

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

---

## SELF-INTEREST

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

---

# SELF-INTEREST

*Edited by*

**Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr.,  
and Jeffrey Paul**



**CAMBRIDGE  
UNIVERSITY PRESS**

Cambridge University Press  
 978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest  
 Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul  
 Frontmatter  
[More information](#)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS  
 Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,  
 São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Cambridge University Press  
 The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)  
 Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9780521598927](http://www.cambridge.org/9780521598927)

© Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1997

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception  
 and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,  
 no reproduction of any part may take place without the written  
 permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1997

*A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library*

*Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data*

Self-Interest / edited by Ellen Frankel Paul,  
 Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. p. cm.  
 Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-521-59892-3

1. Self-interest. I. Paul, Ellen Frankel. II. Miller,  
 Fred Dycus, 1944– . III. Paul, Jeffrey.

BJ1474.S39 1997

171'.9-dc21 96-46422

CIP

ISBN 978-0-521-59892-7 Paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2010

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or  
 accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in  
 this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is,  
 or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Information regarding prices, travel  
 timetables and other factual information given in this work are correct at  
 the time of first printing but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee  
 the accuracy of such information thereafter.

The essays in this book have also been published,  
 without introduction and index, in the semiannual journal  
*Social Philosophy & Policy*, Volume 14, Number 1,  
 which is available by subscription.

## CONTENTS

	Introduction	vii
	Acknowledgments	xvi
	Contributors	xvii
KELLY ROGERS	Beyond Self and Other	1
JEAN HAMPTON	The Wisdom of the Egoist: The Moral and Political Implications of Valuing the Self	21
THOMAS E. HILL, JR.	Reasonable Self-Interest	52
DAVID COPP	The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason	86
DAVID SCHMIDTZ	Self-Interest: What's in It for Me?	107
DAVID O. BRINK	Self-Love and Altruism	122
STEPHEN DARWALL	Self-Interest and Self-Concern	158
JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE	Who Is Rational Economic Man?	179
SUSAN WOLF	Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life	207
NEERA K. BADHWAR	Self-Interest and Virtue	226
MICHAEL SLOTE	The Virtue in Self-Interest	264
THOMAS HURKA	Self-Interest, Altruism, and Virtue	286
	Index	309

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

## INTRODUCTION

“[T]he good man should be a lover of self,” Aristotle wrote, “for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows. . . .”<sup>\*</sup> Yet in much of contemporary moral philosophy, concern for one’s own interests is considered a nonmoral issue, while concern for the interests of others is paradigmatically moral. Indeed, a central issue in ethical theory involves the proper balance to be struck between prudence and morality, between the pursuit of one’s own good and the pursuit of the good of others. When deliberating over what action to take, should one weigh one’s own interests more heavily than those of others? Or is it possible to accommodate both self-interest and regard for others, to show that we have self-regarding reasons for helping others?

The essays in this volume—written from a range of perspectives—address these questions and examine related issues. Some challenge the assumption that morality is exclusively concerned with the pursuit of the good of others, arguing that self-interest can be a legitimate moral motive. Some ask whether it is possible to resolve the apparent conflict between self-interest and morality by appealing to some third, overarching standard, or by showing that self-regard and regard for others share significant common features or spring from a common source. Other essays seek to determine what values are most likely to contribute to an agent’s interest, or what kind of life a self-interested agent should seek to lead. Still others examine the relationship between self-interest and practical reason, or between self-interest and virtue.

In the opening essay, “Beyond Self and Other,” Kelly Rogers explores the assumption, held by many contemporary moral philosophers, that an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others, and may not even have worth then, unless it is motivated by altruism rather than selfishness. Self-interested action, on this view, may be rational or prudent, but lacks any genuine moral dimension. Rogers undertakes a comprehensive critique of this “self-other” model of morality, drawing upon Aristotelian and American Pragmatist sources, and offering a number of examples designed to show that self-interested actions can have moral value. A more promising model, she argues, would recognize our need for moral guidance in a wide range of pursuits, not merely in our dealings with others. Morality can assist us in two main ways: it can help us reconcile our passions and our reason in order to pursue the long-range goal of living a good life; and it can help us develop principles for action, so that we can relate new choices and novel situations that we face with those we

