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THE WILL

The phenomenon of action in which the mind moves the body has puzzled philosophers over the centuries. In this new edition of a classic work of analytical philosophy, Brian O'Shaughnessy investigates bodily action and attempts to resolve some of the main problems. His expanded and updated discussion examines the scope of the will and the conditions in which it makes contact with the body, and investigates the epistemology of the body. He sheds light upon the strangely intimate relation of awareness in which we stand to our own bodies, doing so partly through appeal to the concept of the body-image. The result is a new and strengthened emphasis on the vitally important function of the bodily will as a transparently intelligible bridge between mind and body, and the proposal of a dual aspect theory of the will.

BRIAN O'SHAUGHNESSY teaches philosophy at King's College London. He is the author of *Consciousness and the World* (2000) and many articles on the philosophy of mind.

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A dual aspect theory
II

BRIAN O'SHAUGHNESSY

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*For my father
William O'Shaughnessy*

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Glossary

The following expressions occur in the text with the senses given below:

action: I here follow standard contemporary philosophical usage. Examples: murder, rape, theft. Non-examples: sleeping, knowing, ageing.

activity: I follow standard usage in reserving this term for the active process whose continuation goes to constitute action-events of their type. Examples: the processes of murdering, or of listening. Non-examples: murder, hearing.

basic action: I follow standard contemporary philosophical usage, so that the basic act is the act of immediately moving one's limbs. Examples: familiar cases of moving one's limbs. Non-examples: opening the door, moving one limb by the means of moving another limb, contracting one's biceps by moving that arm.

bodily action: a bodily action is either a basic action, or a constitutive action or instrumental action which occurred because a basic action or bodily trying occurred that was causally responsible for the t-kind event required for that T-type of action. Examples: twiddling one's thumbs, opening the front door by turning the latch key, contracting one's biceps by moving one's arm. Non-examples: listening, making one's mouth water by thinking of juicy steaks.

constitutive action: the stipulated sense I give to this expression is as follows. It is the act of bringing about events within the motor-mechanism of limb-moving by the immediate means of either moving or trying to move that limb. Examples: contracting one's biceps by moving one's arm, contracting one's biceps by trying to move one's imprisoned arm. Non-example: contracting one's biceps by means of an electrical stimulus.

event: this is the standard use observed by contemporary authors. Examples: skids, deaths, battles, murders. Non-example: the continuing solidity of a rock.

instrumental action: I follow standard usage. An act rates as instrumental of type T if an act of type T occurred because some act or trying caused the t-kind event required for T-type acts. Examples: opening a door by kicking, causing goose pimples by thinking of poetry, generating sweat by trying to move an imprisoned arm.

phenomenon: I use this as a generic term to cover both events and processes. Examples: earthquakes, thefts, dissolvings, meltings.

process: I think I follow standard usage here. I take it to be a phenomenal continuity, such that when that continuity has come to an end a single countable event has occurred that is the same in type. Example: the skidding (process) went on continuously for two seconds, so that a two-second-long skid (event) occurred. Non-example: the continuing solidity of a rock.

willed: the usage I follow is such that an event is willed if it is the event that is the first or immediate object of the active event that occurs when we act, and therefore also of the generating act-desire. Therefore neither the events brought about in instrumental actions nor the events produced in constitutive actions are willed, whether desired or not. Example: the arm movements of swimmers. Non-examples: the muscle changes in swimmers, the movement of a swimmer through the water, the noise I intentionally produce by knocking on a door. I shall use the letter ' ϕ ' throughout the entire text to single out such an event.

willing of: the usage I follow is such that when an event ϕ is willed, then the act which was the act of ϕ -making, and effect of the act-desire directed towards ϕ occurrence, is 'a willing of ϕ '. Example: the basic act of arm raising is a willing of arm rise. I shall use the letter ' Φ ' throughout the entire text to single out such a bodily action.

Note: I use the following terms interchangeably throughout the text: 'action'/'act', and also 'try'/'strive'.