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Excerpt

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## CAN THERE BE AN “AFTER SOCIALISM”?

BY ALAN CHARLES KORS

There is no “after socialism.” There will not be in our or in our children’s lifetimes an “after socialism.” In the wake of the Holocaust and the ruins of Nazism, anti-Semitism lay low a bit, embarrassed by its worst manifestation, its actual exercise of state dominion. In the wake of the collapse of Communism, socialism’s only real and full experience of power, socialism too lays low for just a moment. Socialism’s causes in the West, however, remain ever with us, the product of the convergence of two extraordinary achievements: liberal free enterprise and political democracy. The former creates wealth that has transformed all human possibility, but it also gives rise to particularly deep envy. The latter allows ambition a route to power by an appeal to the democratic state to seize and redistribute wealth in the name of social equality. As Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises understood perfectly, the bounty of free enterprise leads the unproductive to believe that such wealth is a fact of nature, there for the taking.

Socialism means the abolition of private property, profit, and voluntary exchange. It means the organization of the production and distribution of goods and services—that is, of the fruits of human invention, innovation, thought, risk, talent, and labor—by political planners who allegedly know both what people need and how to satisfy that need. It means the expropriation and allotment of wealth according to those planners’ sense of value. Socialism may be understood by any child. It is taking other people’s stuff. It is also the rash and ignorant slaughter of the goose that lays the golden eggs. That story is folkloric and enduring, however, precisely because it reflects something deep in human nature. Thus, one only could speak realistically of an “after socialism” if one eliminated envy, resentment, force, irrationalism, and political ambition from our affairs. That, however, would be in another world.

It will not be difficult—it already is not difficult—for socialism to change its now quaint name a bit, where necessary, while still forging resentment, ambition, fantasy, and the mania for planning other people’s lives into a powerful political, economic, and ultimately cultural agenda. The full dream and millennial religion of nineteenth-century socialism perhaps no longer moves either masses, masters, or martyrs, but its underlying impulses and values remain potent and active. Politicians and demagogues, “after socialism,” do and will appeal successfully against property, profit, economic liberty, and “the market.” It was “after socialism” that Lionel Jospin and his Socialist Party swept to power in France on the platform of

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creating jobs by reducing the allowable work week at the same rate of pay. It is “after socialism” that “the Third Way” has achieved such prominence, one of the abandoned “ways” being reliance upon the economic liberty of voluntary exchange. It is “after socialism” that we see the most classically liberal society in the world drawn toward the central planning of health care and pharmaceutical distribution. It is “after socialism” that we see more and more control of economic life given to international boards of alleged experts. This occurs in the midst of the supposed triumph of free enterprise occasioned by the catastrophe of centralized economic regimes. To believe that the future will be less susceptible than the present to demagoguery, envy, and the myth of planning would be a foolish act of faith. It is by no means clear to whom the future belongs.

One should heed Mises’s preface to the second English edition (1951) of his magisterial work on socialism, *Die Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus* (1922). Mises warned us not to confuse “mutual rivalries among the various totalitarian movements”—the struggle between statist anti-Communists (e.g., New Dealers and Western European socialists) and Communists—with the deeper “great ideological conflict of our age”—the struggle between supporters of “a market economy” and supporters of “totalitarian government control.”<sup>1</sup> Mises was wrong, in historical context, to minimize in any way the conflict between New Dealers and Western European socialists, on the one hand, and Bolsheviks, on the other, because the very possibility of human liberty depended upon the defeat of Communism. He was also wrong to argue, in the face of a Communism for which living human beings were nothing but a means toward an end, that it did not matter very much which set of social and economic engineers controlled the apparatus of the planning state. Mises never seemed fully to understand—if to understand at all—the indivisibility of self-ownership in all spheres and of economic liberty. In the long run, however, he was right that freedom still depended ultimately on the outcome of the struggle between private property, private enterprise, voluntary production, and voluntary exchange, on the one hand, and central planning, on the other.