<sup>\*</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, in *A New Aristotle Reader*, ed. J. L. Ackrill (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 1169a12–13.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

have faced in the past. In the course of the essay, Rogers challenges the view of self-interest as preference-satisfaction; the notion that concern for others is the only proper source of moral motivation; and the idea that regard for others is either necessary or sufficient for morality. While she acknowledges that selfishness is a real moral failing, she characterizes it not as an excessive pursuit of self-interest, but as unreflective pursuit of one's supposed interests, without regard for the wider context in which one acts. The remedy for this failing, she contends, is not to foster an impartial regard for one's own interests and the interests of others, but to recognize that one acts in a world of other people, each pursuing his own ends. By abstracting away from our own concerns, we can gain an appreciation of the situation of others, and can come to see the value of helping them pursue their interests; yet this need not detract from the moral value of pursuing our own interests.

The assumption that morality is primarily other-regarding is also the subject of Jean Hampton's contribution to this volume, "The Wisdom of the Egoist: The Moral and Political Implications of Valuing the Self." Hampton examines theories of self-worth and their impact on how individuals view themselves in society, and she explores the detrimental effects of conceiving morality as a system of impersonal duties owed to others. She begins by distinguishing principle-dependent moral theories from worth-dependent ones: under the former, abstract principles of appropriate treatment are primary, and these principles lead one to the conclusion that all persons have equal worth; under the latter, the notion that people have equal worth is primary, and is used to derive principles of appropriate treatment. Hampton believes that worth-dependent theories offer the more promising approach, since they begin with what she takes to be the proper object of moral concern: the self or the person. The belief in the value of the self is exemplified in the position of the egoist, who places himself at the top of his hierarchy of values. Hampton maintains that the egoist is correct to recognize the self as the bearer of value; his mistake is to value himself exclusively, failing to place any moral weight on the fact that there are other selves, other people in the world. Illustrating her discussion with examples from literature, Hampton argues that the assumptions we make about the source of human value have profound personal and social implications. One's view of one's own worth influences the kinds of interests, talents, and ambitions one develops and the kind of treatment one demands from others; and a society that fails to acknowledge the equal worth of its members will be marked by oppression of those deemed to be of lesser worth. Hampton concludes that by taking self-worth—rather than some impersonal system of duties—as the basis of morality, we can honor both our own value and the value of others.

The assumption challenged by Rogers and Hampton—that morality is primarily or exclusively other-regarding—underlies an ongoing philo-

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

## INTRODUCTION

ix

sophical debate over whether it is always rational to be moral. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. explores the relationship between rationality and morality in "Reasonable Self-Interest," seeking to discover a model of practical reason which accords with widely held common-sense views about moral reasoning. Hill begins by sketching three models of practical reason. On the self-interest model, reason demands that each agent intelligently pursue his own self-interest. On the coherence-and-efficiency model, one is rational if one pursues one's ends, whatever they are, in an informed, coherent, and efficient way. On the consequentialist model, certain ends (such as pleasure, happiness, or friendship) are said to have intrinsic value, and one is rational to the extent that one promotes the greatest possible sum of these values, for oneself and for others. Hill analyzes each of these models, attempting to determine how well each conforms to what he takes to be common-sense views of reason, self-interest, and morality; and he proposes a fourth model, based on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. On this model, one acts rationally if one coherently and efficiently pursues one's ends, subject to certain constraints based on the Kantian idea of treating others as autonomous ends in themselves. The content of these constraints is to be arrived at through "idealized co-legislation," in which conscientious agents deliberate together to arrive at publicly justifiable rules of conduct. This model accords with common sense, Hill argues, in that it recognizes the primary importance of individual moral agents and gives us wide latitude in choosing our ends, while at the same time requiring that we have some regard for others.

While Hill attempts to develop a model of reason which would ameliorate the conflict between self-interest and morality, David Copp takes a different approach to this conflict. In "The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason," Copp assumes that there will be cases in which morality and self-interest conflict, and asks whether, in such cases, the requirements of morality are normatively more important than the requirements of self-interest. A natural way to try to resolve such conflicts would be to appeal to some third standard, such as an Aristotelian standard of personal excellence, which could be drawn on to resolve disputes. Copp argues, however, that the very idea of a standard that would provide a definitive appraisal of the relative normative importance of morality and self-interest is incoherent. Neither morality nor self-interest overrides the other; there simply are judgments and reasons of these two different kinds—there is never an overall judgment as to which action is required *simpliciter* in cases of conflict between these kinds of reasons. In such cases, Copp contends, there is no fact of the matter as to what a person ought *simpliciter* to do. Nevertheless, he maintains that his position does not threaten the significance of morality in guiding our actions: while morality cannot override self-interest, neither can self-interest override morality. Copp concludes with the suggestion that we can minimize

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

the potential for conflict between morality and self-interest, by fostering moral education and social conditions that give people self-interested reasons for acting morally.

