

## AFTER SOCIALISM



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Edited by

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### INTRODUCTION

Communism collapsed with remarkable and unpredicted\* rapidity, first in 1989 with the downfall of the Eastern European satellites, and then in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, the crucible of revolution. As with other world historical events, an accurate appraisal may await the passing of centuries. From our proximity, though, the nearly bloodless vanquishment of Communism, largely fomented, ironically, by Polish workers and disgruntled vanguards, cast a pall upon socialism, its ideological heritage, in all of its myriad forms. For socialists of every stripe, the fall of Communism necessitated a reexamination of their own variants of socialism, if only to distance them from the Communist model that had so conspicuously failed, if only to provide reassurance that socialism at its core remained relevant into the twenty-first century.

In this collection, twelve philosophers, historians, and political scientists—scholars with a diverse set of disciplinary and political leanings—assess aspects of socialism in light of its recent reversals. Some of the essays consider what made the socialist project seem compelling to its advocates, examining the moral and political values that made socialism appealing to intellectuals. Others evaluate whether there are aspects of socialism that ought to be preserved, such as its quest for equality and community. Some essays examine whether free-market systems need to be further modified in response to ongoing socialist critiques. Several others argue for the continuing validity of socialism in its social democratic incarnation, suggesting ways in which socialism may still have a productive future. Still others condemn the socialist project as inherently misguided in theory, while also portraying "really existing socialism" as cataclysmic in practice.

This volume opens with a passionate call for socialists to acknowledge and atone for the evils perpetrated in socialism's name. In "Can There Be an 'After Socialism'?" Alan Charles Kors argues that it is historically and morally premature to speak of an "after socialism," or even to expect that such a state will ever be attained. The deepest causes of socialism, Kors contends, remain active: Great prosperity still leads many to feel intense envy. Plans advocating the seizure and redistribution of wealth still provide political opportunists with a route to fulfilling their ambitions. The irrational goal of employing centralized planning to govern the lives of citizens still captivates the imagination of intellectuals. Even after the

<sup>\*</sup>Unpredicted, that is, by all but Andrei Amalrik; see Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).



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crimes of the Stalinist period were denounced by the Soviets themselves, Western socialists' disillusionment with socialism in power has been, above all, despair over the failure to actualize a socialist vision, not a recognition of socialism's inherent defects, particularly its refusal to respect the value of individual liberty. The double standard expressed by contemporary Western intellectuals in their responses to Nazi and Communist crimes—the evils of the Holocaust are seen as manifest and unmitigated, whereas the crimes of Communist regimes are often denied, ignored, or exculpated—is inhumane and sadly revealing. Kors concludes that until we muster the will to demand a full historical, intellectual, and moral accounting of socialism in power—an accounting of all the atrocities committed in socialism's name by Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tsetung, Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, Castro, and their followers—there will be no "after socialism."

The next three authors in this collection also advance critiques of socialism and its legacy. The collapse of socialism's most successful exemplar leads to an obvious question: Why did socialism fail? Chandran Kukathas addresses this question in his essay "The Cultural Contradictions of Socialism." Kukathas argues that socialism's failure stems from problems inherent in socialist theory. The socialist ideal envisages a society in which private interests no longer dominate, and in which the illusory democracy of class-based bourgeois politics has been replaced by a real and complete democracy. To move beyond bourgeois democracy, socialism advocates collective ownership of the means of production. Socialism as an economic system, however, proved in practice to fall victim to the calculation problem first articulated by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises and later refined by F. A. Hayek. Although the Austrians' critique was hotly contested by socialists, the economic mistakes and obvious failures of central planning in practice have now driven socialists to acknowledge that socialism does have a pricing problem and that markets need to function in some form under socialism in order to solve this problem. But Kukathas suggests that socialism still faces an insurmountable hurdle—namely, no plausible political strategy can both produce and maintain socialist results. On the one hand, most socialists reject dictatorship on the ground that it fails to provide citizens with "real" democracy. Yet the alternative to dictatorship, a pluralist politics, cannot be sustained if a government is to pursue socialist economic goals a pluralist political system will reject socialist policies. One of the few who has addressed this problem, David Miller, fails to rescue the socialist project from its theoretical quandary. As long as people will think for themselves, Kukathas concludes, no political ideology—socialism included—can win a permanent victory.

