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978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- Adams, Frederick, 162n, 163n, 168n, 182–3n, 230n, 242n
- Aizawa, Ken, 92n
- Almog, Joseph, 169n, 170n, 180n, 185n
- analytic-synthetic distinction, vii, ix, 5, 12, 18–38, 46, 51–2, 172, 176
- Anderson, John R., 278n
- animal thoughts, 158n, 208, 311
- anti-Representationalism, 8, 132, 139, 187, 193–6, 243
- Antony, Louise M., ix, 25n, 67n
- a priori knowledge, 2, 5, 18, 23–8, 34–8, 49–54, 75–6, 87, 94, 165n, 172, 176, 250, 256n
- Armstrong, D. M., 208, 210n
- artifactual holism and localism, 90, 105–13
- astronomical holism and localism, 90, 101, 104–13, 117
- attitude ascriptions, meanings of, 82–4, 196–218 context dependency of, 8, 46–7n, 117–21, 124, 141, 181n, 196–208, 215, 221–3, 234–7, 243–4 *see also* intimate link; opaque ascriptions; transparent ascriptions
- autonomous psychology, *see* methodological solipsism
- Baker, Lynne Rudder, 169n, 250, 251n, 257n, 264n, 276n
- Barwise, Jon, 170n
- Bealer, George, 76n
- behaviorism, 60, 66–7, 247, 256n
- Bigelow, John, 53–4n
- Bilgrami, Akeel, 69n
- biological holism and localism, 90, 101, 103–13
- Block, Ned, ix, 5, 11n, 12, 16, 18n, 20n, 38–42, 44, 55n, 120n, 169n, 187n, 264n, 268n, 276n, 286n, 290–1n, 291, 292, 293–4, 295n, 299n, 309
- Bloomfield, L., 66n
- Boer, Stephen, 225n
- Bogdan, Radu J., 249n
- Boghossian, Paul A., 20, 238n, 250n
- Bonjour, Laurence, 51n
- Brandom, Robert, 64n, 193n
- Bratman, Michael, 230n
- Braun, David, ix, 170n, 183n
- Bromberger, Sylvain, 276n
- Burge, Tyler, 15, 82n, 159n, 173n, 255n, 294–5, 300–2
- Byrne, Alex, ix
- Carnap, Rudolf, 23, 52n, 233n, 262
- Cartesianism, 2, 5, 8, 25, 26–7, 28, 32, 49–54, 75, 81, 82n, 94–5, 160n, 171n, 172–6, 179n, 180n, 185n, 219, 230, 236, 238, 256n
- Castaneda, Hector-Neri, 8, 139, 224–5

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- causal theories,
 - of meaning, ix, 4, 7–8, 99, 116, 129, 133–4, 138, 139, 161–3, 165–70, 176–8, 183n, 185–6, 218, 226–8, 267, 288–91
 - of reference, 7, 160–1, 163–70
- Chalmers, David, 74n
- Chastain, Charles, 147n
- Chisholm, Roderick, 145n
- Chomsky, Noam, 66n, 157, 259
- Church, Alonzo, 233n
- Churchland, Patricia S., 18n, 253–6, 278n, 296
- Churchland, Paul M., 18n, 120n, 253–6, 296
- cluster theories, *see* description theories of meaning or reference, cluster
- coarse-grained,
 - behaviors, 307–10
 - meanings, 9, 142, 185, 232, 235, 237–8, 240, 243, 287–92, 309
- competence, *see* linguistic-conceptual competence
- complexity of meanings, 12, 56, 155–8, 248
- computer analogy, argument from, 8–9, 255–6, 265–72, 276–7, 281, 312
- conceptual analysis, 34, 51–3, 165n, 173n; *see also* methodology of philosophy; naturalism
- conceptual-role semantics, *see* functional-role semantics
- confirmation holism, 2, 4, 12, 17–18, 23, 26, 31, 46, 50, 107n, 293
- conventional meaning, 59n, 65, 68n, 69n, 154–8, 176, 193n, 199, 201, 207, 222, 225–8, 232–40; *see also* speaker meaning
- Cowie, Fiona, ix, 14n, 255n
- Crane, Tim, 259n
- Crimmins, Mark, 170n, 184n, 201n, 202n, 203n, 205, 206n
- CTM (Computational Theory of the Mind), 257, 263, 267–8, 276n, 277, 280–4; *see also* FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION; NARROW PSYCHOLOGY; SYNTACTIC PSYCHOLOGY
- Danto, Arthur, 298n
- Davidson, Donald, 15n, 52n, 56n, 66–7, 82n, 139–40, 173n, 198n, 247
- de dicto* and *de re* ascriptions and thoughts, 118, 144n
- deflationary theories of truth or reference, 48, 64, 143, 150, 162, 193, 195, 215
- demonstratives (indexicals, pronouns), theories of, 142–54, 163–6, 168, 170n, 179, 186, 197–8, 218–25, 231–2, 235–7, 241, 288, 290, 302–3
- Demopoulos, William, 257n
- Dennett, Daniel, 149
- Descartes, René, 52n
- description theories of meaning or reference, 4, 7, 115–6, 129–31, 139, 159–65, 176, 185, 188, 234, 242–3, 270, 274, 290
- cluster, 11n, 19n, 96–100, 124, 130
- descriptions, theories of, 142–4, 147n, 163–5, 168
- descriptive-causal theories of reference, 7, 160–1, 165n
- de se* thoughts, 224; *see also* modes of reference or (re)presentation, first-person
- d(esignating)-chains, 164–9, 177, 226–7, 288