The tension between morality and self-interest is also the subject of David Schmidtz's contribution to this volume, "Self-Interest: What's in It for Me?" Schmidtz begins by noting that our faith in the rationality of acting prudently is far stronger than our faith in the rationality of acting morally. "Why should one be moral?" is considered a serious question, which has been the subject of a great deal of philosophical debate; yet the same cannot be said of "Why should one be prudent?" Schmidtz argues, however, that our reasons to be prudent are every bit as contingent as our reasons to be moral: the fact that we have self-interested reasons to perform a certain action in no way guarantees that we will be motivated to do so. The alleged conflict between morality and self-interest is similarly contingent, Schmidtz contends, since the moral perspective does not require that one have a universal regard for the interests of others, and self-interest does not require a wholesale lack of concern for others. Both perspectives make room for a deep, although not universal, regard for others. Indeed, a eudaimonistic view, of the kind Schmidtz defends, suggests that caring for others gives one more to live for, and thus advances one's self-interest. This sort of view, if correct, gives us reasons to reconsider the alleged tension between morality and self-interest, and to reject the common practice of using self-interest as an all-purpose scapegoat for our failures to be moral. Often, Schmidtz suggests, the problem lies elsewhere: weakness of will and social pressure can lead us to act imprudently just as easily as they can lead us to act immorally. Thus, while he agrees that we can be motivated to be moral even when being moral is not in our interest, he also maintains that we can lack motivation to be moral even when morality and self-interest coincide.

The common assumption that self-interest and concern for others are frequently in conflict might seem to indicate that the two sorts of concern are fundamentally different, yet David O. Brink suggests that this need not be the case. In "Self-Love and Altruism," Brink explores what he calls a "metaphysical egoist" attempt to reconcile the demands of self-interest and other-regarding morality. On this view, people's interests are said to be metaphysically interdependent, so that acting on other-regarding moral requirements is a reliable way of promoting one's own interests. The version of metaphysical egoism that Brink develops draws on Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of love and friendship and on T. H. Green's ethics of self-realization, and it extends the views of these theorists by appealing to plausible claims about persons and their persistence through time. Beginning with a discussion of *intrapersonal* psychological continuity, Brink argues that there is a parallel *interpersonal* form of psychological continuity: a continuity of interdependent beliefs, experiences, desires, and ideals. He suggests that, just as one has a concern for one's own



Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

## INTRODUCTION

xi

future self, one can and should have a parallel concern for others with whom one shares, or can share, psychological continuity. Thus, Brink's view models interpersonal relations and concern on intrapersonal relations and concern, and thereby extends the boundaries of self-interest so as to include the good of others. Brink concludes his essay by addressing a number of possible objections to his theory, focusing on foundational worries about the value, character, scope, and weight of metaphysical egoist concern for others.

Like Brink, Stephen Darwall attempts to draw out the similarities between self-interest and regard for others, offering an account of self-interest that makes it analogous to a benevolent concern for others. In his essay "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Darwall begins with a critique of informed-desire accounts of self-interest, in which an agent's self-interest is taken to consist in whatever the agent rationally and informedly takes an interest in. Such theories have a certain appeal as views of what counts as a rational interest, but this appeal does not survive when they are considered as theories of self-interest. Darwall argues that informed-desire accounts include too much within the scope of self-interest, and therefore leave no room for genuine self-sacrifice: anything which an agent informedly judges to be worth some sacrifice is taken to be part of his self-interest, and thus not really a sacrifice at all. Drawing on the work of Henry Sidgwick, Darwall proposes an alternative account of self-interest, which understands a person's interest in terms of what we (or the person himself) would want for him for his own sake. Unlike informed-desire theories, such an account can explain why not everything a person desires is part of his good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we (and he) would sensibly want, insofar as we care about him. Darwall concludes with a discussion of the subjective and objective factors that contribute to a good life, arguing that a self-interested agent should desire a life that he can value and derive pleasure from, but one that is also made up of genuinely worthwhile human activities, such as mutual love and creative expression.

