

INTRODUCTION

IMAGES OF CONCENTRIC COMMUNITY

THE WORLD ORDER


At the beginning of the twenty-first century, globalization was the vision of the future to many people. It seemed that loyalty to local communities, regions, and even nations would soon disappear as consumers embraced international commerce. Multinational corporations straddled the globe, making sovereign states appear anachronistic. Global financial bodies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, dictated economic policy – at least to underdeveloped countries. The United States, the remaining superpower, increasingly worked through the G-8 Nations and the World Trade Organization in financial matters. Regional trading blocks, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, appeared ready to replace independent states in the economic sphere. Not only did particular nations seem less and less relevant, nationality itself appeared threatened, as Germans seemed more inclined to give their loyalties to the European Union than to the fatherland. And Europe, despite apprehensions about immigrants from such countries as Algeria and Turkey, continued to receive economic refugees from beyond its borders. Significantly, many people seemed more interested in economic mobility than in country or nationality, let alone region or ethnicity.¹

¹ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Random House, Time Books, 1995; Ballantine Books, 2001), 3–20; and Saskia Sassen, “U.S. Immigration Policy toward Mexico in a Global Economy,” in *Between Two Worlds: Mexican Immigrants in the United States*, ed. David G. Gutiérrez, Jaguar Books on Latin America, no. 15 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, SR Books, 1996), 217–21.

On the other hand, ethnicity and nationalism surged again in regions and countries around the world. From the collapsed Soviet empire, old nations arose again and new states appeared – Estonia, Belarus, Kazakhstan. Despite their own notions of global economic integration, nationalists called for political independence. Even in well-established nations, such as Australia, aboriginal peoples demanded self-determination and regional autonomy. Major international organizations, such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, scrambled to deal with the political and military repercussions of nationalist demands. While globalization seemed to promise integration and centralization, the renewed nationalism and regionalism suggested provincialism, separatism, and even anarchy. Facing a bewildering array of new choices in the world market of goods and ideas, the individual often longed for a familiar group and place – the nation, the homeland. Indeed, opposing centripetal and centrifugal forces pulled at the individual, a process beginning with the modern era.²

From about 1400 dramatic changes had occurred in the global order, many originating in the lands about the North Atlantic, changes altering the relations between people and their communities. (See Map I.1.) In this Atlantic World commercial and imperial expansion had led to ethnic and racial conflict on a massive scale, causing the disruption of countless aboriginal bonds between people, their social groups, and homelands, especially in the sixteenth century. Born of these violent clashes new peoples, such as the mestizos of New Spain and the Creoles of Louisiana, developed over the following two hundred years. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many new nations and states arose from the empires on both sides of the Atlantic – Haiti, Liberia, Canada, and Ireland, to name only a few. Indeed, regenerative elements appeared again and again, leading to greater multiethnic community by the turn of the twenty-first century. Identifying with various ethnic groups and homelands, from bands to nations, individuals had often been drawn into aggression or violent resistance by their associations, but had also found cooperative characteristics in such groups. The latter elements were increasingly evident in the Atlantic World as it moved

² E[ric] J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), 163; and Peter L. Berger, “Introduction: The Cultural Dynamics of Globalization,” in *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*, ed. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 16.



Map I.1. Some Peoples around the North Atlantic. Adapted from Meinig, *The Shaping of America*, vol. 1, *Atlantic America 1492–1800*, front cover. Cartography by Cassingham and Foxworth, courtesy of the Edwin J. Foscue Map Library, SMU.

toward the third millennium. Whether such cooperative characteristics could effectively tie men and women, their homelands, and nations to the world through federalism is the general question of this book.³

³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 190–1; Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), 61–2; and “Chronology of Events,” in *The Atlantic World in the Age of Empire*, ed. Thomas Benjamin, Timothy Hall, and David Rutherford, *Problems in World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), xi–xiv. Even though the Atlantic World of the colonial era extended as far down as South America and South Africa and at least as deep as New Mexico in the west and the Baltic in the east, I have generally limited my study to the shores of the North Atlantic to keep the project manageable, to anchor the work in natural geography, but more importantly to focus on local cultural homelands, rather than on the socioeconomic world systems incorporating them especially after transoceanic contact. However, I am discussing the ethnic and geopolitical evolution of these homelands into the twenty-first century.

