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0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Introduction

On a raw Christmas Day in 1864, fifteen-year old William Nalle rushed to his grandmother's farm in Culpeper County, Virginia. Federal cavalymen had just swept through the neighborhood. William knew some of them personally; they had wintered near his home the previous year. Now they had come back, and in the words of the horsemen's commander, "thoroughly cleaned [the countryside] of stock and forage." They had done more than that. Reaching his grandmother's home, young Nalle beheld "a spectacle I shall not shortly forget." The farm had indeed been stripped of stock and forage; in the process, some of the doors had been wrenched off and the entire place ransacked as Union troopers had searched for provisions. Some of them, William recorded in his diary, had even grabbed his grandmother by the collar and unsuccessfully demanded money. Others had stolen clothing from the slaves living on the farm and forced "an old colored man (whom they had stripped) [to] stand out and try to dance." All in all, the experience had been terrifying. And, William noted, "every body within three or four miles of the road on which the yankees passed was treated just as bad and in [a] great many cases much worse."¹

The fate that befell William's grandmother, her slaves, and her neighbors was shared by thousands of Southern civilians during the American Civil War. Then and later, white Southerners recalled the fear and humiliation of their ordeal with a bitterness that still resonates after more than a century. Even in 1994 – 130 years after William T. Sherman began his famous March to the Sea – the North Carolina Secretary of Cultural Resources could still threaten to block a proposed monument to Sherman's soldiers at Bentonville, the state's principal Civil War battleground. The troops, she said, had been commanded by a man "more evil than Ivan the Terrible or Genghis Khan." The state commander of the Sons of Confederate Veterans agreed: "Monuments should be erected to heroes. These were no heroes. They were thieves, murderers, rapists, arsonists, trespassers."²

¹Report of Maj. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert, December 28, 1864, U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), Series I, vol. 43, pt. 1, p. 679. Cited hereafter as OR. (Unless noted, all citations are to Series I.) Entry for December 25, 1864, William Nalle Diary, VHS. A list of abbreviations used in the footnotes is on page xii.

²"New Bentonville Battle Pits History, Memories," *Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer*, May 29, 1994.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

It is easy to chuckle at such unreconstructed sentiments. Yet they remain a cultural artifact of considerable power, and have helped to shape a view of Union military policy toward Southern civilians that distorts as much as it illuminates. The actual picture was considerably more complex. For example, sprinkled among scathing Southern descriptions of the coming of the Yankees one can also find accounts like that of John Brown, a judge living in Camden, Arkansas. He headed his diary entry for April 15, 1864, "THE AWFUL DAY OF ALL DAYS," as Union troops swept into town and carted off bacon, hams, and other foodstuffs. The loss of his provisions was bad enough, but far worse was the prospect of "what might and indeed was likely to happen, the sacking of my house and . . . probably personal violence and insults to my family. . . ." By evening, however, this apocalypse had yet to materialize, and after nine full days of Federal occupation Brown reported, "As good order as could be expected is preserved in the City – Indeed, better than I had expected." When the Federals departed, Brown estimated his losses at "about \$1000 per day for the 12 days," a figure that included the value of several slaves who left with the Union armies. On the whole, however, he felt "quite easy" about his losses. His slaves had departed, his garden had been trampled, but no "personal violence or indignity" had occurred, and he still had enough provisions to feed his family.³

Brown was unusually philosophical about his experience. Yet although less traumatic than that of William Nalle's grandmother, his encounter with the Yankees was not wholly dissimilar. Both civilians had seen their food larders ransacked. Both had suffered damage and losses. But both had survived, their lives and homes intact. A Southern partisan might argue that they had nevertheless suffered needless trauma. A Northern partisan could respond that they got off lightly. And each could debate endlessly the typicality of either experience. From a historical perspective, however, it is less interesting to distribute praise or blame than to note the obvious combination of severity and restraint, and to ask what such a phenomenon can mean.

