An Introduction to Indian Philosophy

This wide-ranging introduction to classical Indian philosophy is philosophically rigorous without being too technical for beginners. Through detailed explorations of the full range of Indian philosophical concerns, including some metaphilosophical issues, it provides readers with non-Western perspectives on central areas of philosophy, including epistemology, logic, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. Chapters are structured thematically, with each including suggestions for further reading. This provides readers with an informed overview, whilst enabling them to focus on particular topics if needed. Translated Sanskrit texts are accompanied by authorial explanations and contextualizations, giving the reader an understanding of the argumentative context and philosophical style of Indian texts. A detailed glossary and a guide to Sanskrit pronunciation equip readers with the tools needed for reading and understanding Sanskrit terms and names. The book will be an essential resource for both beginners and advanced students of philosophy and Asian studies.

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An Introduction to Indian Philosophy

ROY W. PERRETT
An old style can be translated, as it were, into a newer language; it can, one might say, be performed afresh at a tempo appropriate to our own times. To do this is really only to reproduce . . .

But what I mean is not giving an old style a fresh trim. You don’t take the old forms and fix them up to suit the latest taste. No, you are really speaking the old language, perhaps without realizing it, but you are speaking it in a way that is appropriate to the modern world, without on that account necessarily being in accordance with its taste.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*
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Preface

I would like to thank especially the following persons who have – both through their writings and through conversation or correspondence over the years – significantly shaped the way I think about Indian philosophy: in alphabetical order, they are Arindam Chakrabarti, Eli Franco, Jonardon Ganeri, Jay Garfield, Jitendra Mohanty, Stephen Phillips, Karl Potter, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Jay Shaw, Mark Siderits, John Taber, and Tom Tillemans. Naturally, it should not be inferred that any of them would agree with all of what I have written here.

A very special debt of gratitude is also due to Hilary Gaskin, my editor at Cambridge University Press, who commissioned this book and continued to believe in it – patiently combining the right mix of editorial acumen, encouragement and reproof – over the inordinately lengthy time I took to deliver the final manuscript. Without her efforts this book would certainly not have come into being. Many thanks!

Two other persons’ efforts were also essential in transforming the submitted manuscript into the final book: those of the anonymous clearance reader for Cambridge University Press, who offered a number of valuable suggestions for improvement, and of Rosemary Crawley, Assistant Editor, who skilfully shepherded me through the production process.

A note on the pronunciation of Sanskrit

The vast majority of classical Indian philosophical texts are in Sanskrit, as too are the names of their authors. Following standard scholarly practice, all Sanskrit words in this book are written phonetically according to the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST). A few very basic points about the pronunciation of Sanskrit for readers unfamiliar with the language are set out below. (For more detailed information on Sanskrit phonology see Coulson 1976 or Goldman and Sutherland 1987.)

The vowels a, i, u, e and o are pronounced roughly as are the English vowels in (respectively) 'but', 'pin', 'pull', 'they' and 'go'. The use of a macron indicates a lengthening of the corresponding vowel: so ā, ī, and ū are pronounced as are the corresponding English vowels in ‘father’, ‘police’ and ‘rude’. The diphthongs ai and au are pronounced like the ie in ‘pie’ and the ow in ‘now’. The vowel r̥ is pronounced as the ri in the name ‘Rita’. Sanskrit m̐ indicates nasalization of the preceding vowel.

An h following a consonant indicates it is aspirated: so ph and th are pronounced as in ‘uphill’ and ‘boathouse’. A dot under a consonant indicates that the tongue is to be pointed to the roof of the mouth when uttering it. S with an accent (´s) or a dot (’) is pronounced approximately as sh.

The general rule in pronouncing Sanskrit words is to stress the penultimate syllable, if it is long, or the nearest long syllable preceding it. If none is long, the first syllable is stressed. (A long syllable is one containing a long vowel or one in which a vowel is followed by two or more consonants.)