MIGRATION

Naturally, migration played a major role in the evolving order of the Atlantic World. While contact across the Atlantic was sporadic before 1500, migration within each continent had a long history. Prior to sustained contact across the sea, many distinct peoples traversed and occupied multiple regions along its shores and hinterlands. To utilize the land, men and women organized societies, including bands in places now called Munster and Ontario, kingdoms in Mississippi and Tlaxcala, and chiefdoms in Sierra Leone and Granada. In all of these places, varied peoples made diverse social connections – economic, political, and other – between themselves and the lands they moved over and occupied. Economically, some societies, such as the Pueblo, bequeathed land through matrilineal inheritance, whereas others, including the English, bequeathed it through primogeniture, the size of private estates usually manifesting differences in class. Politically, understanding how distinct migrating peoples established homelands, nations, and empires helps us understand the world order at the beginning of the modern era.⁴

Of course, there were always migrants of many kinds transforming whole countries and regions, usually moving into the space of earlier inhabitants. Obviously, migrants were initially less anchored to land or region, but within a generation as individuals, they were born natives and could thus claim the homeland if they desired. “Africans” in sixteenth-century Puerto Rico, “Scots” in seventeenth-century Ulster, “French” in eighteenth-century Quebec, and “African Americans” in nineteenth-century Liberia were only a few examples. Twentieth-century migration complicated the picture further because of its even more diverse origins – Vietnamese and Asian Indians, for example, entered the countries of the Atlantic World in greater numbers. The assimilation of subsequent generations often strengthened the receiving

⁴ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), 3–8, 12; and D[onald] W[illiam] Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, vol. 1, *Atlantic America, 1492–1800* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), 19, 44; throughout my chapters I am most indebted to Meinig’s monumental, multivolume work. In contradistinction, my work does not focus on the national development of the United States, but on the impact of imperialism and federalism on ethnic regions around the North Atlantic, homelands as important to their peoples as their encompassing national states.

country's dominant culture if the latter's population was sufficiently numerous. On the other hand, only rarely did migration reinvigorate regional culture. Relying on local traditions for survival, often without support from the dominant culture, regional ethnic groups usually gained only if migrants similar to themselves arrived. In general migration contributed to globalization because the movement increased cultural cross-pollination.⁵

As twentieth-century states experienced the immigration of culturally different peoples, citizenship became less defined by lineage or even residency, and nations feared loss of coherence. Even though Americans of European and African descent had long comprised the citizenry of the United States, French and British nationals of African or Asian background, respectively, have resided in Europe in significant numbers only since 1900. Yet by 2000 residency, given the mobile populations of globalization, no longer seemed permanent enough to provide migrants with the loyalties associated with nationality. According to historian David Gutiérrez: "it may well be that the most logical decision for transmigrants and even permanent immigrants is one that actively . . . disavows allegiance to a single national entity." Recognizing this phenomenon, several members of the European Union instituted open border policies, which the Mexican government prodded the United States to imitate in North America, despite the misgivings of ethnic majorities in all these countries who felt themselves becoming decreasingly homogeneous. In fact, most people continued to have an almost primordial need to attach themselves to place, including the globe's migrants, who while looking for a living, always seemed to be searching for a home.⁶

⁵ John H. Elliott, "Introduction," in *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800*, ed. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987), 3–13. Arguing that multiethnic countries have always been more typical than the idealized nation-state is William H. McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History*, Donald G. Creighton Lectures, 1985 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986), 6–7, 84–5.

⁶ David G. Gutiérrez, "Ethnic Mexicans and the Transformation of 'American' Social Space: Reflections on Recent History," in *Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 1998), 327. A critique of the importance of primordial ideas to modern ethnicity appears in Thomas D. Hall, "The Effects of Incorporation into World Systems on Ethnic Processes: Lessons from the Ancient World for the Contemporary World," *International Political Science Review*, 19 (no. 3, 1998): 261–2.

HOMELANDS

Imagining the homelands of native peoples about the Atlantic prior to the modern era requires a vocabulary often unavailable to us. With images of contemporary maps in mind, we are often at a loss to perceive the earlier geography. For example, an Algonkian people, known as Micmacs, inhabited a place they called Megumaage (or Migmagi) – impossible to locate today without reference to Nova Scotia in Canada. Kajoor draws a blank in the contemporary imagination without reference to Senegal in modern West Africa. Yet these two place names represent homelands, not empty spaces – territories identified with distinct ethnic groups, territories culturally dominated by these groups at some time. These peoples had migrated to and occupied these lands long enough to become native and develop deep loyalties to their birthplace. Such attachments often led to resistance to newcomers and conflicts during the modern era. These same attachments to the homeland often transferred to the immigrants, especially their children, and interethnic accommodation, if not equality, also often resulted. Commonly, a homeland sat at the core of a wider ethnic region whose margins were shared more fully with immigrants and surrounding peoples. Historically, overwhelming migration transformed many a region from the homeland of one ethnic group to another, as in the case of Megumaage, which became French Acadia and then British Nova Scotia by 1800. Thus, regions evolved along with the larger world order.⁷

