in the form of punishment is a principal claim to authority for modern governments (Kennedy, 1984). Over the last century in the developed world, the bureaucracies associated with the administration of such punishment have burgeoned. Generally these bureaucracies have retained their direct links with other aspects of the state, while tending to expand into 'community' dimensions (see Cohen, 1985). This growth has what Cohen refers to as a 'net widening' effect, where beyond the formal structures of the welfare state authority an ever expanding array of 'punishment', 'correctional' and 'intervention' strategies present as being community-centred. Probation, community work orders, juvenile attendance centres and work release centres are just some such initiatives which incorporate a structure of state authority within a community location. The potential for enhancing state legitimacy through such developments, without sacrificing ultimate authority, is obvious. This is particularly important for states within which the formal institutions and processes of criminal justice are under challenge (see chapter 7).

An early feature of the 'modernisation' of most state systems is the development of formal criminal justice. However, a feature of this development has been to marginalise the principal participants within the expectations and interests of state institutions and processes. The exercise of force through policing becomes the province of the state, or is

licensed out through state police to the private sector. Crimes are prosecuted by the state on behalf of the community, rather than remaining the responsibility of the victim. In fact, until recently, with developments such as victim impact statements and victim's compensation, the victim was becoming marginalised out of the justice process except for his or her role as a witness.

The administration of justice through state courts is now a complex state function in many societies. Even in cultures where the division between the religious and the secular is not rigid, the criminal courts have a unique procedural autonomy beyond the form of laws which they administer.

With the development of formal court-room justice has arisen pressures for adjudication systems within the reach of the common offender or victim. Many citizens now view the criminal justice process as unable to satisfy the legitimate expectations of victims, the protection concerns of the community, and the demands of defendants for universal access to quality representation (McBarnet, 1978). The pressures for alternative adjudication processes which result, have had a far greater significance in areas of civil law, while the criminal jurisdiction still remains largely the province of the state.

More recently, and particularly in those cultures where custom is a current force in socialisation, traditional community-based forms of dispute resolution have reasserted their significance amongst modernised crime control strategies (see chapter 7). The formal state-monopolised mechanisms of control have colonised certain of these forms (as depicted in the case-study in chapter 7), removing them from their community context and into the state-sponsored process. The results of this transformation confirm that crime control is a profoundly contextual enterprise.

The punitive arm of the state continues to exercise oppressive dimensions of state power. Despite trends towards de-institutionalisation and alternative sentencing options (e.g. those which do not simply involve a fine or a period of incarceration), the state's power to execute and imprison offenders is jealously guarded. Even for limited experiments with the privatisation of prisons and juvenile custody, the licence and to imprimatur of the state are essential. A significant feature of the expanding influence of the state through the criminal sanction process has been the development of sentencing options which now bring into the formal justice process, and progress through that process, offenders who earlier would have been dealt with by informal, non-state measures. For instance, in some jurisdictions offenders who otherwise might have been

admonished either by the police or the courts are now subject to supervision (probation) or work (community service orders). If these individuals breach such orders they will often receive a custodial penalty, and perhaps such a consequence would never have been likely if their original offence had been dealt with informally.

Diversion away from the formal justice process and its consequences towards welfare or community supervision alternatives is now a motivation of even government agencies. Particularly with juvenile offenders the deleterious effects of being labelled a criminal by state agencies such as the police and the courts (criminalisation) are being recognised as often outweighing the harm caused by the offence itself. Diversion also exposes the limitations of criminal justice and the unrealistic expectations held out for punishment. Processing recreational drug users through the courts and prisons, for instance, may be far more likely to exacerbate their criminal potential than minimise their abusive behaviours.

Criminalisation, and the secondary deviance which the criminal label appears to foster, is certainly on the increase in developing nations, despite the influence of diversion, and the widespread concern over the failure of rehabilitative punishment. This is a logical consequence of the expansion of a sector of state administration which remains attractive to conservative and radical politics alike, irrespective of its demonstrated and constant failure to live up to its competing ideologies. One needs only to witness the expansion of prison populations to crisis point in Britain, the USA and much of Europe to doubt the necessary connection between increases in criminalisation and positive cost/benefit analysis for the state (see Christie, 1993).

