

## Introduction

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*Barbara Hobson*

Over the last decades, multiculturalism, identity politics, and, more broadly, struggles for recognition have dominated the political landscape. We now have a new language to express forms of exploitation that are culturally symbolic, and to describe processes that make invisible racial, ethnic, and gender differences. In popular parlance we refer to this as dissing someone or being dissed. In academic discourse, the terms misrecognition or nonrecognition are applied when members of excluded or marginalized groups find their way of life or status as persons denigrated and devalued. Implicit in this discourse is a new construction of justice, one that goes beyond saying that to non-recognize a group or person can and does inflict harm, but is also a form of oppression (Taylor, 1994).

This has been described as a paradigm shift in which claims for redistribution, those based on a fairer and more equal division of the pie, have been eclipsed by claims for recognition, based on respect and valuation for group differences (Fraser, 1997a; 2003). It is safe to say that the collapse of Soviet-style communism, alongside the ascendancy of neoliberal politics and economic policies, has dampened and delegitimized class-based politics. Nevertheless, as the events of the past years have underscored, this shift has been overblown. One has only to consider the rise of social movements around globalization and its economic consequences for industrialized countries and exploited third-world workers. Not to be forgotten in this discussion of recognition and redistribution is the devastatingly destructive linkage terrorists have made between certain extreme forms of Muslim fundamentalism and the symbolic icon of global economic power, the World Trade Center.

To ask if the cultural is displacing the material, or if identity is replacing class is to ask the wrong question (Phillips, 1997). First, it assumes a very narrow definition of recognition as identity politics (Fraser in this volume). Second, to pose the question that way is to ignore the dynamic interplay between claims to alter maldistribution and challenges to the devaluation of members of a group based on their identities, an interplay that empirical cases in the book so vividly demonstrate. Struggles

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for recognition involve issues of land rights, equitable distribution of economic resources, and access to social goods. All of these are deeply interwoven into claims for respect and strategies for remedying racial, ethnic, and gender disadvantage and discrimination (Lake, 1994b; Lewis, 2002). Struggles for redistributive justice, cast as class struggles in the past, were and continue to be entwined with appeals for the dignity of workers and respect for working-class culture (Thompson, 1963; Sewell, 1980).

The core question of this book is what shapes the interplay between these dimensions. To understand this interplay, the authors have located claims for recognition in the specific histories, institutional settings, national narratives, and collective memories of various social groups. While social actors often make strategic choices (different kinds of differences require different kinds of strategies) (Fraser, 1997a), in recognition struggles the forms that actions take are more complicated than narrow instrumentalism would predict. The making of political identities and the framing of claims are shaped by national, regional, ethnic, and gender narratives, but also by historical and cultural legacies around citizens' rights and obligations (Steinberg, 1999).

Looking at such specific contexts reveals the complex processes that lay behind strategic choices made by social actors representing social groups and movements; it raises questions about the meanings attached to recognition and the institutional settings and policy logics that connect them to redistribution. When viewed this way, recognition and redistribution become specific lenses for viewing the same struggles, rather than discrete categories.

Most relevant to the emergence of a politics of recognition is the rise of social movements around particularized identities including blacks, women, aboriginals, gays, and the disabled. These movements made similar challenges to the universalist framing of rights and social citizenship that shaded out their values, experiences, and needs, and did not redress particular inequalities and injustices they faced. The salience in these kinds of claims based on particularized identities and the range of claimants and claims-making has spawned much research on what some would call "new" social movements.<sup>1</sup>

### **Bridging theoretical domains**

As our title, *Recognition Struggles and Social Movements*, suggests we are building bridges across two theoretical terrains. On the one side, recognition has been grounded in normative political theories of justice, citizenship, and democracy in which inclusion, rights, and membership are the cornerstones. Variations among theorists in this tradition exist in terms

of the way they conceptualize the different outcomes: greater or lesser participation of citizens in political, economic, and social spheres, extent of redistribution of resources, and opening or closing geographic, political, social, and economic borders. National level political institutions play a central role in these outcomes. On the other side, social movement theories are centered on organizations and actors at a subnational level. They often revolve around processes: what generates a movement, its resources and opportunities, what shapes the dynamics of movements, how do they ebb and flow through the cycles of protest, what is their relation to identity formation, and what role do structures play in mobilizing specific forms of collective action? Little attention has been paid to outcomes in terms of shifts in institutional and macro-political structures (McAdam et al., 2001).