Hayek and Mises were at one in believing that central planning had an economic, social, ideological, cultural, historical, and, ultimately, totalizing logic. In terms of fundamental economic theory, they both understood the obviousness of what appeared inane to most contemporary Western intellectuals: that the more complex a society and economy, the more impossible and incoherent the task of central planning becomes. Without the price mechanism to reflect the choices of individuals, there is no efficacious way to discover and allocate economic knowledge or to harmonize the activities of disparate actors toward human satisfaction. More

<sup>1</sup> Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis*, trans. J. Kahane (Indianapolis, IN: LibertyClassics, 1979), 1–2.

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deeply, in terms of the most profound consequences for human life and society, both Hayek and Mises understood that central planning placed us, in Hayek's phrase, on "the road to serfdom."

In the late 1920s, Communists began to distinguish analytically between "socialism" and "communism." Departing from Marx, who certainly appeared to use the terms interchangeably, the Communist Party of the USSR—and, hence, the world Communist movement—argued that "socialism" was a transitional stage between capitalism and a final "communism." In some sense, Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* (1944)—though much, much more than this—was a sustained argument that independent of intention, "democratic socialism" also could only be transitional toward something else.<sup>2</sup> It would not be toward utopia, however, but ineluctably toward something akin to Soviet Communism, the totalitarianism that was the final stage of the abolition of economic and social liberty.

At the heart of this argument lay Hayek's chilling, inductively correct, and, in its predictive reach, prescient chapter, "Why the Worst Get on Top." Hayek argued that it was no accident of time or place, specific to Nazism or Bolshevism, that the concentration of power over all life in a centrally planned society attracted and rewarded the morally worst. Persons of what views, personalities, and behaviors would succeed politically in a collectivist system? In Hayek's view, they would be the strong and aggressive. They would be the least scrupulous about the choice of means. They would be men who attracted and coalesced around them the simultaneously submissive and ruthless. They would be demagogues who could rally the docile, gullible, and passive. They would be leaders who skillfully divided society into a "we" and a dangerous "they" and who succeeded, also, in linking socialism to a virulent and popular nationalism and antic cosmopolitanism. Above all, they would be those who took power not as a necessary evil, but as the very goal itself.<sup>3</sup>

In a competitive society, Hayek reasoned, economic and political power were split, and no one could have more than a fraction of the breathtaking dominion available to those who planned the economic, social, educational, and cultural lives of a society in its totality. Economic power over the whole life of another person, however, centralized as political power, created a society of virtual slaves. It is slavemasters who seek to rule slaves, in a society in which the ruler's decisions about "the good of the whole" override all the prescriptions and prohibitions of individualist ethics and law. In such a society, those with concrete ideals of right and wrong will flee the immediate service of a ruler. Those "literally capable of everything," in Hayek's words, will rise to positions just below a ruler whose primary passion in life is the love of being obeyed. It is not just that the indulgent, principled, and restrained will not find power in a collec-

<sup>2</sup> F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 134–52.

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tivist society, but that the very worst alone will succeed. Whatever the ideals, whatever the initial intentions, whatever the source of early socialist conviction, there are systemic institutional and psychological reasons why socialism will always lead to serfdom and the sacrifice of multitudes.<sup>4</sup>

Hayek's analysis has never been the common view in the West, and least of all in political Europe and in American intellectual circles. The collapse of the European Communist regimes would only entail disillusionment with the substance of socialism under other names if the latter were linked, in the Western mind, to the catastrophic experience of the former. There is no reason to believe that this has occurred. Let us examine, for a point of reference, the first wave of significant disillusionment that swept across Europe and the West in the 1930s in response to the perceived "excesses" of Stalinism or, indeed, to the sense that it had not succeeded in accomplishing the Bolshevik dream. Note well, to understand the nature of such intellectual anti-Stalinism, that in the case of Nazism, there were no significant works that spoke of "disillusionment" because national socialism had failed to fulfill appropriately the rightful ideal of tribalism, exclusive and expansive nationalism, the corporate state, and the führer principle. The anti-Communist texts of greatest appeal to Western intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s, however, generally reached the conclusion that Communism had failed to achieve the rightful socialist ideal. Although many reached to the existential autonomy of the individual's experience, not one of them concluded on behalf of classical liberal society and its system of private property, free enterprise, voluntary exchange, and individual rights.

