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Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul

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INTRODUCTION

Since the ancients, philosophers, theologians, and political actors have pondered the relationship between the moral realm and the political realm. Complicating the long debate over the intersection of morality and politics are diverse conceptions of fundamental concepts: the right and the good, justice and equality, personal liberty and public interest. Divisions abound, also, about whether politics should be held to a higher moral standard at all, or whether, instead, pragmatic considerations or *realpolitik* should be the final word. Perhaps the two poles are represented most conspicuously by Aristotle and Machiavelli. For Aristotle, the proper aim of politics is moral virtue: "politics takes the greatest care in making the citizens to be of a certain sort, namely good and capable of noble actions." Thus, the statesman is a craftsman or scientist who designs a legal system that enshrines universal principles, and the politician's task is to maintain and reform the system when necessary. The science of the political includes more than drafting good laws and institutions, however, since the city-state must create a system of moral education for its citizens. In marked contrast, Machiavelli's prince exalted pragmatism over morality, the maintenance of power over the pursuit of justice. Machiavelli instructed that "a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion."

The fourteen contributors to this collection are predominantly arrayed on the Aristotelian end of the continuum, although several moral skeptics and pragmatists do enter the fray. Our authors address questions that have become ever more pressing in our era of global interconnectedness counterbalanced by global terrorism. Should politics be an extension of moral/religious teachings or should the two keep to their own realms: "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's"? Should politics play a meliorative role and attempt to surmount popular morality and replace it with something better, or should politics take humankind as it is? Is there something about the political stage that permits elected officials to act in ways that would be considered morally objectionable in private citizens? Does the statesman's art permit lying for a good cause, concealing the truth from citizens in the name of a lofty purpose of state, or simply lying to preserve one's power or reputation? If so (or not), what standards of morality must politicians be held to if a democracy is to thrive? Does the private morality of politicians matter to our assessment of their fitness for office or of their political achievements? Does the operation of a liberal democracy depend upon agreement about

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public (or political) morality when private morality is irredeemably pluralistic? When is a democratic state justified in intervening in the affairs of other nations for humanitarian reasons? How can pluralistic societies make moral distinctions of the gravest importance, such as that between freedom fighters and terrorists?

Our first two contributors reflect on internationalist themes and how democratic societies ought to assess and respond to international terrorism and state-sponsored atrocities. In her essay, "What's Morality Got to Do With It? Making the Right Distinctions," Jean Bethke Elshtain challenges the idea that morality and politics are not mutually constitutive, a presumption shared by the positivist epistemology of "value-free" social science and scientific neorealism in the study of international relations. Neorealism claims that international relations is really all about power, and that morality and ethics are dragged in only as "cover." A supposedly value-free social science claims that description and evaluation are two entirely separate activities. Description is neutral and yields no evaluative implications; what we value we "layer on" to our description of actions or events, doing so more or less arbitrarily, based on our own biases. Elshtain challenges such presumptions by showing how getting the descriptions right is often morally charged, and doing so enables us to make important distinctions and, then, evaluations. For example, getting the description right allows us to call what transpired on September 11, 2001, an "unspeakable horror" not a "glorious victory." Elshtain emphasizes that distinctions—such as that between combatants and noncombatants, justice and revenge—anchor any decent political world. Only by getting our descriptions right about terrorism and genocide can we prevent a slide into a world of indiscriminate horror.

Whether the use of force by one state against another constitutes an act of aggression or a legitimate humanitarian intervention, observes Mark S. Stein, often hinges on the interpretation of hotly debated terms such as 'political independence', 'territorial integrity', and 'authorized force'. In his essay, "Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention," Stein explores the legal and ethical issues raised by state-sponsored humanitarian efforts conducted by one or more countries against another country without the explicit approval of the United Nations Security Council. Legal analysis leads Stein to conclude that virtually no respected international body would interpret the UN Charter as permitting unauthorized humanitarian intervention. Legal analysis does not, however, answer the ethical question of whether states should avoid unauthorized intervention. This question recalls enduring debates in moral theory about act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, and the place of institutions in utilitarian theory and practice. While some of these debates involve implausible hypothetical scenarios, Stein considers real-world examples of unauthorized humanitarian intervention—the establishment of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, the NATO bombings of the Bosnian Serbs, and NATO's

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Kosovo intervention against Yugoslavia—as a means of gaining practical insight on balancing rule adherence against the minimization of human suffering.