The individual's interest in leading a fulfilling life—a subject Darwall touches on—is the focus of the next two essays in this collection. In "Who Is Rational Economic Man?" Jennifer Roback Morse proposes a way of expanding the economist's model of rationally self-interested behavior so that it can give an account of our longings for what she calls the "ultimate goods": truth, beauty, happiness, and love. Morse begins with a discussion of the standard economic definition of rationality, which holds that an agent is rational if he has an internally consistent set of preferences and pursues a given set of ends in a way that minimizes costs. She sets out an alternative model which recognizes that every rational individual plays a dual role: each agent calculates the costs and expected benefits of possible actions, taking his preferences as given; yet, at least on occasion, each agent also takes time to reflect on his values and preferences, and to

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

consider whether he is living the kind of life he wants to live. A person can experience inner conflict, frustration, and disappointment with the course of his life, and these are difficult or impossible to account for on standard economic models. Morse's alternative model attempts to account for these conflicts and disappointments by introducing longings for ultimate goods alongside the appetites (for nourishment, physical comfort, amusements, and so on) that rational agents attempt to satisfy. On Morse's model, the appetites are considered pleasurable in themselves, and are also treated as inputs or contributing factors to the achievement of the longings; but a person can consume too much of the appetites relative to their value in fostering the achievement of the longings. When this occurs, the rational agent must reassess and reorder his preferences if he is committed to achieving the ultimate goods. By conceiving of rationality in this way, Morse argues, we develop an understanding of a number of phenomena that economists cannot currently explain well, including immoderation, self-indulgence, and dissatisfaction with the course of one's life.

The link between self-interest and leading a meaningful life is the subject of Susan Wolf's contribution to this volume, "Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life." Wolf begins with a discussion of three types of theories of self-interest: hedonistic theories, which identify a person's good with the felt quality of his experiences; preference theories, which emphasize the satisfaction of the agent's desires, whatever they may be; and objective-list theories, which equate a person's good with the achievement of (for example) knowledge, pleasure, friendship, love, and other goods thought to be objectively valuable. The view Wolf offers falls into the third category: she argues that a fully successful life must be a meaningful one, where the concept of meaningfulness has both subjective and objective components, suitably linked. A meaningful life, she says, is a life of active engagement in projects of worth, which might involve such things as moral or intellectual accomplishments, relationships with family and friends, or artistic/creative enterprises. In the course of her essay, Wolf discusses the relationship between meaning and happiness, and between meaning and a subjective sense of fulfillment. She acknowledges that accepting meaningfulness as an important ingredient of a good life makes the identification of what is in one's self-interest less clear and determinate than it might otherwise be: since there is such a wide range of meaningful activities that one might engage in, it will be difficult to make comparative judgments about which are more conducive to one's interests. Wolf concludes by suggesting that, while meaning and self-interest must remain closely linked, the activities that give meaning to one's life will give one reasons for acting that are, to some extent, independent of self-interest—reasons derived from the worth of the activities themselves.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

## INTRODUCTION

xiii

The last three essays in this collection deal in various ways with the relationship between self-interest and virtue. In “Self-Interest and Virtue,” Neera K. Badhwar sets out to defend the Aristotelian view that virtue is essential to an individual’s happiness or *eudaimonia*, and thus that virtuous action is in the agent’s self-interest. This view has its origin in Aristotle’s belief that virtue is necessary for the most effective functioning of our various capacities—cognitive, emotional, social, and physical. Badhwar connects virtue with an agent’s self-interest by arguing that virtue is essential to the proper functioning of the agent’s capacities, or to what Badhwar calls his “practical efficacy”; this efficacy, in turn, is essential to the agent’s happiness. More precisely, she says, virtue is partly constitutive of an agent’s happiness, objectively conceived: virtues such as honesty, integrity, justice, generosity, and courage put the agent in touch with various aspects of reality and enhance his relationships with others. Practicing these virtues frees the agent of the control of skewed perceptions and irrational emotions, and thereby enables him to feel at home in the world. Yet if virtue leads to efficacy and happiness, what can we say of tyrants or predators, those who pursue vicious ends? Badhwar argues that such predators cannot achieve the kind of efficacy and self-esteem that are essential for happiness. In choosing to live in parasitic dependence on others, rather than leading productive lives in beneficial cooperation with others, they betray a lack of autonomy and are forced into a pattern of self-deception, rationalization, and evasion that is likely to have devastating psychological consequences. Badhwar concludes that an agent’s true interest lies in cultivating a life of virtue and practical efficacy, and that, in the absence of bad fortune, this is the kind of life most likely to lead to happiness.

