Introduction

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the viability of the Ch'ing dynasty was severely tested. Massive internal uprisings, defeat in two foreign wars, and continued external threats could have toppled the two-century-old Manchu ruling house. Only the timely emergence of 'a galaxy of extraordinarily able officials' saved it from extinction.[1] They put down the rebellions, worked hard at reconstruction, attempted to upgrade the bureaucracy, and tried to restore the old order. To block further imperialist inroads, they adopted aspects of Western diplomatic practices and military technology. By dint of dedication and effort, these men tried to bring about a dynastic revival – the Ch'ing Restoration – and prolonged the life of the dynasty by half a century.

This book is about one of those 'extraordinary able officials' whose life and career were an integral part of the late Ch'ing experience. This man was Shen Pao-chen (1820–79), who began his journey to the top of Ch'ing officialdom after passing the civil service examinations. At the relatively young age of forty-one (1862), he was already the governor of an important province in the rich Yangtze valley. Then, in 1867, abandoning the security of high office and the chance for an early promotion to the rank of governor-general, he accepted the leadership of China's first fully fledged modern naval dockyard and held that position for more than eight years. His career closed with a four-year term as governor-general of Liang Kiang, which comprised the key provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kiangsi. He was thus a pivotal person of the period; his public life touched almost all of the important aspects of the Ch'ing Restoration. But before we can begin discussing the man, we

1 Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874*, second printing (Stanford, Calif., 1962), p. 312. Unless otherwise stated, all references to this work are to the second printing.

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must take stock of our inherited understanding of the Restoration itself and to examine the potential for change in late Ch'ing China.

The Ch'ing Restoration

No discussion of the Ch'ing Restoration would be complete without reference to Mary Wright's magisterial work, first published in 1957.[2] In it she argues that the Restoration was essentially a conservative movement; its thrust was to revamp and revitalize the old Confucian order. The cultivation of and search for good, moral men in government and the restoration of the agrarian economy were central to the entire effort. There were innovations, however. They involved, on a limited scale, improvement of the traditional armed forces, including some use and manufacture of Western arms, and new means for handling foreign affairs. The military undertakings are subsumed by scholars under the rubric 'Self-strengthening Movement' (*tzu-ch'iang yün-tung*), and those associated with the use of Western methods or technology are known as *yang-wu* (literally, Western matters or Western affairs). But these innovations were promoted or tolerated only because they were deemed necessary for preserving the old order, not its modernization. Thus, even though the Western powers, under the 'Co-operative Policy', created a favourable international environment for China's modernization, the Restoration leaders could not halt the dynastic decline. By the time the Co-operative Policy was discarded in 1869 and 1870 (the rejection of the Alcock Convention and the Tientsin Massacre), all the signs of failure had become, or were soon to become, apparent. Wright therefore concludes that the requirements of Confucian stability were not compatible with the demands of modernization. The Restoration was doomed to failure.

That the Restoration failed is not in question – the degree of the failure is. Most of the controversies among historians, however, focus on the causes of failure. In recent years, Wright's central thesis that Confucianism was incompatible with modernization has been challenged. Wang Erh-min, for example, contends that Confucianism and Western learning, especially Western science and technology, were not at all incompatible: some scholars of the early nineteenth century were quite receptive to Western scientific ideas, and a few even applauded Western political institutions.[3] Other historians also conclude that Confucian

2 Ibid.
3 Wang Erh-min, 'Ju-chia ch'uan-t'ung yü chin-tai Chung-Hsi ssu-ch'ao chih hui-t'ung', *Hsin-ya hsüeh-shu chi-k'an*, no. 2 (1979), 163–78.

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values were not in themselves an obstacle to change and, in some cases, were an adequate basis for the formulation of new ideas.[4]

In the realm of implementation, Kwang-ching Liu points out some real successes – there had been a 'reassertion of the essential features of the Ch'ing polity . . . [and] despite certain necessary adjustments, the inherited institutions persisted'.[5] There were failures, he admits, but what really prevented the Restoration from developing into a more effective reform movement was the opposition of the high authorities. The flexibility granted the officials by the throne during the Taiping era was quickly replaced by a return to rigid adherence to rules and regulations.[6]

As the debate continues, our attention is also drawn to the ideology and self-interests of specific elite groups, the role of the gentry and of the various strata of government, the throne, the powerful provincial leaders (regionalism), institutional inertia, the impact of imperialism, and the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional economy.