In "The Idol of History," James W. Ceaser is concerned about the extent to which socialist elements have taken root in other political theories. Ceaser analyzes the Communist doctrine of history, assessing the extent



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to which it has outlived socialism's retreat. A doctrine of history was critical to Communist thought: the idea that history was unfolding in a deterministic way that would guarantee the victory of Communism justified acts of untoward evil by the vanguard party. According to Communist doctrine, history is a meaning-laden process of events that form parts of a progression toward an ultimate end-state. A problematic corollary of this doctrine was that Communists felt that the past had little to teach them; because history is a progression and the future should be a higher, better state than the past, they felt that the past counted for little. Ceaser argues that important elements of this doctrine have infected modern liberalism. Though modern liberalism is diverse, Ceaser suggests that at least some liberals have come to view liberal democracy as the natural historical end-state. Liberalism, ironically, is increasingly taking on the historical doctrine held by its theoretical rival, an outcome that Ceaser finds troubling.

Socialism's critiques of capitalism have not abated with the downfall of the Soviet Union, but rather they have taken new forms, sometimes under new names. In "Backwards into the Future: Neorepublicanism as a Postsocialist Critique of Market Society," Gerald F. Gaus assesses "postsocialist" criticisms of market society leveled by prominent civic republicans and charges that these criticisms are misguided. Socialism, Gaus explains, has historically advanced two criticisms of capitalist markets: that they are instrumentally ineffective as a means of organizing a peaceful and prosperous economy, and that they are inherently unfree. In the aftermath of socialism's collapse, the first of these criticisms is almost universally rejected. However, Gaus notes, intellectuals continue to insist that market relations are unfree or otherwise morally tainted. Prominent among theorists who accept markets as instrumentally efficient but challenge their moral status are the neorepublicans Cass Sunstein and Philip Pettit. Gaus identifies three challenges that neorepublicans pose to defenders of markets. First, they argue, markets are characterized by imbalances of power, and this makes them realms of unfreedom. Second, markets take people's preferences for granted, but these are often nonautonomous (markets themselves can influence one's preferences, for instance) and can run contrary to individuals' best interests; accepting such preferences as given is, then, morally problematic. Third, markets allow trades that ought not-indeed, rationally cannot, given problems of value incommensurability-be made. Taking these objections in turn, Gaus shows that each is unpersuasive. Gaus stresses that a philosophical defense of market relations is needed, for a defense of markets based solely on their instrumental efficiency at providing goods will do little to persuade those who criticize markets on moral gronds. Yet even without such a defense from market advocates, Gaus concludes, the grounds on which civic republicans attack markets are themselves deeply flawed.



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Each of the next five essays in this collection defends either socialism itself or elements of socialist theory. In "What's Left of the Welfare State?" David Miller examines how well the welfare state fulfills traditional socialist objectives. Socialists, he states, can focus their attention either on collectivizing production or on collectivizing consumption. With production-oriented models of socialism (most conspicuously, the Soviet Union) in retreat, Miller suggests that socialism as a political project must advance a consumption model. Socialists who focus on consumption typically regard the modern welfare state as the main vehicle for socializing, and equalizing access to, the means of consumption. To assess the welfare state as a socialist project, Miller suggests that we must separate socialist justifications for it (such as appeals to equality and community) from liberal ones (such as appeals to providing insurance against risk and ensuring that all receive a social minimum). Once this distinction is understood, it seems that the welfare state does little to advance specifically socialist aims. The modern welfare state is not particularly egalitarian, and it does little to foster the sort of communitarian aims socialists crave. Miller next turns from his assessment of the welfare state to a consideration of whether or not three prominent alternatives to it that have received considerable attention should appeal to socialists. One alternative is that each person should receive a so-called capital stake upon reaching adulthood; a second is that each citizen should get an unconditional basic income; a third is that governments should tax individuals on the basis of their earning capacities (as opposed to their actual earnings). While each of these plans has some merit, Miller says, none really seems to be an adequate embodiment of socialist values.

The historical evolution of socialist thought in continental Europe provides the backdrop for Sheri Berman's "The Roots and Rationale of Social Democracy." Berman's discussion of socialism's development springs from her observation that two shibboleths dominate contemporary discussion about the future of the Left in advanced industrial democracies. The first is that globalization is creating a fundamentally new environment for leaders and publics, imposing burdens and constraining choices. The second is that traditional social democracy has played itself out as a political ideology, creating a vacuum which can and should be filled by some new progressive movement with greater contemporary relevance. Berman contends that, ironically, the very conditions that have led so many observers to proclaim social democracy's demise provide an excellent opportunity for a reassessment of its history and significance. This is because for all its purported novelty, the issue at the heart of the contemporary globalization debate-whether political forces can dominate economic ones or must bow before them—is in fact very old. Indeed, Berman demonstrates that social democracy emerged from a similar debate within the international socialist movement a century ago about the relative



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power and import of political and economic forces. It is because this history has been largely forgotten or misunderstood that contemporary discussions of social democracy are so superficial and intellectually impoverished. It is also why refreshing the democratic Left's collective memory, Berman argues, is so important.

