1 *Philia*

> 'You acted very naturally,' said he. He seemed thoughtful, and after a few moments added: 'All the same, I don't think much harm would have come of accepting.'
>
> 'No *harm*, of course. But we could not be put under an obligation.'
>
> 'He is rather a peculiar man.' Again he hesitated, and then said gently: 'I think he would not take advantage of your acceptance, nor expect you to show gratitude . . . He has rooms he does not value, and he thinks you would value them. He no more thought of putting you under an obligation than he thought of being polite . . .'
>
> E. M. Forster, *A Room with a View*

People relate to each other in a variety of ways: father and daughter, consumer and producer, lovers, king and subjects, professional colleagues, fellow-employees, doctor and patient, bully and victim, just to give a few examples. All of these relationships are different from each other, and all are expressed differently. Furthermore, the differences in the kinds of relationships are both socially and culturally determined, and can even vary enormously within the same culture over relatively short periods of time.

In every society there are a number of relationships (although not all) between individuals which operate on the basis of exchange of one kind or another, and just as there are many kinds of relationship, there are also many kinds of exchange.[1] Typical Greek examples of exchange-relationships (some being different from our own) include master and slave, men and gods, lover (*erastes*) and beloved (*eromenos*), patron and client, master and pupil, buyer and seller, and so on.

[1] For the following, see Davis (1992) esp. ch. 3. Compare the work of Marshall Sahlins on pre-state tribal cultures which he sees as being dominated by reciprocity ((1968) 81–95; (1972) 185–275). Sahlins' work has had a great deal of influence on a number of recent studies of reciprocity and exchange in ancient Greece (cf. esp. Millett (1991) 110), but, while this has had an influence upon my own work, when applied to classical Greek society the broad bands of reciprocity which he describes (generalised, balanced and, negative reciprocity) raise a number of interesting questions, but are too crude to do more than that for this complex society, and there are too many difficulties to import his model of reciprocity wholesale into the classical Greek experience.

Each society also has what have been termed different 'repertoires' of exchange, that is, the collection of kinds of exchange which that society commonly uses and understands. As a corollary of this, different societies have different understandings of exchange depending upon their social, political, religious and economic condition. Consequently, different people because of their distinct situations view exchanges in various and divergent ways, and this can be as much a matter of class as of culture, although one would expect those within the same culture to have approximately similar repertoires of exchange.

And since each society has its own repertoire of exchanges, the interpretation of exchange is therefore open to ambiguity and manipulation.[2] Persians, Thracians and Macedonians, for example, did not necessarily have the same view of exchange-relationships or the same repertoire of exchanges as Greeks did.[3] The results of an exchange 'only have meaning in relation to the intentions of the exchangers, which they generally frame in terms of a named kind of exchange, between people in an identified social relationship, using appropriate commodities'.[4] Even among the Greek states themselves, there was no guarantee that the same repertoires prevailed, or that a kind of exchange which predominated in one community was equally important in another.

So what happened if the intentions of the exchangers conflicted, if the expectations and assumptions underpinning their exchange were different, if the social status of one or both of the partners was ambiguous, or if the exchange was not the same in the repertoire for each? If we are to come to an understanding of Greek society and its relations with others, we first need to come to terms with the way in which it thought about itself and how it conceived its own relationships on its own terms. To do this we need to explore the societies' own categories of relationship, and to use the categories of other societies (including our own) to highlight the differences.[5]

In classical Greece personal relationships belonged to the repertoire of exchanges encapsulated by *philia*, commonly translated as friendship (although the inadequacies of this as a translation will be discussed below), and it is with types of *philia* relationships that we shall primarily

[2] Davis (1992) 28–64. [3] Cf. Wolf (1966) 20. [4] Davis (1992) 39.