With the increase in criminalisation flows a consequent development of the formal and informal systems responsible for managing criminalisation. These institutions and systems generate administrative structures which spend money and process people. Any or all of these activities are measurable and say something about the nature and state of crime within the communities in which these systems operate (see Hogg, 1983).

The growth of formal state agencies for managing and controlling crime and enforcing the law is viewed in some paradigms as an important indicator of social development. It is important as a part of contextual crime analysis to inquire whether crime and other indicators of development are inextricably linked within, and determinant of contexts of social development. It is also relevant to consider the role which the processes of criminal justice play in the advancement of legitimate development aspirations. In order to elucidate these connections for the purposes of crime analysis, an examination of the manner in which crime is represented must precede.

Misrepresentations of crime and control

One of the difficulties associated with an accurate contextualisation of crime is the diverse manner in which it is represented. This is not simply a problem of distortion or misinterpretation; the basic sources from which crime becomes known are so varied. Therefore, the possibility of problematic representations of crime being broadcast and forming the basis of official reaction is almost unavoidable.

Personal descriptions or accounts of crime constitute the most popular representations of crime. The accuracy, representativeness and comparability of such accounts are problematic. However, what they may lack on these measures they make up for in entertainment value and political impact. Therefore, their potential audience and significance may differ considerably from the official account, while their 'authority' and longevity may outweigh such representations.

Criminal justice system records of crime, while proposing greater credibility as official accounts, are disparate enough to fuel a variety of crime representations. The media are particularly committed to the use of such data as verification for opinion, and politicians often tend to rely on 'systems'¹⁴ data (i.e. that which is a measure of how the justice system operates) as representations of real crime activity. Associated with these records are the problems attendant on enumerating a social phenomenon like crime. Not only does there exist a 'dark figure' of crime beyond official statistics, but there is also the 'dark figure' of recording which plagues any management system.

Whether representations of crime rely on official records, surveys, memoirs or common-sense as their source, the impact of the representation will be as much dependent on the means of broadcasting and the motives behind this as on its proximity to truth. In this respect, the recent shift in the media interest in crime in the USA, away from fictionalised representation and towards the widespread televising of actual policing, current court sittings, and life in prison, has brought crime control into the homes and businesses of large sectors of American society otherwise not touched by crime. They are now the observers of police operations, the participants in trials, and the judge and jury of the offender and the system. Even so, these glimpses of crime situations may not leave the viewer any more deeply aware of the complexity of the entertainment phenomenon.

The media saturation of crime control in Western broadcasting has

¹⁴ Using the concept of criminal justice as a system (here and on later occasions) is not to endorse the interpretation of essential processes and institutions which comprise the 'system' as systematic, integrated or internally consistent.

done much more to popular representations of crime than simply remove the entertainment locus from the imaginary to the actual. It has generated an expectation amongst the viewing public that it is their right to observe, participate and pass judgement. Additionally, there has emerged a requirement in the exercise of criminal justice that it be both media 'friendly' and entertaining. Crime is no longer hidden in dark alleys, smoky interrogation rooms or gloomy prison cells. It is up for sale to the networks and it is there at the dinner table. It cannot exist without glib commentary from reporters and presenters who are there to provide a link with the crime situation and to represent the opinions of the viewers. Still, the barrier of the television screen and the abstraction of the 'moralist' news commentary ensures that the 'difference' of crime and the criminal is maintained. While we can view the relationship between crime and the controllers, we are almost always sure whose side we are on.

Selective interpretation of crime

Crime is a phenomenon which relies on a complex and often formal process of definition, identification and reaction. In certain theories concerned with crime this process is referred to as labelling. Once the labelling process commences, either informally through community opinion, or at the formal level courtesy of state agencies and processes, then there exists the potential for the behaviour against which it is directed to be amplified (see Young, 1981).

The interpretation of crime relies heavily on official accounts which are investigated, recorded and judged by the agencies of criminal justice. To this extent crime labels must be set and imposed by bodies which retain the authority to make them stick.

