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BEYOND SELF AND OTHER*

BY KELLY ROGERS

Today there is a tendency to do ethics on the basis of what I should like to call the "self-other model." On this view, an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others—and not even then, unless it is motivated by altruism rather than selfishness. This radical rift between self-interest and virtue traces back at least to Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.–50 A.D.), according to whom, "lovers of self, when they have stripped and prepared for conflict with those who value virtue, keep up the boxing and wrestling until they have either forced their opponents to give in, or have completely destroyed them."[1] More recently, the distinction between those who value themselves and those who "value virtue" has been drawn sharply by Bernard Williams: "[I]n moral theory . . . it is not the Kantian leap from the particular and the affective to the rational and universal that makes all the difference; it is rather the Humean step—that is to say, the first Humean step—from the self to someone else."[2]

Proof that morality is essentially *about* benefiting others does not usually emerge alongside defense of any particular moral theory. Kantians, for instance, place the categorical imperative at the center of morality—utilitarians, the "greatest happiness" principle—and virtue ethicists, a certain conception of virtuous character. Still, Williams, and most other moral philosophers, conceive of the moral agent as one who has ventured that "first Humean step."[3] The self-other paradigm functions like a back-

* I am grateful to Mark Riebling, R. M. Hare, Frances Rogers, the other contributors to this volume, and its editors for their helpful suggestions in writing and revising this essay.

[1] Philo, *The Worse Attacks the Better*, in *Philo*, vol. 2, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1929), X.32.

[2] Bernard Williams, "Egoism and Altruism," in Williams, *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 265.

[3] For example: Thomas Nagel, a neo-Kantian, asserts: "[M]oral requirements have their source in the claims of other persons" (Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986], p. 197); Peter Singer, a utilitarian: "The ethical life is the most fundamental alternative to the conventional pursuit of self-interest" (Singer, *How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest* [Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1995], p. ix); and Lawrence Blum, a virtue ethicist: "Basically, what makes the altruistic emotion morally good is that its object is the weal of another person. Why it is of moral value to have sympathy, compassion, or concern for someone is that one is thereby concerned for the good—the weal and woe—of another person" (Blum, *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality* [Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980], p. 163). Classical virtue ethicists, such as Plato and Aristotle, of course, rest ethical theory on the ideal of personal flourishing (*eudaimonia*), but for many modern commentators that is precisely what undermines the Greeks' claim to be doing *moral* theory. Some interpretors have tried to show that certain Greek ethical theories do by and large

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ground theory, a riverbed of belief which *constrains what we can count as a moral theory at all*. I take this to be the central reason why egoism is generally considered so unacceptable. It is not so much that egoism is demonstrably false or incoherent—indeed, it is regarded by many as consummately rational—but rather that it contradicts one of our most deeply held dogmas about morality.

Though aspects of the thesis that morality is "other-based" have been questioned by some, in what follows I attempt to develop a thorough-going critique of this idea, and, drawing upon Aristotelian and American Pragmatist sources, to make suggestions toward an alternative model for morality.[4]

I. Robinson Crusoe: Beyond Good and Evil?

"For a single man on a desert island, moral reasoning would be unnecessary and pointless, except on the assumption that he is in interaction with persons beyond his island, whether men or gods."[5] So writes Kurt Baier, inviting us to imagine the moral vacuum in which a totally isolated individual would ostensibly exist. A Robinson Crusoe figure, to be sure, would have many prudential concerns: studying his island's flora and fauna, navigating its streams, finding food, building a sturdy shelter; perhaps, after tending to life's necessities, he could develop hobbies and activities, and actually enjoy his new existence. But since nothing Crusoe does affects others, morality on the self-other paradigm is silent concerning him. If one accepts this paradigm, it would seem to follow that all Crusoe's activities—at least, until Friday arrives—must be "beyond good and evil."

Can this be right?

Let us imagine that Crusoe, rather than striving to improve his life, sits down in a cave and feels sorry for himself. He gathers berries and plants

conform to the self-other paradigm—see, e.g., Terence Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), esp. sections 208–12—but I have found problems with this idea; see my "Aristotle on Loving Another for His Own Sake," *Phronesis*, vol. 39, no. 3 (1994), pp. 291–302.