George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* (1938) celebrated above all, as the antithesis of Communism, the anarcho-syndicalism that he saw as the most antiliberal strata of the Spanish Left. Communism, in contrast, was decidedly "bourgeois." Orwell's ineffable *1984* (1949) touched on the personal liberty of the private life and the life of the mind, but not on the economic liberty that has been the greatest friend of both. The final tragedy of his brilliant *Animal Farm* (1945) was that the leadership of the revolution has become just like the bourgeoisie. Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (1940)—the deepest, most moving, and most compelling analysis and criticism of Communist moral logic ever penned on the Left—dreamed of a future in which the socialist struggle against "economic fatality" would be joined to a universal sense of humanity and absolute ethics.

Few anti-Communist works have had more influence or a longer shelf life than *The God That Failed* (1949), edited by Richard Crossman, the British socialist and Labour Member of Parliament.<sup>5</sup> The essays of polit-

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> R. H. S. Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed* (New York: Harper, 1949).

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ical disillusionment in this anthology are stunning pieces. They explain more compellingly and empathetically than any other work the appeal of Communism to its intellectual devotees. They make vivid and credible the nightmarish experience of participation in the Communist movement (or of fellow-traveling) during the interwar period, the cognitive dissonance of remaining involved long after one should have seen the betrayal of one's ideals, and the pain and moral necessity of a final break. They also conclude, every one of them, with an ongoing rejection of a liberal, and, above all, an economically liberal society.

Crossman's introduction made plain that the appeal of Marxism was that "it exploded liberal fallacies—which really were fallacies." He depicted the intellectual underpinnings of free enterprise as the belief in "automatic Progress" and the denial "that boom and bust are inherent in capitalism." He determined that "no intelligent man after 1917" could have chosen liberal "dogma," and given only two choices, any honest mind would have chosen Communism. Fortunately, however, Crossman opined, "two world wars and two totalitarian revolutions" had taught the Western democracies of their need "to provide an alternative to world revolution by planning the co-operation of free peoples."<sup>6</sup>

In his essay in *The God That Failed*, Koestler compared his time with the Communist Party to Jacob's finding himself with Leah, not the beloved and beautiful Rachel. Communism, he claimed, presented itself under false appearances. He hoped that he, like Jacob, would be given, after appropriate labor, the reality of Rachel.<sup>7</sup> Ignazio Silone spoke of his "faith in Socialism" being "more alive than ever in me." Socialist theories, he decided, were transient and unimportant. "Socialist values," on the other hand, were "permanent," and on the basis of them, "one can found a culture, a civilization, a new way of living together among men."<sup>8</sup> Richard Wright concluded of the Communists, "They're blind. . . . Their enemies have blinded them with too much oppression." Nevertheless, he said to himself, "I'll be for them, even though they are not for me."<sup>9</sup>

André Gide, whose essay in Crossman's anthology was taken from his *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* (1936) and his *Retouches à mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* (1937), was disillusioned with Communism both because of its trampling of artistic independence and, above all, because he found in the Soviet Union "privileges and differences where I hoped to find equality." Soviet workers, he noted, "are no longer exploited by shareholding capitalists, but nevertheless they are exploited," and "all the bourgeois vices and failings are still dormant, in spite of the Revolution." Stalin's Russia, for

<sup>6</sup> The quotations in this paragraph are from R. H. S. Crossman, "Introduction," in *ibid.*, 1–11.

<sup>7</sup> Arthur Koestler, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 74–75.

<sup>8</sup> Ignazio Silone, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 113–14.

<sup>9</sup> Richard Wright, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 157–62.