Michael Slote’s essay, “The Virtue in Self-Interest,” approaches the relationship between self-interest and virtue from a more abstract, theoretical perspective. An ethical theory, Slote observes, can attempt to understand the relationship between two concepts reductively, by accounting for “higher” concepts in terms of “lower” ones—as utilitarianism accounts for ethical ideals and standards in terms of “mere” well-being or pleasure. Or a theory can take a dualistic approach, analyzing each concept independently. A third method—which Slote calls “elevationism,” in contrast with reductionism—understands ethically lower concepts, such as well-being or self-interest, in terms of ethically higher concepts such as virtue. This is the approach taken by some ancient virtue-ethics theorists, including the Stoics, for whom well-being simply *consists* in being virtuous. Slote acknowledges that Stoic elevationism has a number of counterintuitive implications—for example, that appetitive pleasures are not part of human well-being and that pain is not intrinsically contrary to well-being. He suggests a more plausible form of elevationism, influenced by the ethical theories of Plato and Aristotle, which employs weaker assump-

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

tions about the connection between well-being and virtue. On this view, every element of human well-being must be tied to or consistent with one or another particular virtue. Although this view does not provide an entirely unified account of an agent's virtue and his well-being or self-interest—since different elements of well-being will be related to different virtues—it nevertheless conforms to some of our strongest intuitions regarding the contribution of at least some forms of pleasure to well-being. Slote argues that this view can also help us explain why some activities that individuals engage in, such as those that waste their talents, or those that involve interactions in which the parties use each other as mere means, do not contribute to the individuals' well-being.

The final essay in this collection, Thomas Hurka's "Self-Interest, Altruism, and Virtue," presents an account of virtue which places self-interest and altruism within a general theory of the intrinsic value of attitudes toward goods and evils. Hurka begins with a welfarist-perfectionist theory of the good, according to which such things as pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are all intrinsically good, that is, good in themselves, apart from their consequences. He defines self-interest as a positive attitude toward one's own good, an attitude consisting of three components: desiring to obtain one's good, actively pursuing it, and taking pleasure in it when it is achieved. Altruism, on this view, consists of a similar attitude toward the good of others. Hurka argues that both self-interested and altruistic attitudes are intrinsically good, since they involve love of some person's good for itself (that is, apart from its consequences). At the same time, he contends, self-interested and altruistic ends can be instrumentally evil if, by being too intense, they prevent a person from dividing his love proportionally between his own and others' good. On this view, excessive self-interest makes for a moral failing of selfishness, excessive altruism for one of self-abnegation. After setting out this theory, Hurka suggests that it should be modified to recognize a subtle asymmetry in the common-sense view of selfishness and self-abnegation, according to which self-abnegation is not always a failing. He also discusses ways in which the theory might be revised to accommodate some other common-sense moral views, such as the belief that parents should care more about the good of their children than they do about the good of strangers.

Reconciling self-interest and regard for others is a central concern of moral theory, one that requires a proper understanding of the nature of self-interest and the relationship between rationality and morality. The twelve essays in this collection offer valuable contributions to ongoing discussions of these issues.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors wish to acknowledge several individuals at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, who provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of this volume. They include Mary Dilsaver, Terrie Weaver, and Pamela Phillips.

The editors would like to extend special thanks to Executive Manager Kory Swanson, for offering invaluable administrative support; to Publication Specialist Tamara Sharp, for attending to innumerable day-to-day details of the book's preparation; and to Managing Editor Harry Dolan, for providing dedicated assistance throughout the editorial and production processes.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

## CONTRIBUTORS

**Kelly Rogers** is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Florida. She has published articles on Aristotle's ethics in *Ancient Philosophy*, *Phronesis*, and the *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, and is the editor of *Self-Interest: Philosophical Perspectives from Antiquity to the Present* (forthcoming from Routledge).

**Jean Hampton** served as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Her books include *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (Cambridge University Press, 1986) and (with Jeffrie Murphy) *Forgiveness and Mercy* (Cambridge University Press, 1988). She is also the author of numerous essays in moral, political, and legal theory, especially in the areas of contractarian moral theory, history of political theory, retributive justice, and liberalism.