Bringing the state and institutions back in is very much on the social movement agenda (see McAdam et al., 1996; Meyer et al., 2002). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly make this explicit in their recent book, *Dynamics of Contention* (2001), by addressing the mechanisms underlying revolutionary and nationalist movements, and looking at democratic contention that challenges formal political structures. But they leave out a large segment of “contentious politics” that involves struggles over social politics and social policy, which is a major arena of concern for both political theorists and actors engaged in recognition struggles themselves. One could say that POLITICS in their study is in capital letters, whereas politics in recognition struggles, in the lower case, involves confronting everyday institutionalized patterns and practices that deny social groups participatory citizenship, struggles that challenge the basic coding of rights and obligations in nation states and constitute different varieties of collective “we” than the norms that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when these polities were formed (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

Our focus on social politics paves the way for rebuilding some of the earlier links between social movements and social policy (Amenta, 1998; Lipsky, 1970; Piven and Cloward, 1971). Recognition struggles often involve making claims for resources, goods, and services through state polices: care allowances via women’s movements, social security benefits for gay couples, or building access ramps for the disabled. But claims in recognition struggles are also connected to membership and inclusion in the polity.

Our approach to empirical studies of recognition struggles fills a void in the literature on redistribution and welfare regimes, which has focused on the competing interests and the power resources different social actors accumulate (Korpi and Palme, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and paid insufficient attention to the processes of political identity formation and

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the framing of claims (Hobson, 2000a). Identity is at the core of the recognition paradigm (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1995b), but there has been little attempt to understand the ways in which institutional contexts shape collective identities. It has been social movement studies that have paid attention to the interaction between actors and institutions, and their discursive resources and political opportunities.

### **Recognition and social movements**

Are recognition struggles a subset of social movements? While defining something as a social movement helps to legitimate research in these terms,<sup>2</sup> in the real world of political interaction such labels are both arbitrary and without practical consequence. It is more useful to ask where the struggles we examine fit in this conceptual landscape. Not all social movements are recognition struggles, that is, they do not involve groups that make claims resulting from devalued statuses and misrecognized identities.

For the same reasons that McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) refer to their cases as “contentious politics,” we use the concept struggles to emphasize that these are not episodes of collective action, but rather unbounded expressions of protest and claims-making in which institutions are the loci of group interaction. Recognition struggles often represent a long *durée* of struggle, spanning decades and reflecting histories of disrespect and devaluation (see Hobson, Sainsbury, and Lake in this volume). Comparing such struggles across space and time, as the authors in this volume have done, reveals how they are embedded in political cultures, and how they reframe claims and recast strategies in response to new political configurations and institutional change.

### **Collective identity formation**

Constructionist social movement theorists, the main protagonist being Alberto Melucci, have paved the way for studies like ours (see Mueller’s epilogue). For Melucci, collective identity formation is a dynamic process involving negotiations among individuals within a movement and with outside competitors, allies, and adversaries in relation to a political system (Melucci, 1996: 78–79). His analysis (Melucci, 1995) of these social processes provides some of the missing links to Axel Honneth’s (1995b) sociopsychological interpretation of recognition and social movements. Within Honneth’s analysis of the structure of relations of recognition is the idea that the individual must establish a “relation to herself.” Thus the cognitive processes involved in the experience of shame and disrespect

are “psychological symptoms,” from which a person can come to the realization that he or she is being denied social recognition (1995b: 136). Through social movements, these feelings become articulated so that the experience of disrespect can become a source of political motivation (1995b: 139).

My earlier research challenges Honneth’s (1995b) disjuncture between an individual’s sense of disrespect and harm and the political act of resistance. I have argued that recognition struggles name, interpret, and make visible histories of discrimination and disrespect, and thus not only motivate an aggrieved person to become politically active or to resist, but are a crucial part of the process of self-realization of mis- and nonrecognition. The very framing of grievances as injustices and the articulation of group identity shape cognitive processes, by which individuals understand and interpret personal experiences of disrespect and self-realization, seeing them as shared with others in a devalued and disadvantaged group (Hobson and Lindholm, 1997). To begin with this perspective is to take the analysis of recognition struggles further into the territory of social movement theory, which is often concerned with how identities are contested, negotiated, and mediated through different institutional and discursive universes (Snow and Benford, 1992; Steinberg, 1999; Taylor and Rupp, 1993). Our studies of recognition confirm Melucci’s (1996: 69) argument that collective identities are not just a sum of individual motives nor merely expressions of structural preconditions, but a dynamic interplay between structure and meaning. The research projects in this book also highlight the often-neglected fact that this interplay often occurs within enduring political cultures (see Mueller in this volume).