On the ideology and self-interests of elite groups, Jonathan Ocko argues that a key to understanding the Restoration lies in the way reform-minded scholar-officials analysed and dealt with the problems of government.[7] These officials, informed by the School of Practical Statecraft (*ching-shih*), clung for too long to the preconceived notion that effective government depended largely on administrative measures and the selection of moral men. They failed to get at the root of China's problems – the social inequities among the traditional elites. They ignored both the personal ambitions of the nonofficial scholar-gentry class and its desire for reform, especially in improving local government. The two groups thus competed as much as they co-operated, particularly in the areas of tax collection and local control. A weak imperial institution, represented by a boy-emperor and his regents led by Prince Kung and

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4 Lü Shih-ch'iang, 'Feng Kuei-fen ti cheng-chih ssu-hsiang', *Chung-hua wen-hua fu-hsing yüeh-k'an*, 4.2 (February 1971), 1–8; Liu Kwang-ching, 'Nineteenth-Century China: The Disintegration of the Old Order and the Impact of the West', in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago, 1968), vol. 1, book 1, p. 142; Albert Feuerwerker, 'Economic Aspects of Reform', and Saundra Sturdevant, 'Imperialism, Sovereignty, and Self-strengthening: A Reassessment of the 1870s', both in Paul A. Cohen and John E. Schrecker, eds., *Reform in Nineteenth-century China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), pp. 36 and 67; Shannon R. Brown, 'The Ewo Filature: A Study in the Transfer of Technology to China in the 19th Century', *Technology and Culture*, 20.3 (July 1979), 550–68.
5 Kwang-ching Liu, 'The Ch'ing Restoration', in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, *Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911*, part 1 (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 477–8.
6 Ibid. The Restoration failed particularly to improve the quality of local government.
7 Jonathan K. Ocko, *Bureaucratic Reform in Provincial China: Ting Jih-ch'ang in Restoration Kiangsu, 1867–1870* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, was in no position to provide direction or support to either group for innovative change. Ocko thus lays the blame on the self-interests as well as a fatal blind spot in the intellectual heritage of the reforming officials.

Inevitably, different sociopolitical groups perceived the Restoration differently and chose their course of action accordingly. For instance, the gentry of Soochow, in James Polachek's view, simply used the Restoration as an opportunity to seize power from the local government. The resulting conflict then largely nullified the effort of dynastic revival.[8] Yet the study of the gentry's activism does not always yield a bleak picture. Philip Kuhn, for example, acknowledges the growing power of the gentry during and after the Taiping era, but stresses that the local elite were, at the same time, brought into the formal structure of local government at the expense of rapacious clerks and runners. Such a development, in fact, was quite in tune with the Restoration objective of revitalizing local government.[9]

The growth of powerful regional leaders is yet another evil often attributed to the Restoration. It originated in the exigencies created by the Taiping Rebellion, which had led to the growth of mercenary armies (*yung-ying*) commanded by actual or would-be provincial officials. They recruited their troops from their own provinces and drew their financial support, though with imperial approval, largely from the regions in which they operated. With provincial revenue and the commercial transit duties (the likin) under their control, these high officials gained great, even autonomous power.[10] Since the bulk of the Restoration leaders came from among their ranks, and since many of them vigorously pro-moted such *yang-wu* enterprises as arsenals and shipyards as part of their Restoration effort, it is not hard to conjure up a picture in which personal or regional power was the ultimate concern.

