

Index

- abstract concepts, difficulty defining, 95
- activation, 57
 - experimentation's role in understanding of, 59
 - focus on norm required for, 58
 - network structure, organization of concepts in, 72, 73
 - schemata and scripts activated by categorization, 81
 - situation and context, specificity to, 80
 - spreading activation process, 70–76, 83
- Alexander, Jason, 221, 231
- Allison, S. T., 173
- altruism, 16–20, 105, 106, 189
- ambiguous situations leading to conflicting interpretations of applicable norms, 78
- Andersen, Hans Christian, 185, 196
- anti-social and pro-social behavior. *See also* unpopular norms
 - descriptive *vs.* social norms used to control, 64–68, 70
 - evolution of norms controlling, 214
 - external interventions affecting, 195
 - group communication creating negative norms, 177
 - manipulation of norms to control, 7
 - “preaching to the converted,” problem of, 75
 - transgressions of social norms, effect of, 72
 - zero tolerance policies, effectiveness of, 67, 73
- AR (Authority Ranking), 92
- Ash, C., 193
- asymmetric information and payoffs, Ultimatum games with, 118–121
- attention to cues leading to categorization, 85–88
- attribution error, 189
- Authority Ranking (AR), 92
- awareness and choice, 47
- Axelrod, R., 217
- Bayesian games
 - awareness and choice in following social norms, 48
 - fairness norms and Ultimatum games, 121
 - prisoner's dilemma games transformed into coordination games by cooperative norms, 27, 28

- Bayesian games (*cont.*)
- scripts, social norms embedded in, 94
 - unpopular norm formation and collapse, 181
- behavior. *See also* anti-social and pro-social behavior; deliberational route to behavior; heuristic or problem-solving route to behavior
- herding behavior and emergence of fairness norms, 216
 - psychological *vs.* behavioral account of emergence of social norms, 8–10
 - social norms as regulating behavior conditional on other people's behaviors, 219
 - social norms not simply identifiable with patterns of, 8–10
- beliefs and desires. *See* expectations and preferences
- beneficial *vs.* negative norms. *See* anti-social and pro-social behavior; unpopular norms
- benevolence, 16–20, 106
- Bettenhausen, K., 176
- bias and stereotyping
- group identity leading to, 134–135, 153–157, 190
 - meaningless categorization and intergroup discrimination, 134–135, 154, 155
 - role-schemata, 93
 - schemata and scripts linked to, 81, 155
 - self-stereotyping, 160
 - social categories leading to, 89, 90
 - unpopular norms, formation and survival of, 179, 184
- Blount, S., 125
- Bouas, K. S., 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 175
- Brewer, M. B., 158, 161, 166
- categories
- natural kinds, 89, 91, 96
- categorization, 83–85
- attention to cues leading to, 85–88
 - comparison process as hallmark of, 85
 - conscious or deliberative, 93
 - cues as basis for, 57
 - defined, 83
 - exemplars, 84, 91
 - familiarity with categories, effects of, 86, 88
 - framing effects, 87
 - group identity, as basis for, 134–135, 154, 155, 156
 - heuristic route to behavior, 5
 - human artifact categories, 88, 89
 - interpretative issues regarding, 85–88
 - meaningless categorization and group identity, 134–135, 154, 155, 158, 162
 - natural kinds, (*See also* natural categories) 88–89
 - preferred levels of, 89
 - prototypes, 83, 91
 - psychological essentialism, 89, 90, 91
 - representativeness heuristic, 87
 - schemata and scripts activated by, 81
 - social dilemmas, 170, 171
 - social kinds, 89–93, 96
 - spreading activation process and, 83
 - unconscious or non-declarative nature of, 97
- Chen, X. P., 172
- Cialdini, R., 29, 62, 63–70, 71, 75, 87, 151, 162
- classroom behavior studies, 186, 191
- codified norms distinguished from social norms, 8
- cognitive processes. *See also* categorization; schemata and scripts
- awareness of or access to, 48