[4] An early paper that raises significant criticisms is W. D. Falk's "Morality, Self, and Others," in Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian, eds., *Morality and the Language of Conduct* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), pp. 25–67. For more recent discussions, see John Cottingham, "The Ethics of Self-Concern," *Ethics*, vol. 101 (July 1991), pp. 798–817; Neera Kapur Badhwar, "Altruism versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 90–117; and Jean Hampton, "Selflessness and the Loss of Self," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 135–65. Cottingham attacks impartialism in ethics; Badhwar challenges the alleged incompatibility of altruistic and self-interested motivation; and Hampton argues that self-sacrifice is not necessarily morally praiseworthy. Michael Slote also raises important challenges to the self-other approach to morality in his *From Morality to Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[5] Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View*, abridged version (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 110–11.

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when he feels hungry, but beyond that he makes little effort to situate himself, spending his days pining for his old home and deceiving himself about the gravity of his plight. Do we still say there is no moral difference between the two Crusoes?

Perhaps it will be said that even though the former Crusoe exhibits greater virtue—he is more courageous, honest, etc.—his virtue has no specifically *moral* merit, since he exercises it merely in the service of self-interest, which he is already naturally inclined to pursue. Extending his virtue toward Friday, on the other hand, would require special effort. But this objection does not point to a difference between the self and others *qua ends*; it points merely to a motivational difference in pursuing them.

Nor is it obvious that any such motivational gap exists. There are certainly many counterexamples to it, particularly in the very natural affection that parents feel for children, and friends for friends. Does a parent really require "special effort" to concern himself with his child? If anything, parents seem inclined to put their children's good before their own.

In any case, is the pursuit of self-interest really as natural and automatic as is being claimed? The problem of weakness of the will aside, people constantly act in self-destructive ways to gratify their passions, even when they realize this is contrary to their interests. In many cases it would seem that the truly demanding thing to do is to override one's inclinations for the sake of one's best interest. Of course, not everyone succeeds in doing this.[6]

II. The Darwinist Double-Standard

In this connection, it is interesting to note the widespread assumption—apparently originated in modern times by Charles Darwin—that if we can only demonstrate the ubiquity of our affection for others and the pervasiveness of altruism in the natural kingdom, we can show that other-concern, and thus morality, is endemic to our nature. In his discussion of the "moral sense" in *The Descent of Man*, Darwin optimistically asserts that inasmuch as we can expect man's "social instincts" to continue developing, "virtue will be triumphant."[7] This idea, however—which is not uncommon among modern philosophers[8]—raises the crucial question: Do our social inclinations provide us with a natural impetus for morality or not? When the inclination is egoistic, the answer seems to be negative; but evidence that we are natural altruists is taken to show our

[6] Cf. David Schmidtz, "Reasons for Altruism," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 68.

[7] Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or, the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life* and *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (New York: Modern Library, 1948), p. 494.

[8] A recent example appears in Peter Singer, *How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest*, ch. 5.

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propensity for morality. Proponents of the self-other model thus embrace the contradictory position that self-interest cannot form a moral end because we are inclined toward it, but that another's interest *can* form a moral end, because we are inclined toward *it*.

There is a further inconsistency in the denial that a solitary Crusoe can be moral—namely, that it at once affirms and denies the self's legitimacy as a moral objective. Consider the following statement of Baier: "Doing good is doing for another person what, if he were able to follow (self-interested) reason, he would do for himself."[9] Thus, the agent's self-interest is a nonmoral end, if he pursues it himself—but also a moral end, so long as it is pursued by someone else. Against this, I have to agree with John Dewey when he states: "Consistently you must either say the self is a nonmoral principle or else that it is a moral principle."[10] If the self is a nonmoral end, then it is a nonmoral end, "wherever it is found." By the same token, if it is a moral end, then "the ego and the alter both stand exactly on the same plane."[11]