### **Contested identities**

Whereas the thrust of social movement research has been on finding out how shared meanings are generated within groups – on the construction of collective identity – the theorizing on recognition has focused on the contests around identities with others. Charles Taylor (1994) in his pathbreaking essay on the “Politics of Recognition,” set the agenda: that identities are not made in isolation but constituted in dialogue “unshaped by a predetermined social script” (1994: 36), which he claims, has made the politics of equal recognition more conflictual. Our studies not only show that this dialogue is between elites and marginalized groups, but also among those engaged in different recognition struggles. White Australian feminists were challenged by Aboriginal women who castigated them for referring to women’s oppression by men as colonization

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(Lake in this volume). The minority women in the Migrants' Lobby in the European Union confronted the official EU Women's Lobby for their failure to address the inequalities faced by minority, ethnic, and black women (Williams in this volume).

### **Agency and power**

Recognition struggles are boundary-making activities. This is true of all social movements in terms of who is a member/participant and who is not. But in recognition movements, who represents whom over what is embroiled in conflicts around authenticity and political identities (who is an authentic Aboriginal, which groups of women should speak for women). In recognition struggles, boundary-making occurs in different arenas among actors and various institutions, including political parties, government bureaucracies, churches, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media. Such institutions confer agency on certain actors in collectivities by recognizing them as the authorities to represent the group. These actors then become certified spokespersons for a group: asked to serve on government commissions, interviewed in the media, featured as public speakers in political arenas, published in popular and academic journals (see Ferree and Gamson, Gal, Hobson, and Szalai in this volume). The more institutionalized the recognition, the greater the power to shade out other articulations of misrecognition or nonrecognition and the greater the governance that can be exercised.

### *Political opportunity*

Shifting institutional structures (changing elites and elite alliances) or shifts in the ideological disposition of those in power (Tarrow, 1996), classic definitions of political opportunity, do not provide a wide enough lens through which to analyze recognition struggles. First, the usual conceptualization of opportunity structure does not acknowledge its cultural dimensions, and these are often central to recognition struggles. Second, it does not address the growing importance of supranational and global processes on political opportunity, assuming instead that nation states are somehow the "natural" boundaries within which politics occurs. This is particularly untrue in the domain of recognition, but is ever more unrealistic with regard to redistribution, too, as the language of "globalization" reminds us (Guidry et al., 2000).

Considering this first point, inclusion of the cultural dimensions of political opportunity structures is a controversial position in social movement theory.<sup>3</sup> We would suggest that, in recognition struggles, it is

difficult to argue otherwise. Recognition struggles take place on symbolic terrains where discourse is of paramount importance in organizing the political arena itself, by defining rights, citizenship, and even what counts as a political resource. Moreover, recognition struggles are encased in a universe of political discourse about persons, groups, and nations, that can limit or expand the framing of claims. Take two examples from authors in this book (Gal and Hobson in this volume). Gender equality was characterized as anachronistic in the former Soviet Union and other orthodox Marxist states in Eastern Europe, the argument being then that the emancipation of women was already complete. Feminism was trivialized by the state then and yet is now attacked for its discursive association with the debunked “accomplishments” of the state. In Swedish political discourse, women were constrained by their successes. UN reports said they were living in the most gender equal society in the world, and that they had achieved parity with men in labor market participation (Hobson in this volume). These “state accomplishments” also serve discursively to marginalize continuing feminist analysis of the inequalities that remain.

Some social movement scholars do view cultural processes as elements of political opportunity (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Steinberg, 1999; Meyer et al., 2002; Ferree et al., 2002a). Discursive opportunities embedded in institutional pronouncements and ideological resources available to challenging groups affect what it is politically possible to say, and this affects the likelihood of altering policies of mis- and nonrecognition. The media is a crucial field in which frames are transmitted, as well as a site where discursive contests take place over who and what is recognized. Two essays in this book highlight the ways in which media can open up or close down political opportunity. The media brackets who is authorized to speak for women and on behalf of the right to abortion in Germany and the USA, and the focus on certain speakers and on certain ways of making claims is interrelated (Ferree and Gamson in this volume). The translation of feminist texts from West to East creates trajectories in the universe of political discourse (Gal in this volume).