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- designation, *see* modes of reference or (re)presentation, *en rapport* (designational)
- Devitt, Michael, ix, 2, 4, 15n, 20n, 23n, 24n, 28n, 34, 35n, 51n, 53n, 57n, 64n, 65n, 67n, 81n, 83n, 84n, 92n, 103, 118n, 133n, 134n, 135n, 139, 144n, 145n, 147n, 157, 159n, 163–170, 171n, 173, 177n, 178n, 183n, 194, 201n, 202n, 208, 218n, 225n, 228, 236n, 238n, 250n, 255n, 260n, 270n, 272n, 277, 282
- direct reference, ix, 4, 8, 48, 64, 85–6, 91, 128, 134n, 138, 145, 165n, 170–87, 203n, 222–3n, 240–3, 286n
- disquotational principle, Kripke's, 82n, 198n, 228n
- Donnellan, Keith S., 115, 161, 163–4, 170n, 240
- Dretske, Fred I., 161, 284
- Duhem, Pierre, 50
- Dummett, Michael, viii, 52–3n, 65n, 124n, 172n, 194n
- economic holism and localism, 30–1, 44, 90, 104–13, 124, 126
- eliminativism, semantic, 3, 8–9, 15n, 60, 61n, 66–7, 100, 136, 151, 244, 245–312
- Elugardo, Rey, ix
- Emptiness Problem, 171, 177
- en rapport* reference, *see* modes of reference or (re)presentation, *en rapport* (designational)
- epistemology, vii, 2, 5–6, 17–18, 23–38, 46, 49–54, 74, 75–6, 87, 89, 94–5; *see also* confirmation holism
- equivalence (disquotational) principle, 53n, 194
- Evans, Gareth, 52n
- Existence Problem, 171, 177
- exportation in attitude ascriptions, 143–5, 163, 166
- export strategies in semantics, 179–86
- extensional and intensional ascriptions, 149–150
- 'Fido'-Fido theory, ix, 4, 8, 85–6, 91, 128, 129, 134n, 138, 139, 142–54, 165n, 169–87, 195, 240–3
- Field, Hartry, ix, 20n, 149, 157, 164n, 187n, 191n, 211, 213, 228, 257, 258, 276n, 294n, 310
- fine-grained meanings, 69, 86, 117, 142, 150n, 158n, 176, 185, 191, 195, 220–2, 225, 228–40, 243–4, 286n, 289n, 291n
- first- and second-level meanings distinguished, 8, 83, 139, 196–7, 208–10, 212, 215–17, 219, 240, 244–5
- Fodor, Jerry A., vii, ix, 1, 3, 10–11, 15–16, 17n, 18n, 23n, 24–5n, 35n, 43, 44, 46n, 64n, 87–8, 93n, 94, 119, 121n, 124n, 126n, 133n, 134, 151, 155–6, 170n, 180n, 183n, 201n, 242n, 248, 250n, 255n, 257, 258, 264n, 265, 267–8, 274n, 275–6n, 280–4, 286n, 294n, 296, 300–2
- folk psychology, 43–4, 46–7n, 73–4, 158n, 249, 251–4, 257, 275–80, 285, 298
- folk semantics, 7, 54, 62, 69, 77n, 78, 80, 82, 85, 114–22, 140–50, 164, 173–6, 182–4, 188–92, 194–6, 196–7, 211–14, 220–3, 231, 243–4, 248–9
- FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION, 264–5, 268–9, 272, 276–7, 282

