Introduction

> The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars.[1]

After a long transatlantic journey, which included a sailing time of approximately eight weeks, the brig *Pitt Packet* was homeward bound on April 22, 1769. A rising April sun would have melted fog and warmed chilled hands in the early spring morning as the brig's crew made preparations to enter the harbor at Marblehead, Massachusetts.[2] Thomas Power,

[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987; originally published by Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, in 1890), 1.

[2] Marblehead weather patterns for the month of April were observed and recorded by Ashley Bowen in his journals. *JAB*, I-II. While Bowen did not record the weather for April 1769, he did make such observations for the two previous Aprils. See, ibid., I, 153, 175. The *Pitt Packet's* crew comprised a captain, a mate, a master mariner, a cook, and four common seamen. L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds., *Legal Papers of John Adams*, Vol. 2 (Harvard University Press, 1965), 277, 313–320. The average sailing time was based on the round trip from Boston to London in the eighteenth century. Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic 1675–1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (Oxford University Press, 1986), 57.

the *Pitt Packet's* master, probably shouted orders for tack and sheet lines to be hauled in and secured as the brig angled toward the harbor mouth.[3] A chorus of barefoot seamen would then sing pulling songs, or sea chanties, in order to lend a cadence to barehanded tacking labors.[4] Singing and working, anticipating long-absent family and friends, the *Pitt Packet's* crew prepared to come home.

The brig belonged to Robert "King" Hooper, proprietor of one of the largest fish merchant houses in Marblehead, which was then the principal commercial fishing port in New England in terms of capital investment, number of vessels, and manpower.[5] The *Pitt Packet*'s crew had transported their dried, salted cod to overseas markets in Spain, as did a smaller percentage of other colonial crews in the eighteenth century.[6] There, the processed fish was sold to merchants in ports such as Bilbao and Cadiz. Typically, crews returned with fruits, loads of salt, lines of credit, and manufactured goods from England. On this particular voyage, the *Pitt Packet* was returning directly from Cadiz with salt for Marblehead's commercial fishing industry.[7]

The brig did not immediately reach Marblehead's harbor that chilly April morning, however. Dawn's early light also illuminated bent backs and busy hands on board the British naval frigate *Rose*, which was patrolling Atlantic waters along New England's coastline. The *Rose*'s Captain, Benjamin Caldwell, sent Lieutenant Henry Gibson Panton with several armed men to board the *Pitt Packet* early Saturday morning on the pretext of searching for contraband. But, Caldwell's real intent was to press men into naval service.[8] With its sails trimmed in preparation

[3] See, John Harland, *Seamanship in the Age of Sail: An Account of the Shiphandling of the Sailing Man-of-War, 1600–1860, Based On Contemporary Sources* (Naval Institute Press, 1984), 145–154.

[4] Frederick Pease Harlow, *Chanteying Aboard American Ships* (Meriden, CT: Barre Publishing Company, Inc., 1962).

[5] For more on Hooper, see the short biography in *JAB*, Vol. 2, 661. For more on Marblehead, see Christopher P. Magra, "'Soldiers . . . Bred to the Sea': Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts and the Origins and Progress of the American Revolution," *New England Quarterly*, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 4 (December 2004), 531–562.

[6] A majority of colonial shipments of dried cod went to the West Indies in the eighteenth century. See chapter four.

[7] For the *Pitt Packet*'s cargo on the day of its impressment and seizure, see Customs Commissioners to Salem Customs Officers, April 27, 1769, Salem Custom House Record Book, 1763–1772, folders 280–281, JDPL.

[8] On Captain Caldwell's orders, and his intent to impress, see the eyewitnesses' testimony compiled in "Adams' Minutes of the Trial," Wroth and Zobel, eds., *Legal Papers of John Adams*, Vol. 2, 293–322.

for homecoming, the Marblehead brig could not evade the *Rose* and its press gang.