Indeed, a definitive ethnic map of the “Atlantic World” in 1400 would contain many names unfamiliar to all concerned, given that this global region was inconceivable to human beings who had scarcely crossed it yet. There were hundreds of bands, clans, tribes, fiefdoms, chiefdoms, and kingdoms on the continents bordering the northern sea. The Micmacs were only one of the native peoples of present northeastern Canada. In addition to other Algonkians, such as the Montagnais and Naskapis, bands of Inuits extended far into the Arctic north. To the southwest of the Micmacs resided the Mohawks and Oneidas, member tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy.

⁷ Olive Patricia Dickason, *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times*, Civilization of the American Indian Series (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 71–4.

Linguistically related to the latter, the Cherokees occupied extensive areas of the present southeastern United States. Despite their varied sociopolitical organizations, these peoples similarly considered their respective regions home.⁸

To the west of the Cherokees and the Atlantic, though linked to it by the Gulf of Mexico, lived the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and the Natchez tied through tradition to Texas and Mexico. These peoples represented complex cultures rooted in riverine homelands, distantly related to the sophisticated cities of Mesoamerica. From the latter the Aztec Empire influenced a multitude of peoples within and beyond its borders – the Yaquis to the northwest and the Mayas to the southeast, to name only a few. Through direct and indirect trade Aztec goods crossed beyond the modern borders of Mexico. Indeed, indirect contact had existed for at least two thousand years before 1400 as the cultivation of maize, originating in central Mexico, had extended well into Canada and out into the Caribbean, establishing a common element of material culture among the diverse ethnic homelands on the western side of the Atlantic.⁹

In the fifteenth century on the eastern shore of the great ocean also stretched a Babel of peoples whose homelands ranged politically from fiefdoms to kingdoms. Norman fiefs dotted the landscape of what we now know as Wales. Celts in Brittany and Basques in the Pyrenees organized themselves in lineages, allied to this or that larger power. Royal dynasties struggled for dominance over the French homeland. On the Iberian Peninsula, Christian Castile and Aragon challenged the Muslim Kingdom of Granada, as Portuguese mariners launched voyages to the south. Beyond the lands of the Moors, along the West African coast, lay the kingdoms of the Temne, a land the Portuguese named Sierra Leone.¹⁰

On both sides of the Atlantic, the political units were both small and large, varying from family-centered bands to bureaucratic states.

⁸ Ibid.; for a definition of native peoples, stressing “nonstate societies,” see Thomas D. Hall and Joane Nagel, “Indigenous Peoples,” in *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, vol. 5, *He-Le*, ed. George Ritzer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 2281.

⁹ Alice Beck Kehoe, *North American Indians: A Comprehensive Account*, Prentice-Hall Series in Anthropology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 175–6.

¹⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 139.

But in all cases they were human communities related to place – to water holes or hunting grounds, to farms or grazing lands, to towns or cities. Regardless of the economy or political organization, cultures took hold of geography, making and remaking homelands for their peoples as the global order evolved. By the end of the fifteenth century, that order underwent revolutionary change as the Atlantic World came together through commerce and conquest. The era of transatlantic empires began.¹¹

IMPERIALISM

Worldwide, competition over land among the various bands, chiefdoms, and kingdoms had often led to conflict. Chiefs, local lords, and petty kings extended their domains, usually their homelands, by conquering their neighbors. Victory in war led to the growth of empires – extended societies found on both sides of the Atlantic well before sustained contact across the ocean. Empires based on conquest, such as the Aztec in Mesoamerica, the Moorish in North Africa, the English in Western Europe, sometimes developed into nation-states by integrating the conquered; at other times empires formed loose associations of peoples, but associations always resting on a substantial amount of force. Empires, vast collections of varied lands and peoples, generally benefited one people or ethnic group, particularly its elite. The elite acquired the wealth that came from the conquered; nevertheless, the wealth, power, and prestige of empire trickled down to the masses of the conquering ethnicity. In the sixteenth century, empires spanned the Atlantic.¹²

The order of the new trans-Atlantic World rested on imperialism, a relationship of dominance and subordination between peoples founded on conquest. Leading the way across the ocean

¹¹ Ibid.; and James F. Searing, *West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce: The Senegal River Valley, 1700–1860*, African Studies Series, 77 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 10–12.