The agencies of criminal justice are usually empowered to exercise their labelling function with discretion. At the simplest level this can be explained by the fact that crime control resources are finite and are always set below the optimal level of need. Therefore, for the system of criminal justice to operate at all, law enforcement and criminal justice happen selectively. And this is so because criminal justice is expected to be discretionary – discretion is promoted for the efficiency of the process. The process of criminalisation is an inherently political exercise, reliant on legislative prohibitions being activated through administrative practice. Similar factors influence political decision-making in other contexts and will ensure that the interpretation of crime is a selective process. Add to this the fact that the public's understanding of crime is heavily reliant on the selective reporting of the media and it is not surprising that interpretations of crime are hardly universal or value-free.

Drugs/crime link – representation of crime and control out of context

A good example of the selective nature of crime is the manner in which drugs and crime are connected, particularly in modernised Western societies. The selective criminalisation of certain forms of recreational drug abuse has been a recent feature of crime control policy world-wide, and yet the logic of this can often only be appreciated at the level of international politics. For example, the nomination of some drugs rather than others to criminalise will be explained by the political history of twentieth-century drug control and not on the basis of pharmacological logic. Even 'harm minimisation' as the motivation for drug prevention and control policies cannot explain why certain drug use and sale practice is criminalised while similar behaviours are not. Governments, rather than doctors or police, determine what drugs of choice are to be criminalised. For example, if one follows the history of the criminalisation of heroin (see Ward and Dobinson, 1988) it becomes apparent that legislation and law-enforcement strategies have been motivated by a wide range of concerns, from harm minimisation to national security.

The selective interpretation and criminalisation of certain drug practices has led to increases in other forms of crime, as well as the development of new crime control strategies. For instance, the increase in the market price of certain 'street' drugs such as heroin has motivated the involvement of drug addicts in a wide range of property crimes in order to service their drug habits. The prisons of developed countries are full of young male drug users sentenced for burglary and robbery. Perhaps more than any other process of criminalisation this century, the drugs/crime link has changed the face of criminal justice and the appreciation of crime threat¹⁵ like no other crime connection. Drug squads demand a large slice of policing budgets, trials frequently feature defendants with a drug history, and penal institutions are disproportionately occupied by drug abusers. The drugs/crime link in this way is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Arguably, drug control practice is not so much concerned with crime control. Rather it is directed at the maintenance of certain moral and political boundaries which have been largely set at an international level and imposed on local jurisdictions (*ibid.*).

Essential to the recent discourse on drugs and crime has been the representation of drug-trafficking as a principal money earner for organised crime. This has also rekindled the interest, generated initially by literature on the American Mafia in the 1930s, in crime organisations as threats to government. More recently the investigation of transnational

¹⁵ For a detailed discussion of the development of crime threat, see chapter 6.

crime has recognised the limitations of considering certain crime forms as dependent on particular enforcement practices and legislative definitions within individual jurisdictions.¹⁶ A new industry of crime control in the form of the confiscation of the proceeds of crime has grown up as a result of these representations.

Organised crime mystique

The popular and romanticised representation of organised crime exposes the distance between the social reality of crime and perception and representation. For example, the 'Godfather' version of Mafia organisation has promoted an understanding of relationships between crime and ethnicity and crime and the family. Organised crime in this way is profoundly mystified. A mythology is established that limits discourse, directs control strategies, and influences the representation of many forms of associated criminality.

But why the creation of this mystique (see chapter 5)? One explanation may be that it is the community's preferred perception of organised crime, and this serves as the justification for state control. The Mafia mystique supports the community's need for a distinction between the 'real criminals' and the rest of society (see Box, 1983). Such a distinction was shaped into a series of firm expectations about Mafia-style organised crime. By simplifying, generalising and thus mystifying organised crime, the complexity and ubiquitous influence of organised criminal activity, and its link with capital at all levels of American commercial and economic life, is obfuscated (Findlay, 1992).

This Mafia image was produced through a mixture of real events and media reporting. There was a conscious effort by ambitious public officials to create super-criminals, superseding the need to explain the state's failure to control organised criminal activity. This had the consequence of further expanding state crime control mechanisms in the hope of achieving future success.