In this book, I will argue that it suggests the continual working of political logic even in a circumstance as volatile as the unleashing of armed men against a hostile population. Intertwined with the political logic, and sometimes indistinguishable from it, was also a deep sense of moral justice: a belief that whatever the claims of military necessity the innocent and helpless deserved some pity, and that even the guilty should suffer in rough proportion to the extent of their sins. As one might expect, such convictions were sometimes observed in the breach, and certainly what transpired as Union armies ranged the American South could be highly destructive even when carried out with discrimination. But it was seldom the wanton, wholesale fury of legend.

The North's ultimate "hard war" policy was very far from the program with which it had begun the conflict. In fact, initially the Federal government deliberately sought to exempt white Southerners from the burdens of war. Their constitutional rights were to be respected; their property was not to be touched. The Lincoln administra-

³Entries for April 15, 24, and 28, 1864, John Brown Diary, HCWRTC, USAMHI.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

tion specifically renounced any intention of attacking slavery. The central assumption underlying the early policy was a faith that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. Not all Northern generals embraced this conciliatory policy, but most did, and it remained the dominant posture toward Southern civilians until the summer of 1862.

At that point, a series of Union military reversals convinced many Northerners to abandon conciliation. The Lincoln administration encouraged field commanders to seize Southern property that might be useful to their operations. In September 1862 it issued its preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The decision to free Confederate slaves firmly repudiated the conciliatory policy; it also signaled that the war thenceforth would be prosecuted with less regard for its effect on Southern society. Some feared it would unleash a racial war of outright extermination. But the Federal government maintained political control over the situation; its primary objective remained the restoration of the Union, not the devastation of the South.

Although the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation destroyed conciliation as a major Federal policy, it did not immediately herald the birth of the hard war program of 1864–1865. The classic hard war operations that historians have found so striking had at least two main attributes. First, they were actions against Southern civilians and property made expressly in order to demoralize Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate economy, particularly its industries and transportation infrastructure. Second, they involved the allocation of substantial military resources to accomplish the job. Operations fitting these basic criteria did not surface in the western theater until at least April 1863. In the East and along the coast, they seldom made their appearance until much later – indeed, not until Grant became General-in-Chief and was able to impose his western concepts of warfare on commanders in the Virginia theater.

The conciliatory and hard war policies both possessed a strategic dimension. Each sought to detach Southern civilians from their allegiance to the Confederate government – the first through respect and magnanimity, the second through intimidation and fear. Between the conciliatory and hard war phases a third period intervened, a pragmatic interlude in which Union policy toward noncombatants had little strategic purpose. During this period, Union commanders sought victory exclusively on the battlefield; their stance toward civilians tended to be whatever seemed best calculated to produce operational success. They foraged when they needed to forage and retaliated when beset by guerrillas, but otherwise viewed civilians as peripheral to their concerns. This did not mean, however, that the political dimension was wholly lost. Official policy during this period came to discriminate between three kinds of Southern civilians – overt secessionists, neutral or passive individuals, and persons known to sympathize with the Union – and prescribed different treatments for each.

One must of course use care in imposing conceptions like conciliation, pragmatism, and hard war on a struggle that sprawled across thousands of miles of varied terrain, involved millions of individuals, and took four years to fight. Elements of all

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

three policies were present from the war's outset, and remnants lingered to its conclusion. The shift should not be thought of in absolute terms, but rather in degree of emphasis. Conciliation was the primary policy from April 1861 until June 1862; pragmatism from July 1862 until about January 1864; and hard war from February 1864 until the war's end. Even then, the difference between the pragmatic policy and the subsequent hard war policy was never so clearly distinct as between conciliation and its competitors. Indeed in the western theater, where the pragmatic policy formed the crucible of subsequent hard war measures, the distinction tends to blur. It holds up better in the eastern theater, where commanders, particularly in the Army of the Potomac, clung to a conservative style of warfare much longer than did their western counterparts.