[5] Moses Finley in *The World of Odysseus* was the first to consider the role of reciprocity and economic systems of exchange for the ancient Greek world, and since then there has been an increasing interest in interpreting and understanding the economics, literature, religion and early history of the Greeks in terms of exchange and reciprocity. See, e.g., Finley (1977) esp. 64–6, 95–105; (1981a); (1981b); (1983) esp. 24–49; Hands (1968); Donlan (1981/2) 137–75; Herman (1987); Blundell (1989); Gould (1989); Millett (1991); Seaford (1994); von Reden (1995); Konstan (1996); Burkert (1996) 129–55 as well as a number of books and articles dealing with the interpretation of *philia* in fifth-century tragedy: e.g., Greenberg (1962); Scodel (1979); Konstan (1985); Goldhill (1986) 79–106; Schein (1988); Stanton (1990); Schein (1990); Goldfarb (1992); Roth (1993); Stanton (1995).

be concerned. The complication is that *philia* both was a kind of exchange itself, and also on another level characterised a number of kinds of exchange.[6] As a result, we need to look first at the general features of *philia*, before turning to three more specific kinds of relationship which could be said to share in *philia*: kinship, companionship and ritualised-friendship (*xenia*).

1.1 *Philia*

The qualities which constitute *philia* itself are difficult to define. Just as our own ideas of friendship can be quite vague (we all *know* who our friends are, but can we so readily say what friendship *is*?),[7] *philia* is a subtle and complex abstraction which cannot easily be pinned down to a set of rigid parameters. Nevertheless, in the ancient world there was a keen interest in coming to terms with what defined *philia* and the proper relations between *philoi*, and this was reflected no less in Greek tragedy than it was in the philosophical treatises of Plato and Aristotle.[8]

Aristotle has given us the most extended ancient discussion of the kinds of *philia*.[9] When he introduces the subject in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he says that *philia* is a virtue (*arete*), or at least it involved virtue, that it is similar to concord (*homonoia*) and more important than justice (in fact those who are just need *philia* as well), that it was not only necessary but also noble (*kalon*), that those who love their friends (*philophiloi*) are praised, and that some think *philoi* must also be good men (*agathoi*).[10]

Aristotle also makes it quite clear that there are three different types of friendship: *philia* based on virtue; *philia* based on pleasure; and *philia* based on utility.[11] The purest and best form of *philia* is of course the friendship based on virtue, and this is the friendship of the good.[12] Such friends wish another good for his own sake, and it is among friends of this kind that *philia* and virtue find their highest forms.[13] Aristotle admits that, although enduring, this sort of friendship is rare and requires time and intimacy (*synetheia*), and that one cannot be accepted as a friend until it

[6] See Price (1989) 131–61.
[7] For one survey of modern western notions of friendship, see Allan (1979) 34–45.
[8] E.g., Sophocles' *Ajax*, *Antigone*, and *Philoctetes*, and Euripides' *Alcestis*, *Orestes*, and *Electra*, Plato's *Lysis* and the *Symposion*, and a total of three chapters in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. For *philia* in Homer and the Homeric world, see Adkins (1963); (1972); Karavites (1986); Hooker (1987).
[9] For other attempts to define a classification for *philia* relationships (both ancient and modern): Hierocles in Stobaeus 4.671–3 (Wachsmuth and Hense); Earp (1929) 32–3; Dover (1974) 273–8; Blundell (1989) 39–49.
[10] *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1155a1–31.
[11] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a6–10; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1236a15–33. See also Price (1989) 103–30; Osborne (1994) 139–52.
[12] *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b6–7.
[13] *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b9–10, 1156b23–4.

has been shown that one is worthy of being loved (*philetos*) and trusted.[14] This perfect form of friendship seems to be based in large part on what we might call affection: that is, wishing someone good for their own sake with intimacy, commitment and trust.[15]

As well as this affective element, Aristotle also discusses another ingredient in *philia*: reciprocity, or giving for a return, whether the exchange takes the form of goods or services.[16] He says 'a man becomes a *philos* whenever he is loved (*philoumenos*) and loves in return (*antiphilei*) and this is known to both',[17] and elsewhere that goodwill (*eunoia*) can only become *philia* when it is reciprocated.[18]

In the non-philosophical texts as well, the Greeks were not coy about the emphasis placed on reciprocity, even in relationships between kin. Xenophon's Socrates, mediating in a quarrel between Chaerecrates and his brother, points to this in disturbingly explicit terms:

> 'Tell me,' Socrates said, 'If you wished to prevail upon one of your acquaintances to invite you for dinner when he is sacrificing, what would you do?'
>
> 'Of course I would begin by inviting him myself when I sacrificed.'
>
> 'And if you wished to persuade one of your *philoi* to take care of your property when you were away, what would you do?'
>
> 'Of course I would first undertake to look after his property when he was away.'
>
> 'And if you wished a foreign friend (*xenos*) to entertain you when you came to his city, what would you do?'
>
> 'Of course I would entertain him first when he came to Athens; and if I wished him to be eager to negotiate in the business I had come for on my behalf, of course it would be necessary to do this first for him also.'
>
> 'Can it be that you have long kept your knowledge of the magic spells of men a secret?' Socrates said, 'Or are you afraid that you might disgrace yourself if you do your brother a good turn first? Indeed a man who anticipates his enemies (*echthroi*) in doing harm and his *philoi* in doing benefactions seems to be worthy of the highest praise.'[19]

Not only was the giving of a service the surest way of making the return certain but also it was one's duty to make a return if a service was given.

Euripides, in his rather sinister tragedy the *Orestes*, plays with the themes of friendship and the morality of repayment of debts.[20] At one

[14] *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b24–9.
[15] On the role of affection in personal relationships, see esp. Foxhall (forthcoming), *contra* Osborne (1994) 139–52.
[16] E.g., see Finley (1977) 64; Easterling (1989) 12.
[17] Arist., *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1236a14–15. See also Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1155b27–1156a5; cf. Xen., *Mem.* 2.6.28; Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a8, 1157b30. The assumption that giving for a return is the foundation of *philia* is also scrutinised in Plato's *Lysis* (e.g. 212d).
[18] *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1155b32–4.
[19] Xen., *Mem.* 2.3.11–14.
[20] The morally depraved Pylades, the faithful *philos* (Eur., *Or.* 725–8, 1403–6), is contrasted with Menelaus, the bad *philos* (717–21), who chooses the pious deed over the impious (627–8, 704–5).

point in the play, Orestes demands repayment from Menelaus for the debt incurred by the pursuit of Helen in terms which highlight the constant back-and-forth motion of action and reaction, and debt and repayment in (although here somewhat exaggerated) social relations. Orestes argues that although the mustering of Greece was in itself an evil, it was done to right the evil of Helen's flight, and in turn incurred a debt which must now be repaid. He says to Menelaus:

> Give to me, Menelaus, not of that which is your own,
> but give back to me what you have received, since you received it from my father –
> I am not talking about possessions. If you save
> my life, you save my dearest possession.
> Am I unjust? I ought to receive some unjust thing from you for this evil.
> For even my father, Agamemnon,
> having mustered Greece unjustly, went under the walls of Ilium,
> not having done wrong himself, but healing
> the wrong deed and injustice of your wife.
> You must give me this: one for one.
> He risked his life truly, as *philoi* ought for *philoi*,
> labouring beside your shield,
> so that you might get back your wife.
> Since you received this there, pay back the same to me:
> you will only have laboured and stood as a saviour
> on my behalf for one day, not filled out ten years.[21]

Not only must wrong deeds receive retribution, but also favours must be repaid. Orestes sees this as his right, for he claims the gift remains the possession of the giver, and he would only be receiving back what is his own already.[22]

Trust (*pistis*) that gifts would be repaid was also fundamental to the relationship.[23] Often the first step in an exchange was a step in the dark and one always took the risk that the gift would not be returned. It was part of the emotive packaging of *philia* that *philoi* were trustworthy. Dercylidas said to the people of Abydus in 394:

[21] Eur., *Or.* 642–57.

[22] Morris ((1986) 13 n. 2) in his discussion of gift-exchange in the archaic period is right in discarding the anthropological notion of the gift as an extension of the person in the Greek context. Contrast Mauss ((1990) 12, 47–80) who describes the donor as merging with the gift so that each becomes part of the other. The donor then participates himself in the value of the gift and it is this aspect which makes the most powerful obligation to return; see also von Reden (1995) 45.

[23] On a suggested etymological connection between the noun *philotes* and the adjective *pistos*, see Taillardat (1982) 1–14. Note also the importance of timing in the exchange. As Bourdieu has shown ((1977) 3–9) the temporality of the exchange of gift and counter-gift adds to the meaning of the exchange: a gift cannot be given too soon or too late without altering its meaning within the relationship.