The growth of 'regionalism', as this phenomenon is called, has been analysed by Franz Michael and Stanley Spector. They stress in particular the personal loyalty the regional leaders commanded of their military and civilian staff. As a result, these powerful men, even as they were

8 James Polachek, 'Gentry Hegemony: Soochow in the T'ung-chih Restoration', in Frederic Wakeman, Jr., and Carolyn Grant, eds., *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), pp. 211–56.
9 Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), and idem, 'Local Self-Government under the Republic: Problems of Control, Autonomy, and Mobilization', in Wakeman and Grant, eds., *Conflict and Control*, pp. 265–8.
10 Lo Yü-tung, *Chung-kuo li-chin shih* (Shanghai, 1936), vol. 1, pp. 84–6. Control over these resources was facilitated by the power of the governors-general and governors to appoint financial managers from among large pools of expectant officials. The latter were thus beholden to the high officials for their preferment.

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shifted from province to province, never lost control over their sub-
ordinates and the resources at their disposal. Michael further argues that
these regional leaders, once installed in power, did not dissolve their
political or military organizations at the end of the rebellions, which
were the raison d'être of their existence. He asserts that, as regionalism
undermined central control, there was no real dynastic Restoration.[11]

Michael and Spector's thesis has been challenged by Kwang-ching
Liu, Wang Erh-min, and myself. By taking a closer look at how decisions
and political appointments were made, how a large number of 'regional'
armies were disbanded in the mid-1860s and the remaining troops were
financed and moved about, and how disputes were resolved, we have
found that these so-called regionalists were far more loyal to the Ch'ing
court and the latter far more in control of provincial affairs than Michael
and Spector have alleged.[12]

According to some, this rebuttal has won the day.[13] But according to
Stephen MacKinnon, in the redistribution of power in the late Ch'ing,
there emerged 'three simultaneously expanding and overlapping nodes of
power', namely, the central government, the provincial leaders, and the
local elites at the subdistrict level. None expanded at the expense of the
others.[14] Be that as it may, the regionalism thesis still has its following,
kept alive largely by historians of twentieth-century China, who find in it
a plausible explanation for the rise of warlordism after 1916.[15]

11 Stanley Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese
   Regionalism* (Seattle, Wash., 1964). The introduction, entitled 'Regionalism in Nineteenth-
   Century China', is by Franz Michael. The first major works to argue along this line
   were those of Lo Erh-kang and P'eng Yü-hsin. Lo, 'Ch'ing-chi ping wei chiang-yu ti
   ch'i-yüan', *Chung-kuo she-hui ching-chi shih chi-k'an*, 5.2 (June 1937), 235–50; P'eng,
   'Ch'ing-mo chung-yang yü ko-sheng ts'ai-cheng kuan-hsi', *She-hui-k'o-hsüeh tsa-chih*, 9.1
   (June 1947), 83–110. Both have been reprinted in *Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung*, 2d
   ser., vol. 5: *Cheng-chih*, comp. Li Ting-i, Pao Tsun-p'eng, and Wu Hsiang-hsiang
   (Taipei, 1963), pp. 85–100 and 3–46, respectively. Future references are to the reprint
   edition.
12 David Pong, 'The Income and Military Expenditure of Kiangsi Province in the Last
   Years (1860–1864) of the Taiping Rebellion', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 26.1 (November
   1966), 49–66; Wang Erh-min, *Huai-chün chih* (Taipei, 1967), esp. pp. 376–86; Kwang-
   ching Liu, 'The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal',
   Tsing Hua hsüeh-pao, new ser., 10.2 (July 1974), 176–207 [in Chinese] and 207–23 [in
   English].
13 Thomas L. Kennedy, 'Self-Strengthening: An Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings',
   Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i, 3.1 (November 1974), 5–6.
14 Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in Beijing
   and Tianjin, 1901–1908* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), pp. 5–10.
15 See, e.g., James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang* (Stanford,
   Calif., 1966), pp. 1–9, and Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese
   Politics, 1925–1937* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 1–17. Although both trace the origins of
   modern regionalism to the mid-nineteenth century, both emphasize that twentieth-
   century warlordism was not a direct descendant of the regionalism of the Taiping

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A major obstacle to understanding the phenomenon of regionalism is its frequent confusion with provincialism and other levels of local interests. Regionalism, as just defined, was not an accepted norm in the traditional state. There was always opposition to it, ideologically and politically. The so-called regional leaders discussed by Michael were never fully able to take over the provinces they 'occupied'. Provincial officials continued to be appointed from Peking, and they had as much to gain (or lose) by aligning themselves with the 'regional' leaders as with local interests, which often resisted the extractive alien 'regional' regimes. Provincialism, in fact, was a far more prevalent form of political power with which all men with regional pretensions must contend. And, in contrast to regionalism, provincialism was a perennial feature of the Chinese state. Though not encouraged (certainly when it became excessive), it was nevertheless condoned by the imperial government.