The next four contributors explore various connections between morality and politics in democratic societies. In “Thinking Constitutionally: The Problem of Deliberative Democracy,” Stephen L. Elkin critiques the quest, spawned by the work of John Rawls, for an ideal, rational deliberative democracy. The many advocates of such a moralized politics envision a legislative process of public deliberation abstracted from narrow, group-interested motivations. Legislators must be free from self-interest, political ambition, and the crude desire to exercise political power. Instead, they will be conscientious and desirous of pursuing the principles of justice. Not for them the bargaining, the horse-trading of our familiar interest-group democracy. Relying on insights about factionalism and constitutionalism from Madison and about human nature and politics from Machiavelli and Hobbes, Elkin focuses on the importance of institution and constitution building to secure the best regime practicable. He peoples his politics with humans in their flawed state, and his democracy does not depend upon ideal men and women pursuing a selfless public good. Elkin’s legislators aim at creating institutions that will secure the good enough, rather than the best. In institution building, it must be recognized that morally ambiguous and even worse motives cannot be avoided altogether in political life. “There is a sense in which politics is precisely what ideal theory seeks to avoid,” Elkin remarks. In contrast to ideal theorists, Elkin offers a messy politics that tries to harness ambition, power lust, and the rest of human nature’s unseemly qualities.

While Elkin is concerned with constructing a democratic regime that suits humans’ flawed nature, Russell Hardin in his essay, “Representing Ignorance,” wonders how we might assess the morality of elected officials who govern citizens who are largely ignorant of political issues. Hardin’s strategy is to analyze politics as a profession. Thus, just as lawyers and doctors have their respective role moralities, elected officials have theirs, which must be functionally defined by the purpose that they are to fulfill once in office. Hence, the role morality of elected officials will largely be determined by our theory of representation and how it deals with the problem of voter incompetence. Hardin isolates three major and distinct theories of representation: a quasi-Madisonian theory that sees legislators as agents of their constituents, a political party theory that makes elected officials agents of their parties, and an audience democracy theory that views officials as basically agents of themselves rather than others. In our era of media savvy politicians, Hardin sees little room for discerning a distinctive role morality for representatives of the third type, while in earlier eras the first two theories generated much clearer role moralities. In audience democracy, unlike its two predecessors where citizens’ interests coincided with their moral expectations for their rep-

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representatives, no such assumption can be made today. Personality and success in dealing with the media trump other qualities, and what we have are representatives who don't know much about their constituents trying to represent constituents who know little about policies or officials. A well-defined role morality for elected officials remains elusive in light of diverse theories of representation and the actual electoral choices of citizens in democratic regimes today—wherein voters do not seem to have in mind any role morality, conventional or otherwise, for the leaders they put in office. Borrowing from David Hume, Hardin proposes that we define the morality of elected officials as “artificial” duties, defined by their functional fit with the institutional purposes of their profession.

Hardin's attention is directed at the consequences of voter ignorance in crafting a role morality for elected officials, while Stanley A. Renshon focuses on another defect in the citizenry of some democratic societies, particularly in the United States: the lack of national identity and attachment. Political theorists, observes Renshon in “Dual Citizenship and American Democracy: Patriotism, National Attachment, and National Identity,” repeatedly remind Americans that they live in an increasingly interdependent world in which traditional understandings of sovereignty are becoming obsolete. Americans are urged to shed their parochial outlook in favor of more inclusive connections to other cultures. In this spirit, Americans welcome people with dual citizenship, that is, individuals who are citizens of two or more countries and hold allegiance to each. At the same time, Americans are being asked to show greater cultural sensitivity to increasingly diverse racial and ethnic groups. Americans are urged to welcome immigrants, to respect their beliefs, and to adjust to their needs. None of this is regarded as a significant issue, as long as everyone believes in the American creed. Yet how the two trends of multiculturalism and dual citizenship accord with the requirements of republican democracy has not been carefully considered, nor fully debated, in the United States. The ethics of dual citizenship and how to balance rights, responsibilities, and obligations ought to be fully examined. Such a discussion must place ethics in the context of the actual practices specific to American democracy and the psychology that underlies them. According to Renshon, this requires us to pay close attention to the nature of American national identity and its largely overlooked importance in providing a foundation for citizenship.