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Gide, was “the same old capitalist society.”<sup>10</sup> In his essay, Louis Fischer turned to Gandhi, not Western democratic socialism, and called for a “Double Rejection” of competing liberal and Communist systems.<sup>11</sup> Stephen Spender was emphatic in his own form of double rejection. Although he held out no hope for Communism, he felt that “if it could achieve internationalism and the socialization of the means of production, [it] might establish a world which would not be a mass of automatic economic contradictions.” He assured his readers that “no criticism of the Communists removes the arguments against capitalism.” Indeed, he argued that “America, the greatest capitalist country, seems to offer no alternative to war, exploitation, and destruction of the world’s resources.”<sup>12</sup>

Indeed, “socialism” almost never has been judged, as a goal and value, by the experience of Communism in power. Like the Marxists themselves, however, Hayek rightly asked his century to judge forms of human society not by their ideals, but by their living incarnations. Let us do this. The goal of socialism was to reap the cultural, scientific, creative, and communal rewards of abolishing private property and free markets, and to end human tyranny. Using the command of the state, Communism sought to create this socialist society. What in fact occurred was the achievement of power by a group of inhumane despots: Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, Castro, Mengitsu, Ceaucescu, Hoxha, and so on, and so on. On the whole, these despots ruled (and some still rule, personally or dynastically) until old age. Traditionalist societies were supposed to be the ones that valued the aged, but revolutionary societies gave us undreamed-of lessons in gerontocracy. Hayek didn’t know the half of it in 1944: “the worst” loved and clung on to ruthless power at all costs. We are invited now to discuss what follows these tyrants, and what lessons we have learned from them, and what sort of world might emerge from the loss of belief in Communism. There is one problem, however: the bodies.

We are surrounded by slain innocents, and the scale is wholly new. This is not the thousands killed during the Inquisition; it is not the thousands of American lynching. This is not the six million dead from Nazi extermination. The best scholarship yields numbers that the mind must try to comprehend: scores, and scores, and scores, and scores of *millions* of bodies.<sup>13</sup> All around us. If we count those who died of starvation during Communists’ experiments with human interactions—twenty to forty mil-

<sup>10</sup> André Gide, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 179–95.

<sup>11</sup> Louis Fischer, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 225–28.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Spender, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 265–77.

<sup>13</sup> Of so few works of scholarship may one say that it is indispensable to honest debate in one’s time. The following book, with its documentation, is just that: Stéphane Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). For the numbers of Soviet dead, see also Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), which makes use of data made available by *glasnost*.



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lion in three years in China alone<sup>14</sup>—we may add scores of millions more. Shot; dead by deliberate exposure; starved; and murdered in work camps and prisons meant to extract every last fiber of labor from human beings and then kill them. And all around us, widows and widowers and orphans.

No cause, ever, in the history of all mankind, has produced more cold-blooded tyrants, more slaughtered innocents, and more orphans than socialism with power. It surpassed, exponentially, all other systems of production in turning out the dead. The bodies are all around us. And here is the problem: No one talks about them. No one honors them. No one does penance for them. No one has committed suicide for having been an apologist for those who did this to them. No one pays for them. No one is hunted down to account for them. It is exactly what Solzhenitsyn foresaw in *The Gulag Archipelago*: "No, no one would have to answer. No one would be looked into."<sup>15</sup> Until that happens, there is no "after socialism."

The West accepts an epochal, monstrous, unforgivable double standard. We rehearse the crimes of Nazism almost daily, we teach them to our children as ultimate historical and moral lessons, and we bear witness to every victim. We are, with so few exceptions, almost silent on the crimes of Communism. So the bodies lie among us, unnoticed, everywhere. We insisted upon "de-Nazification," and we excoriate those who tempered it in the name of new or emerging political realities. There never has been and never will be a similar "de-Communization," although the slaughter of innocents was exponentially greater, and although those who signed the orders and ran the camps remain. In the case of Nazism, we hunt down ninety-year-old men because "the bones cry out" for justice. In the case of Communism, we insisted on "no witch hunts"—let the dead bury the living. But the dead can bury no one.

