

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy

This wide-ranging introduction to classical Indian philosophy is philosophically rigorous without being too technical for beginners. Through detailed explorations of the full range of Indian philosophical concerns, including some metaphysical issues, it provides readers with non-Western perspectives on central areas of philosophy, including epistemology, logic, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. Chapters are structured thematically, with each including suggestions for further reading. This provides readers with an informed overview, whilst enabling them to focus on particular topics if needed. Translated Sanskrit texts are accompanied by authorial explanations and contextualizations, giving the reader an understanding of the argumentative context and philosophical style of Indian texts. A detailed glossary and a guide to Sanskrit pronunciation equip readers with the tools needed for reading and understanding Sanskrit terms and names. The book will be an essential resource for both beginners and advanced students of philosophy and Asian studies.

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An old style can be translated, as it were, into a newer language; it can, one might say, be performed afresh at a tempo appropriate to our own times. To do this is really only to reproduce . . .

But what I mean is *not* giving an old style a fresh trim. You don't take the old forms and fix them up to suit the latest taste. No, you are really speaking the old language, perhaps without realizing it, but you are speaking it in a way that is appropriate to the modern world, without on that account necessarily being in accordance with its taste.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*

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Preface

I would like to thank especially the following persons who have – both through their writings and through conversation or correspondence over the years – significantly shaped the way I think about Indian philosophy: in alphabetical order, they are Arindam Chakrabarti, Eli Franco, Jonardon Ganeri, Jay Garfield, Jitendra Mohanty, Stephen Phillips, Karl Potter, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Jay Shaw, Mark Siderits, John Taber, and Tom Tillemans. Naturally, it should not be inferred that any of them would agree with all of what I have written here.

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In writing this book I have made use of some of my own previously published articles (in varying degrees of revision). Thus the Introduction and Chapter 2 incorporate material from my 'Truth, Relativism and Western Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', *Asian Philosophy* 8, 1998. Chapter 1 includes material from my article 'Hindu Ethics' in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Blackwell, 2013). Chapter 3 includes material originally published in 'The Problem of Induction in Indian Philosophy', *Philosophy East and West* 34, 1984. Chapter 4 reuses some material from my 'Musical Unity and Sentential Unity', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 39, 1999. Chapter 5 includes

material from ‘The Momentariness of Simples’, *Philosophy* 79, 2004, and ‘Causation, Indian Theories of’ in Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Routledge, 1998). Chapter 6 draws on ‘Computationality, Mind and Value: The Case of Sāṃkhya-Yoga’, *Asian Philosophy* 11, 2001, and ‘Personal Identity, Minimalism, and Madhyamaka’, *Philosophy East and West* 52, 2002. I am grateful to the editors and publishers involved for permission to reprint these materials here. Finally, the book’s epigraph is reprinted (with the permission of Wiley) from Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* (Blackwell, 1980).

A note on the pronunciation of Sanskrit

The vast majority of classical Indian philosophical texts are in Sanskrit, as too are the names of their authors. Following standard scholarly practice, all Sanskrit words in this book are written phonetically according to the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST). A few very basic points about the pronunciation of Sanskrit for readers unfamiliar with the language are set out below. (For more detailed information on Sanskrit phonology see Coulson 1976 or Goldman and Sutherland 1987.)

The vowels *a*, *i*, *u*, *e* and *o* are pronounced roughly as are the English vowels in (respectively) ‘but’, ‘pin’, ‘pull’, ‘they’ and ‘go’. The use of a macron indicates a lengthening of the corresponding vowel: so *ā*, *ī*, and *ū* are pronounced as are the corresponding English vowels in ‘father’, ‘police’ and ‘rude’. The diphthongs *ai* and *au* are pronounced like the *ie* in ‘pie’ and the *ow* in ‘now’. The vowel *ṛ* is pronounced as the *ri* in the name ‘Rita’. Sanskrit *ṁ* indicates nasalization of the preceding vowel.

An *h* following a consonant indicates it is aspirated: so *ph* and *th* are pronounced as in ‘uphill’ and ‘boathouse’. A dot under a consonant indicates that the tongue is to be pointed to the roof of the mouth when uttering it. *S* with an accent (*ṣ*) or a dot (*ṣ̣*) is pronounced approximately as *sh*.

The general rule in pronouncing Sanskrit words is to stress the penultimate syllable, if it is long, or the nearest long syllable preceding it. If none is long, the first syllable is stressed. (A long syllable is one containing a long vowel or one in which a vowel is followed by two or more consonants.)