- experiments guided by
 - understanding of, 58
- focus on norms and attention to
 - cues grounded in, 58
- group identity derived from, 154
- laboratory experiments invoking
 - conscious choice, 62
- network structure, organization of
 - concepts in, 72, 73
- operations involved in, 81
- social dilemmas and, 170–175
- social identity as, 160
- spreading activation, 70–76
- cognitive shortcuts and heuristic route
 - to behavior, 5
- collective habits, 20–21, 31
- Collins, A. M., 71
- commitments. *See* promise-making
 - and cooperation, relationship between
- common fate inducing group identity, 164, 166
- commons dilemmas, 87, 161
- Communal Sharing (CS), 92
- communications effect
 - carry-over of effect after change of rules, 148–149
 - computer opponents providing no expectations, 168–170
 - experiments illustrating, 144–146
 - generic cooperation norms
 - discredited as explaining, 145, 147, 151
 - group identity as explanation for (*See* group identity)
 - negative norms formed via, 177
 - norm formation and, 176
 - perceived consensus as explanation for, 165, 166, 167, 175
 - pluralistic ignorance, lack of
 - communication leading to, 187
 - possible explanations for, 141, 145
 - relevance of discussion and, 164, 165, 166, 167
 - self-efficacy, 163–164
 - social norm explanation as
 - alternative to group identity theories, 148–150, 151–152, 162, 168–175
- comparison process as hallmark of
 - categorization, 85
- compliance with norms. *See* conformity to norms
- computer opponents, 125, 168–170
- conditional cooperation, 140
- conditional preferences
 - collective habits distinguished from social norms by, 20–21
- conditions for descriptive norms to exist, 31
- conditions for social norms to exist, 11, 15–16
- conformity, 191
- fairness norms, 101, 112, 128, 234
- personal/moral and social norms
 - distinguished by, 20–21
- conditional strategies supporting
 - cooperative norms, 215
- conflicts of interest, 2, 78
- conformity to norms
 - conditional preferences for, 191
 - contingency and, 1
 - deliberate evasion of norms, 9, 128
 - existence of various types of norm, relevance to, 38
 - inconsistency in, factors affecting, 43–46
 - informational cascades and, 198, 203. (*See also* informational cascades)
 - motivation for, 190–193, 203
 - pluralistic ignorance, group identity, and unpopular norms, 190–193
 - situation and context affecting, 79
- conscious behavior. *See* deliberational route to behavior
- consensus, perceived, 165, 166, 167, 175
- consequentialism, 57
- constraints on actions, social norms
 - viewed as, 130

- constructivist theory of norms, 2
 context. *See* situation and context
 affecting observance of social norms
 contingency
 conditions for descriptive norms to exist, 31
 conditions for social norms to exist, 11, 12
 conformity to social norms and, 1
 dispositional account of beliefs and desires, 6
 conventions
 conditions for existence of, 38
 conformity necessary to existence of, 38
 coordination games, as equilibria of, 2, 35–38
 defining, 2, 34
 descriptive norms evolving into, 29, 34, 39
 game theory, 2, 35–38, 39–40
 social norms, relationship to, 38–42
 Stag-hunt game, 39–40
 cooperation in social dilemmas. *See* communications effect; group identity; promise-making and cooperation, relationship between; social dilemmas
 cooperative norms
 generic cooperative norms, denial of, 145, 147
 multiple conditional strategies supporting, 215
 prisoner's dilemma games transformed into coordination games by, 16–20
 coordination games
 conventions as equilibria of, 2, 35–38
 cooperative social norms transforming prisoner's dilemma games into, 25–28, 38
 defined, 26
 descriptive norms as solutions to, 2, 32–34
 CS (Communal Sharing), 92
 cues, 56
 attention to, 85–88
 Cialdini's littering experiment, 63–70
 experimentation's role in understanding of, 59
 factors affecting generosity of behavior, 129
 focus of subjects on, 58
 group identity leading to norm-abiding behavior, 146
 internal cues and self/other disparity in attribution of social motives, 188
 recognition of social norms required for effectiveness of, 70
 situation and context providing, 80
 social dilemmas, 170
 cultural differences in social norms, 7, 8
 fairness norms, 114
 game playing, cross-cultural studies in, 73
 interpretation of cues and categorization processes, 86
 self/other disparity in attribution of social motives, 188–189
 situation and context, "local" norms created by, 42
 Dana, J., 126, 137
 Darley, J. M., 45, 49, 80, 182
 Dawes, R., 146–152, 155
 default rules, 5, 6, 148, 168, 170
 deliberational route to behavior, 4
 awareness and choice in following social norms, 47
 categorization, 93
 combined with heuristic route, 5
 curbing anti-social behavior by focusing on social norms, 68
 group identity, 192
 laboratory experiments invoking, 62
 manipulation of norms in situations of conflicting interests, 78
 misconceptions regarding, 80
 rational choice theory and, 4, 5, 69