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- formality condition, 257, 264n, 268n, 275–6n
- formal properties, nature of, 258–65; *see also* syntactic properties, nature of
- Frege, ix, 2, 4, 48, 52, 64, 82n, 139, 142–3, 161, 162n, 165, 170, 171–2, 174n, 176, 180–1, 198n, 238
- Fregean assumption, 18–28, 37–8, 41, 42, 43, 128, 129, 130–1, 133, 136, 188, 202
- Fuller, Gary, 162n, 163n, 168n, 182–3n, 242n
- functional-role semantics, 3, 8, 9, 16, 20, 41–2, 43–6, 64, 69, 88, 96, 188–96, 206–7, 255n, 258, 274, 275–6, 285, 290n, 292–312
- functionalism, 5, 12, 16, 43–6, 88, 110, 255, 294
- function of meanings, 137–8
- Gasper, Philip, 250n
- Geach, Peter, 275n
- generality, argument from our interest in against holism, 6–7, 85, 101, 109–11, 123–7, 132, 135
- Godfrey-Smith, Peter, ix
- Goldman, Alvin I., 79n, 298n
- Goodman, Nelson, 103n
- Gordon, Robert M., 79–80n
- Grice, Paul, 59n, 68n, 154–8, 225–7
- groundings, 164, 167–9, 239
- Grover, Dorothy, ix
- Hannan, Barbara, 250n
- Harman, Gilbert, ix, 15n, 16, 17n, 18n, 53n, 120n, 193n, 194n
- Haugeland, John, 260, 262n, 264n
- having a particular object in mind, *see* modes of reference or (re)pre-sentation, en rapport (designational)
- Heidelberger, Herbert, 52–3n
- Hidden-Indexical theory, 202–6, 221–2, 234, 237
- Higginbotham, James, 55n
- holism, *see* artifactual holism and localism; astronomical holism and localism; biological holism and localism; confirmation holism; economic holism and localism; HOLISM doctrines defined; psychological holism and localism; semantic holism
- cluster, 19n, 96–7, 105–6, 111–12, 124, 130
- negative, 99, 106–7, 111, 115, 124, 128
- type (in contrast to token), 43–6, 88, 98–9, 110, 115, 122, 127
- HOLISM doctrines defined,
- DESCRIPTIVE EXTREME BIOLOGICAL**, 103
- DESCRIPTIVE SEMANTIC**, 100
- EXTREME SEMANTIC**, 96
- NEGATIVE SEMANTIC**, 99
- SEMANTIC**, 96
- TYPE SEMANTIC**, 98
- Horgan, Terence, 249n, 254n
- Hornstein, Norbert, 279n
- Horwich, Paul, 64n, 193n
- identification assumption, nature of, 74, 78, 104, 114
- Identity Problem, 8, 171–85, 235–8, 242–3
- ignorance and error, arguments from, 114–6, 130–1, 159, 195, 287
- indeterminacy of translation, 15, 66–7
- inferential-role semantics, *see* functional-role semantics