Our artists rightly obsess on the lesser but still immeasurable Holocaust, which lasted several years, and when we watch "Night and Fog," "Shoah," "Schindler's List," and almost countless other films, we weep, we lament, and we rededicate the humane parts of our souls. The greater Communist holocaust, which lasted decade after decade—the great charnel house of human history—educes no such art. Its one tender, modest film, "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," based on Solzhenitsyn's novel, is almost never replayed and cannot be found for purchase. The Communist holocaust should have brought forth a flowering of Western art, and witness, and sympathy. It should have called forth an overflowing ocean of tears. Instead, it has called forth a glacier of indifference. Kids who in the 1960s had portraits of Mao and Che on their college walls—the moral equivalent of having hung portraits of Hitler, Goebbels,

<sup>14</sup> Courtois et al., *The Black Book of Communism*, 487–96; see also the works and articles to which this part of the book refers.

<sup>15</sup> Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956*, trans. Harry Willetts (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 3:482.

or Horst Wessel in one's dorm—now teach our children about the moral superiority of their political generation. Every historical textbook lingers on the crimes of Nazism, seeks their root causes, and announces a lesson that should be learned. Everyone knows the number “six million.” By contrast, it is always “the mistakes” of Communism or of Stalinism (repeated, by mistake, again, and again, and again). Ask college freshmen how many died under Stalin's regime, and they will answer, even now, “Thousands? Tens of thousands?” This is the equivalent of believing that Hitler killed “hundreds” of Jews. The scandal of such ignorance does not derive from this or that textbook, but from an intellectual culture's willful blindness to the catastrophe of its relative sympathies. Chile offered refuge and asylum to Erich Honecker, the tyrant of East Germany who wanted the tanks in the streets—it is time to bury the past without rancor, everyone said—but clamors now for “justice” for Augusto Pinochet. On the same day that Spain indicted Chile's Pinochet, it welcomed, with honors, Cuba's Castro, while Castro's critics or naysayers—or any groups, like gays, that annoyed the tyrant—lie dead, rot in prison, or try to recover from the deadly work camps to which he sent them. Most of Europe has outlawed the neo-Nazis, but the French Communist Party has been, from 1999 to 2002, part of a ruling government. One may not fly the swastika, but one may hoist the hammer and sickle at official events. The denial of Hitler's dead or the minimization of the Jewish Holocaust is, literally, a crime in most of Europe. In contrast, the denial or minimization of Communist crimes is an intellectual and political art form. The most recent of Communist mass murderers, Pol Pot and his Communist Khmer Rouge, enslaved a people and slaughtered a fifth to a fourth of the entire Cambodian population (as if an American regime had murdered some fifty-six to seventy million of its people). Pol Pot learned his politics in Paris from the French Left, and he was supported, above all, by his Chinese Communist patrons. The consensus about him today, however, is that he was an aberrational creation not of his beliefs, values, and allies, but of American bombing on behalf of anti-Communism in Indochina. The bones of Cambodia and the millions who risked death to flee Communist Vietnam and Laos for an uncertain life anywhere else tell us about the value—though not the tactical wisdom—of the anti-Communist cause there too. “Antifascist” is a term of honor, where “anti-Communist” is a term of ridicule and abuse. Therefore the dead lie among us, ignored, and anyone with moral eyes sees them, by their absence from our moral consciousness, spilling naked out of the television and movie screens, frozen in pain in our classrooms, and sprawled, unburied, across our politics and our culture. They sit next to us at our conferences. There could not have been an “after Nazism” without the recognition, the accounting, the justice, and the remembrance. Until we deal with the Communist dead, there is no “after socialism.”

The record is truly plain. Socialism, wherever it actually had the means to plan a society, to pursue efficaciously its vision of the abolition of



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private property, economic inequality, and the allocation of capital and goods by free markets, culminated in the crushing of individual, economic, religious, associational, and political liberty. Its collectivization of agriculture alone led to untold suffering, scarcity, and contempt for property as the fruit of labor. It was, at its best, the ability, through horror and servitude, to build Gary, Indiana once, without the good stuff, and without the ability even to maintain it. Socialism in power produced relative poverty, murderous inefficiency, arbitrary inequality, cronyism, enslavement, concentration camps, torture, terror, the destruction of civil society, ecological disaster, brutal secret police, and systemic tyranny. Everywhere it ruled, there were, beyond our ability to comprehend their courage or their suffering, those who endured solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, the sadistic infliction of pain, and slow or rapid death because they said "No," because they criticized their rulers, because they would not denounce their friends and colleagues, or simply because they annoyed, for whatever reason—even with a joke—a Communist with power. Until we come to terms with all these crimes and victims, there will be no "after socialism." To be moral beings, we must acknowledge these awful things appropriately and bear witness to the responsibilities of these most murderous times. Until socialism—like Nazism or fascism confronted by the death camps and the slaughter of innocents—is confronted with its lived reality, the greatest atrocities of all recorded human life, we will not live "after socialism."