By the beginning of 1864, the Union high command had embraced a "strategy of raids" in which the Confederate economic infrastructure became a major target. Here too, however, political calculations persisted. The Northern armies continued to distinguish between Unionist, passive, and secessionist civilians. The hard hand of war descended most heavily on public property and the property of private persons who supported the Confederacy, especially the wealthy.

This three-way division among Southern civilians remained to the end of the conflict. So did orders that forbade wanton acts of destruction. And although much needless destruction occurred, it is remarkable that generally the policy held up. The war on Southern civilians did not degenerate into savagery compared with past European experience or white America's war on the Indians. The policy worked in part because statesmen and generals wished it so. But that was only part of the story. It also survived because tens of thousands of Union soldiers – toughened by war, hungry for creature comforts, and often angry at the civilians in their midst – nevertheless understood the logic and abided by it.

Indeed, throughout the war, the evolution of Union policy toward Southern civilians cannot be understood simply by looking at the prescriptions of high public officials. One must instead examine the interplay between formal directives issued at the top; informal attitudes held by Northern generals, private soldiers, and civilians; and the actions of Union forces in the field. This interplay helped shape and reshape Federal policy toward Southern civilians as it moved toward the hard war of the conflict's final years.

The phrase I have chosen to express this final stage – "hard war" – requires some explanation. I have preferred it to "total war," the term more frequently employed, for several reasons. First, although total war does connote the destructiveness of attacks on the economic resources of an enemy society, strictly speaking it embodies important other dimensions, such as the extensive mobilization of manpower and resources, which lie outside the scope of this book. A second reason to use an expression distinct from total war was so that I might emphasize the substantial continuities between Federal strategy and previous practice without having to apply total war to describe everything from the Hundred Years War to World War Two. Third, other historians

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

have used hard war to describe this form of warfare, which saved me the embarrassment of creating a completely novel label. Then too, the phrase had at least a limited contemporaneous usage, as in one observer's characterization of William T. Sherman: "He believes in hard war."⁴

Finally, the term hard war was expressive but not too exact. I needed something flexible enough to include operations aimed at the destruction of enemy economic resources (whether publicly or privately owned), forced evacuations, or confiscation of property without recompense. As will be seen, the range of operations that fit this description was too wide to conform easily to a more precise label. But most of these operations had one common element: the erosion of the enemy's will to resist by deliberately or concomitantly subjecting the civilian population to the pressures of war.

This book is a study of how the North came to choose such a policy, and what that policy was like in action. It does not, therefore, touch on all aspects of Union military policy toward Southern civilians. The Federal army's role in military government, wartime Reconstruction, and emancipation is a worthy subject I hope to explore in another book. But it lies outside the scope of this one, which confines itself to Federal military policy toward Southern civilians and property within the zone of active hostilities.

The book is not overtly concerned with ethical judgment or prescription. I am not interested in assessing the extent to which Federal units behaved legitimately, or the degree to which their actions swerved outside the bounds of accepted conduct. My purpose is different: I want to describe what was done, and examine the human web of decisions and attitudes that made it possible. Nevertheless, the issue of military attacks on noncombatants is, as it should be, a matter of grave moral concern. I believe I owe it to readers, when addressing a subject as fraught with moral implications as this, to briefly offer my personal perspective and thus alert them to my potential biases.

I believe in restraint in the conduct of war. It is sometimes tempting to echo Leo Tolstoy's scathing contempt toward those who "prate about the rules of warfare." "War," he makes Prince Andrei declare in *War and Peace*, "is not a polite recreation but the vilest thing in life, and we ought to understand that and not play at war." Nevertheless, however naive or even offensive the "ethics of war" may seem, in practice they are not dreamy ideals but simple reality. Those who wage war routinely seek to justify themselves on moral grounds, something they would hardly bother to do if moral claims did not matter. Union commanders and soldiers alike accepted those claims. Grant spoke of the destruction of civilian property as a "humane" policy that ultimately saved the lives of Federals and Confederates alike; Sherman said in