If Renshon's dual citizens can be described as having bifurcated loyalties between “here” and “there,” then Tyler Cowen's policymakers might well be described as facing moral dilemmas between serving the public “now” or “later.” In “Policy Implications of Zero Discounting: An Exploration in Politics and Morality,” Cowen asks, “What are our political obligations to future generations?” As Cowen notes, most plausible moral theories have a strong consequentialist element and must somehow compare present well-being to future well-being. Applying the economist's

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tools to the question of present versus future, Cowen considers the policy consequences of weighting future societal interests as heavily as current interests. This is what economists call “zero discounting,” and, Cowen relates, its policy implications cut across the traditional “Left-Right” divide. Cowen finds that the present generation has strong obligations to save and invest, but not strong obligations to redistribute wealth toward the very poor. To ameliorate poverty in the long term we should pay more attention to increasing the rate of economic growth. Persistent environmental problems become more important according to a zero discount model, but transient or “one-shot” environmental problems become less important. Overall, a zero rate of discount shifts the balance toward consequentialist rather than deontological considerations in public policy-making, underscores the importance of a free society, and explains, in part, why it may be hard to adhere to rule-based prescriptions either in politics or in one’s personal life.

Descending into the cave, our next three contributors confront the seamier realities of government and politics, including politicians who lie to cover up personal scandals or to deceive their constituents, and citizens who betray their countries to abet foreign tyrannies. While politicians have long been accused of lying by ordinary skeptics and professional pundits alike (and while many a politician has been caught in a fib or flat-out scandal), in at least one area of national life, secrecy, subterfuge, and deception are essential tools of the trade: the realm of espionage. In his “Reflections on Espionage,” Harvey Klehr observes that debate about the morality of espionage emerged almost as soon as the ancient practice itself. Because it requires duplicity and betrayal, espionage has been condemned by idealists, but realists acknowledge that it is unavoidable. Klehr finds that the moral status of spies varies, depending on several factors, including who the spy is. For example, is he a foreign national serving as an “agent in place” in his target country, or a disgruntled “Judas,” willing to betray his own country and the lives of his fellow citizens? A moral calculus that justifies espionage must also take into account the nature of a spy’s employer, as well as the spy’s motives, tactics, and targets. Klehr then examines persistent efforts to first deny, and later justify, the extensive espionage that was committed by Americans working on behalf of the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s. He argues that the attempts at justification of the American Communists who spied for the Soviet Union are clearly flawed and increasingly unpersuasive, particularly since revelations from Soviet and Eastern bloc archives have made the guilt of many indisputable. Indeed, Klehr offers a compelling rebuttal to the *ex post facto* rationalizations that have been offered either by the spies themselves or by their biological or ideological offspring. Protestations about serving the interests of peace or providing a balance of terror in the nuclear arms race prove hollow when compared against the spies’ own words from their KGB files and against the actions

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that they took to benefit Stalin's USSR, actions that helped to prolong and worsen the Cold War.

Whereas espionage has made a science out of secrecy and subterfuge, the more cynical observer might be inclined to quip that it is politicians who have made an art form out of lying. As Robert Weissberg demonstrates in his delightfully droll essay, "Mr. Pinocchio Goes to Washington: Lying in Politics," serious analytical problems beset those who would attempt to expose or eradicate lying in politics. After all, many falsehoods are not necessarily lies (i.e., intent to deceive is necessary) and different cultures construe truthfulness differently. Mental illness or some other condition may render an individual unable to separate truth from fiction. A falsehood uttered under coercion cannot be deemed a lie, while spoken lies may be admitted or qualified when accompanied by a nonverbal gesture such as a wink or a nod. Specialized terminology can convert seeming fabrication into convoluted truth, and today's truth may become tomorrow's lie, thanks to the unearthing of new information. Moreover, there can be no such thing as a lie if there is no such thing as truth. In attempting to analyze what lying is and when it matters, Weissberg finds that recourse to the great philosophers, such as Plato, Augustine, Machiavelli, and Kant, among others, produces little in the way of clear judgment. Each offers countless loopholes. The United States legal code deals extensively with lying, but lying is not always a crime, and proving perjury in court is an arduous task. After wrestling with the difficulties of identifying and proving lies, Weissberg argues that, ultimately, democratic elections may provide our best defense against political mendacity.