It will not happen. The pathology of Western intellectuals has committed them to an adversarial relationship with the culture—free markets and individual rights—that has produced the greatest alleviation of suffering, the greatest liberation from want, ignorance, and superstition, and the greatest increase of bounty and opportunity in the history of all human life. No one has explained the etiology of this pathology adequately, although it constitutes one of the deepest flaws and tragedies of societies based on free markets and individual rights, the most radically progressive civilizations that the planet has seen thus far. It is a pathology that with each passing decade becomes coarser and more detached from any principle of reality.

This pathology allows Western intellectuals to step around the Everest of bodies of the victims of Communism without a tear, a scruple, a regret, an act of contrition, or a reevaluation of self, soul, and mind. In his essay in *The God That Failed*, Spender noted that it was a general human moral failure to treat in categorically different fashion the various victims of history. He meant his observation, correctly, to describe the adherents of all ideologies and political camps, but his judgment is vital to understanding why Communism's countless bodies—the Holocaust at least ten times over—can remain among us. When men pursue a political course, Spender wrote, human beings who stand with them become "vivid and real . . . real human beings with flesh and blood and sympathies like

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yourself." By contrast, those who stand in the way of their cause become "abstractions . . . tiresome, unreasonable, unnecessary theses, whose lives are so many false statements." In the first case, they see "corpses"; in the second case, they see "words."<sup>16</sup> We and our children are educated, entertained, instructed, informed, and given art by individuals who do not see this unspeakable mass of piled bodies, but see only words about them.

The cognitive behavior of Western intellectuals faced with the accomplishments of their own society, on the one hand, and with the socialist ideal and then the socialist reality, on the other, takes one's breath away. In the midst of unparalleled social mobility in the West, they cry "caste." In a society of munificent goods and services, they cry either "poverty" or "consumerism." In a society of ever richer, more varied, more productive, more self-defined, and more satisfying lives, they cry "alienation." In a society that has liberated women, racial minorities, religious minorities, and gays and lesbians to an extent that no one could have dreamed possible just fifty years ago, they cry "oppression." In a society of boundless private charity, they cry "avarice." In a society in which hundreds of millions have been free riders upon the risk, knowledge, and capital of others, they decry the "exploitation" of the free riders. In a society that broke, on behalf of merit, the seemingly eternal chains of station by birth, they cry "injustice." In the names of fantasy worlds and mystical perfections, they have closed themselves to the Western, liberal miracle of individual rights, individual responsibility, merit, and human satisfaction. Like Marx, they put words like "liberty" in quotation marks when these refer to the West. Note well, of course, that when an enemy arose that truly hated Western intellectuals—fascism and Nazism—and whose defeat depended upon the West's self-belief, intellectuals had no difficulty at all in defining and indeed popularizing a contest between good and evil.

This intellectual behavior is a pathology that freezes time selectively to suit its purposes. The first economic dislocations of capitalist industrialization became the intellectuals' model for the future that would emerge from such dynamism, as if one should ignore the process that raised previously unimaginable numbers of human beings to a dignified, free life, protected as never before from helplessness before nature and men. Russia from 1914 to 1917 became frozen for all time, with war and Rasputin being the only alternative to Stalinism, as if the curve of Russian economic and social development by the early twentieth century did not point to energetic and promising change. Once able to mobilize large numbers at any moment, Communists were given a right to permanent and absolute power, as if the Republican Party of 1920, which at least won an honest election, had gained a permanent right to govern America and

<sup>16</sup> Spender, essay in Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed*, 253.