Perhaps the most memorable variant of one of socialism's main themes is Marx's phrasing of the dictum, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." In "An Interpretation and Defense of the Socialist Principle of Distribution," Joseph H. Carens offers an interpretation of this principle and argues that it is a morally superior principle of distribution than those offered by liberalism or capitalism. Carens begins by discussing both clauses of the socialist principle, defending each against common criticisms. After briefly considering how the distinction between "needs" and "wants" influences interpretations of the second clause, he focuses his attention on the first one. This clause is particularly important, Carens posits, as the moral duty it invokes can potentially offer people in a socialist state the sort of motivation to engage in productive activity that income incentives provide in capitalist states. After discussing why the socialist duty to contribute—a duty that Carens defines as an obligation to take a full-time job and to make good use of one's talents-is useful from an egalitarian perspective, he moves on to argue that the duty is morally justifiable. Two sets of criticisms are often leveled against the duty. One focuses on the concern that the socialist ideal of distribution is unfair—for instance, on the ground that it fails to take into account people's varying preferences for work, leisure, and consumption. The other focuses on the claim that the socialist principle of duty is incompatible with freedom. On this sort of account, the idea that there is a collective ethos telling people what they have a duty to do runs contrary to liberal conceptions of freedom that require respect for pluralism and individual choice. By using thought experiments and assessing the relevant philosophical literature, Carens defends the socialist duty to contribute, arguing that it has the resources to meet both sets of criticisms.

The issue of incentives that Carens raises also emerges in Norman Barry's "Some Feasible Alternatives to Conventional Capitalism." Contemporary socialists, Barry notes, have had to absorb so much of the teachings of market economics and neoliberal social theory that socialist doctrines appear outmoded. In his essay, however, Barry demonstrates that certain socialist projects can be compatible with the conditions necessary for prosperity and freedom. For instance, socialists' redistributive goals would be better achieved by taxing land rents (that is, income received by landowners over and above that needed to induce them to use the land for productive economic activity) than it would be by using traditional methods of egalitarian redistribution. Following the doctrine of social philosopher Henry George, Barry suggests that taxing rental income would effectively challenge ownership rights, and that the result-



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ing redistribution of rental income could in fact advance the important idea of self-ownership. After noting that this argument should not be extended in the Rawlsian direction of taxing the alleged rental income that people acquire from their natural talents, Barry turns to consider an important alternative to conventional capitalism's reliance on the modern capitalist firm—the mutual. A mutual is a business entity owned not by stockholders, but by "owner-members" who, with no outside ownership to answer to, share all the profits and risks of their collaborative enterprise. Barry suggests that recent regulatory actions by modern governments have threatened the viability of mutuals; this bleak future, he says, is a serious problem, given that the structure of mutuals allows them to occasionally outperform modern capitalist firms.

Like Barry, William A. Galston looks to combine elements of the socialist tradition with contemporary liberal practices. Whereas Barry suggests numerous practical policies, Galston, in "After Socialism: Mutualism and a Progressive Market Strategy," suggests a theoretical blending of views. Galston begins by examining lessons from the recent history of the relationship between socialism, markets, and liberal democracy. On Galston's view, socialism collapsed because the practices of socialist leaders and parties clashed with their professed ideals, and because socialist society proved incompatible with citizens' rising demands for individual freedom and collective self-determination. Examining empirical evidence, Galston contends that markets are a necessary condition for democracy, though not a sufficient one. Galston moves on to lay out the theoretical components of "mutualism," a view he posits as being an alternative to both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism. The core concepts of mutualism include individualism, value pluralism, individual and social responsibility, and a view of human nature in which people combine self-regard with regard for others. After discussing mutualism's commitments, Galston illustrates the approach's impact on public policy. Specifically, a mutualist progressive market strategy favors policies that coordinate individual and social responsibility in line with a principle of reciprocity. Contemporary examples of such policies include the United States' Americorps program, which uses national service as a precondition for certain forms of financial aid, and the Clinton-era reforms of U.S. welfare policy, which tied aid more directly to recipients' behavior. Galston ends his essay by considering what remains of socialism. The answer, he thinks, is that socialism contains a distinctive conception of society and an understanding of mutual responsibility, elements that his strategy of mutualism embraces without also accepting the rest of socialism's theoretical difficulties.