The power structure within a province was complex. Local interests (at the district or prefectural level) were frequently at odds with larger provincial interests. And ambitious or energetic governors-general and governors could too easily be misconstrued as harbouring regional desires. Thus, in this study, I distinguish regionalism from provincialism, localized interests, and the personal ambitions of high provincial officials.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that regionalism was a widespread phenomenon, its impact has still to be determined. Within the framework of the traditional political order, which the Restoration tried to revive, regionalism was ultimately antidynastic, as Michael and Spector suggest. Yet as an expression of the desire for greater regional or personal power, regionalism could accommodate, and even welcome, most forms of *yang-wu* undertakings, which were an integral part, and, some would argue, a more progressive part, of the Restoration. In this regard, the view can be sustained that regionalism, despite its antidynastic appearance, in fact provided the mechanism by which local leaders could go beyond the limits of change imposed by the central government. Greater successes on the part of the regional leaders in their *yang-wu* enterprises could well have reversed dynastic decline. The question is, why did they not achieve more?

Developing his argument mainly from Mary Wright's ideas and to a lesser degree from Michael and Spector's, John Rawlinson contends that

era. In a later work, Sheridan clearly states: 'The regional army leaders [of the nineteenth century] used their armies on behalf of the monarchy. More than that, they were personally subject to the authority of the monarchy. (The political–military machines they created did not flourish into the twentieth century and then overthrow the monarchy, as is sometimes suggested.)' See his *China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949* (New York, 1975), p. 37.

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it was traditional institutions, based on Confucian ideology, that gave
the Restoration and *yang-wu* movement their essential character and
limited their achievements. Thus, China's tardy and inadequate response
to the Western challenge, such as the failure to develop a national navy,
as opposed to a number of competing provincial squadrons, can be
directly traced to a weak imperial institution and strong regional loy-
alties.[16] Rawlinson thus implies that regionalism both promoted and
hindered *yang-wu* modernization.

Adopting a broader perspective, Thomas Kennedy tries to strike a
balance between internal and external forces which influenced *yang-wu*
modernization. China's modern ordnance industry, he argues, was an
institutional innovation which ushered in a new era of mass production.
It could have served as the foundation of a light industry but for the
semicolonial environment in which it emerged. The financial troubles of
the arsenals and the poor quality of the foreign technicians were partly
attributable to the nature of the Western presence. The Chinese, for
their part, managed the arsenals as they would have a bureau in the
traditional government, resulting in corruption and inefficiency. Poor
imperial leadership as well as the lack of co-ordination among provincial
officials complete the list of reasons for what went wrong.[17]

The impact of imperialism, all too briefly and obliquely discussed by
Kennedy, is more systematically addressed by L. A. Bereznii and Frances
Moulder. The former, a Marxist scholar, stresses the deleterious effects
of imperialism: it was economically exploitative as well as politically,
socially, and psychologically damaging. The imperialists, by supporting
the Ch'ing regime and 'reactionary elements' such as Tseng Kuo-fan
and Li Hung-chang, inhibited progress. China's failure and Japan's
success in modernizing their countries were directly related to their
different degrees of exposure to imperialist exploitation.[18]

Moulder, in contrast, adopts the world-system approach. She argues
that the traditional societies of China and Japan were essentially similar.
Institutional or cultural factors therefore cannot explain their failure or
success. Rather, China's failure should be understood in terms of its
higher level of incorporation into the world economy (and therefore
greater Western encroachment). By bringing about the Opium Wars the

16 John L. Rawlinson, *China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–1895* (Cambridge, Mass.,
    1967), pp. 198–204.
17 Thomas L. Kennedy, *The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry,
    1860–1895* (Boulder, Colo., 1978), pp. 150–60.
18 L. A. Bereznii, 'A Critique of American Bourgeois Historiography on China: Problems
    of Social Development in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', an unauthorized
    digest of the book by the same title [in Russian; Leningrad, 1968] (Cambridge, Mass.,
    1969).