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- informativeness and cognitive significance of identity statements, 2, 8, 172–3, 176–180, 238
- intentional behaviors or actions, basic, 298n
denial of, 9, 249–55, 258, 295–9, 308, 312
nature of, 230–1, 294–5
- intimate link, 8, 82–3, 86, 116, 118, 121, 123, 193, 198–208, 215–6, 247n, 311
- intuitions, role of, 1, 5, 42, 48–54, 65, 72–85, 184n, 242; *see also* methodology of philosophy; naturalism
- IT (illustrative theory of referential meanings), 163–71, 173, 177–8, 218, 223, 226–8, 239–40, 288–9
- Jackson, Frank, 150n
- Jones, Todd, 15–16
- Kant, Immanuel, 250
- Kaplan, David, 141n, 143n, 170n, 179n, 180n, 185n, 186, 222–3n
- Katz, Jerrold J., 18n, 55, 56n, 169n
- Kirkham, Richard L.
- Kitcher, Patricia, 254n, 255n, 257n
- Kitcher, Philip, 50n
- Kripke, Saul A., 8, 82n, 114–15, 118, 139, 161, 163, 164n, 170n, 172, 189n, 198n, 203, 222, 228n, 228–41, 242n
- Kuhn, Thomas S., 88
- language-of-thought hypothesis, 13, 56n, 95n, 139, 154–8, 248, 254, 266
- Larson, Richard K., 67n, 166n
- Lepore, Ernest, 11n, 15n, 18n, 23n, 24–5n, 35n, 53n, 64n, 87, 93n, 94, 124n, 133n, 134n, 169n, 173n, 250n, 257n
- Levine, Joseph, 33–6, 134n
- Lewis, David K., ix, 43, 45, 65n, 109n, 158n, 210
- linguistic-conceptual competence, 2, 5, 25, 26–8, 32, 51–3, 65, 66n, 78–83, 94, 160n, 172–3, 176, 178–9, 185n, 227, 238
- Loar, Brian, 17n, 20n, 52n, 169n, 187n, 191n, 192n, 236n, 249n, 256, 264n, 273, 274n, 275n, 292n, 300, 307n
- localism, *see* artifactual holism and localism; astronomical holism and localism; biological holism and localism; economic holism and localism; LOCALISM doctrines defined; psychological holism and localism; semantic localism cluster, 11n, 19n, 97–100
- LOCALISM doctrines defined, DESCRIPTIVE SEMANTIC, 100 NORMATIVE SEMANTIC, 99 SEMANTIC, 98
- Loewer, Barry, 53n, 169n, 173n, 257n
- logical necessity, 22–3, 25, 28, 33, 172, 176
- logical truth, 22–3, 25–9, 32, 50, 51–2
- Lormand, Eric, ix, 69n, 161n, 216n
- Ludlow, Peter, ix, 67n, 166n
- Lycan, William G., ix, 20n, 28, 44, 55, 56n, 63, 67n, 77n, 169n, 170n, 180n, 186, 187n, 188–9, 192, 208, 224, 225n, 257n
- McClamrock, Ron, 16, 43, 121
- MacDonald, G., 67n
- McGinn, Colin, 20n, 53n, 169n, 187n, 192n, 257n, 272, 292n

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- McKinsey, Michael, 52n
 Malcolm, Norman, 250n
 Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 169n
 Marshall, Graeme, 307n
 Mates, Benson, 242n
 meaning, tokens having more than one, viii, 3–4, 68–9, 79n, 85, 89, 91, 94, 95–6, 139, 143–154, 239, 242
 meaning holism, *see* semantic holism
 meaninglocalism, *see* semantic localism
 meanings, *see* attitude ascriptions, meanings of; coarse-grained meanings; complexity of meanings; fine-grained meanings; first- and second-level meanings distinguished; function of meanings; meaning, tokens having more than one; modes of reference or (re)presentation as meanings; narrow meanings (contents); promiscuous meanings; proto-intentional meanings and behavior; semantic roles, nature of; senses, Fregean; similarities in meanings; vagueness of meaning; wide meanings (contents) (in contrast to narrow)
 methodological proposals, first, 5, 62, 70, 84, 140 second, 5, 71, 84, 140, 252–3 third, 5, 77, 84, 140 fourth, 6, 83–5, 140, 208–15 *see also* methodology of semantics
 methodological solipsism, 8–9, 255–6, 268n, 272–7, 285, 291, 292, 299–312
 methodology, of linguistics, 53n, 77, 81n of philosophy, 1, 48, 54, 75–6; *see also* conceptual analysis of psychology, 63n, 85n
 of science, 1, 48–9, 70–6, 78–9, 244–5
 of semantics, viii–ix, 1–6, 8, 47, 48–86, 87, 100–1, 122, 140, 173–4, 176, 179, 183–4, 186, 197, 208–15, 218n, 251–2
 Millian theory, *see* ‘Fido’-Fido theory
 Millikan, Ruth, 161
 modes of reference or (re)presentation, causal, ix, 4, 7–8, 99, 116, 129, 133–4, 138, 139, 160–70, 176–8, 183n, 185–6, 218, 226–8, 267, 288–91
 demonstrative, 142–3, 218–223, 231, 232, 234, 236, 241
 descriptive, 4, 7, 139, 159–65, 176, 185, 234, 242–3, 270, 274, 290
 disjunctive, for names, 233–5, 292
 en rapport (designational), 7, 143–8, 147n, 151, 153–4, 163–6, 200–3, 216, 222
 first-person, 223–5
 as meanings, 4, 7, 64, 85–6, 128–9, 133–4, 139, 142–5, 148–54, 161–3, 165–71, 174–86, 188, 195, 200–6, 216–44, 267, 285, 288–91, 303, 306n; *see also* senses, Fregean
 one a species of another, 231–2, 236–7
 unified, 231–2, 234, 236–7
 Mrs. T, 36–7n, 119–20, 190, 273
 Mulaire, Edmond, 15–16
 names, *see* proper names, theories of narrow behavior, 307–10
 narrow meanings (contents), 3, 9, 14n, 16, 39–42, 48, 60, 128, 255n, 256, 258, 273–7, 278, 285, 299–312
 as functional roles, 9, 20, 42, 255n,