⁴For examples of the term "hard war," see Bruce Catton, *Grant Moves South* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 294, and James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 779. The quote is from Burke Davis, *Sherman's March* (New York: Random House, 1980), 9.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

defense of his order exiling the citizens of Atlanta: "God will judge . . . whether it be more humane to fight with a town of women at our back or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own people."⁵

Above all, I believe in the principle of noncombatant immunity, the distinction drawn between the fighting man, who is a proper object for attack, and the civilian, who usually is not. This too is a distinction that soldiers in the Civil War period accepted and generally observed. At the same time, however, I do not believe that this principle can be made absolute. If military organizations are to be expected to conform to rules in warfare, those rules must provide them scope to perform their duties effectively; the rules must, in short, permit them to do what is truly necessary to win. Sometimes military necessity requires attacks of a kind that expose civilians to risk or their property to destruction. When such attacks are required, some sort of mediating principle is needed to reconcile the imperatives of noncombatant immunity and military necessity. I regard the principle of "double effect" as the most workable and satisfactory guideline. This is an old idea that goes back to the Catholic scholastics of the sixteenth century, but Michael Walzer has offered a good modern definition: "The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect [i.e., a legitimate act of war]; the evil effect [death or severe hardship to noncombatants] is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting costs to himself."⁶

These are my own views. They are by no means universally shared, and they do not always coincide with those held by the actors in the Civil War. I have not consciously tried to impose them on the events described in these pages, although I have attempted to ascertain and express the moral beliefs actually held by participants in the conflict. Readers may judge for themselves how well I have succeeded.

⁵Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Rosemary Edwards, 2 vols. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1957), vol. 2, p. 922; Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant*, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Webster, 1885) vol. 1, p. 369. William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, 2 vols. in 1 (reprint edition; Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1974 [1875]), vol. 2, p. 125.

⁶Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (paperback edition; Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1980 [1977]), 155.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)

I



The roots of a policy

“A reckless and unprincipled tyrant has invaded your soil,” the proclamation raged. Heedless of moral and constitutional restraint, Abraham Lincoln had hurled his “abolition hosts” into northern Virginia, murdering civilians, seizing private property, “and committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to humanity to be enumerated.” The Northern invaders had abandoned all rules of civilized warfare. “[T]hey proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is ‘Beauty and booty.’”¹

Addressed to the people of northern Virginia and dated June 5, 1861, this purple missive took flight from the pen of Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, hero of Fort Sumter and newly appointed commander of the defenses at Manassas Junction. In the innocent morning of the American Civil War – the bombardment of the fort had killed no one, and scarcely anyone had perished since – such grotesqueries were not uncommon. Few, however, were more thoroughly out of tune with reality. Twenty-five miles from Manassas, the leader of the “abolition hosts,” Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, had a very different sense of his purpose and methods. He had made his headquarters in the shade of a mansion on Arlington Heights. Far from pillaging the handsome residence, he had composed a polite letter to its owner, the wife of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. A guard had been placed around the house, McDowell assured her, and an officer was living on the lower floor to insure its being respected. As for himself, “I am here temporarily in camp on the grounds, preferring this to sleeping in the house, under the circumstances which the painful state of the country places me with respect to its proprietors.”²

It was a chivalrous letter, but much more than chivalry was at work. Beauregard’s blandishments to the contrary, McDowell’s government sought not only to embrace but to exceed the rules of civilized warfare, and thereby demonstrate that Southern civilians had nothing to fear from Northern armies. As an order to Union soldiers put it in worthy counterpoint to the indignant charges of the rebel commander, a “turbulent faction” had seized control of Virginia and sought to inaugurate a “reign of

¹“To the good People of the Counties of Loudoun, Fairfax, and Prince William,” June 5, 1861, OR 2:907.