Asymmetry between self and other seems to arise on the assumption that whereas benefiting others is a lofty occupation, to the degree that we pursue our self-interest, we lead lives that are vicious, materialistic, small-minded—existing in a condition of "permanent holidaying," as Peter Singer has put it.[12] But, first, why is *this* sort of life supposed to be to our advantage? Why is a passion-driven, antisocial life considered *interested*, instead of just stupid and shallow? Further, why does this assessment of self-interest not apply to the self-interest of *others*? If this sort of existence is bad to pursue for ourselves, why is it good to pursue for someone else? Or, if *their* self-interest is not a "permanent holiday," why must *ours* be? This is really the gist of Dewey's objection, which seems to leave us with two options—either (1) to reconceive our own self-interest in a manner that does not question-beggingly build immoralism right in, or (2) to banish *all* self-interest from the moral domain, *others' included*.

In any case, it is unclear why certain goods—wealth, bodily pleasure, etc.—are assumed to be more "of the self" than others. To desire a good is to have a particular affection for it, and all affections are equally affections of the self.[13] As Henry Sidgwick notes, "all our impulses, high and low, sensual and moral alike, are so far similarly related to self, that—except when two or more impulses come into serious conflict—we tend

[9] Baier, *The Moral Point of View*, pp. 107–8.

[10] John Dewey, *Lectures on Psychological and Political Ethics, 1898*, ed. Donald F. Koch (New York: Hafner Press, 1976), p. 210.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 218–19.

[13] This observation belongs to Joseph Butler, who deftly observes that "love of our neighbor . . . has just the same respect to, is no more distant from, self-love than hatred of our neighbor, or than love or hatred of anything else"; see *Joseph Butler: Five Sermons*, ed. Stephen L. Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), p. 50.

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to identify ourselves with each as it arises."[14] There are no grounds for arbitrarily associating self-interest with material as opposed to spiritual goods, or with antisocial as opposed to social affections. Consequently, it begs the question to assume that self-interest is necessarily at odds with morality. And, indeed, as Dewey points out, "unless ideal ends were also rooted in some natural tendencies of the self, they could neither occur to the self nor appeal to the self."[15]

III. A Bankrupt Model: Self-Interest as "Preference-Satisfaction"

Unless we wish to exclude all beneficial activity from the moral arena, clearly we must reconceive the nature of self-interest, questioning the hedonic or "preference" conception that underlies the "permanent holiday" idea. On this conception, a person's interests are determined simply on the basis of his preferences at the time, no matter how absurd or destructive they might be, and a person is "rational" to the extent that he maximizes his preference-satisfaction. Thus, whatever you happen to desire—no matter how harmful it might be to yourself and those around you—*that* is your interest, and since it is "rational" to pursue your interest, it is "rational" to harm yourself and others.

Since it is *not* rational to harm oneself and others simply because one has the whim, however, there is evidently something awry here. Without denying that self-interest does include a subjective dimension, we need to recognize that it contains an equally important objective component, and that when we lose sight of this latter component, we fail to do best by ourselves.[16] Human beings have various needs which must be met in order to flourish, and which their preferences do not necessarily parallel. Thus, for example, whatever he might feel at the time, the heroin addict whose preference it is to shoot himself up with an AIDS-infected needle, is not pursuing his best interest. To claim otherwise is to blur entirely the difference between falsely believing one is doing well and *actually* doing well. Or, if self-interest is to be defined as nothing other than a (potentially delusionary) belief-state about one's condition, then we require an alternative concept to express the idea of *actually* doing well. This concept—be it self-realization, flourishing, or what have you—*may* be inimical to morality, but it cannot be assumed to be so in advance.

[14] Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1907), pp. 90-91.

[15] John Dewey and James Tufts, *Ethics* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1908), p. 364.

[16] For a fuller discussion of the objective component of self-interest, as well as a detailed consideration of its relation to the agent's subjective state, see James Griffin, *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), esp. part 1.

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IV. Moral Courage: The Case of the Disabled Veteran

Consider the case of a certain Vietnam veteran, whose contact with a grenade during the war has left him permanently confined to a wheelchair. Upon returning to the U.S., he decides to enroll in architectural school, to pursue a lifelong ambition. Each school day for four years he wheels himself out to the bus stop at 7 a.m., takes an hour-long bus ride, and then wheels himself, rain or shine, around a large, hilly campus, going from classes to labs to the library. At 7 p.m. he reboards the bus, goes home, fixes himself dinner, studies as long as he can, and goes to sleep. He eventually graduates at the top of his class and becomes a highly successful architect.