In recent years it has become increasingly common for newspapers and other media to expose problematic aspects of the private lives of political (and other public) figures and to make them the subject of commentary. John Haldane's "A Subject of Distaste; An Object of Judgment" asks the question: How should one judge these revelations? Any reasonable answer will have to take account of circumstance, form, and content. Some methods of acquiring information violate norms of justice. Some styles of exposure or public presentation are so gross and gratuitous as to be beyond principled defense. Some matters are so far removed from a public figure's office that no case for revelation can be made from the side of public interest. Equally, while some matters may be relevant in evaluating the conduct of public figures, and the means of acquiring the information are not unjust, and the proposed manner of presentation would not be gratuitously sensational, it may well be the case that other interests (including the interests of others) are such that it would be wrong to damage them, even as unintended but foreseen secondary effects of otherwise legitimate exposure. Haldane favors a traditional conservative approach to analyzing these issues, also drawing upon moral theology to expound the idea of fraternal correction. He wonders, however, whether these ways of thinking are applicable to contemporary

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pluralistic societies and, if they are not, to what extent these societies are in any sense moral communities.

The last five essays in this volume address various tensions in modern democratic societies and how to defuse or lessen them. In “Against Civic Schooling,” James Bernard Murphy observes that both liberals and conservatives agree that civic education must go beyond civic knowledge and skills to include proper civic motives and dispositions; that is, both sides agree that civic education must aim at civic virtue, even if they disagree about which virtues ought to be learned. Unfortunately, both liberals and conservatives also agree that such an education in civic virtue is the responsibility of public schools. But just because civic virtues must be learned, argues Murphy, does not mean that they can be taught—let alone that they can be taught in the classroom. Murphy assesses the best empirical studies on the effectiveness of civic education in schools and shows that schooling aimed at instilling civic virtue is, at best, ineffective and often counterproductive. Advocates of civic schooling nevertheless argue that schools need a compelling moral purpose and that civic education is the most appropriate such purpose in a diverse, democratic society. Yet, as Murphy demonstrates, these normative arguments fail to grasp that academic schooling already has a compelling moral purpose, namely, to impart the intellectual virtues—those dispositions that make us conscientious in the pursuit of truth. Civic schooling is either irrelevant to the intrinsic moral purpose of schooling or positively subversive of it. Murphy shows that the history of civic schooling is a history of the subordination of truth-seeking to some civic agenda, leading to the white-washing and distortion of academic knowledge. Indeed, civic schooling aimed at “instilling civic virtue” is inherently partisan and thereby violates the civic trust that underpins vibrant public schools.

Norman Barry observes that for much of the twentieth century, the influence of logical positivism and linguistic philosophy had reduced political and moral theory to a mainly analytical role in ethics and politics. But the publication of John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* in 1971 prompted a plethora of articles and books on the traditional concerns of political philosophy: principally justice, equality, and rights. In his contribution to this volume, “Political Morality as Convention,” Barry argues that much of this work has increased the divisiveness in society. He suggests that political theory should be much more concerned with exploring the conventions and practices of the market and the rule of law that make a society stable, prosperous, and predictable. Hume exemplifies the approach to social philosophy that Barry favors. Although in some ways Hume was the ancestor of logical positivism, Barry emphasizes that Hume did not share its subjectivism and relativism. Barry applies the lessons of Hume’s indirect utilitarianism to contemporary law and business: the current “moralism” in law is rejected in favor of a form of legal positivism derived from H. L. A. Hart. Barry claims that constitutionalism and legal

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decentralization are the keys to harmony, and he argues that the current imposition of ethical duties on business should be replaced with the cultivation of conventions derived from the practice of commerce.

Michael Slote, in "Autonomy and Empathy," develops a welfare-oriented approach to morality and politics that builds on recent feminist work in the ethics of caring. While critics have charged that caring theorists cannot account for such "masculine" principles as justice and autonomy, Slote shows that an empathic approach can ground respect for the autonomy of the person. Drawing, too, on work by developmental psychologists, he sees empathy as crucial to ethics. A caring approach to ethics, explains Slote, must be reconfigured so that it appraises the rightness of human actions and the justice of laws and institutions, depending on whether they express relevant empathic concern. We can then say that parents who impose their own agendas on their children lack empathy for the desires, fears, and aspirations of their children, and thus express a morally criticizable lack of respect for their children's autonomy. Similarly, religious intolerance invariably can be attributed to an absence of real empathy for the point of view of those who are persecuted or denied their religious freedoms (often, ironically, "for the sake of their souls"). Such intolerance, too, involves a morally invidious denial of autonomy. However, paternalism of this invidious sort contrasts with the kind of state paternalism that merely imposes fines on motorists who do not wear their seatbelts. This latter form of paternalism, while it injects moralism into politics, does not necessarily express a lack of empathy or respect for the autonomy of others.