²Irvin McDowell to Mrs. R.E. Lee, May 30, 1861, *ibid.*, 655.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*The Hard Hand of War*

terror" over loyal citizens. "You are going on American soil . . .," the order counseled. "You must bear in mind that you are going for the good of the whole country, and that while it is your duty to punish sedition, you must protect the loyal, and, should occasion offer, at once suppress servile insurrection." And they would go gently. For property damaged by unruly soldiers, McDowell established a system to indemnify the owners; for houses occupied for military use and wood cut for soldiers' campfires he asked the War Department to pay rent and compensation.³

The logic behind such a policy was simple. Shakespeare put it succinctly in *Henry V*: "[W]hen lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentlest gamester is the soonest winner." Each Union soldier, declared a Boston newspaper, "can exert incalculable influence in favor of a permanent peace after the shock of battle has subsided, by his demeanor toward belligerents. It will not be too much to say that the length of the war will be determined, as much by the behavior of the loyal forces, when not employed in actual fighting, as on the field of strife." In 1861, many Northerners thought such a posture made excellent sense. The perceived nature of the rebellion, the status of contemporary legal prescription, and the inheritance of previous American military experience all testified to its wisdom.⁴

THE NATURE OF THE REBELLION

Perhaps the principal reason Northerners resisted the idea of making war on Southern civilians was that it seemed unnecessary, even counterproductive, to do so. Few thought the Confederacy enjoyed widespread support; most believed that pockets of staunch Unionism still existed throughout the South, and that the majority of those who professed loyalty to the Confederate government were either lukewarm in their support or else ignorant and deluded. "Wrongly or rightly," noted one foreign observer in September 1861, "[the Northern people] affect to believe that the South has been led astray by the conspiracy of only a few leaders, for whom they reserve all their anger." If this were true, Union armies could expect to be welcomed by a sizeable element of the Southern population. Cowed into submission or seduced by the apparent triumph of secession, these wayward countrymen would recover their loyalty as soon as the Federal government demonstrated its resolve to maintain the Constitution and enforce the law.⁵

In some respects, the faith in widespread Southern Unionism seemed difficult to support. The seceded states, after all, had withdrawn by the expressed will of popularly elected state legislatures and conventions. That certainly implied a broad foun-

³"To the United States Troops of this Department," June 3, 1861, *ibid.*, 662; McDowell to E.D. Townsend, May 29, 1861, *ibid.*, 653.

⁴*Boston Evening Transcript*, July 19, 1861.

⁵Entry for September 16, 1861, *Comte de Paris Journal*, typescript copy in the possession of the author. The original journal is in the possession of the Fondation Saint-Louis, Amboise, France. A typescript copy may be consulted at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*The Roots of a Policy*

dation of approval, as Northerners sympathetic to the South pointed out to their more bloody-minded peers. But many Northerners – and most Republicans – subscribed to the theory that the South had been hoodwinked into secession by a comparative handful of men, a wealthy slaveholding aristocracy styled, in the melodramatic political rhetoric of the period, the Slave Power Conspiracy. According to this view, the wealthiest slaveholders in the South, although a small minority of its white population, controlled the balance through their domination of social and political life. “One class of citizens is accustomed to rule,” declared Carl Schurz in 1858, “and the other to obey.”⁶

Although this was a gross simplification of political conditions in the South, it formed a staple component of Northern political perceptions in the antebellum period. The Nullification Crisis, the War with Mexico, the filibuster expeditions to Central America, the Ostend Manifesto, Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lecompton Constitution, and Dred Scott decision all had seemed to confirm the existence of a minority faction that through control of the national government, had regularly imposed its will upon a passive majority. Now, apparently stymied by the election of a free soil President, the same conspiracy had used its control of the state governments in the South to secede from the Union and establish an illegitimate, despotic Confederacy.⁷

The pervasiveness of the Slave Power myth made plausible the idea that most Southerners had enjoyed little voice in the decision to leave the Union and simply accepted it as a fait accompli engineered by their social betters. Lincoln himself subscribed to this theory. As late as July 1861 he maintained, “It may well be doubted whether there is, to-day, a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every other one, of the so-called seceded States.” The nature of the conflict, then, was not really a contest between two mobilized, committed societies. Rather, as Representative James M. Ashley of Ohio insisted, it was a “struggle between the people on one side, and a privileged class on the other.”⁸