Men, now it is possible for you, although you were formerly *philoi* of our city, to seem benefactors (*euergetai*) of the Spartans. For being faithful (*pistoi*) in good fortune is not wonderful, but whenever people remain steadfast in the misfortunes of their *philoi*, this is remembered for all time.[24]

In the same vein Xenophon's Hieron laments the fact that a tyrant has few *philoi*, that is few people he can trust.[25] The return to a large degree depended upon the moral force of the exchange,[26] but in some relationships, particularly those of a more impersonal nature, an exchange of oaths could act as a guarantee of trust. Alcibiades exchanged oaths with the Persian Pharnabazus to seal their private friendship, and Curtius has the Scythians tell Alexander that oaths are a precaution of the Greeks, while Scythians simply keep faith.[27]

The tensions of giving and receiving were also eased to a certain extent by the fact that *philia* was also fundamentally an equal relationship, where individuals of roughly equal status exchanged gifts of roughly equal value. Aristotle says that 'friendship (*philotes*) is said to be equality (*isotes*), and this is particularly true in friendships among the good', but even among 'less perfect' *philoi*, the relationship was based on equality.[28]

Nevertheless, Aristotle recognises that there are relationships which are unequal in status such as that between father and child, husband and wife, ruler and ruled.[29] In these relationships he says the inequalities are based on a different kind of justice, for it is equal according to proportion but not according to quantity.[30] Although what each party is entitled to receive from the other is not the same, a sense of equality is still maintained: the superior partner should be befriended more than he befriends, 'for whenever the "befriending" (*philesis*) is according to worth, then somehow there is a sense of equality (*isotes*), and equality seems to be a part of *philia*'.[31]

A further complication is found in the practice of incremental giving, where a relationship was maintained by giving a return greater in value than the original gift. This in turn placed the recipient (the original giver) in debt and put him under an obligation to return the favour. Hesiod says that if you pay back a neighbour well, and give him more than he gave, then you have something to rely on later when you are in need.[32] As

[24] Xen., *Hell.* 4.8.4; cf. Xen., *Hell.* 3.1.1.
[25] Xen., *Hieron* 3 esp. 7–9; see also Easterling (1989) 23–4.
[26] See esp. Gouldner (1977) 35.
[27] Alcibiades: Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.12; Scythians: Q. C. 7.8.29. Compare also the *synomosiai* at Athens in 411: literally those who swore together (see ch. 3).
[28] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1157b33–1158a1, 1158b1; cf. 1163a1–2; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1238b14–16.
[29] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1158b11–19. [30] Arist., *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1238b20–1.
[31] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1158b20–1, 23–8; cf. 1159b1–3; 1162a34–1162b4.
[32] Hesiod, *WD* 349–51.

Gregory points out: 'The formal difference between [balanced and incremental gift-giving] comes about because the gift in an incremental gift-giving sequence combines the two gifts: one part of the return-gift cancels the original debt, the other part creates a new debt.'[33] This new debt must also be requited by an equal payment and perhaps also by an increment which in turn creates a new debt, and so the relationship continues.

In recent years a great deal of emphasis has been placed upon the part of reciprocity in *philia* and the part of affection has been undermined. Goldhill, for example, has argued that *philia* was relational: that is, it expressed the relation between an individual and his society and 'is used to mark not just affection but overridingly a series of complex obligations, duties and claims'.[34] Millett too, while discussing Aristotle's three kinds of friendship, has stressed the instrumentality within relationships on the grounds that the *philia* of utility and mutual interest is by far the commonest kind of friendship.[35]

The importance of instrumental relationships is clear. Aristotle writes that 'all *philia* involves *koinonia* (association)',[36] and that while the friendships (*philiai*) of kin and comrades can be set apart, the *philiai* of citizens and tribesmen and fellow-sailors are more like the *philiai* between associates (*koinonikai*), 'for these seem to be, as it were, according to some agreement'.[37] The basis of such *koinoniai* is common advantage:

> All *koinoniai* seem to be parts of the political *koinonia*; since people journey together for some advantage and for procuring some of the commodities necessary for life. The political *koinonia* seems to have originally come together and to have kept going for the sake of advantage; law-givers also aim at this and say that the common advantage is just. So other *koinoniai* aim at particular aspects of what is advantageous, like sailors aiming at the advantage in sailing for earning money, or some such thing, or comrades-in-arms aiming at the advantage in war in loot or victory or the conquest of a city, and similarly also tribesmen and demesmen. Some *koinoniai* seem to exist for pleasure, like religious groups and dinner clubs. These exist for the sake of sacrifices and company. All these seem to be subordinate to the political *koinonia*; for the political *koinonia* aims not at an advantage in the present, but at an advantage for the whole of life . . . Indeed all *koinoniai* seem to be portions of the political *koinonia*, and such *philiai* go with such *koinoniai*.[38]