The crew-members on board the *Pitt Packet*, however, were not willing to surrender once Panton and the press gang boarded the brig. Michael Corbet, Pierce Fenning, John Ryan, and William Conner, Irishmen who called Marblehead home, picked up "fish gig, musket, hatchet, and harpoon" and stood ready to forcibly resist impressment.[9] It is likely that the brig served double duty in Hooper's employ as a fishing vessel and a trading vessel, and the work tools had simply been left on board during the trade voyage. In any case, the four common seamen, those directly in danger of being impressed, armed themselves with fishing implements and retreated inside the brig.

The resistance quickly escalated. After a tense standoff amidst piles of salt in the forepeak, Corbet drew a line on the floor using handfuls of the preservative and dared the press gang to cross it. Panton unwisely took up this challenge, stepped over the salt line, and advanced toward "the Ship's People." Corbet then launched the harpoon he had been holding, which struck Panton in the neck severing his jugular vein. The British lieutenant fell, his men carried him to the main deck, and he bled to death. During the ensuing mêlée, two Marblehead mariners were shot and severely wounded. The colonial laborers were then arrested and tried for murder.[10] Their trial gained notoriety throughout the colonies.[11] In the end, the maritime laborers' defense attorney, who was none other than John Adams, was able to get the men acquitted on the basis that Panton's death occurred as a result of justifiable homicide in self-defense.

The *Pitt Packet* affair, colonial fish merchants, and those who labored in the colonial fishing industry are not typically part of the American independence story. The British North American mainland colonies that became the United States of America have been portrayed as being fundamentally rural and agrarian, with inconsequential port cities.[12] Farmers

[9] Ibid., 277.

[10] For more on this event, see Magra, "'Soldiers . . . Bred to the Sea'," 531–562.

[11] *Boston Chronicle*, April 27, 1769; *Boston Gazette*, May 1, 1769; for coverage in the *Boston Evening Post*, the *New York Journal*, and the *Pennsylvania Chronicle*, see Oliver Morton Dickerson, comp., *Boston Under Military Rule, 1768–1769, As Revealed In A Journal of the Times* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971; orig. pub., 1936), 94–95, 104–105.

[12] Daniel Scott Smith maintains that an expansive and accessible western frontier effectively prevented large-scale population concentrations and urban development during the colonial era. Smith, "A Malthusian-Frontier Interpretation of U.S. Demographic

and farming tend to dominate accounts of European settlement and economic development in North America.[13] Political and economic issues surrounding the ability to buy and sell borderlands between British settlement and Indian country have been shown to have influenced the decision of colonial land speculators and agriculturalists to resist British authority during the late eighteenth century imperial crisis.[14] In the words of one notable early American historian, the American Revolution should be seen "as a consequence of the forty-year-long effort to subject the Ohio Country, and with it the rest of the Transappalachian west, to imperial control."[15] Other colonial farmers remained relatively isolated from the outside world in rural communities and only reluctantly agreed to fight for American independence when the British Army was on their doorsteps and town meetings were banned.[16] Farmers then became minutemen, filled the ranks of the Continental Army under George Washington, and heroically fought against a powerful British military to defend their liberties and livelihoods in the face of tyranny.[17] In this interpretation, the Atlantic Ocean represents nothing more than a large liminal space

History Before c. 1815," in Woodrow Borah, et al. eds., *Urbanization in the Americas* (Ottawa: History Division, National Museum of Man, 1980), 15–24.

[13] According to Richard B. Sheridan, "the agricultural sector engaged 80–90 percent of the work force." As for the export sector, he writes: "Foreign trade, however important it was as an energizing force, constituted only around 9–12 percent of colonial gross output." Sheridan, "The Domestic Economy," in Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, eds., *Colonial British America* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 43. For more along these lines, see Edwin J. Perkins, *The Economy of Colonial America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

[14] See, for example, Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); and Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

[15] Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Face of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), xx.

[16] See Richard L. Bushman, *King and People in Provincial Massachusetts* (North Carolina University Press, 1985); Robert A. Gross, *The Minutemen and Their World* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); and John Shy, *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 1965).