Given this view, it seemed pointless to invade the South with fire and sword. The notion that the soul of the rebellion reposed in a planter aristocracy made clear where the blade of vengeance should be thrust. James Shields, an Illinois Congressman turned general, summed up the popular view in a letter to Union General-in-Chief George B. McClellan in January 1862. “The Southern Government,” Shields lectured, “is a military oligarchy. The head of the oligarchy is in Richmond, and when the head

⁶Carl Schurz, *Speeches of Carl Schurz* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1865), 11–12.

⁷For background on the belief in a Slave Power Conspiracy, see David Brion Davis, *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), passim.; and Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 88–102.

⁸“Message to Congress in Special Session,” July 4, 1861, Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 8 volumes and index (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), vol. 4, p. 437. Ashley’s statement is quoted in Kenneth M. Stampp, *And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860–1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 254.

Cambridge University Press

0521599415 - The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Mark Grimsley

Excerpt

[More information](#)*The Hard Hand of War*

falls a Union sentiment will be bound to burst forth in the South, which will soon entomb the body of this foul conspiracy.”⁹

Shields was a Democrat, not a Republican, and his characterization of the Confederate government as a “military oligarchy,” coupled with his prediction of a massive outpouring of Union sentiment in the South, indicated how extensive was the belief among Northerners that the rebellion lacked popular support. Many others held that such support as did exist was brittle and could be readily overthrown. Edward Bates, Lincoln’s Attorney General and a prominent conservative, thought an effective naval blockade would suffice to defeat the Confederacy. “Their people are high spirited and ready enough to fight,” he told the President in April 1861, “but impatient of control and unable to bear the steady and persistent pressure which we can easily impose and which they have no means to resist.”¹⁰

As a conservative, Bates was also suspicious of the sweeping changes that might accompany a destructive invasion, particularly the specter of a murderous slave uprising. He hoped “to conduct the war [so] as to give the least occasion for social and servile war, in the extreme Southern States, and to disturb as little as possible the accustomed occupations of the people.” Other conservatives agreed and argued, moreover, that severe measures would only provoke the South to greater resistance. Speaking out against a proposed confiscation bill in August 1861, Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky insisted that “these laws will have no efficacy in war. Their only effect will be to stimulate your adversaries to still more desperate measures. . . . The experiment has been tried by other countries. England tried it upon Ireland, and she reaped the reward of it in hundreds of years of intestine war.” Union Brigadier General George G. Meade concurred. “Let the ultras on both sides be repudiated,” he wrote his wife, “and the masses of conservative and moderate men may compromise and settle the difficulty.”¹¹

The antislavery “ultras,” of course, felt differently. In their minds, it made little sense to oppose a rebellion without also attacking the institution that lay at the heart of it. Unlike their more moderate colleagues, however, they believed – or at least affected to believe – that such a step would not stiffen Confederate resistance. A policy of emancipation would hardly be conciliatory. Even so it did not require Union armies to sweep into Southern territory and devastate the region’s economy. Indeed, during the war’s first year the Radical Republicans advocated such a policy no more than anyone else, although they frequently voiced their readiness for harsh measures if necessary. What they wanted from Union commanders was prompt, vigorous military action – but action aimed at destroying rebel armies and seizing rebel cities, not the visitation of deliberate hardship on Southern civilians.

⁹Shields to McClellan, January 28, 1862, OR 5:700–702.

¹⁰“Memorandum,” April 15, 1861, Howard K. Beale, ed., *The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859–1866*. American Historical Association Report, 1930 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), 183.

¹¹*Ibid.*; U.S. Congress, *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 1st session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1861), 412; Meade to Mrs. Meade, November 24, 1861, in George Gordon Meade, ed., *The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade*, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), vol. 1, pp. 230–231.