This veteran would be widely admired and praised. But why? It is not *despite* the fact that he is pursuing his best interest that we admire his courage, determination, and integrity, but precisely in virtue of the fact. His entire struggle is the product of a decision to make something of himself, instead of letting his life go to waste. Yet on the self-other model, this is precisely why we must deny his actions any moral worth.

But this is absurd. To withhold *moral* commendation on the grounds that it is "his own self" that he aims to improve is to degrade the veteran's achievement.[17] And to assume, in advance, that a person's efforts at self-realization, or flourishing, must be at variance with morality, is manifestly false.

V. Other-Regard: Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Morality

The desirability of rethinking the relationship of self-interest to morality may be further illustrated by two examples.

(1) A woman's husband has recently gone to jail for armed robbery. She visits him in prison on several occasions, and feeling pity for his unhappiness, agrees to assist him with an escape plot, thereby abetting a criminal and risking her own incarceration. The fact that the wife is "selflessly" pursuing her husband's good imbues her activity with no particular moral value.

(2) A student cheats on a final exam because he has not studied enough during the semester. The exam is not graded on a curve, so he is not causing others' grades to drop; nor is he deceiving his professor, who is "on" to him. But he *is* sabotaging his own education and his future. Now, clearly, there is something morally wrong with this student's behavior that has nothing to do with whether he is concerned with others—indeed, it would be natural to remind him that he is actually harming himself.

We require a broader conception of self-interest and morality than that assumed by the self-other paradigm to handle such cases as these. This

[17] See Hampton's "Selflessness and the Loss of Self" for further discussion of this idea.

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model arises on the assumption that morality's function is, as one philosopher has put it, to resolve "the problem of ordering our relations with *other people*."[18] Since self-interest is the root of the problem—supposedly, if we were like the self-sacrificing ants or bees, we would all live in harmony—altruism is thought to be the solution. Morality is consequently seen as an end-specific pursuit—to wit, a pursuit aimed at others' welfare—that has no application outside society. On this view, morality has no role to play in cases like that of the veteran, who strives for personal success. On the other hand, such agents as the wife are at least in the "moral ballpark," inasmuch as they are trying to further the good of someone other than themselves.

VI. An Alternative Model: The Metaphysics of Virtue

There is an alternative way to conceive of morality, though—viewing it not as a substantive pursuit itself, but as a structural program for doing the things one already does, only doing them in a certain *way*. This approach denies that morality is a specific activity set alongside all the rest of our activities—artistic, philosophical, scientific, and so forth—and distinguished by its end; rather, it is a system of principles for guiding action which is potentially applicable to *anything* we undertake.[19] On this view, morality's function is not merely to resolve self-other conflict, but to foster harmonious interaction with our *total* environment. This environment includes a social dimension, but also a great deal more, including each person's relationship to himself, his work, science, art, and the natural world.

In this wider context, the problem which morality exists to solve stems from a basic fact about human beings—viz., that we are beings who *think* conceptually or abstractly, but who must *act* in a world of particulars. This fact creates a gap between the *director* and the *circumstances* of our action. Morality assists in bridging this gap, enabling each of us to function as a coherent and integrated unit. It does this in two central ways. First, it helps synchronize our passions—which are always for particular things—with our reason—which is capable of forming a long-term or "enlightened" vision of the good life as a whole. Second, it enables us to develop principles for action, so that each time we a face a choice similar

[18] Harry Frankfurt, "The Importance of What We Care About," *Synthese*, vol. 53 (1982), p. 257.

[19] I say "potentially" in order to leave open the question of what pursuits may have moral import in a given situation; for as the case of the veteran suggests, something as mundane as getting oneself to school can be morally significant. This approach rejects any intrinsic moral/nonmoral divide, though it need not make a moral issue out of every step one takes. Whether a given item or issue will have moral significance will depend in a given circumstance on such things as whether it conflicts with any of one's other values, the sorts of choices and struggles it involves, its importance to one's well-being and/or that of others, and so forth. Unfortunately, I can do no more here than allude to these issues, which merit a separate discussion of their own.