The final three essays each contain visions, socialist or otherwise, of how the future will unfold. In "Sovereignty, Commerce, and Cosmopolitanism: Lessons from Early America for the Future of the World," John Tomasi focuses on how the demise of socialism might lead liberal theo-



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rists to engage in deeper study of the American founding. If liberalism comes after socialism, Tomasi asks, what institutions might liberalism require if it is to be established on a global scale? Tomasi explores answers to this question by bringing together insights from philosophy, international relations theory, and early American history. Those pursuing the implementation of a global liberal federalism often look to the unification of the states in early America as a model for the unification of contemporary nation-states on a global or regional scale. Tomasi elucidates and defends this analogy, and in addition emphasizes the importance of Anti-Federalist positions held at America's founding and illustrates how certain positions on contemporary globalization are analogous to the Anti-Federalists' views. Some international relations theorists see the global expansion of capitalism as bringing a new spatial epoch, an epoch in which the connection between political power and territorial space is increasingly unsettled. Tomasi uses the case of early America to explore these "postterritorial" considerations, in particular by focusing on recent historical scholarship on the colonial frontier areas or "middle ground." Tomasi then examines several contemporary problems of supranational governance by considering the analogy between the founding of America and contemporary globalization.

Jeremy Shearmur argues that, in the future, realms of voluntary choice could help proponents of market socialism and liberalism respond to the arguments of critics of market relations. His essay, "Beyond Fear and Greed?" opens with a discussion of an argument by socialist philosopher G. A. Cohen. Cohen argues that market relations are morally objectionable on the ground that they coordinate social behavior through appeals to individuals' fear and greed. Shearmur agrees with Cohen that this criticism has force, and contends that part of why it hits home is because proponents of markets such as Hayek and Mises reaffirm in their writings what Shearmur calls "the Mandevillian tradition"—the idea that morally problematic individual behavior can be harnessed to produce desirable social outcomes. Exploring the Mandevillian tradition with an eye toward alleviating some of its less desirable features, Shearmur asks whether we can develop partial alternatives to market mechanisms that can coordinate social arrangements in large-scale societies. Surveying an array of sources— Robert Putnam's work on volunteers, Richard Titmuss's writings on "the gift relationship," and literature on residents' associations and the Disneyrun community of Celebration, Florida-Shearmur suggests that people might choose to have their living arrangements (and, to a degree, their characters) shaped so as to bring about the large-scale results that they favor. By offering ways in which groups can pursue virtue within the confines of Mandevillian society, Shearmur contends, this route to social change provides a partial response to Cohen's "fear and greed" criticism.

In "Liberalism's Divide, After Socialism and Before," Jacob T. Levy traces important currents in liberal theory—currents that may come to the



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fore now that socialism has fallen and liberalism seems ascendant. Levy begins by considering contemporary debates as to whether it is autonomy or toleration that ought to be seen as the rightful foundation of liberalism. Levy links this debate to a broader dichotomy in the history of liberal thought. On the one hand, there is a pluralist strand of liberalism, exemplified by Montesquieu, Burke, Tocqueville, and Acton, that is friendly to the local traditions, customs, groups, and institutions that are intermediate between citizens and national governments. On the other hand, liberalism also has a rationalist strand, one that includes Voltaire, Paine, Kant, and Mill, which is hostile to the sorts of injustices that can be fostered by the intermediate traditions and agencies that the pluralists hold dear. The importance of this tension was for a time eclipsed by the argument between libertarian and welfarist liberals, Levy maintains, but it is coming to the forefront as liberal political theorists turn away from questions of distribution toward questions of culture, religion, and association. Tracing the differing arguments and justifications offered by pluralist and rationalist liberals, Levy shows that the tension between these groups does not map neatly onto the libertarian/welfarist divide. The upshot of this is that both of these latter groups will have to confront the long-standing questions posed by the pluralist/rationalist divide.

The twelve essays in this volume address socialism's practical failures, theoretical defects, as well as its considerable historical tenacity. In reevaluating socialism's past and speculating on its future as an alternative to resurgent capitalism, these essays address issues that will be of pivotal importance in the decades to come.



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