Indicative of the realism which eventually characterised writings on the Mafia in the 1970s was the view that so long as exotic enemies are imagined in our midst, the actual social significance of organised crime, which such villains are said to monopolise, will never be understood. The social relevance of the Mafia mystique, consistent with a more realistic definition of organised crime, depends on a broad re-evaluation of com-

¹⁶ Also, particularly with the confiscation of criminal assets as a mechanism of crime control, the distinction between criminal and civil jurisdictions had necessarily collapsed. The limitations inherent in the criminal sanction have meant that civil remedies may offer a more convincing and effective control result.

munity priorities. Therefore, organised crime is the product of forces that threaten values, not the cause of them. If society countenances violence, considers personal gain to be more important than equity, and is willing to bend the law in the pursuit of wealth, power and personal gratification, then society itself will always be receptive to illicit enterprise, whether condoned, ignored or condemned. Such enterprise will become a reality whenever a group of people is willing to take advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities that arise as a result of selective law enforcement, violence or corruption in pursuit of their own wealth and power. Even the processes and institutions designed to regulate or eradicate crime which are reliant on syndicated and corrupt structures may go to create an environment which will eventually facilitate its development. As long as organised crime is understood as an alien conspiracy dominated by ethnic groups, it will remain difficult to understand how it actually operates.

Transnational crime

As mentioned previously, concepts of crime have traditionally relied on some cultural or jurisdictional context for their relevance and impact. Implicit in this is the expectation that crime stops at national borders, or at least that it has localised interests. The jurisdictional boundaries of crime, however, can only be explained in terms of legal convenience and legislative limits. As piracy, smuggling, abduction, gun-running and counterfeiting have been crime problems for centuries, so too the laws of individual nations have been powerless to control them.

Transnational crime is new only for the manner in which law-enforcement and international agencies have recently identified it as a priority. Again, the selective political representation of crime is the explanation for such a trend. For instance, as governments realise the potential for criminal enterprise to endanger world market structures, capital transfer, national security, and international transport and communication, crime targets are selected out for collaborative action while others are ignored. Strategies have been developed, for example, to prevent and prosecute commodity futures fraud and abuses, but an international approach to crimes against the environment is yet to be convincingly settled.

The other difference with transnational crime, represented as a recent problem for globalisation, is the manner in which crime control is reshaped in order to address the difficulties with jurisdiction. Crime control is, in this context, at least a bilateral endeavour. However, in many control strategies for transnational crime the bilateral efforts are stimulated by globalised representations of crime and control priorities.

Crime without sites

The explosion of the internet as a market for information and consumerism presents novel challenges to traditional representations of crime and control. Not only through the internet is the crime situation 'virtual', but the site for its commission is the globe. Jurisdictional conceptions of crime and control fail to inform the existence of such a phenomenon.

When neo-Nazi propagandists in Germany spread racial vilification and incite violence, where is the crime committed and what is the crime? The German authorities have recently moved to specifically criminalise the use of the net for this purpose so as to enable conventional control strategies to be activated. When a child pornographer sends information across the net from a state where both the broadcast material and the broadcast are not criminal, whose role is it to intervene? In the US some legislatures have criminalised the receipt of such information within their jurisdiction.

When an Asian marriage broker advertises women in the West, and part of the connection arrangement relies on the violation of immigration regulations, whose morality is offended and whose interests should the criminal law protect? By prosecuting the recipient of the information in the host state, or the party to the agreement who tries to subvert immigration requirements, the crime relationship (as selectively labelled) is only partially addressed.

Where time and space have collapsed through the internet so too have the conventional representations of crime and control. Crime becomes a message with a contested meaning, without any rigid spatial context. The predator has a limitless population of victims across an indeterminate map. The danger in this is to demonise the means for communication rather than the contested message or the invisible messenger.

Crime, the media and moral panic

Political decisions regarding crime and its representation are not only dependent on the interests of parties directly involved in the relationship. Community expectations about crime and its control may also influence the manner in which governments and enforcement agencies selectively respond to crime, and a crucial element in the creation of public opinion about crime is media representation.

The manner in which the media report on crime will affect a vast range of individuals who would otherwise have little immediate experience of it, as well as those connected to crime relationships. The impact of media reporting will obviously be greater where opinions are divided or other-

wise ambivalent about certain instances of crime and control.