[17] Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789*, 2nd ed. (Northeastern University Press, 1983). Higginbotham's account is typical of the land-centered analytical framework used by most military historians. He discusses "the provincialism," "the rural isolation, the traditions of localism," that defined "a predominantly agrarian society" in British North America. He also maintains "the War of Independence was for Americans mainly a defensive type of struggle waged on the patriots' soil." According to Higginbotham, soldiers in the Continental Army "were mainly farmers, blacksmiths, tanners, and artisans." Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 7, 11, 12, 13, 21.

separating lands where history unfolded.[18] The maritime dimensions of the American Revolution fade to black.[19]

Farmers played formative roles in the origins and progress of the American Revolution, yet, the *Pitt Packet* affair serves as a stark reminder that colonial resistance to British authority during the Revolutionary Era cannot be fully explained without investigating why those who made their living from the sea participated in this resistance. Similarly, the progress of this formative event cannot be completely understood without coming to terms with how those tied to the sea contributed to the war for independence. In the case of New England, it was both an epicenter of revolutionary fervor and the headquarters of commercial fishing in colonial America.

It is widely acknowledged that New Englanders played important roles in bringing about the imperial crisis that separated the colonies from the mother country at the end of the eighteenth century. Riots directed against the sovereignty of the British government were particularly prevalent in New England throughout the 1760s and early 1770s. In these mob activities, effigies and customs vessels were burned; customs officials and royal governors were forced to watch their property being destroyed; monopolized tea became flotsam and jetsam; and British soldiers were harassed to the point at which they were willing to shoot into a crowd of unarmed colonists.[20] Moreover, the idea to boycott British manufactured goods and use consumer power as a political weapon began in Massachusetts;

[18] For a thorough discussion of this historical interpretation in general, and for arguments against it, see Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun, eds., *Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean* (New York: Routledge, 2003); and Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (University of California Press, 1997). Also, see W. Jeffrey Bolster, "Putting the Ocean in Atlantic History: Maritime Communities and Marine Ecology in the Northwest Atlantic, 1500–1800," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 113, No. 1 (February 2008), 19–47;" and Marcus Rediker, "Toward a People's History of the Sea," in David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby, eds., *Maritime Empires: British Imperial Maritime Trade in the Nineteenth Century* (Rochester, NY: Boydell, in association with the National Maritime Museum, 2004), 195–206.

[19] To date, there is not a single overview of the maritime dimensions of the American Revolution.

[20] Alfred F. Young, *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999); Andrew S. Walmsley, *Thomas Hutchinson and the Origins of the American Revolution* (New York University Press, 1999); Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution*, 3rd ed. (University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Harvard University Press, 1979); Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765–1780* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Eric Foner, *Tom Paine and*

militia units were formed here with the intention of resisting British authority at a minute's notice; elites in this region established the first committees of correspondence to unite colonists in opposition; and the "shot heard around the world" was fired here.[21]

Furthermore, men from New England were exceptionally active during the American Revolutionary War. Communities in this area supplied more manpower to the war effort on a consistent yearly basis for the duration of the conflict than any other region.[22] In any given year, no colony/state ever provided more men for service in the Continental Army than Massachusetts.[23] In addition, three of the four major generals who served under George Washington at the start of the war were from New England, and seven of the eight brigadier generals hailed from this region.[24] Also, four of the seven members of the first Naval Committee appointed by the Continental Congress in 1775 were New Englanders.[25] It is no coincidence that these revolutionaries lived and worked in a region that was the center of commercial fishing in colonial America.

The cod fishing industry, in particular, was one of the most valuable extractive industries in all of colonial America, and it was the single most lucrative export business in New England.[26] On the eve of the American

Revolutionary America (Oxford University Press, 1976); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* (Harvard University Press, 1974); and Thomas C. Barrow, *Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660–1775* (Harvard University Press, 1967).

[21] T. H. Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence* (Oxford University Press, 2004); Gross, *The Minutemen and Their World*; Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial radicals and the development of American opposition to Britain, 1765–1776* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972); and Shy, *Toward Lexington*.