In his essay, "God's Image and Egalitarian Politics," George P. Fletcher argues that secular philosophies are hard pressed to ground their claim that all human beings should be treated with equal concern and respect. "This is simply a postulate of American liberalism," argues Fletcher, and while few today would question the idea of human dignity and equality, less clear is its historical provenance. Fletcher rejects claims that the principle of equality emerged in the natural law of the ancient Romans or in Stoic philosophy. He traces the modern conception of human equality to the biblical account of creation, yet he acknowledges certain contradictory elements in the Book of Genesis. Contradictions in the Hebrew text may reflect the difference between normative and anthropological approaches to equality, observes Fletcher. Nevertheless, they are instructive today as jurists and elected officials wrestle with competing interpretations of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. While equality remains the ideal, the pursuit of a successful and satisfactory egalitarian politics remains, in many ways, a work in progress.

In his essay, "Should Political Liberals Be Compassionate Conservatives? Philosophical Foundations of the Faith-Based Initiative," John Tomasi examines the relationship between liberal egalitarianism and the vision of American welfare reform known as "compassionate conserva-

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tism." Compassionate conservatives call for a substantial mixing of church and state; in particular, they call for public funding to be directed freely to religious organizations that provide social services. Political liberals wish to justify the use of political power in a way that accepts the fact of reasonable value pluralism; in particular, they are committed to treating citizens of faith as political equals. Tomasi shows that an argument for the compassionate conservatives' vision of welfare reform can be formulated in public reason terms. Accordingly, political liberal egalitarians, to be true to their own deepest principles, should advocate principles of justice that would be welcoming to the compassionate conservatives' model of church-state relations. Ultimately, Tomasi suggests, the dominant contemporary idea of liberalism, unlike classical conceptions, is incompatible with any strong notion of separation between church and state.

The essays that comprise this volume address perennial concerns in political and moral theory, from the meaning of citizenship to the proper role of the legislator, from the legitimacy of the state's use of force to the warrant for acts of terror by zealots against civilians, from espionage and deceit to the cultivation of religious and civic virtue. These essays underscore the rekindled yearning of many to hold the political realm to a higher standard, despite the skepticism of the dissenters who question the likelihood or even the desirability of success.

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winner of the 1998 Gradiva Award of the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis for the best published work in the category of biography. His recent books include *America's Second Civil War: Dispatches from the Political Center* (2002) and *The 50% American: National Identity in a Dangerous Age* (forthcoming).

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Harvey Klehr is Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Politics and History at Emory University. He has published widely in both scholarly journals and popular periodicals, including *The New Republic*, *The Weekly Standard*, and the *New York Review of Books*. He is the author, coauthor, or editor of ten books, including *The Secret World of American Communism* (with John Earl Haynes and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, 1995) and *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (with John Earl Haynes, 1999; Russian documents translated by Timothy D. Sergay). His newest book is *In Denial: Historians, Communism, and Espionage* (2003).

Robert Weissberg has taught Political Science at Cornell University and is Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published articles in the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Critical Review*, *Political Behavior*, *The Public Interest*, and many other scholarly journals and anthologies. His recent books include *Political Tolerance: Balancing Community and Diversity* (1998); *The Politics of Empowerment* (1999); *Democracy and the Academy* (editor, 2000); and *Polling, Policy, and Public Opinion: The Case against Heeding the "Voice of the People"* (2002). He has also written for general audiences through *The Weekly Standard*, *Chronicles*, *Society*, and other popular publications. He has earned grants from the Earhart and Sarah Scaife Foundations, and he is currently working on two book projects: the first will assess the impact of political activism, while the second will examine the United States government's effort to expand wealth by encouraging personal debt.

John Haldane is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews and Director of the Center for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs there. He is widely published in several areas of philosophy, in particular history of philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of value. He is the editor of *Reality, Representation, and Projection* (with Crispin Wright, 1993) and *Mind, Meta-*

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