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to one we have faced before, it is not like facing a new particular for the first time. On this account, being "moral" is a question not of choosing others over self, but of committing oneself to achieving an integrated personality and a principled way of life.

Seen this way, the moral virtues will be defined in terms of an appropriate relation to the *world*—rather than merely to other people—thus rendering virtue morally significant even for individuals acting in isolation.[20] Consider, for instance, the virtue of honesty. The problem with dishonesty on this view is that of willful misrepresentation of the facts, not that of *who* the facts are misrepresented to. Thus, to return to the case of Crusoe, he is equally dishonest, and morally blameworthy as such, if he lies to himself as if he lies to Friday. Or consider the case of courage: its function is to handle fear, and this is independent of what one's fears are *about*—say, being attacked oneself or being afraid for another's sake. If someone is in control of his fears, he is in control of his fears; their content does not alter that fact. The question of the beneficiary of one's virtue is a separate matter from whether one has and exercises that virtue.[21]

VII. Social Virtues, or Hume's "Egregious Blockhead"

So far we have considered virtues which are essentially personal, but which may be extended toward others as well. But there are certain virtues—e.g., generosity—which involve others' welfare in a far more immediate way, making essential reference to beneficiaries. Are these sorts of virtues best defined on the basis of the self-other model? I would suggest not. To be sure, part of the reason that a generous person benefits others is a concern with their welfare, but there is a good deal more to the virtue than providing benefit. In particular, as Aristotle observes, it involves a certain attitude toward a *third* object, namely, one's wealth.[22] One who cares about others and *wishes* he could give to them, but who compulsively hoards his money, is not generous. Likewise, the person who

[20] This approach is broadly Humean in refusing to recognize any fundamental difference between the personal and social virtues qua virtues, concurring with Hume that "[i]t is probable that the approbation attending the observance of both is of a similar nature and arises from similar principles . . ." (Hume, *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. Charles W. Hendel [New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1957], p. 139).

[21] What happens, though, when we turn our attention from the benefits of virtue to the costs of vice? Crusoe may be praised equally for all his displays of honesty, regardless of their beneficiary, but does he not commit a more serious moral offense when he lies to Friday than when he merely deceives himself? (I am grateful to David Schmidtz for raising this objection.) Surely the two cases are not equivalent, but their inequivalence does not, I think, lie in any difference between them qua instances of dishonesty. Rather, forcing another to pay the price of one's own misdeeds involves the additional vice of *negligence* or indifference toward the consequences of one's actions. Negligence may occur in self-confined cases as well—Crusoe may ignore the fact that self-deception tends to result in various psychological maladies—but we tend to think of him as being free to inflict these evils upon himself in ways he is not free to inflict them upon others.

[22] See Aristotle's entire discussion of generosity in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book IV, ch. 1. Its lack of an other-regarding focus is quite striking, as I discuss in "Aristotle on Beneficence" (unpublished manuscript).

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cares nothing for his wealth and indiscriminately gives it all away is not necessarily so either. Generosity is not simply helping others by shuffling one's goods toward them, but knowing how and when to give and how and when *not* to. As Aristotle suggests, the idea is to strike a correct balance in one's giving, and this includes paying attention to how well-off one is leaving oneself. Finally, we do not want to call such agents as the wife who assists with her husband's jailbreak "generous," even though this is an instance of selfless giving to another. The self-other model makes it seem as if the virtue of generosity is essentially about attaining others' good—whereas in fact it seems to be more about the general attitude one takes toward one's possessions vis-à-vis the good of both others *and* oneself, as well the wider environment in which one acts. One who possesses this disposition will most likely do the best job of securing the good for both his fellows and himself, but that is something of a different point.

