

Intelligence for an Age of Terror

During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was concerned primarily with states; nonstate actors like terrorists were secondary. Now, the priorities are reversed – and the challenge is enormous. States had an address, and they were hierarchical and bureaucratic; thus, they came with a "story." Terrorists do not. States were "over there," but terrorists are there and here. Therefore, they put pressure on intelligence at home, not just abroad. They also force intelligence and law enforcement - the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - to work together in new ways, and, if those 700,000 police officers in the United States are to be the "eyes and ears" in the fight against terrorism, new means of sharing not only information but also analysis across the federal system are imperative. The strength of this book is that it underscores the extent of the change and ranges broadly across data collection and analysis, both foreign and domestic, and it presents the issues of value that arise as new targets require the collection of more information at home.

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi

Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521518451

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First published 2009

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data

Treverton, Gregory F.

Intelligence for an age of terror / Gregory F. Treverton.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-521-51845-1 (hardback)

1. Intelligence service – United States. 2. Terrorism – Government policy – United States. I. Title.

JK468.I6T723 2009 363.325′1630973 – dc22 2008047224

ISBN 978-0-521-51845-1 hardback

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Preface

This book very much stands alone, but it also takes up where my 2001 book, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, left off. At the beginning of the last chapter of that earlier book, completed before September 11, I observed that the book had been mostly about how intelligence should reshape in continued fair weather for globalization. What, I asked, might turn that weather fouler? The first excursion I considered was a major terrorist attack on the United States (the other, haunting from the perspective of 2009, was a global economic collapse). This is hardly prescient – a stream of blue-ribbon panels had predicted an attack, sometime.

I imagined that an attack would make intelligence more important, which has turned out to be the case and thus became a reason for this book. (The other prediction I made was that military instruments would not turn out to be very relevant, and so military budgets would decline. On that score, I was either wrong or premature – depending on whether the war in Iraq is regarded as central to or a diversion from the fight against terror.) It struck me then, and continues to strike me now, that for all our talk about terrorism and other transnational threats as the preeminent targets of intelligence, the implications of that shift run much deeper than is usually realized. That became a second reason for doing this book.

As usual, the book accreted as much as it was written, as I drew on and adapted work done for other purposes. In the process, I incurred intellectual debts to a large number of colleagues, not all of whom I name here. My old friend Philip Bobbitt and I have come to many similar conclusions about the market state and about intelligence in an age of terror, sometimes by different routes, and I am always stimulated by talking with or reading him. John Parachini, who directs RAND's Intelligence Policy Center, has been a sparring partner for ideas throughout. RAND has provided support of a more tangible sort, first to assess the 2004 intelligence act and outline the next steps, then to work on drafting this book.

After September 11th, I had the opportunity to build up RAND's analytic support for the FBI – first in a review of the Bureau's internal security in the wake



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of the Robert Hanssen spy case and a blue-ribbon panel report, and most recently in a congressionally mandated assessment of the pros and cons of establishing a domestic intelligence service separated from law enforcement, a project of which the FBI was not the sponsor but in which it did have a keen interest. The work has been for me a fascinating introduction to a very different organizational culture than traditional intelligence, one I've come to admire in many respects. Even better, Bruce Ciske of the Bureau has been my informal guide throughout that introduction – a distinct professional and personal pleasure.

My chapter on analysis draws on work commissioned by the then–Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal, and his deputy, Bill Nolte. I am grateful to them for that chance to snoop around the analysis shops in the intelligence community, and to my then–RAND colleague in that venture, Bryan Gabbard. I'm also grateful to Roger George and Jim Bruce, longtime colleagues, the latter now at RAND, whose edited volume on analysis gave me the chance to think more about "politicization."

The chapter on analysis and the sections on learning organizations draw on a chapter commissioned by the CIA for a book on the psychology of intelligence analysis. The editor of that book, Dr. Richard Rees, worked over my chapter harder and more creatively than any editor ever has – all to my benefit. Alas, the book's fate is a kind of parable for the challenges U.S. intelligence faces. Cleared as unclassified, the CIA still decided not to publish the book – because an "official" publication by the CIA was thought to sanction comments that were critical, albeit intended as constructive criticism. The result was thus the oddity of an unclassified book that is available only on the CIA's highly classified computer system.

Finally, I have had the good fortune for the past several years to be a sometime visiting professor at the Swedish National Defence College. Only the Swedes would invite a foreigner to develop an intelligence program at their national defense college, but they have, happily. It has given me opportunity and incentive to think comparatively across a range of issues from the nature of the target and how to deal with "complexities," to how to engage both new customers and private citizens in jointly producing useful intelligence. I thank my colleagues there, especially Wilhelm Agrell, Lars Nicander, Jan Leijonhielm, and Magnus Ranstorp.