- descriptive norms
- Cialdini's littering experiments
 - involving, 63–70
 - conditions for existence of, 31–32
 - conformity not necessary to
 - existence of, 34, 38
 - conventions crystallizing from, 29, 34, 39
 - coordination games, as solutions to, 2, 32–34
 - defining, 2, 29–31, 63
 - equilibrium, viewed as, 32–34
 - game theory, 32–34
 - group identity and social dilemmas, 161, 167, 172
 - informational cascades, 203
 - manipulation of behavior using,
 - problems with, 64–68
 - motivation to follow, 29
 - self-interest always dictating, 29, 34
 - social norms distinguished from, 63, 64
 - social norms evolving from, 214
 - threshold effects, susceptibility to, 66
- desires and beliefs. *See* expectations and preferences
- Deutsch, M., 64
- deviation from social norms. *See* transgressions of social norms
- Dictator games
- confusion as to norm for, 126, 137–139
 - cultural differences, 115
 - fairness norms, 102, 106, 115, 125, 137–139
 - interpretation of cues and categorization processes, 86
 - laboratory *vs.* field experiments, 61, 62
 - norm-based explanation of, 115
 - uncertainty variations, 125
- discrimination. *See* bias and stereotyping
- discussion increasing cooperation. *See* communications effect
- dispositional account of beliefs and desires, 6
- drinking norms among university students, 186, 190, 204, 214
- economics-based studies involving norms, 19, 56, 57, 219
- Elias, Norbert, 40
- Elster, J., 24, 75
- EM (Equality Matching), 92
- emergence of fairness norms, 214–217
- belief in existence of norm, process of reaching, 223–226
 - conditional preferences and, 234
 - expectations and preferences leading to, 216
 - herding behavior, 216, 234
 - model for, 221–227
 - psychological processes behind, 216–217, 221, 231
 - sensitivity to norm, 222
 - strategy sets, 219, 220, 222, 223, 228–234
 - Ultimatum games, 215, 216, 217–221
 - updating beliefs and strategies, 228–234
 - utility functions, 216, 218, 219, 220
 - willingness to conform to norm, 222
- emergence of social norms,
 - psychological *vs.* behavioral account of, 216–217
- emergencies, helping behavior in. *See* helping behavior studies
- emotions
- generated by norm transgressions, 92, 96
 - mediators of norm observance, 24, 75
- The Emperor's New Suit* (Hans Christian Andersen), 185, 196
- empirical expectations
- combination of normative and empirical expectations, 13–15
 - conditions for descriptive norms to exist, 30, 32

- empirical expectations (*cont.*)
 conditions for social norms to exist,
 11, 13–15, 95
 conventions, as condition for
 existence of, 38
 Enzle, M. E., 72
 epistemic *vs.* practical rationality, 51
 Equality Matching (EM), 92
 equilibria. *See also* Nash equilibria
 conventions as equilibria of
 coordination games, 2, 35–38
 descriptive norms viewed as
 equilibria, 32–34
 fairness norms, 111
 social norms viewed as equilibrium,
 22
 unpopular norms, 178, 195
 equity *vs.* equality
 categorization, schemata, and
 scripts, 81, 82
 fairness norms, 101, 114, 124, 125,
 133, 136
 etiquette and manners as norms, 40,
 42, 43
 evasion of norms, 9, 128
 evolution of social norms, social
 dilemma situations as source of,
 234. *See also* emergence of
 fairness norms
 exceptions to social norms, 44
 exemplars and categorization, 84,
 91
 exit, pluralistic ignorance, and
 unpopular norms, 194
 expectations and preferences (beliefs
 and desires). *See also* conditional
 preferences; empirical
 expectations; normative
 expectations
 assessment independent of
 observed behavior, importance
 of, 55
 awareness and choice,
 building blocks of multiple social
 constructs, 2
 computer opponents providing no
 expectations, 125, 168–170
 conditional cooperation in social
 dilemmas, 140
 constructivist explanation of norms
 in terms of, 2
 context-dependent nature of,
 55–59
 defining social norms in terms of,
 9–10
 deliberational view of behavior and,
 6
 descriptive norms, 30, 32
 dispositional account of, 6
 fairness norms and Dictator games
 with uncertainty, 125
 fairness norms distinguished from
 fairness preferences, 101–102
 fairness norms, emergence of,
 216
 fairness norms, reciprocity, and
 Ultimatum games, 112
 formation of, 176, 178
 heuristic view of behavior and, 6
 lack of knowledge about existence
 or nature of, 177, 178
 motivation to follow social norms
 based on, 22
 personal dispositions, expectations
 of others based on, 141
 pluralistic ignorance arising from
 misrepresentation of, 187,
 188–190
 rational reconstruction of social
 norms using, 3, 10
 reciprocity, expectation of, 15, 135,
 136
 scripts, expectations as part of, 135
 social comparison leading to
 misrepresentation of, 179, 180,
 182–186
 stability of preferences, assumptions
 regarding, 101
 experiments. *See also* specific
 experimental topics, e.g. helping
 behavior studies
 auxiliary hypotheses as basis for, 71
 definition of social norms affecting
 design of, 57

