

## Trust within reason

Some philosophers hold that trust grows fragile when people become too rational. They advocate a retreat from reason and a return to local, traditional values. Others hold that truly rational people are both trusting and trustworthy. Everything hinges on what we mean by 'reason' and 'rational'. If these are understood in an egocentric, instrumental fashion, then they are indeed incompatible with trust. With the help of game theory, Martin Hollis argues against that narrow definition and in favour of a richer, deeper notion of reason founded on reciprocity and the pursuit of the common good. Within that framework he reconstructs the Enlightenment idea of citizens of the world, rationally encountering, and at the same time finding their identity in, their multiple commitments to communities both local and universal.





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CONTENTS

# Preface vii

- The paradox of trust 1
  Truth, virtue and happiness 5
  The problem of trust 9
  The Enlightenment Trail 13
  Promises, promises: nature's
  paradoxical task 18
- 2 The perils of prudence 26 Plan of the book 26 Fear 29 Sympathy 37
- 3 The centipede's sting 44
  Three views about moral
  psychology 47
  Centipedes and backward
  induction 54
  Conclusion: prudence in peril 60
- 4 Aremedy in the judgement and understanding? 63
  Perils of strategic choice 66
  Impartiality and fairness 71

- 5 Fairness and morality 82 Playing fair with Kant 84 Contractarians 91 Morality in trust 98
- 6 Allinthe game 105
  Prelude: Enlightenment
  football 106
  The games of social life 110
  Reason and obligation 117
- 7 The bond of society 126
  Problems of coordination 128
  Trust in miniature: teamwork 137
- 8 Trust in the light of reason 143
  Reciprocity 144
  'A remarkable change in man' 150
  The moral and political sciences 154
  Citizens of the world? 159
  Bibliography 164
  Index 169



PREFACE

Trust within reason is based on the inaugural series of A. C. Reid Lectures in Philosophy at Wake Forest University and I take pleasure in giving thanks to all who made the occasion possible. For almost half a century Dr Reid so inspired his students at Wake Forest that it was decided to mark his death with a fitting memorial. The A. C. Reid Philosophy Endowment Fund, whose subscribers include many of those students, exists to promote a philosophical spirit in a troubled world and the A. C. Reid Lectures are part of its endeavours. I am glad to be associated with so noble an undertaking and honoured to have been invited to inaugurate the series. It was a very genial occasion too, widely attended and leading to fertile exchanges with members of several departments. That is due to the Wake Forest Philosophy Department and I thank the philosophers for the energy and kindness which went into the accompanying arrangements. Ralph Kennedy and Win-Chiat Lee, in particular, who undertook the practical work, were tireless in their determination to make the lectures a success and their visitor abundantly welcome.

The final text also owes much to a period in Munich as the guest of the Philosophy Department and especially to the comments of my

vii



viii Preface

amiable host, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. That provided a welcome chance to extend and improve the text, helped by wide-ranging seminars with graduates and faculty. Raimo and Maj Tuomela, who were visiting the University, kindly shared their work on joint action and gave me the benefit of their comments.

I am also grateful, as always, to my colleagues at the University of East Anglia, particularly to Timothy O'Hagan, who has been an invaluable critic for very many years and improved the text on this occasion too, to Roberta Sassatelli, who was acute in her comments, and to Robert Sugden, my sterling compass through the thickets of the theory of games. Jerry Goodenough has kindly prepared the bibliography and index.

Finally, very special thanks are due to Rüdiger Bittner, who was researching at East Anglia while I was writing the original lectures and, with unstinted generosity, has subjected more than one draft to a precise and stimulating scrutiny. I have gained hugely from his unflagging queries and suggestions, to say nothing of the pleasures of philosophy in his company. The final text does not rise to the standards which he sets but has improved vastly in the attempt.