¹² Jurgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, trans. Shelley L. Frisch (1995; Princeton, N.J.: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1997), 8–9; for one major empire in two phases, see Xavier Yacono, *Histoire de la colonisation française, Que sais-je? Le point des connaissances actuelles*, no. 452, 2nd rev. ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1973).

was, needless to say, the Spanish Empire, followed in North America principally by the English and French. Whatever formal or informal empire we examine, military, political, economic, cultural, and general social power rested in the hands of the conquering ethnic group even as it co-opted local leadership. Imperialism, synonymous with colonialism for our purposes, naturally had a geographical dimension. The dominant ethnic group had a historic homeland at the core of the empire, populated densely by that group – Spain, England, France. Radiating from that core were the provinces or colonies, generally less integrated as one moved farther from the center. In the case of imperial Spain, the Canaries, Mexico, and Texas exemplified this pattern. In the provinces resided ethnic groups usually unrelated to the dominant group, often conquered and restive – the Guanches, Aztecs, and Coahuiltecan.¹³

THE NATION

On both sides of the Atlantic, early nations had generally formed from bands, clans, and tribes that had a common heritage, often lineal and linguistic – the Tlaxcalans in the Western Hemisphere or the Moroccans in the Eastern. A nation was usually an ethnic group that had established a sovereign state in its homeland, as had Tlaxcala and Morocco. As we have seen, a people expanding at the expense of other ethnic groups often became an empire. To the degree that the national core integrated the provinces politically, and especially culturally, imperialism became national expansion. That process, however, was long and uncertain, with a product liable to disintegration, for on the periphery were other nationalities,

¹³ Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 193; Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002), 26–7; and Thomas D. Hall, “Ethnic Conflict as a Global Social Problem,” in *Handbook of Social Problems: A Comparative International Perspective*, ed. George Ritzer (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004), 141–2. Although colonialism has materialistic motives at its base, the role of ethnicity receives greater attention in colonial theory than in the world systems paradigm into which the theory is sometimes embedded (e.g., Meinig, vol.1, 258–67).

subordinate ethnic groups, located in competing homelands within ethnic regions.¹⁴

European nations came to dominate the Atlantic World at the beginning of the modern era as they unified their homelands and launched expansion overseas. England sought more effective control over the Celtic Fringe – Wales, Scotland, and Ireland – after losing its foothold on the continent at the end of the Hundred Years War. On the other hand, France secured its unity with the defeat of the English, followed by incorporation of peripheral ethnic regions, such as Brittany and the Basque Country north of the Pyrenees. Modern Spain formed after its victory over the Moors at Granada in 1492, followed by the conquest of Navarre two decades later. This national development, or nation building, occurred in conjunction with the imperial thrust down and across the Atlantic.¹⁵

¹⁴ What I call “early nations,” McNeil, 17, describes as “close analogues to the nation state of modern times”; cf. Anderson, 36–7; for much of my understanding of domestic colonialism beyond the United States, I owe Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1975), 4–5. In the 1960s “internal colonialism” became an important theory advanced to explain the historical development of ethnic and racial inequality in modern national states. The concept gained wide applicability among historians and others in Latin America, Europe, and the United States, especially as regards ethnic Mexicans in the latter. Though by the 1980s the theory had been dismissed as inadequate by many scholars, its influence resurged, especially as postcolonial theory evolved. In *Beyond Nations*, I accept the validity of internal colonialism for the historical interpretation of ethnic regions – see Pablo González-Casanova, “Sociedad plural, colonialismo interno y desarrollo,” *América Latina* 6 (no. 3, 1963): 16, 18, the seminal article on the theory; Barrera, 193, the major study of internal colonialism and Chicanos; Robert J. Hind, “The Internal Colonial Concept,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26 (July 1984): 548, 552–3, 558, 561; and Emma Pérez, *The Decolonial Imaginary: Writing Chicanas into History, Theories of Representation and Difference* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1999), 6, 131 n.16, a postcolonial work that supports internal colonialism.

¹⁵ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), 211–24; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System, Studies in Social Discontinuity*, vol. 1, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Academic Press, 1974), 146–7; and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 16–30.