- importance of, 58, 59–63, 76
 “local” nature of norms and
 interpretation of results, 77
 social dilemmas, 141, 142–146,
 174
- fads, origins of, 204
- fairness norms, 100–102. *See also*
 emergence of fairness norms;
 expectations and preferences
 (beliefs and desires); inequality
 aversion (Fehr-Schmidt) model
 and fairness norms; Ultimatum
 games and fairness norms
 categorization and intergroup
 discrimination, 134–135
 conditional preferences, 101, 112,
 128, 234
 constraints model *vs.* norms-based
 model, 130
 cultural differences, 114
 Dictator games, 102, 106, 115, 125,
 137–139
 disagreement about, 100
 equilibria, 111
 equity *vs.* equality, 101, 114, 124,
 125, 133, 136
 group favoritism and, 130–136
 “local” nature of, 76, 77, 78, 83
 norm-based *vs.* rule-based
 predictive model, 112–117
 preference for fairness
 distinguished, 101–102
 psychological essentialism and,
 92
 reciprocity model, 110–112, 120
 schemata and scripts, 100, 114
 self-serving biases and, 101, 123,
 130–136
 situation and context affecting
 observance of, 101, 109, 112–117
 social preferences, 107–110
 uncertainty, Dictator games with,
 125
- Falk, A., 121
- familiarity with categories, effects of,
 86, 88
- fear of punishment as motivation to
 follow social norms, 23, 42
- Fehr, E., 107, 109, 110, 117, 119, 121,
 122, 124, 127
- field *vs.* laboratory experiments,
 59–63
- Fiske, S. T., 92
- focusing on norms
 activation, required for, 58
 awareness and choice in following
 social norms, 46–51
 complexity of process, 79
 curbing anti-social behavior via, 67,
 68, 69, 70
 experiments, importance of, 58
 factors affecting generosity of
 behavior, 129
 mechanisms leading to, 76
 spreading activation process, 75
- footbinding, 41
- formal norms distinguished from
 social norms, 8
- formation of norms, 176. *See also*
 emergence of fairness norms
- framing effects, 6, 87, 123–125
- fundamental attribution error, 80
- game theory. *See also* specific types of
 game, e.g., Ultimatum game
 awareness and choice in following
 social norms, 46, 47
 conventions, 2, 35–38, 39–40
 cross-cultural studies, 73
 descriptive norms, 32–34
 fairness norms leading to deviations
 in Ultimatum games, 103
 psychological game theory and
 Rabin’s reciprocity model, 110
 social norms, 25–28
- gangs and gang behavior
 benefits of gang violence norms,
 192
 conformity and group identity,
 191
 formation and survival of
 unpopular norms, 179, 180
 social comparison, 180, 183

- gender stereotyping among young children, 184, 190
- general utility function based on norms, 52–54, 105, 115
- generic norms
communications effect not explained by, 145, 147, 151
minimal group paradigm, 154, 174
social norms not to be regarded as generic imperatives, 79
- Genovese, Kitty, 183
- Gerard, H. B., 64
- Giuliani, Rudolph, 67, 73
- Goodman, N., 85
- group discussion increasing cooperation. *See* communications effect
- group identity, 146–152. *See also* minimal group paradigm
bias and stereotyping growing out of, 134–135, 153–157, 190
categorization as basis for, 134–135, 154, 155, 156
cognitive effect, deriving from, 154
common fate inducing, 164, 166
computer opponents providing no expectations, 168–170
conformity, reasons for, 190–193
creating group identity, 157–162
deliberative nature of, 192
descriptive norms and, 161, 167, 172
exit or rejection, 194
experimental groups, problems posed by, 174
experiments illustrating, 144–146
fairness norms, 130–136
formation of norms and, 176
holistic perspective on, 146
in-groups *vs.* out-groups, 143, 146, 147, 148–149, 150, 153–157, 161, 171, 174
leadership effects, 153, 172
“me” *vs.* “us” situations, 146, 162
norm-abiding behavior triggered by, 146
- perceived consensus, 165, 166, 167, 175
- possible explanations for effects of, 145
- promise-making and cooperation, relationship between, 150–152, 156, 157
- reductionist perspective on, 145
- relevance of discussion and, 164, 165, 166, 167
- schemata and scripts, 155, 156, 174, 175
- self-efficacy, 163–164
- social identity theory and self-stereotyping, 159–161, 162, 173, 192
- social norm explanation as alternative to, 148–150, 151–152, 162, 168–175
- stimulating group behavior, 157–162
- unpopular/anti-social norms and, 183, 190–193
- well-established *vs.* newly-formed groups, cooperativeness of, 156
- group norms, 173, 174, 176
- Guth, W., 112, 215
- Harvey, M. D., 72
- helping behavior studies, 45, 49
conformity and group identity, 191
indirectly observed emergencies, 183
pluralistic ignorance demonstrated by, 186
situation and context, role of, 80
social comparison, wrong inferences drawn from, 182
social norm transgressions, effects of, 72
- herding behavior, 216, 234
- heuristic or problem-solving route to behavior, 4
awareness and choice in following social norms, 47
combined with deliberative route, 5