There seems little empirical evidence which would allow for confident statements on a relationship between values (moral or political) and delinquency. Even serious repeat delinquents appear to recognise generally accepted social standards, and often place a higher value on conventional accomplishments than on success at breaking the law. With what has been recently referred to as victimless crime (e.g. drug abuse; forms of consenting sexual activity) where community standards may be divided or ambivalent, the motivations and views of offenders will be equally diverse. However, simply because someone commits a predatory crime, it cannot be interpreted as a profound rejection of consensual morality.

Where the view of crime as an attack on fundamental public morality is widely held in media reporting of crime, and official rhetoric surrounding reactions to crime (e.g. judicial pronouncements) align with this opinion, then the representation of the crime received by the public is clear. If this representation is accompanied by suggestions for reaction or response then governments and enforcement agencies face a more limited range of choices for action.

When the media and the official account feed off one another in stimulating public reaction to crime, then a 'moral panic' may emerge within the wider community which may not only be out of all proportion to the reality of the phenomenon, but also may not require any reliance on this reality to galvanise an accepted representation of crime and demands for action.

Crime and the state

One area in which the representation of crime is complicated by the interests of authority is where crimes originate within state structures. These very structures, such as the police, the courts, the military and the prison service, may otherwise be responsible for authorising the official account of particular crimes. If they are involved in the crime relationship as perpetrators, then who or what will have the authority to present a conflicting, but convincing official account? In a formal sense, the institutions responsible for identifying and processing crime have their authority located in the state. If the state labels crime, then its own criminality will rarely be criminalised.

In this respect the state plays an essential role in the formalisation of crime through its monopoly over criminal justice institutions and processes. Some labelling theorists would argue that without state definition mechanisms there could be no crime (Chambliss, 1984: Part I). Obvious-

ly this is not intended to mean that criminal behaviours would accompany the disappearance of the state. Rather it implies that crime is so dependent on official identification, determination and enforcement processes that the social context of crime, at least in terms of the community appreciation of it, cannot be as it is without state intervention.

The issue of state crime is perhaps more complex. Like any social institution possessed of power and authority, the state has the potential to make criminal choices. It can do this in three principal ways:

- (a) by setting up 'boundaries of permission' in the form of legal or moral regulations, where criminal choices may be fostered (e.g. differential taxation laws, selective criminalisation of drug abuse);
- (b) by engaging in activities which are themselves criminal (e.g. corruption of public officials);
- (c) by abusing the processes of criminal justice.

The difficulty in examining state crime is exacerbated by the lack of clarity in the separation of state powers. When are the activities of state officials the activities of the state? Can the state be liable for contradictory initiatives and responses where crime is concerned? For example, if the government enacts prohibitions against the corruption of its officers, while at the same time permitting licensing or commercial tender practices which invite corruption, how is it to be held responsible?

A particular dimension of state crime which is disturbingly prevalent in certain developing countries is that of extreme forms of state violence (see Findlay and Zvekic, 1993). This is not to say, for instance, that the use of excessive force is the province of the police in developing nations alone. On the contrary, the technologies of force have been sophisticated to such an extent in Western states that the potential for state violence is enhanced. But in some developing settings the agents of criminal justice do not seem to be constrained by even the most basic conditions of human rights. This is obviously the case when street children are murdered by state police in Latin America and the police seem to be immune even from adverse local public opinion.

Instances of illegal shortcuts by members of state criminal justice agencies in the pursuit of control objectives proliferate (see PNG–Australia Development Co-operation Programme, 1993). In such situations the police may express little faith in the courts to convict or the prisons to punish offenders, and become frustrated with the perceived failure of the system to effect a satisfactory outcome. Innocent bystanders become victims of state violence when police take the law into their own hands. Illegitimate force is directed against suspects and prisoners in order to get a 'result' with which the courts cannot disagree. Villages may be burnt

and citizens beaten or raped in order to exact penalties not open to the formal institutions of punishment.

When practised in conjunction with reactive control policies which are incapable of preventing abuses of power before they occur, state violence will reinforce the solidarity of criminal and non-criminal groups against state authority as a common 'enemy'. For example, the Rhondas in Peru carry out night patrols as much to protect their communities from the excesses of police and military violence as to prevent intra-community disorder (see Findlay and Zvekic, 1993: ch. 5). This solidarity may also be evidenced by the disappearance of inter-gang conflict, such as occurs in the favellas of Brazil where crime groups will co-operate to resist the incursions of the state police (*ibid.*: ch. 6). Coincidentally, state violence erodes the willingness and ability of the average citizen to assist in the official maintenance of social order.