[22] In 1775, New England provided 91% of the manpower for the Continental Army, while the Mid-Atlantic region provided the remainder. In 1776, New England provided 50% of the same type of manpower; 28% for the Mid-Atlantic region; and 22% for the Southern region. In 1777, the equivalent figures were 40%; 25%; and 35%. In 1778, 39%; 24%; and 37%. In 1779, 41%; 26%; and 33%. In 1780, 45%; 33%; and 22%. In 1781, 55%; 26%; and 19%. In 1782, 52%; 23%; and 25%. In 1783, 54%; 27%; and 19%. Thomas L. Purvis, *Revolutionary America, 1763–1800* (New York: Facts on File, 1995), 234–240, table 8.53. These figures are based on the number of men actually furnished, not the quotas required.

[23] Purvis, *Revolutionary America*, 234–240, table 8.53.

[24] Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 89–90.

[25] Samuel Eliot Morison, *John Paul Jones, A Sailor's Biography* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), 36.

[26] Economic historians consider commercial fishing to have been an extractive industry similar to lumbering and mining. See John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607–1789* (University of North Carolina Press, 1985), chapter fifteen. Entrepreneurs invested capital and hired workers in order to extract a resource from the ocean for processing and export to overseas markets.

Revolution, between 1768 and 1772, colonial merchants sold fish overseas valued at £152,155, which represented thirty-five per cent of the region's total export revenue.[27] Moreover, the cod fisheries employed a significant portion of colonial New England's population. Of the 581,100 people living in this region in 1770, an estimated 10,000 men found employment in this sector of the economy.[28] These 10,000 men represented eight per cent of the adult male working population.[29] Such levels of labor and capital impressed overseas observers such as Adam Smith, who penned the following at the start of the American Revolutionary War: "[T]he New England fishery in particular was, before the late disturbances, one of the most important, perhaps, in the world."[30]

Massachusetts was the site of the principal fishing ports and shipping centers in New England throughout the colonial period. By themselves, Marblehead and Gloucester, Massachusetts, accounted for sixty per cent of all the fish caught annually in the entire New England region.[31] Coastal communities in this colony were responsible for shipping nearly

[27] McCusker and Menard, *The Economy of British America*, 108, table 5.2. By comparison, settlers in Atlantic Canada (Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland) exported fish, their leading commodity, worth £133,932 in 1768, or seventy-three per cent of the total export revenue for the region. Ibid., 115, table 5.4. At the same time, Middle Colonies (New York and Pennsylvania) exported grains worth £379,380, or seventy-two per cent of the total export revenue. Ibid., 199, table 9.3. The Upper South (Maryland and Virginia) exported tobacco worth £756,128, or seventy-two per cent. Ibid., 130, table 6.1. The Lower South (North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia) exported rice worth £305,533, or fifty-five per cent. Ibid., 174, table 8.2. The West Indies exported muscovado sugar worth £2,762,250, or seventy-one per cent. Ibid., 160, table 7.3. Colonial New England maintained a smaller, more diversified export sector than most of the other regional economies. Yet, even in this diversified sector, fish brought in fifteen per cent more annual revenue than the second most lucrative export, livestock.

[28] Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker, and Benjamin W. Labaree, *New England and the Sea* (Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 1972), 29–30. This figure is conservative. One contemporary estimate placed the number of workers "employ'd in the Cod fishery" as high as 13,000. *Boston Evening Post*, January 20, 1766. For the population figure, see McCusker and Menard, *The Economy of British America*, 103, table 5.1.

[29] The eight per cent calculation was made following Daniel Vickers's method of first factoring a fifty-five per cent male population and then factoring a forty per cent demographic of men aged fifteen to forty-five: "the male working population." Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630–1830* (University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 194n.

[30] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Max Lerner, ed. (New York: The Modern Library, 1937; orig, pub. in 1776), 544–545.

[31] Albion, Baker and Labaree, *New England and the Sea*, 30. Because the Massachusetts fishing industry took such a majority of the share of the catch from the entire region, and maintained such a large proportion of fishermen and fishing vessels, Daniel Vickers asserts that during the colonial period the New England and Massachusetts fishing industries "can be treated as roughly equivalent." Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen*, 154, table 4.