- curbing anti-social behavior by
 focusing on social norms, 68
 dispositional account of beliefs and
 desires, 6
 laboratory experiments invoking
 conscious choice, 62
 representativeness, 87
 situation and context affecting, 80
 Hinkle, S. L., 164, 166
 Hirschman, A. O., 194
 Hobbes, T., 20, 175
 Hoffman, E. K. A., 123
 Hogg, M. A., 173
 holistic perspective on group identity,
 146
 human artifact categories, 88, 89
 Hume, D., 21
 hypocritical enforcement of
 unpopular norms, 191, 193, 194

 Ik people, 9, 128, 195
 imitation and informational cascades,
 204
 inequality aversion (Fehr-Schmidt)
 model and fairness norms, 100
 alternative offer variation on
 Ultimatum game, 122
 asymmetric information and payoffs
 variation on Ultimatum game,
 119
 framing effects, Ultimatum game
 variation with, 124
 norm-based model compared, 117
 uncertainty, Dictator game with, 127
 informational cascades, 196–197
 assumptions behind, 197–199
 distribution of trendsetters' tastes
 affecting, 201–205
 model, 200, 208–209
 negative cascades, 202
 partial cascades, 201, 207
 positive cascades, 202
 results of applying model, 200–201
 reversal of, 197, 205–208
 trendsetters, 196, 198, 201–205
 informational *vs.* normative
 influences as motives, 63

 injunctive norms, 63
 intention. *See also* entries at motivation
 fairness norms, reciprocity, and
 Ultimatum games, 112
 importance of, 57
 interpretative issues
 categorization, 85–88
 more than one norm applicable,
 Isaac, R., 149

 Jensen, T. D., 172
 Jewishness as social category, 90, 158,
 173
 Jin, N., 135
 Johnson-Laird, P., 95

 Kagel, J. H., 118
 Kauffman, K., 184
 Kaufman-Gilliland, C., 163
 Kerr, N. L., 163, 173
 Kiesler, S., 168
 Kim, C., 118
 Kitcher, P., 217
 Komorita, S. S., 164, 165, 166, 167,
 168, 175
 Kramer, R. M., 161, 166
 Kuang, J. X., 126
 Kuran, Timur, 192

 laboratory *vs.* field experiments,
 59–63
 Latane, B., 45, 49, 80, 182
 leadership, group identity, and social
 dilemmas, 153, 172
 legal norms distinguished from social
 norms, 8
 legitimacy of normative expectations,
 acceptance of, 21, 25, 95
 Lewis, D., 35, 36, 37
 littering, Cialdini's experiments with,
 63–70, 75, 76, 87, 151
 “local” norms created by situation and
 context, 42, 83, 113
 Loftus, E. F., 71
 Lombard League, 192
 loyalty, pluralistic ignorance, and
 unpopular norms, 194

- Macauley, J. A., 77
- Mackie, Gerry, 144
- manners and etiquette as norms, 40, 42, 43
- Market Pricing (MP), 92
- Matza, D., 184
- memory search, spreading activation as reference to process of, 71
- Messick, D. M., 131, 133
- Miller, D., 184, 186
- minimal group paradigm
 - bias and stereotyping, 134–135, 154, 155
 - conformity, 193
 - creating group identity and stimulating group behavior, 158, 162
 - fairness norms, 134–135
 - generic norms, 154, 174
 - scripts and schemata activated by, 171
- misrepresentation of others'
 - expectations and preferences
 - pluralistic ignorance arising from, 187, 188–190
 - social comparison, 179, 180, 182–186
- mixed-motive games, 3, 38
- moral constraints model, 130
- moral norms, 8, 20–21
- motivation of others,
 - misinterpretation of, 182–186
 - pluralistic ignorance, 188–190
 - social comparison, 179, 180, 182–186
- motivation to follow descriptive norms, 29
- motivation to follow social norms, 42
 - acceptance of others' normative expectations as well-founded, 23–25
 - awareness and choice, 46–51
 - Cialdini's littering experiments revealing, 63
 - conformity, 190–193, 203
 - desire to please others as, 23
 - distinguished from other motives, 16–20
 - emotions, role of, 24, 75
 - expectations and preferences as, 22
 - fear of punishment as, 23, 42
 - guilt at violation of norm as, 24
 - inconsistent conformity, factors affecting, 43–46
 - informational *vs.* normative influences, 63
 - internal *vs.* external incentives, 3–7
 - situational factors affecting, 45
 - values attached to given norm, 42
- MP (Market Pricing), 92
- Murnighan, K., 176
- Nash equilibria
 - conventions as equilibria of coordination games, 35, 38
 - defined, 25
 - descriptive norm as equilibrium strategy of coordination game, 33
 - prisoner's dilemma games transformed into coordination games by cooperative social norms, 25, 26
 - strict, 26
- natural categories, 88–89, 91, 96
- naturalistic fallacy, 43, 96
- negative informational cascades, 202
- negative norms. *See* anti-social and pro-social behavior; unpopular norms
- network structure, organization of concepts in, 72, 73, 74
- neural networks models, 72
- Nisbett, R., 49
- non-declarative knowledge. *See* unconscious or non-declarative knowledge
- normative expectations
 - acceptance of others' normative expectations as well-founded, 23–25
 - combination of normative and empirical expectations, 13–15