Moreover, nearly all the theorizing on political opportunities has considered opportunities in terms of national structures (McAdam et al., 1996). Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) analysis of transnational advocacy groups and their leverage politics is relevant to recognition struggles. International non-government organizations (INGOs), by supporting local groups in their analysis and offering them discursive resources and international recognition, have helped such groups become national power brokers. For example, South African women who gained material resources and prestige through their involvement in the anti-apartheid

struggle were reinforced in their desire to participate in the writing of the South African constitution through their participation in transnational conferences and interactions on gender politics, and ended up being able to take a strongly feminist position in this process (Seidman, 1999; 2000). In the new democracies of Eastern Europe, feminist groups who were mis-recognized in their respective countries acquired a sense of legitimacy through their contact with outside organizations, which gave them funding and access to international forums (Gal and Kligman, 2000b).

The European Union (EU) arms national actors with a whip in leverage politics, as its Directives become laws in member states (though implementation involves active mobilization on specific issues in each country) (see Hobson in this volume). Moreover, EU discourse and guidelines in formal and informal documents and policies have opened up a range of political opportunities. The insertion of a new clause in the Amsterdam Treaty on non-discrimination based on ethnicity and race has resulted in mobilizations within nation states across ethnic groups. In many instances, these groups did not represent themselves as an immigrant or minority group experiencing “ethnic and racial discrimination,” but as distinct nationalities within a host country – as Turks or Iranians, Pakistanis or Jamaicans.

#### *Institutional political contexts*

Our approach underscores the fact that the relation between social actors in recognition struggles and institutional contexts is an indeterminate one (McAdam et al., 2001; Ferree et. al., 2002a). Nevertheless, we acknowledge the centrality of institutional contexts, and the path dependencies in recognition struggles. Recognition politics are dynamic: social actors seize political opportunities, reclaim and refashion public discourses, and reconfigure the politics surrounding recognition and redistribution. But claims and claims-makers exist in political cultures. Sociopolitical context can be seen as a field of constraints and opportunities both in terms of: (a) who and what gets recognized; and (b) where and how cultural identities are embedded.

There are hospitable and inhospitable fields for recognition struggles. Groups claiming rights on the basis of particularized identities in authoritarian regimes may not only be illegal, but violence can be used to repress them. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the mobilization of women in a recognition struggle for gender equality with men in Afghanistan (RAWA, or the Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan, did so, often with transnational resources, even though to articulate such claims meant the risk of torture and death). Recognition struggles were also dampened



in the former Soviet Union, where there was political censure against those making claims based on ethnic identities. Gypsy activists, who now serve on local municipal committees representing their communities in Hungary, risked reprisals against themselves and their families if they expressed ethnic identities and norms in the former Soviet regimes (Szalai in this volume).

One institutional form that dampens recognition struggles in democratic welfare states is corporatism. The institutionalized recognition of a tripartite of interests – employers, workers, and governing parties – in bargaining over social policy has facilitated the inclusion of workers' interests and power and their influence over wages, but has left few channels open for recognizing the demands for participatory parity by other groups, such as ethnic and racial groups and women (Åmark, 1992). This was certainly a constraint for Swedish feminists (Hobson in this volume).

Finally, institutional/political contexts also have different capacities for making change, because they vary in terms of economic development and GNP, in the institutions that are in place for altering laws and practices, and in the ideologies underpinning these institutions. To take an example from this book, the Spanish mothers making claims for more resources for their drug-addicted children were confronting a state that did not have a highly developed social welfare regime (Valiente in this volume). Along the same lines, Ferree and Gamson (in this volume) show how, in the USA, where there are few social rights guaranteed, it is harder to make the claim for social support in claiming a formally secured right to abortion, while in Germany, where political liberalism is weak, it is difficult for women to make a claim for rights to individual self-determination that would limit state intervention.

Policy logics shape the redistribution in families as well as the stakes individuals have in perpetuating gendered identities in society, both by limiting the possibilities for making claims to alter the family wage, which would demand expansion of public sector spending (O'Connor et al., 1999), and by not challenging the way markets discriminate in the allocation of jobs and positions, because there is an assumption of naturalized gender difference.

States can make laws and policies that create constituencies (Pierson, 1994). In recognition struggles, laws promoting gender equality or gay rights have led to the forging of collective identities through mobilizations to initiate or implement policy (Meyer, 2002; Bernstein, 2002; Hobson in this volume). State policies, through laws and policing, can also shape the content of recognition struggles by stigmatizing certain identities. Kulick and Klein's chapter in this volume on the scandals of gender-crossing "travestis" in Brazil makes this point.




Figure 1 Recognition struggles, national political cultures, and supranational frames