100 per cent of the total quintals (112 pounds dry weight; pronounced "kentals") of cod exported from New England to Southern Europe between 1771 and 1772. The same ports were responsible for shipping forty-five per cent of the total quintals of cod to the West Indies during this period. Combined, these coastal communities shipped eighty-five per cent of all the fish caught in the colonies in the early 1770s.[32] Although there were certainly commercial fisheries in other colonies, none were as extensive or commercially viable as those in Massachusetts.[33]

Having said this, the commercial cod fishing industry had a wide impact on New England's economic life. Colonists relied on the revenue from the Atlantic cod trade, and they exchanged the dried, salted commodity itself, in order to purchase imports. These imports included trade goods and raw materials from the West Indies and Southern Europe, foodstuffs from the Mid-Atlantic and Southern regions, and manufactured goods from Great Britain. Such imports were distributed throughout New England. Molasses from the West Indies was especially crucial in terms of fueling distilleries located in all the New England colonies. In addition, the fishing industry benefited important regional enterprises such as shipyards, lumber mills and ropewalks, and local artisans such as carpenters, blacksmiths, shipriggers, and sailmakers. Without fish, the most valuable export in all of New England, considerably fewer imports would have entered the region, and there would have been less demand for domestic goods and services.[34]

Cursory correlations have been made between the fact that the commercial fishing industry was headquartered in New England and the fact

[32] British North American Customs Papers, 1765–1774, MHS. The fact that a quintal was the equivalent of 112 pounds should be taken with a grain of salt. Units of measurement were anything but standardized in the early modern Atlantic world. See, John J. McCusker's remarks in "Roundtable Reviews of Peter E. Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* with a Response by Peter E. Pope," in *International Journal of Maritime History*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June, 2005), 251–261.

[33] When asked "from what Ports do the Shipping employed in the New England fishery fit out," a witness called before Parliament to testify on the nature of the colonial fishing industry in 1775 replied, "the greater part of them from Marblehead, Salem, and Cape Anne [Gloucester], for the Cod Fishery." *AA*, Series 4, Vol. 1, 1644.

[34] Boston merchants observed in 1781 that "the various mechanics [i.e. urban artisans] necessarily employed in the building, rigging and fitting out such a number of vessels, must without it [i.e. the commercial fishing industry] be destitute of subsistence. And the great quantities of provisions expended by our fishermen, and the timber made use of in building the vessels, together with the staves, hoops, &. made use of in the exportation of the fish and oil, will convince us that the loss of the Fishery must essentially affect our inland brethren." Resolve of a Boston town meeting at Faneuil Hall, December 11, 1781. *Gentlemen, the inhabitants of the town of Boston* . . . (Boston: Benjamin Edes and Sons, 1781), Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans #17105.

that there was exceptional Revolutionary activity in the region. For example, we know that Marblehead, Massachusetts, the foremost fishing port in the thirteen British North American colonies on the eve of the Revolutionary War, was second only to Boston in forming a committee of correspondence.[35] Mobilization rates for Marblehead were also higher than the average mobilization rates for colonial farming communities. It was typical for twenty-two to thirty-five per cent of rural towns' adult male population to participate in the Revolution.[36] Yet this key fishing community sent nearly thirty-nine per cent.[37] Moreover, Marbleheaders commonly re-enlisted for at least one additional tour of duty after their initial experience in the war.[38] In short, there has been some recognition of the absence of an ephemeral "*rage militaire*" among men from the foremost fishing community in colonial America that burned out quickly after the fiery passions of 1775–76 had cooled.[39] Having said this, a book-length academic study of the military mobilization of colonial fishing communities in the Revolutionary War has never been attempted.[40]

One might expect naval historians who specialize in the Revolution to investigate all of the maritime aspects related to this conflict. And to a certain extent they have linked the sea to military events that occurred during the war. These scholars focus on the U.S. Navy's formation, command

[35] Ronald N. Tagney, *The World Turned Upside Down: Essex County During America's Turbulent Years, 1763–1790* (West Newbury, MA: Essex County History, 1989), 68–73; and George Athan Billias, *General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960), 31. Committees of correspondence were organized in the colonies to facilitate communication among disaffected elites and to organize resistance to British authority.