- conditions for social norm to exist, 11, 15
- descriptive norms not necessarily involving, 30
- legitimacy, acceptance of, 21, 25, 95
- ought as statement of obligation rather than prudential ought, 13–15
- projectibility, acceptance of, 95
- sanctions, 11, 23, 42
- norms. *See also* specific type, e.g.
- personal norms
 - constructivist theory of, 2
 - defined, 2
 - formation of, 176
 - general utility function based on, 52–54
 - injunctive, 63
 - sociological theories of, 2
- Orbell, J., 146–152, 155
- ostracism, fear of, 204
- Packard, J. S., 184
- partial informational cascades, 201
- payoffs and asymmetric information, Ultimatum games with, 118–121
- PD games. *See* Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games
- perceived consensus, 165, 166, 167, 175
- personal norms
- anonymous observance of, 43
 - focus on social norms activating, 75
 - measuring, 75
 - motivating factor, as, 63, 64
 - promise-making and cooperation, relationship between, 151
 - social norms distinguished from, 20–21, 151
- personal *vs.* social identity, 159
- PI. *See* pluralistic ignorance
- Pillutla, M., 172
- pledges. *See* promise-making and cooperation, relationship between
- pluralistic ignorance, 186–188. *See also* informational cascades
- consequences of, 193–196
 - defined, 15
 - group identity and conformity, 190–193
 - lack of communication leading to, 187
 - misrepresentation of others' expectations and preferences, 187, 188–190
 - normative expectations and social norms, 15
 - resolving conflicts raised by, 193–196
 - self/other disparity in perceived power of social motives, 188–190
 - social comparison, wrong inferences drawn from, 184, 186
 - transgressors' true preferences, beliefs about, 205
- positive informational cascades, 202
- practical *vs.* epistemic rationality, 51
- “preaching to the converted,”
- problem of, 75
- Prentice, D. A., 184, 186
- prescriptive *vs.* proscriptive social norms, 8
- priming. *See also* cues
- complexity of, 79
 - defined, 71
 - “preaching to the converted,” problem of, 75
 - semantic relatedness, proportional to, 72
 - unconscious nature of, 71
- prison guard attitudes and unpopular norms, 180, 183
- Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games
- computer opponents providing no expectations, 168
 - cooperative social norms transforming into coordination games, 16–20, 38
 - general utility function based on norms, 52–54

- Prisoner's Dilemma (*cont.*)
 mixed-motive games, as example of, 3
 motivation to follow social norms distinguished from other motives, 16–20
 social dilemma experiments typically using, 142
 unpopular norms, formation and continuity of, 181
 pro-social behavior. *See* anti-social and pro-social behavior
 process-oriented *vs.* consequentialist modes of appraising outcomes, 57
 projectibility of normative expectations, acceptance of, 95
 promise-making and cooperation, relationship between, 162–168
 cognitive processes, 172, 175
 group identity, 150–152, 156, 157
 prototypes and categorization, 83, 91
 psychological essentialism
 natural categories, 89
 social categories, 90, 91
 psychological processes behind emergence of fairness norm, 216–217, 221, 231
 public goods dilemmas, 142
 awareness and choice in following social norms, 47
 evolution of social norms and, 234
 “Give some” game used in social dilemma experiments, 143
 interpretation of cues and categorization processes, 87
 step-level problems, 142
- Rabin, M., 110–112, 120, 130
 rational reconstruction of social norms, 3, 10, 69
 rationality and rational choice theory
 awareness and choice in following social norms, 47, 50, 51, 69
 deliberative route to behavior, 4, 5, 69
- fairness norms and Ultimatum games, 103–105, 107, 218
 group identity, 193
 informational cascades, 203
 practical *vs.* epistemic rationality, 51
 social dilemma experimental results, failure to predict, 141, 142, 143, 144
 unpopular norms, formation and continuity of, 179, 181
 reasons for following norms. *See* entries at motivation
 reciprocity norms
 equilibrium, social norms viewed as, 22
 evasion of accepted norms, 9, 195
 expectations based on, 15, 135, 136
 fairness norms and Ultimatum games, 110–112, 120
 multiple conditional strategies supporting, 215
 non-generic nature of, 79
 spreading activation process and relationship to revenge norm, 74
 reductionist perspective on group identity, 145
 reference groups, 191
 referent information influence, 173
 religious norms, public *vs.* private support for, 185, 187, 191
 representativeness heuristic, 87
 resource dilemmas, 142, 143
 revenge norms, 74, 179, 180
 Robber's Cave experiment, 154
 Ross, L., 80
 Rothbart, M., 90
 rule-based models, problems with, 112
 Runciman, W. G., 78
- salience of norms. *See* activation; cues; focus on norms; priming
 scaling procedures, 74
 Schanck, R., 187
 Schelling, T., 36