In general, the approach to morality sketched here differs from the self-other model in that it refuses to allow a narrow conception of social excellence to supplant a general one of *human* excellence. It proposes grounding morality and virtue on what we may call the axiom of *life*, not that of society—recognizing that one could have one's social relationships in order and still have much moral work left to do. Thus, as Hume points out in the *Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, whereas we certainly heap moral praise upon the possessor of social virtue, "[i]t is at the same time certain that any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, economy, industry, understanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured, honest man of this honorable appellation. Who did ever say, except by way of irony, that such a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead?"[23]

VIII. The Myth of "Pure" Motivation

If the self-other paradigm emphasizes the importance of making others' good one's moral *object*, it equally stresses the importance of making their good one's *motive*.[24] What is it to be motivated by others' interests? Typically, altruistic motivation is thought to involve either a particular sort of sentiment—such as sympathy or love[25]—or a certain rational at-

[23] Hume, *Inquiry*, p. 130. This passage—which is one of many passages exemplifying Hume's belief that virtue "consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, *useful* or *agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others*" (*ibid.*, p. 89; cf. note 20 above)—makes it difficult to see why Williams would regard Hume as a proponent of the self-other model (see the text accompanying note 2 above). Hume places great value on benevolence, but clearly he does not regard morality as exclusively other-regarding.

[24] As Bernard Williams has stated: "[T]he *point* of selecting certain motives for *moral* approbation: we are concerned to have people who have a general tendency to be prepared to put other people's interests before their own" (Williams, *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* [New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972], p. 74).

[25] Though sympathy and love doubtless enhance our sensitivity to others' plights, I must concur with Bernard Mandeville when he says of the related sentiment, pity, that, "as it is

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titude: a recognition that one's reasons for caring about one's own good give one reasons for caring about others' good, too. It is not my purpose to deny the importance of either of these sorts of motivations in fostering proper other-regard. My question is rather: Why is such motivation alone to be regarded as "moral"?

Clearly it has much to do with the fact that morality's purpose according to the self-other model is the protection and fostering of others' good. Nonetheless, we can benefit ourselves while we benefit others, and, in light of this, the lengths to which philosophers have gone to exclude self-interest from moral motivation seem quite extreme. Francis Hutcheson took the idea so far that he came up with a calculus for subtracting self-interest from one's motivation to determine exactly how moral, i.e., altruistic, it was.[26]

But why is concern with self-interest considered so inimical to moral concern for others? Why the stress on motivational "purity"?

Purity seems required for two reasons. The first is that it is demanded by the "permanent holiday" conception of self-interest. If the pursuit of self-interest breeds an indulgent, materialistic, antisocial lifestyle, there is indeed cause to doubt its compatibility with moral motivation. Yet, as I have suggested, such a conception of self-interest is faulty. There is a second reason for doubting the compatibility of self-interest and morality, however, that would obtain even on a richer conception of self-interest. This is the perception that benefiting others from a motive of self-interest entails valuing them *instrumentally*, as mere fodder for our own pursuits. This is a legitimate concern, but is it a corollary of self-interested motivation?

There are different ways of benefiting others self-interestedly, after all. One can, to be sure, manipulate and defraud another person, making it seem as though one has his best interests at heart, when in fact he is being coldly used for some ulterior purpose of one's own. But one can also benefit another self-interestedly in a way that does not reduce him to a mere tool, but rather respects his purposes and autonomy. Consider, for instance, a small-town grocer who takes great pride in stocking his shelves with fresh, colorful produce, and who regards the upkeep of his shop as his greatest personal interest. He does not run his grocery store in order to further others' good, but he does deal with his customers fairly, honestly, and respectfully. What is the difference between these two cases? Why do we feel contempt for the first agent, but respect for and gratitude toward the latter?

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an Impulse of Nature, that consults neither the publick Interest nor our own Reason, it may produce Evil as well as Good" (Mandeville, *An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, in *The Fable of the Bees, Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, ed. F. B. Kaye [Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988], p. 56). For a person who cannot properly regulate his passions, it is strictly a matter of chance whether his sympathy and love will lead to virtuous action or the reverse; so-called "altruistic" sentiments are not privileged in this respect.

[26] Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good*, 4th ed. (1738), in *British Moralists 1650–1800*, ed. D. D. Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1991), p. 273.

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