[36] Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 389–390.

[37] William Arthur Baller, "Military mobilization during the American Revolution in Marblehead and Worcester, Massachusetts" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Clark University, 1994), 20. Baller does not systematically investigate the reasons for this high mobilization.

[38] Walter Leslie Sargent, "Answering the Call to Arms: The Social Composition of the Revolutionary Soldiers of Massachusetts, 1775–1783" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2004), 226, table 6.5; and Baller, "Military mobilization," 27–28. Neither Sargent nor Baller examines the occupational identities of Revolutionary soldiers. Nor do they fully probe the wartime mobilization of labor and capital in the fishing industry.

[39] For more on the concept of *rage militaire*, see Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783* (University of North Carolina Press, 1979), esp. 25–53.

[40] The "new" military history being done on the Revolution, which examines the social composition of the rank and file along with the various relationships between the Continental Army and the American society that created and perpetuated it, has yet to investigate the mobilization of maritime industries such as the cod or whale fisheries, or shipbuilding. For example, there is not a single chapter on maritime enterprise or mariners in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2007).

structure, and tactics.[41] They have further concentrated on military leadership in a biographical mode.[42] There has even been an inquiry into the identities of maritime prisoners of war.[43] However, this otherwise excellent body of work has little to say about the maritime origins of the conflict.[44] Neither do these experts say much about the military mobilization of the fishing industry during the Revolution.

Experts who specialize in the history of oceanic fisheries have probed the relationship between commercial fishing and conflict in the modern era. It is well documented, for example, that the clash between Iceland and Great Britain during the second half of the twentieth century originated in competing claims to fishing waters in the Atlantic Ocean.[45] Fish corporations in the UK and a variety of commercial fisheries in Iceland

[41] For example, see E. Gordon Bowen-Hassell, Dennis M. Conrad, and Mark L. Hayes, *Sea Raiders of the American Revolution: The Continental Navy in European Waters* (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2003); Robert Gardiner, ed., *Navies and the American Revolution, 1775–1783* (London: Chatham Publishing, in association with the National Maritime Museum, 1996); Nicholas Tracy, *Navies, Deterrence, & American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s* (University of British Columbia Press, 1988); *Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1977) (author's note: this a thirty-six page pamphlet consisting of two short conference papers devoted to the U.S. Navy and three brief comments); William M. Fowler, Jr., *Rebels Under Sail: The American Navy During the Revolution* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976); William Bell Clark, *George Washington's Navy: Being An Account of his Excellency's Fleet in New England* (Louisiana State University Press, 1960); Gardner Weld Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution*, Vols. 1–2, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913); and Charles Oscar Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, and Its Achievements* (Chicago: The Burrows Brothers, Co., 1906).

[42] See, for example, Charles E. Claghorn, *Naval Officers of the American Revolution: A Concise Biographical Dictionary* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1988); Morison, *John Paul Jones*; William Bell Clark, *Lambert Wickes, Sea Raider and Diplomat: The Story of a Naval Captain of the American Revolution* (Yale University Press, 1932); and James L. Howard, *Seth Harding, Mariner: A Naval Picture of the Revolution* (Yale University Press, 1930).

[43] See, Francis D. Cogliano, *American Maritime Prisoners in the Revolutionary War: The Captivity of William Russell* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001).

[44] Notable exceptions include Neil R. Stout, *The Royal Navy in America, 1760–1775: A Study of Enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American Revolution* (The United States Naval Institute, 1973); and Carl Ubbelohde, *The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution* (University of North Carolina Press, 1960). These excellent works do not discuss commercial fishing.

[45] Hannes Jónsson, *Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea* (London: Hurst & Co., 1982); and Bruce Mitchell, "Politics, Fish, and International Resource Management: The British-Icelandic Cod War," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (April 1976), 127–138.