- schemata and scripts, 93–98
 abstract concepts, difficulty defining, 95
 activation of, 57, 58
 bias and stereotyping linked to, 81, 155
 categorization activating, 81
 cognitive shortcuts, role played by, 5
 definition of schemata, 5, 93
 definition of scripts, 5, 93
 development of concept of, 93
 expectations as part of, 135
 fairness norms, 100, 114
 formation of norms, 176
 group identity, 155, 156, 174, 175
 informational cascades, 204
 legitimacy and projectibility of
 normative expectations, acceptance of, 95
 social dilemmas, 170, 171
 social norms embedded in, 82–83, 94
 unconscious or non-declarative nature of, 97
- Schmidt, K., 107, 109, 110, 117, 119, 122, 124, 127
- Schmittberger, R., 215
- Schroeder, D. A., 172
- Schwarze, B., 103
- scripts. *See* schemata and scripts
- self-categorization theory, 159–161
- self-efficacy, 163–164
- self-interest
 descriptive norms always dictated by, 29, 34
 expectations, problems with defining social norms in terms of, 9
 fairness norms, 101, 123, 130–136
 game theory, default utility function in, 105
 self/other disparity in attribution of social motives, 189
 social dilemmas, 141, 171
 social norms often conflicting with, 2
- self/other disparity in perceived power of social motives, 188–190
- Sentis, K., 131, 133
- sexual stereotyping among young children, 184, 190
- Sherif, M., 154
- Simmel, G., 42
- situation and context affecting observance of social norms, 55–59. *See also* activation; categorization; cues; priming; schemata and scripts
 ambiguous situations, 78
 awareness and choice, 46, 49, 50
 Cialdin's littering experiments illustrating, 63–70
 conformity to norms impacted by, 79
 deliberational route to behavior, 80
 expectations and preferences dependent on, 55–59
 experiments, importance of, 58, 59–63
 fairness norms, 101, 109, 112–117
 heuristic route to behavior, 80
 inconsistency in conformity to norms, 45
 "local" nature of norms, 42, 83
 "preaching to the converted," problem of, 75
 prediction of behavior dependent upon understanding, 76
 spreading activation process, 70–76, 83
- Skyrms, B., 217
- social categories, 89–93, 96
- social comparison, 179, 180, 182–186
- social dilemmas, 140–142. *See also* communications effect; group identity; promise-making and cooperation, relationship between; public goods dilemmas
 categorization, 170, 171
 cognitive processes behind, 170–175