I owe debts of other sorts to two other people, to whom I dedicate this book. The late Richard E. Neustadt, my friend, mentor, and colleague, first introduced me to the particularities of the political "tribe" when I was a graduate student. The example of his graceful prose left a lifelong appreciation for the power of a four-word sentence. The other is my wife, Karen – partner, friend, and more throughout the writing of this book and the rest of life's adventures. Needless to say, none of these good people should be held responsible for any shortcomings that remain. Those are mine alone.

Pacific Palisades, California

January 6, 2009



Acronyms

Symbol	Definition*
AAR	after-action review
ACS	Automated Case Support (FBI)
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress
	of Industrial Organizations
ATTF	Anti-Terrorism Task Force (U.S. attorneys)
AUMF	authorization for use of military force
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, or Federal
	Office for the Protection of the Constitution
	(Germany)
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAPPS II	Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
	System II
CBM	confidence-building measure
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
CD	Counterintelligence Division (FBI)
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigative Division (FBI)
CMS	Community Management Staff
COINTELPRO	Counterintelligence Program (FBI)
COPS	Community Oriented Policing Services
CSIS	Canadian Security and Intelligence Service

^{*}All institutions are in the United States unless otherwise specified.



x Acronyms

CTC Counterterrorism Center (CIA)
CTD Counterterrorism Division (FBI)
CTR Currency Transaction Report

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DDNI Deputy Director of National Intelligence

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS Department of Homeland Security

DI Directorate of Intelligence
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIAC Defense Intelligence Agency Center
DMPI designated mean points of impact
DNI Director of National Intelligence

DST Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, or

Territorial Surveillance Directorate (France)

DTA Detainee Treatment Act

EAD Executive Assistant Director (FBI) EC electronic communication (FBI)

ECPA Electronic Communications Privacy Act

FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIA Future Imagery Architecture
FIG Field Intelligence Group (FBI)
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola

FRA Defence Radio Establishment (Sweden)
FutureMAP Future Markets Applied to Prediction

HUMINT human intelligence

ICDO Integrated Concepts Development Office IFOR Intervention Force (United Nations)

IG Inspector General IMINT imagery intelligence

INR State Department Bureau of Intelligence

and Research

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRA Irish Republican Army
IRS Internal Revenue Service



> Acronyms хi

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center

Information-Sharing Environment **ISE** ISI Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistan)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance **ISR**

information technology IT

Joint Military Intelligence College **JMIC** Joint Military Intelligence Program **JMIP**

Joint Task Force Counterterrorism (DIA) **JTFCT**

Joint Terrorism Task Force JTTF **LEA** law enforcement agency

measurement and signatures intelligence MASINT

Multistate Antiterrorism Information Exchange **MATRIX**

MLE military liaison element

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola **MPLA**

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization **NCIX** National Counterintelligence Executive National Counterterrorism Center **NCTC** National Endowment for Democracy **NED** National Geospatial Intelligence Agency NGA

non-governmental organization NGO National Intelligence Council **NIC**

NIC-C National Intelligence Coordination Center

National Intelligence Estimate NIE NIO National Intelligence Officer National Intelligence Program NIP

NIPF National Intelligence Priorities Framework

NOC non-official cover

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency **NSB** National Security Branch National Security Council **NSC NSL** National Security Letter New York Police Department NYPD

Office of the Director of National Intelligence **ODNI** Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (Justice **OIPR**

Department)

open-source intelligence **OSINT** policy analysis and evaluation PA&E



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PACOM Pacific Command
PDB President's Daily Brief
PNR passenger name records

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RCMP-SS Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service

RDM robust decision making

RFU Radical Fundamentalist Unit (FBI)
SAC Special Agent in Charge (FBI)
SAG Strategic Assessments Group (CIA)

SAR suspicious activity reporting
SCC Sector Coordinating Council
SCI secret compartmented intelligence

SIGINT signals intelligence

SIS Senior Intelligence Service SOCOM Special Operations Command

SOUTHCOM Southern Command

SSA Social Security Administration

STEP Science and Technology Experts Program
TIA Total (Terrorism) Information Awareness
TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment

TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSC Terrorist Screening Center
TSDB Terrorist Screening Database
TSP Terrorist Surveillance Program
TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle UBLU Usama Bin Laden Unit (FBI)

UN United Nations

UNITA National Union for the Total Independence

of Angola

WMD weapons of mass destruction



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