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- 258, 274, 275–6, 292–9, 302, 304–12
as functions, 9, 41–2, 128, 255n, 258, 280, 285–292, 302, 304–12
- NARROW PSYCHOLOGY**, 9, 60, 256–8, 272–7, 285–312
- naturalism, ix, 1–2, 5–6, 23–38, 46, 48–86, 90, 160–4, 172, 194, 249–53
- Neale, Stephen, 164n
- networks for proper names, 164, 167–9, 173, 177, 226–7, 239
- new theory, *see* ‘Fido’-Fido theory
- Nichols, Shaun, 79–80n
- nominalism, 66n, 246n
- no-principled-basis consideration, vii–ix, 3, 183, 293
- appeal of, 93–5, 134–5
- a case against, 6–7, 87–135
- rejection of the case for, 4–5, 11–47, 290–1n, 299n
- Occam, William of, 210
- Opacity Problem, 171, 175–7, 180–5, 240–3
- opaque ascriptions, 7, 69, 117–8, 141–54, 161, 166–8, 171, 174–8, 180, 184, 188–92, 195–203, 217–26, 230–38, 276n, 285, 287–91, 295, 304
- Oppy, Graham, ix, 203n
- Owens, Joseph I., 53n, 238n
- Papineau, David, 16, 21, 38, 161, 294n
- paradox of analysis, 173n
- partial reference, 225–8
- Pastin, Mark, 145n
- Patterson, Sarah, 236n
- Pelletier, Francis Jeffry, 76n
- Perry, John, 170n, 180n, 201n, 202n, 203n, 205, 206n, 223–4, 236n
- Pettit, Philip, 67n
- physicalism (materialism), 265, 268–9, 272, 276–7
- Platonism, 8, 55n, 83–4, 210–15
- possible worlds semantics, 56n, 208, 210
- pragmatics, 179–85
- principles of charity and rationality, 15, 67, 192n
- promiscuous meanings, 287–92, 309
- proper names, theories of, ix, 8, 85, 129, 130, 138, 142–54, 159–61, 163–87, 222, 224–44, 261, 286n, 288–92, 302
- propositions, 8, 13, 32–3, 56n, 57, 83–4, 155n, 180–2, 186n, 192n, 202n, 210–15, 224, 237n, 239n
- proto-intentional meanings and behavior, 280, 286, 292, 306–10
- psychological holism and localism, 43–6, 90, 104–13, 124
- Putnam, Hilary, ix, 5, 15n, 17n, 18n, 19n, 20n, 25n, 32, 39, 99, 114–5, 159, 161, 173n, 189, 256, 273,
- Pylyshyn, Z., 255n, 257, 264n, 265, 280n, 282n
- quantifying in, 141, 147n
- Quine, W. V., vii, ix, 7, 15, 17–38, 50, 52n, 54, 66–7, 69, 87, 93n, 94, 117–20, 141–8, 166, 175, 197, 199–208, 210–15, 220, 222, 229, 235, 237, 247, 293
- Ramsey sentences, 109–10, 124
- Ray, Greg, ix
- realism about the external world, 2, 21, 102–3, 130, 194
- Reddam, Paul, 202n

