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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language

This book is a critical introduction to the central issues of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focuses on one or two texts that have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Texts include classic writings by Frege, Russell, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Austin, Grice, and Wittgenstein. Theoretical jargon is kept to a minimum and is fully explained whenever it is introduced. The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, *de re* and *de dicto* necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism about meaning. The book will be invaluable to students and to all readers who are interested in the nature of linguistic meaning.

MICHAEL MORRIS is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is author of *The Good and the True* (1992) and numerous articles.

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