

Contents

Acknowledgments	page xi
Introduction	xiii
Part I The methodology of epistemology	1
1 Using moral theory in epistemology	3
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models	6
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories	15
2 Difficulties in contemporary epistemology	29
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification	29
2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom	43
3 More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations between believing and feeling	51
4 An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief	58
4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory	59
4.2 The voluntariness of belief	61
4.3 Moral and epistemic luck	70
5 Conclusion to Part I: why center epistemology on the virtues?	73
Part II A theory of virtue and vice	77
1 Types of virtue theories	78

Contents

2	The nature of a virtue	84
2.1	The many notions of virtue	84
2.2	Virtue and the good	89
2.3	Virtues distinguished from natural capacities	102
2.4	Virtues distinguished from skills	106
2.5	Virtue and habit: the transformation machine	116
2.6	Virtues, feelings, and motivations	126
2.7	General account of a virtue	134
3	Intellectual and moral virtues	137
3.1	Aristotle's distinction between intellectual and moral virtues	137
3.2	Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues	158
4	The two components of intellectual virtues	165
4.1	The motivation for knowledge and reliable success	166
4.1.1	The motivation for knowledge	168
4.1.2	The success component of the intellectual virtues	176
4.1.3	Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness	184
4.1.4	Motivation in excess	194
4.2	The value of the components of intellectual virtues	197
4.2.1	The value of intellectual virtue in a happiness-based theory	197
4.2.2	The value of intellectual virtue in a motivation-based theory	202
5	The importance of <i>phronesis</i>	211
5.1	Aristotle and Aquinas on practical wisdom	211
5.2	A proposal on the function of <i>phronesis</i>	219
6	The definition of deontic concepts	232
6.1	Right acts, justified beliefs	233
6.2	Acts of virtue	246
6.3	Beyond duty	253
7	Conclusion to Part II: the scope of the moral	255

Contents

Part III The nature of knowledge	259
1 Knowledge and the ethics of belief	260
2 Defining knowledge	264
2.1 The definition	264
2.2 High-grade and low-grade knowledge	273
3 Gettier problems	283
3.1 The problem for JTB theories	283
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory	293
4 Reliabilism	299
4.1 Objections to reliabilism	300
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliabilism	311
5 Plantinga’s theory of proper function	319
6 Harmonizing internal and external aspects of knowing	329
7 Conclusion to Part III: ethics, epistemology, and psychology	334
 Bibliography	 341
Name index	359
Subject index	362