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Introduction: The Scottish Enlightenment in the history of ideas

0.1 *The Scottish Enlightenment*

The essays that make up this volume were written as more or less self-contained pieces, yet each is closely related to the rest. The unifying theme is that important parts of eighteenth-century moral philosophy were heavily influenced by the natural law theories that developed within Protestantism after Hugo Grotius. The general thesis is that Protestant natural jurisprudence harboured a tension between a natural rights and a natural law tendency and that this was of particular importance for much subsequent moral and political thought. This was especially true of moral philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment. After an extensive survey of the seventeenth-century European natural law background, the argument therefore concentrates mainly on Scottish moral thought in the eighteenth century.

It has long been a commonplace that the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment understood the moral life and moral institutions of humanity in social and historical terms; in fact, they have been seen as pioneers of holistic methods of explanation and of historical sociology. Yet at the same time, the Scots have commonly been included in the roll of honour for the founders of liberalism, and this individualistic perspective was perhaps reinforced by the tendency of traditional history of philosophy to concentrate on the epistemic and moral powers of an abstract subject. This scene has been changed dramatically in less than a generation.¹ Of the many perspectives that have enriched our understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment, three stand out: that of practical morals and moralizing politics; that of natural jurisprudence; and that of scientism.

¹ The best general bibliography is in Richard B. Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh*, Princeton, 1985, pp. 329–76. For more recent literature, see *Eighteenth-Century Scotland: The Newsletter of the Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society*, 1987–, edited by Sher. The references in this introduction are selective pointers only.

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The pioneering work of Caroline Robbins and John Pocock drew the Scots within the walls of revived republicanism, and the moralizing humanism that went along with this has been explained in its Anglo-Scots adaptations by Nicholas Phillipson and others.² Subsequently, additional forms of practical, social moralizing have been explored by Richard Sher and John Dwyer, and, more recently, detailed studies of the moral and political relevance of history, especially national history, have been added.³ Furthermore, the humanist republicanism found in the Scots has been embraced by some American scholars in their search for a republican tradition unencumbered by individualistic liberalism and edified by communitarianism.⁴

These interpretative endeavours have been complicated by the simultaneous appearance of new studies of the role of natural jurisprudence in the Scottish Enlightenment. The issue was raised by a number of scholars in the context of the Scots' external connections – especially with Locke and with the European continent – and in the

2 Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, Cambridge, MA, 1959, ch. 6; same, "'When it is that colonies may turn independent": An analysis of the environment and politics of Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746)', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 11 (1954), 214–51; J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton, 1975, chs. 13–14; same, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge, UK, 1985. A particularly valuable working out of this perspective is John Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue*, Edinburgh, 1985. In addition to the articles by Nicholas Phillipson cited in note 5 to Chapter 8 in the present volume, see his *Hume*, London, 1989, and his 'Propriety, property and prudence: David Hume and the defence of the Revolution', in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge, UK, 1993, pp. 302–20.

3 Sher, *Church and University*; John Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1987; same, 'Clio and ethics: Practical morality in enlightened Scotland', *The Eighteenth Century*, 30 (1989), 45–72; David Allan, *Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of Scholarship in Early Modern History*, Edinburgh, 1993; Colin Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c. 1830*, Cambridge, UK, 1993.

4 In addition to the references in Chapter 10 in the present volume, see e.g. Stephen B. Presser, *The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence*, Durham, NC, 1991. For a good discussion of these issues, see James T. Kloppenberg, 'The virtues of liberalism: Christianity, republicanism, and ethics in early American political discourse', *Journal of American History*, 74 (1987), 9–33. The continuity of ancient and modern republicanism has recently come under critical scrutiny in Paul A. Rahe's massive *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill, NC, 1992.

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context of how to interpret Hume and Smith. It has subsequently been pursued in interpretation of a number of other Scottish thinkers, including Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid, and its central place in the university curriculum has come to be appreciated. The jurisprudential perspective has, however, allowed the question of liberalism – anachronistic though it is – to live on. Again, it has been the American passion for a usable past that has provided much of the energy. The well-known Scottish treatises on moral philosophy were discovered to have whole books and chapters on natural law and rights, and contractarian accounts of life's moral institutions that seemed like perfect substitutes for Locke, whose impact on moral and political thought in the eighteenth century was called into question by the republican interpretation.⁵

Meanwhile, a revolution in the history of science was taking place, and thanks to Roger Emerson and others, it touched the Scottish Enlightenment more than lightly.⁶ The new social and contextual history

5 The literature on natural jurisprudence and the Scots is extensively cited and discussed in the subsequent essays and needs no supplementation here. Concerning the American connection, see notes 42–3 to Chapter 10 of this volume.