West also caused much economic and social dislocation. Large-scale rebellions resulted. All contributed to the dismantling of the state apparatus, leading to the rise of regionalism (à la Spector). Incorporation also severely reduced the central government's capacity to finance, among other things, modern enterprises.[19]

In recent years in post-Mao China, there has been a revival of scholarly interest in the *yang-wu* movement. Previously, the prevailing view of the movement was negative: it was seen as a plot by the feudal elites – the Ch'ing officials – to shore up their power. They collaborated with Western capitalists, exploited the people, and sold out Chinese interests. Although by introducing modern industries they broke the ground for Chinese capitalism, they also hindered capitalistic developments and hastened the growth of semicolonialism. Feudal control and semicolonial exploitation severely deformed the native capitalism, and it remained uncorrected until after 1949.[20]

Since 1978 the discussion has been far more open and lively. Though some scholars still adhere to the established view, more are seeing the *yang-wu* movement in a relatively favourable light. The latter argue, for example, that it was simply a product of the time. As such, it promoted the development of capitalism. The leaders of the movement, despite their class origins and intentions, introduced modern industries, produced new ideas, trained new talents, and created an environment in which a working class could emerge. In consequence, their efforts slowed rather than abetted the growth of semicolonialism. The movement nevertheless failed because of imperialism and the bureaucratic vices associated with the management of its enterprises.[21]

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19 Frances V. Moulder, *Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy: Toward a Reinterpretation of East Asian Development, ca. 1600 to ca. 1918* (Cambridge, 1977). According to Stephen C. Thomas, the adverse effect of imperialism on Chinese industrial development did not become serious until the 1890s. See his *Foreign Intervention and China's Industrial Development, 1870–1911* (Boulder, Colo., 1984).
20 Mou An-shih, *Yang-wu yün-tung* (Shanghai, 1961), and *Yang-wu yün-tung*, by the editorial group of the Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih ts'ung-shu [Modern Chinese history] series (Shanghai, 1973).
21 The picture painted here is a composite one only. The actual debate contains many shades of interpretation even among those who see some progressive elements in the *yang-wu* movement. *Chung-kuo li-shih-hsüeh nien-chien*, ed. Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh-hui (Peking, Annual). See volumes for 1979 (pp. 157–67), 1981 (pp. 84–93), 1982 (pp. 93–9), 1983 (pp. 84–90), and 1984 (pp. 105–13) (there seems to have been no publication for the year 1980); *Chi-lin ta-hsüeh she-hui k'o-hsüeh lun-ts'ung*, 1980, no. 2: *Yang-wu yün-tung t'ao-lun chuan-chi*, ed. Chi-lin ta-hsüeh she-hui k'o-hsüeh hsüeh-pao pien-chi-pu (Chi-lin, 1981); Huang I-feng, *Chung-kuo chin-tai ching-chi-shih lun-wen-chi* (Yangchow, 1981), pp. 182–376; Chang Kuo-hui, *Yang-wu yün-tung yü Chung-kuo chin-tai ch'i-yeh* (Peking, 1979); Huang I-feng and Chiang To, 'Ch'ung p'ing yang-wu yün-tung', *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 1979.2, 58–70; and Hsü T'ai-lai, 'Yeh p'ing yang-wu yün-tung',

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Scholars in China, unlike their counterparts elsewhere, have to live with the consequences of the *yang-wu* movement. Its failure may well have had much to do with post-1949 developments. Chinese discussion on the subject is more impassioned than it is in the West and, given the Marxian historical framework, more preoccupied with the function of the *yang-wu* movement in China's development from feudalism to semifeudalism and semicolonialism and to bureaucratic capitalism. It is therefore critical for historians in China to determine the class origins of the *yang-wu* movement, its phases of development over thirty-five years, its internal contradictions, the role it played in the penetration of Western capitalism and the attendant problems of technological transfer, and its contribution to the emergence of national capitalism – in brief, whether it was moving along with or was opposed to the currents of history, whether it was progressive or reactionary.