Elsewhere, Aristotle defines these kinds of *philiai* as those of utility.[39] Such *philoi*, he says, are in relationship with each other not for themselves

[33] Gregory (1982) 54.
[34] Goldhill (1986) 82 following Benveniste (1973) 273–88, esp. 275–82; cf. Millett (1991) 114.
[35] Millett (1991) 113–26.
[36] On the difficulties of translating *koinonia* see Millett (1991) 39, 114–15.
[37] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b11 (see also 1159b31–2), 14–15.
[38] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1160a9–30.
[39] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a14–30; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1236a33–4.

but because of the good that may accrue to them because of each other.[40] As a corollary of this, these relationships are also easily broken off: the partners might cease being of use to each other if the relationship changes or the motive for the *philia* ceases to exist. As a result the *philia* comes to an end since it only existed for this reason.[41]

Such *philoi* could be selected for the partners' ability to make an adequate or desirable return, although this motive could be hidden behind a polite veneer.[42] The crucial factor in this sort of association is that it is based on an implicit 'agreement' for the exchange, whether this is a moral or legal obligation.[43] Even when the gift itself is difficult to value, the giver expects to receive either an equal or a greater return;[44] so, Aristotle warns, one must take care at the outset from whom one receives a benefaction, for whom one performs one, and on what conditions, so that on this basis one may accept these conditions or not.[45]

Recently Foxhall has reacted against the tendency to see friendship as a relationship in which affection had only a minimal part, and has tried to redress the balance by looking at the place of affection in a number of intimate relationships.[46] While still recognising the importance of reciprocity in many relationships, and realising that at one level affection acts itself as a medium of exchange, she explores the importance of what she has termed the 'limits of trust' (which she loosely defines as the household) for establishing trust, confidence and certainty in relationships in which there was no medium- or long-term expectation of a return.[47]

There is no doubt that Aristotle envisages his perfect *philia* as combining both reciprocity and affection. In a similar way, Roman *amicitia* also contained an affective element which could become politicised, rather than being a relationship which was purely instrumental in character.[48] The fact of the matter is that some friendships were more affectionate and some less so, and that friendships worked on a sliding scale of affection and utility with some inclining more towards the affective (and altruistic?) end, and some towards the side of simple advantage. Indeed, there was often no distinction between affective and

[40] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a14–19.
[41] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a19–24; see also Foxhall (forthcoming).
[42] Millett (1991) 118–21; see also Bourdieu (1990) 105–6.
[43] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1162b27–8. [44] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1162b31–3.
[45] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1163a1–8.
[46] Foxhall (forthcoming); cf. (1989). She also does not want to define 'friendships' by *philia*, arguing that there is a whole range of other relationships which are not encompassed by this term. See also Konstan (1996a).
[47] Foxhall (forthcoming). Although Foxhall admits that intimate personal relationships extended beyond the boundaries of the household, she argues that 'metaphorically and pragmatically, close relationships with outsiders tended to collapse into the ideology of the close-knit connections of the household'. [48] See Brunt (1965a) (=(1988) 351–81).

utilitarian relationships, or at least for the most part this kind of distinction was inconsequential.[49] This was particularly true for political friends, who could also be kin and close companions. For example, Alcibiades on his return to Athens came on deck to look for his supporters (*epitedeioi*) because he was afraid of his enemies (*echthroi*), and was reassured when he saw his cousin Euryptolemus and the rest of his family (*oikeioi*) and *philoi*.[50]

There was also a sense in which the reciprocal exchange itself was forced to imitate the features of affection and to generate loyalty, commitment, obligation and durability out of the exchange. This in turn set up contradictions in purely utilitarian relationships which, because of their affective associations, could be overlaid with potent emotive connotations, and, as we shall see in the following chapters, many of the strategies for interstate relations were built on the premise that relationships worked as much from a desire to reciprocate as from the moral force of the exchange, and this ambiguity and inconsistency could be exploited and manipulated for political ends.