And what of a world where the state disappears as a viable site for the representation of crime and control? What of the context where the crime is against global interests and the perpetrator is a multinational? Again, a technique for analysis which is sympathetic to such transitional issues is the representation of crime as relationships rather than events bound within particular jurisdictions. Thus the predator and the victim can be extracted from unsuitable or outmoded social structures, and be considered in moral and functional terms as revealed through processes and outcomes of interaction.

Crime and difference

The unstated dimension in this discussion of crime and its representation is the potential for distinction and reaffirmation through criminalisation. By determining and representing certain relationships as criminal, the state is able to identify and exclude the illegitimate and to confirm and celebrate the legitimate.

As discussions of culture, society, morality and development depend on the often mute existence of their 'alter' or opposing states, representations of crime seem to require the maintenance of the divide between the 'law-abiding' and the deviant. The symbolic significance of criminal justice is all about declaring difference. This is particularly telling at a global level where a commonality of criminal justice (like other features of harmonious culture) is as yet largely symbolic.

This differentiation between criminal and non-criminal goes beyond the nature of crime and its representation. It is crucial for the context of crime within communities and culture. Becker (1973) identified the criminal as the outsider. Matza (1964) saw him as the drifter. Braithwaite

more recently positions him at the cross-roads of re-integration or stigma. Each and every 'serious' representation of the criminal, and even the popular wisdom with which we are confronted daily, attempts to remove crime and the criminal from common contexts of socio-cultural presence.

To emphasise the marginalisation and alienation of crime in its representation, the explanation of crime from within itself is denied. The world of the criminal and his motivations are delegitimised. The organisation of his 'society' is subordinated as 'sub-culture'. The purpose of crime is declared as essentially in opposition to the features of community and culture which equate with peace, prosperity and harmony. Obviously these are the communities and cultures of power and authority which pre-determine, impose and maintain the boundaries of criminality.

Finally, representations of crime are determined and broadcast in forms and fashions which prohibit genuine communication with their subject. As Richards says of literature, art and anthropology, which may as well relate to crime: 'cultural representations . . . have, historically, been founded on the assumption that its discourse is unknown to the subjects of its analysis. Predicated upon the illiteracy of its subjects [the representation of crime] has been supremely and uniquely free to apply itself to an uncontested sphere of special, secret knowledge' (1994: 4–5).

To some degree the globalisation of crime problems has recognised, if disputed, the potential for crime and the criminal to insist on new visibility, and to articulate, repulse or redefine the discourse which is essentially 'about them'. Yet this remains at the level of biography or ethnographic case-study and has in no way progressed to the point where those involved in common or mundane crime relationships have a regular role in their representation.

This book examines crime outside the charmed or demonic circles of Western cultural representations. Rather than unravelling the falsehoods of crime representation, we are interested in the premises of identity, language and culture on which they rely. The hegemonic impression surrounding popular representations can be challenged as well as endorsed through the context of globalisation and we intend to employ this context at least for the critical analysis of representations.

The globalisation of crime problems is part of a process where the representation of social relationships is used to repossess the cultural materials they are said to undermine, and to represent them in different terms. If crime causes fear, then the representation of crime as 'controllable' should reduce fear, but without addressing the features of culture which generate crime and fear. Global representations of the crime problem are particularly directed at reaffirming the values of modernisation

through the denial of crime's place within it.

In this way 'the cultural materials are made to function according to different criteria, given new meanings, new histories, new identities' (Richards, 1994: 5). And about these a 'global consensus' regarding crime is assumed, applied and confirmed.

The measurement and representation of crime provides a new dimension from which crime as a dynamic social phenomenon may be considered. Having identified crime as some form of social problem, the next step in contextual analysis is to indicate social settings in which crime might become more or less apparent. Developmental phases provide such a focus. Features of social development can then be extracted and interrelated in a manner to test their connection, if any, with crime, and vice versa.