The outlandish terminology belies the many areas of common ground shared by Chinese and non-Chinese historians alike. 'Feudalism', for instance, encompasses such concerns as the nature of the traditional order and its ideological foundation; 'semicolonialism' deals with the nature and impact of imperialism; and 'bureaucratic capitalism' entails the manner of government or official intervention in industrial and economic affairs. Nevertheless, Chinese scholars seem less concerned with the role of the central government, especially that of the imperial institution. It is generally assumed that the throne, the central government, and the bureaucrats belonged to the same class and were, therefore, a single historical force.

We have already alluded to the negative role of the central government. Dwight Perkins regards the fault of the central government as one of omission rather than commission. What made it so helpless, he observes, was a lack of money.[22] My recent work shows, in contrast, that the court at Peking squandered an opportunity to create an imperial navy largely because of its reluctance to change the system of public financing, though insufficient funds were also a factor.[23] The subject certainly bears further investigation.

ibid., 1980.4, 19–36. The last two are quite representative of the tone of the debate in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.

22 Dwight H. Perkins, 'Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China', *Journal of Economic History*, 27.4 (December 1967), 478–92. More recently, Madeleine Zelin has shown that at least in early Ch'ing the ability of the central government to introduce reforms was hamstrung by a lack of means rather than a lack of vision or will. Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-century China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984).

23 David Pong, 'Keeping the Foochow Navy Yard Afloat: Government Finance and China's Early Modern Defence Industry, 1866–75', *Modern Asian Studies*, 21.1 (February 1987), 121–52.

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As regards the impact of the economy on the Restoration, no com-
prehensive picture has yet emerged. In broad terms, it appears certain
that the economy, as reflected by the standard of living, had changed
little from the Ming to the late Ch'ing. Yet the devastation of the
midcentury rebellions was immense, a situation with which the Resto-
rationists had to contend.[24]

A depressed rural economy with diminished tax yields undoubtedly
undercut the government's ability to function. But the loss was more
than compensated for by two new taxes: customs duties on foreign trade
and likin on domestic trade. In fact, the size of the Ch'ing economy as
well as that of government revenue, in relation to its population, may
have reached new heights in the post-Taiping era. The question is, who
controlled these resources and directed their use?

Albert Feuerwerker's recent study suggests that in the late Ch'ing
there existed the potential for savings but the government, even in
normal times, did not penetrate deeply enough into society to tap those
resources or manage the people's economic life. It lacked both the
facilities and the political power to do so. The several Restoration leaders
who advocated government intervention to bring about economic devel-
opment ran into stiff opposition from the local elites. The latter were
either ideologically averse to change or disinclined to bear the economic
burden of development.[25] Feuerwerker thus shifts the blame for the
failure of the Restoration away from imperialism and back to the internal
weakness of the Ch'ing system.

The achievement of the Restoration (including its *yang-wu* component)
has been characterized in divergent ways, ranging from near success to
mere illusion. Whatever the judgement, it remains a significant and
critical phase in modern Chinese history. Nevertheless, many questions
remain unanswered. For example, the influence of the local elite on
administrative reform has received some scholarly treatment, but what
was the relationship between the increasingly powerful gentry and *yang-
wu* enterprises? And if regionalism was indeed the driving force behind
many *yang-wu* undertakings, did it not also hinder, inhibit, or distort
yang-wu modernization? The distinction between regionalism and pro-
vincialism having been clarified, how should it affect our understanding
of the Restoration?

Concerning the throne, adequate evidence is seldom evinced to demon-

24 Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China (1368–1968)* (Chicago, 1969), pp.
   28–9, 186–9.
25 Albert Feuerwerker, 'Economic Trends in the Late Ch'ing Empire, 1870–1911', in
   John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu, eds., The Cambridge History of China, vol.
   11, *Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911*, part 2 (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 59–61, 65, 67–8.