- social dilemmas (*cont.*)
- conditional cooperation in, 140
 - cues, 170
 - evolution of norms from, 234
 - expectations and preferences, role of, 140
 - experiments involving, 141, 142–146, 174
 - Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games typically used to examine, 142
 - rational choice theory failing to predict experimental results, 141, 142, 143, 144
 - resource dilemmas, 142, 143
 - schemata and scripts, 170, 171
 - self-interest issues in, 141, 171
 - situational factors affecting
 - observance of social norms, 46
 - social norm explanation for cooperation in, 170–175
 - step-level public goods problems, 142
- social identity theory, 159–161, 162, 173, 192. *See also* group identity
- social norms
- anti-social or destructive, 7
 - behavioral patterns, not simply identifiable with, 8–10
 - collective habits distinguished from, 20–21
 - conditions for existence of, 11–12
 - conflicts of interest, role in resolving, 2
 - conformity not necessary to existence of, 38
 - conventions, relationship to, 38–42
 - defining, 8–11, 55, 57, 63, 219
 - descriptive norms distinguished from, 63, 64
 - equilibrium, viewed as, 22
 - evolution of, 214
 - exceptions to, 44
 - formal/legal/codified norms distinguished from, 8
 - formation of, 176
 - game theory of, 25–28, 38
 - general utility function based on, 52–54
 - human actions, power to direct, 1–7
 - inconsistency in observance of, 43–46
 - informational cascades, 203
 - moral constraints model, 130
 - moral norms distinguished from, 8, 20–21
 - personal norms distinguished from, 20–21, 151
 - pro-social behavior induced by manipulation of, 7
 - rational reconstruction of, 3, 10
 - self-interest, often conflicting with, 2
 - socially beneficial *vs.* negative norms. *See* anti-social and pro-social behavior; unpopular norms
 - sociological theory, 2, 56, 57
 - spreading activation process, 70–76, 83
- Sproull, L., 168
- Stag-hunt game, 39–40
- stereotyping. *See* bias and stereotyping strategies
- cooperative norms supported by multiple strategies, 215
 - emergence of fairness norms in Ultimatum games, 219, 220, 222, 223, 228–234
 - updating, 228–234
- students and classroom behavior studies, 186, 191
- Sugden, R., 25, 37
- supererogatory actions, 129
- symbolic value, 164
- table manners as norms, 40, 42, 43
- Tajfel, H., 90, 134–135, 154, 155, 158, 164, 171, 174, 192, 193
- Taylor, M., 90
- Thaler, R. H., 156
- threshold effects, 66, 73, 223
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 185, 187

- transgressions of social norms
 emotions generated by, 92
 informational cascades reversed by, 197, 205–208
 normative expectations with sanctions, 11, 23, 42
 spreading activation process triggered by, 72
 unpopular norms, hypocritical enforcement of, 191, 193, 194
 trendsetters, 196, 198, 201–205. *See also* informational cascades
 triggers. *See* cues
 Trust games, 3, 46
 trust norms, 76, 215
 tulipmania, 204
 Turnbull, C., 9, 195
 Turner, J. C., 158, 159, 160, 173
- Ultimatum games
 definition of social norms affecting design of, 57
 interpretation of cues and categorization processes, 74, 86, 87
 laboratory *vs.* field experiments, 61
 “local” nature of norms activated in, 78
 mixed-motive games, as example of, 3
 situational factors affecting observance of social norms, 46
 typical game structure, 103
 variations on, 117–130
- Ultimatum games and fairness norms, 102, 103–107. *See also* inequality aversion (Fehr-Schmidt) model and fairness norms
 alternative offer variation, 121–123
 asymmetric information and payoffs variation, 118–121
 computer opponents providing no expectations, 125
 emergence of fairness norms, 215, 216, 217–221
 framing effects, 123–125
 norm-based *vs.* rule-based explanation of, 112–117
 Rabin’s reciprocity model, 110–112, 120
 situation and context, effect of, 112–117
 social preferences, 107–110
 typical game structure, 103
 uncertainty, Dictator games with, 125
 variations on Ultimatum games, 117–130
- unconscious or non-declarative knowledge
 categories and scripts as, 97
 expectations and preferences, 148
 following social norms, 47
 laboratory experiments invoking conscious choice, 62
 priming, 71
 situation and context, effect of, 80
- uniformity of opinion, reinforcement of norms by, 191, 194, 195
- unpopular norms. *See also* anti-social and pro-social behavior;
 informational cascades;
 pluralistic ignorance
 collapse of, 181, 195, 196
 communications problems leading to, 177
 dynamics contributing to formation and continuation of, 176–182, 191
 equilibria, 178, 195
 examples of, 182–186
 group identity and conformity, 190–193
 hypocritical enforcement of, 191, 193, 194
 lack of knowledge about existence or nature of behavioral rules, 177, 178
 rational choice theory and, 179, 181

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Index

[More information](#)

260

Index

- unpopular norms (*cont.*)
 - social comparison, wrong inferences from, 179, 180, 182–186
- utility functions, fairness norms and
 - Ultimatum games, 105
 - asymmetric information and
 - payoffs, game variations with, 119, 120
 - emergence of fairness norms, 216, 218, 219, 220
 - equity/equality tension, 131
 - general utility function based on norms, 105, 115
 - inequality aversion model, 107–110
 - Rabin's reciprocity model, 110–112
- utility functions, general, 52–54, 105, 115
- Van Avermaet, E., 131
- van de Kragt, A., 146–152, 155
- vocal deviants, collapse of norms due to, 196
- voice, pluralistic ignorance, and unpopular norms, 194
- Walker, J., 149
- Wason, P., 95
- Waters, K., 168
- Weber, R., 126
- Wheeler, S., 184
- Willower, D. J., 184
- Wilson, T., 49
- Yamagishi, T., 77, 135, 174, 175
- zero tolerance policies, 67, 73