1.2 Kinds of *philia*

But as well as being a kind of exchange in its own right, *philia* and its cognate *philos* also referred to subsets of relationships which displayed these general characteristics, although in varying degrees.[51] As well as the modern western idea of friends as companions and associates, *philoi* included family (mother, father, brothers, sisters, grandparents, children),[52] and a broader range of less 'personal' relationships. Aristotle remarks that soldiers and sailors address their companions as *philoi*.[53]

[49] Compare also Wolf (1966) 13.

[50] Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.18–19. Compare *amicitia* where private friends could be public enemies (see Brunt (1965a) [=(1988) 351–81)). Such a situation is derided as disgraceful in [Dem.] 58.40.

[51] See, for example, Strauss (1986) 21; Blundell (1989) 39–49; Easterling (1989) 11; Millett (1991) 113–16; Osborne (1994) 139–40.

[52] In Euripides' *Orestes* Helen numbers her sister, Clytemnestra, among her *philoi* (97); Helen accuses Electra of not talking in a manner befitting a *philos* (100); Electra addresses Orestes as *philtate* (217, 1045); Tyndareus, the father of Clytemnestra, and Menelaus are *philoi* (475); and Menelaus is a *philos* of Orestes (449–50; cf. 371–2), as he was to Agamemnon (482). Orestes and Pylades: Pylades says that the affairs of *philoi* are common to *philoi* and that he can only show he is a *philos* by helping Orestes (Eur., *Or.* 735, 802–3) *contra* Konstan (1996a). Although Konstan is right to emphasise the importance of affection in *philia* (see below), his argument that *philia* is not the objective relationship between *philoi* seems to depend too much on the relative dates of the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, and sometimes becomes rather strained. Konstan (1996b) and (1997), where he sets out his position more fully, were published after this book was submitted for publication, so have not been taken into account.

[53] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1159b27–9.

Within the framework of the three types of *philia* (based on virtue, pleasure and utility), Aristotle discusses different groups of *philoi* and says that the claims upon these groups are not all the same.[54] In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he says that the different groupings are kinship (*syngenike*), comradeship or intimacy (*hetairike*), partnership or association (*koinonike*), and civic friendship (*politike*).[55] In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle himself refines and changes these categories and says, as we saw, that associations (*koinoniai*) are elements of the state (*politike koinonia*), making a general category for all political associations based on 'utility' and adding ritualised-friendship (*xenia*) as another category because it is a similar kind of relationship to political *koinonia*.[56] These all amount to different kinds of relationship with their own permutations of the exchange pattern, which need to be explored separately.

1.2.1 Kin

Kin were one's closest *philoi* and those to whom one owed the greatest obligation. As Blundell writes: 'One is tied to other family members by a presumptive bond of natural affection, arising from blood ties and common interests.'[57] Euripides' Admetus claims it is his due that his parents should give their life for his, and when they refuse says that 'in word but not in deed they were *philoi*'.[58] One has a natural duty to one's family because they are family.

Different kinds of kinship each had different levels of closeness.[59] Aristotle recognises the special relationship between parents and children and the part affection has to play in the relationship.[60] He says that this kind of *philia* 'seems to be more in befriending, than in being befriended' and gives as an example the mothers who send their children out to be nursed, and though they love (*philousi*), do not seek love in return (*antiphileisthai*).[61] This is an extreme and altruistic relationship, but in the common order of things Aristotle says that 'whenever children assign to parents what is necessary for those who have given them life, and parents to sons what is necessary for children, the *philia* of such as these will be fitting'.[62]

And yet, having said this, a son is also always in his father's debt as there is nothing he can do which is worthy of what has been done for him.[63] Xenophon's Socrates asks:

[54] See Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1157b1–5, 1159b31–1160a8, 1165a14–16; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1241b32–4; cf. *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1159b35–1160a3. [55] Arist., *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1242a1–2.
[56] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1160a8–14, 1161b11–16; cf. 1156a10–12.
[57] Blundell (1989) 40. [58] Eur., *Alc.* 339. [59] Cf. Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b16–17.
[60] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b16–30, 1162a4–15. [61] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1159a27–33.
[62] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1158b21–3. [63] Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1163b18–21.