**Thomas E. Hill, Jr.** is Kenan Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he has taught since 1984. He previously taught for sixteen years at the University of California, Los Angeles, and more briefly at Pomona College, at Johns Hopkins University, and (on visiting appointments) at Stanford University and the University of Minnesota. He is the author of *Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory* (Cornell University Press, 1992), *Autonomy and Self-Respect* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), and a number of recent articles working toward the development of a modified Kantian moral theory.

**David Copp** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis. He taught previously at Simon Fraser University and the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of *Morality, Normativity, and Society* (Oxford University Press, 1995), a book on the foundations of ethics. He has published articles in moral and political philosophy, and coedited *The Idea of Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), *Morality, Reason, and Truth* (Rowman and Allenheld, 1985), and *Pornography and Censorship* (Prometheus Books, 1983). He is an associate editor of *Ethics* and a former executive editor of the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*.

**David Schmidtz** is Associate Professor of Philosophy and (by courtesy) Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona. He is the author of *The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument* (Westview Press, 1991) and *Rational Choice and Moral Agency* (Princeton University Press, 1995). His articles have appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy* and *Ethics*. He is currently preparing (with Robert Goodin) a book

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

#### CONTRIBUTORS

for Cambridge University Press entitled *Individual Responsibility and Social Welfare*.

**David O. Brink** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. His research interests are in ethical theory, history of ethics, political philosophy, and constitutional jurisprudence, and his essays have been published in such journals as *Ethics*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, and the *Journal of Philosophy*.

**Stephen Darwall** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, where he has taught since 1984. His work has concentrated on contemporary theorizing about the foundations of ethics and practical reason, on the history of fundamental moral philosophy, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and on the connections between these. He is the author of *Impartial Reason* (Cornell University Press, 1983), *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640–1740* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), and numerous articles in moral philosophy, moral psychology, and the history of ethics.

**Jennifer Roback Morse** is Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University. She received her Ph.D. in economics from the University of Rochester in 1980 and spent a postdoctoral year at the University of Chicago during 1979–80. She has taught at Yale University, and was John M. Olin Visiting Scholar at the Cornell Law School in the fall of 1993. Her publications have appeared in the *Journal of Political Economy*, *Economic Inquiry*, the *University of Chicago Law Review*, the *Georgetown Law Journal*, the *Journal of Economic History*, and the *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*. She is currently working on a public choice explanation for the cause of the Civil War, and on models that expand the economists' standard understanding of the person.

**Susan Wolf** is Professor of Philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. She is the author of *Freedom within Reason* (Oxford University Press, 1990), a book on free will and moral responsibility, and has written numerous articles on ethics and the philosophy of mind for such journals as *Ethics*, *Mind*, *Philosophical Topics*, and the *Journal of Philosophy*. Her current research focuses on the relations among happiness, morality, and meaningfulness in life.

**Neera K. Badhwar** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma. She is spending 1996–97 as a Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow at the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, where she will be writing a book on virtue and self-interest. Her articles on friendship, self-interest and altruism, virtue, communitarianism and liberalism, and contemporary moral theory have appeared in *Ethics*, *Noûs*,



Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-59892-7 - Self-Interest

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

#### CONTRIBUTORS

*American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Social Philosophy and Policy*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, and other journals. Her anthology *Friendship: A Philosophical Reader* was published by Cornell University Press in 1993. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in 1986, and held a Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship at Dalhousie University in 1986–87.

**Michael Slote** is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has published widely in ethics and moral psychology, and his most recent book is *From Morality to Virtue* (Oxford University Press, 1995). He is currently working on the implications of virtue ethics for political philosophy.

**Thomas Hurka** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. He is the author of *Perfectionism* (Oxford University Press, 1993) and *Principles: Short Essays on Ethics* (Harcourt Brace Canada, 1993). His principal research interest is perfectionist theories of the good and their implications for moral and political philosophy. He is currently working on a book tentatively titled *Virtue and Vice: A Perfectionist Account*.

*With deepest sadness, we dedicate this issue to the memory of Jean Hampton,  
whose untimely passing has left all of her friends greatly diminished.  
Her piercing intelligence, bemused wit, and unfailing thoughtfulness will be sorely missed.*