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- reference, *see* causal theories of reference; deflationary theories of truth or reference; description theories of meaning or reference; descriptive-causal theories of reference; modes of reference or (re)presentation; partial reference
- reference borrowing, 164, 167, 227, 239, 287–8
- referential (designational) and attributive distinction, 144, 147n, 163–6, 200–2
- relational sense of belief, 148–9n
- Representationalism, 3
- argument from against semantic holism, 7, 101, 127–32
 - defended from eliminativism and revisionism, 8–9, 245–312
 - and the principled basis, 132–5
 - a program for, 7–8, 136–244
- revisability, 5, 18, 23–6, 28–38
- revisionism, semantic, 3, 8–9, 60, 71, 86, 100, 122, 136, 142, 151, 184, 213–14, 223, 244, 245–312
- Rey, Georges, ix, 11n, 51n, 53n, 67n, 250n, 264n, 272n, 274n, 276n, 279n
- Richard, Mark, 8, 56n, 57n, 139, 147n, 166n, 201n, 202n, 203n, 211–15, 218–23, 229, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237n, 240, 241
- rigid designation, 169–70
- Ruritania example, 5, 38–42, 290–1n, 299n
- Russell, Bertrand, 52n, 147n, 164, 170
- Salmon, Nathan, 170n, 179–85, 203n, 241n, 242
- Schiffer, Stephen, 57n, 145, 158n, 162n, 169n, 201n, 202n, 203n, 205, 210, 256–8, 309n
- Searle, John R., 97, 159n
- Sellars, Wilfrid, 56n
- semantic holism, vii–ix, 3–4, 136, 156, 159, 183; *see also* HOLISM doctrines defined
- belief version of (in contrast to inference version of), 13, 27–34, 37–8
- a case against, 6–7, 87–135, 293
- a critique of the case for, 4–5, 10–47, 290–1n, 299n
- type (in contrast to token), 44–6.
- 88, 98–9, 122, 127
- a straw man?, 15–16
- semantic innocence, 82n, 198n, 203n
- semantic localism, vii–ix, 3–4, 183, 188; *see also* LOCALISM doctrines defined
- atomistic (in contrast to molecular), vii, viii, 3, 10–11, 88, 95, 98, 139, 160
- a case for, 6–7, 87–135, 293
- a Representationalist program for, 136–244
- semantic methodology, *see* methodology of semantics
- semantic purposes, nature of, 5, 57–60, 92
- semantic roles, nature of, 60, 92, 246, 296
- semantic tasks (basic, normative, descriptive), nature of, viii, 1, 5, 47, 49, 54–69, 84, 86, 89, 92, 94, 139–40, 165n, 182, 186
- semantic theories, *see* causal theories; description theories of meaning or reference; descriptive-causal theories of reference; direct reference; eliminativism, semantic; export strategies in semantics; ‘Fido’-Fido theory; folk semantics; functional-role semantics;

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-49887-6 - Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism

Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- possible worlds semantics; Representationalism; revisionism, semantic; truth-referential semantics; two-factor theories; use theories; verificationism
- semi-Representationalism, 8, 132, 138, 187–92, 196, 243
- senses, Fregean, ix, 82n, 134n, 161, 165, 180–1, 198n
- similarities in meanings, 46–7n, 65, 77, 119n, 120–1, 293–4
- simulation theory, 79–80n
- Slater, Carol, 83n
- Sleigh, R. C., 143n
- slippery-slope or sorites arguments, 11n, 119–20n
- Slote, viii–ix
- Soames, Scott, 53n, 170n, 180n, 181n, 203n, 223n, 233, 241n, 242–3
- Sosa, Ernest, 145n, 225n
- speaker meaning, 59n, 65, 68n, 154–8, 193n, 225–8, 232–9; *see also* conventional meaning
- Stalnaker, Robert, 309n,
- Stampe, Dennis, 161
- Stecker, Robert, 162n, 163n, 168n, 182–3n, 242n
- Sterelny, Kim, ix, 2, 15n, 28n, 51n, 53n, 65n, 81n, 147n, 157n, 163, 165n, 169n, 260n
- Stich, Stephen P., 15–16, 43, 46–7n, 79n, 119–20, 123n, 147n, 190–1, 207n, 208, 254n, 256–7, 264n, 266–7, 272–3, 275–6, 278–80, 297–8, 299, 310–12
- STM (Syntactic Theory of the Mind), 256–7, 263, 266, 275–80; *see also* FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION, NARROW PSYCHOLOGY, SYNTACTIC PSYCHOLOGY
- Strawson, P. F., 52n, 97
- substitutivity of identity, 142, 147, 171, 175–7, 181n, 184, 235, 240–3
- success of our ascriptions, argument from for the status quo, 70–1, 76, 81, 84, 85, 101, 112, 126, 132–3, 150–1, 154, 174, 244, 252–3, 312
- against direct reference, 184
- against eliminativism, 254
- against NARROW PSYCHOLOGY, 7, 296, 299
- against semantic holism, 6, 100–1, 113, 122, 127, 132, 135
- against two-factor, use, and verificationist theories, 86, 187, 196
- Swain, Corliss, ix
- synonymy, 23, 65, 77, 162–3, 173, 242–3, 294n
- syntactic properties, nature of, 123, 258–65, 275–6; *see also* formal properties, nature of
- SYNTACTIC PSYCHOLOGY, 9, 60, 256–85, 312; *see also* STM (Syntactic Theory of the Mind)
- SYNTACTIC THOUGHT PROCESSES, 268–72, 275–7, 281, 312
- tacit (implicit) beliefs, theories, or knowledge, 2, 27, 51, 73–4, 79–80, 83, 140, 149, 160n, 248–9
- Tarski, Alfred, 157
- Taschek, William W., 172, 179n, 239n
- Taylor, Kenneth A., ix, 165n, 250n
- thought experiments, 1, 5, 48, 54, 72, 74–5, 80, 84–5, 114, 141; *see also* methodology of philosophy; naturalism
- transcendentalism, 8, 249–53

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Michael Devitt

Index

[More information](#)

- transparent ascriptions, 7, 69, 117–18, 120, 142–4, 149–50, 192, 201–2, 220, 223n, 225, 241, 286n
- rapport-, 7, 144–8, 151, 153–4, 200–2, 222
- simply-, 7, 144–8, 151–4, 161, 176, 184, 188, 195–202, 217–8, 222, 232, 285, 291–2
- truth-referential semantics, viii, 1, 20, 43, 83, 128, 162, 248, 254; *see also* Representationalism
- Twin Earth, 159–60, 189, 273, 286n, 287–9, 300, 303, 305–10
- two-factor theories, viii, 3, 8, 20, 48, 64, 69, 86, 96, 129n, 132, 134–5, 138, 187–92, 194, 243, 256
- “ultimate” method, nature of, 5, 72–8, 104, 113–4, 140–1, 215
- use theories, 1, 3, 64, 132, 139, 187, 193–6, 243
- vagueness,
 - of meaning, 14, 55, 61, 63, 80, 116, 233n, 246–7
 - of reality, 76, 80, 105, 116, 246
- verificationism, viii–ix, 1, 3, 4, 8, 17–18, 20–1, 46, 48, 64, 86, 132, 187, 193–6, 243, 256n
- Von Eckardt, Barbara, 255n, 278n
- Wagner, Steven J., 169n
- warranted assertability, 1, 20–1
- Wettstein, Howard, 53n, 164n, 169n, 170n, 180n, 181n, 185n
- White, Morton G., 29n
- White, Stephen L., 286n
- wide behavior (in contrast to narrow), 307–10
- wide meanings (contents) (in contrast to narrow), 9, 14n, 20, 39, 41, 48, 128, 255n, 256–8, 273–5, 278, 279–80, 285, 286n, 286–312
- WIDE PSYCHOLOGY**, 9, 275, 303–12; *see also* NARROW PSYCHOLOGY
- Wiggins, David, 52n
- Wilson, G., 147n, 164n
- Wilson, N. L., 18n, 97
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 52n, 97
- Woodward, James, 254n
- Wright, Crispin, 53n
- Yagasaki, Takashi, 177n