6 See esp. Roger L. Emerson, 'Natural philosophy and the problem of the Scottish Enlightenment', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, 242 (1986), 243–91; same, 'Science and the origins and concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment', *History of Science*, 26 (1988), 333–66; same, 'Science and moral philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment', in *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. M.A. Stewart, Oxford 1990, pp. 11–36. Other notable contributions to a large literature include M. Barfoot, 'James Gregory (1753–1821) and Scottish Scientific Metaphysics, 1750–1800', Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1983; same, 'Hume and the culture of science in the early eighteenth century', in *Studies*, ed. Stewart, pp. 151–90; J.R.R. Christie, 'The origins and development of the Scottish scientific community', *History of Science*, 12 (1974), 122–41; Christopher Lawrence, 'Medicine as Culture: Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment', Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1984; C.M. Shepherd, 'Newtonianism in Scottish universities in the seventeenth century', in *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, Edinburgh, 1982, pp. 65–85; same, 'The arts curriculum at Aberdeen at the beginning of the eighteenth century', in *Aberdeen and the Enlightenment*, ed. J.J. Carter and J.H. Pittock, Aberdeen, 1987, pp. 146–54; Paul B. Wood, 'Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher: A Study of Science and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment', Ph.D. thesis, University of Leeds, 1984; same, 'Science and the pursuit of virtue in the Aberdeen Enlightenment', in *Studies*, ed. Stewart, pp. 127–49; John P. Wright, 'Metaphysics and physiology: Mind, body, and the animal economy in eighteenth-century Scotland', in *Studies*, ed. Stewart, pp. 251–301. See also Dennis R. Dean, *James Hutton and the History of Geology*, Ithaca, NY, 1992; A.L. Donovan, *Philosophical Chemistry in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Doctrines and Discoveries of William Cullen and Joseph Black*, Edinburgh, 1975; P. Jones, ed.,

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saw the exploration of nature as an integral part of polite culture and of the culture of the mind. This work made clear the full extent of the teleological and providentialist twist put on Newtonianism, and this again gave a better appreciation of how Newton was extended to the moral sphere. Science served better than anything to show humanity its place and function in the general order instituted by the Divinity, and science was therefore itself part of practical moralizing. At the same time, the 'mental sciences' could work out the details of the moral psychology that made moralizing possible.

In another development closely connected with these three lines of interpretation, M. A. Stewart and others have presented a new appreciation of the Stoic legacy and its Christianisation.⁷ Many other areas of scholarship have become intertwined with these ideas. To mention a few obvious ones, the connection between practical moralizing and the arts is being explored; the traditionally accepted sharp boundaries between evangelicalism and polite moral enlightenment are being questioned, and liberal Catholicism has been drawn into the Enlightenment; the institutions of enlightenment are becoming more conspicuous and, especially in the work of Roger Emerson, this has provided a much better understanding of the politics of enlightenment.⁸ Feminist

Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh, 1988; and R. Olson, *Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750–1880*, Princeton, 1975.

7 M.A. Stewart, 'The origins of the Scottish Greek chairs', in 'Owls to Athens': *Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover*, ed. E. M. Craik, Oxford, 1990, pp. 391–400; same, 'The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment', in *Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought*, ed. Margaret J. Osler, Cambridge, UK, 1991, pp. 273–96; Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse*, ch. 2; D. D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, introduction to Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Oxford, 1976, pp. 5–10; Sher, *Church and University*, ch. 5; N. Waszek, 'Two concepts of morality: A distinction of Adam Smith's ethics and its Stoic origin', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 45 (1984), 591–606.

8 Out of hundreds of items I mention a few recent, representative samples of these lines of scholarship: The papers in section 3, 'Music and art in the Enlightenment', and section 5, 'Literature of the Enlightenment', in *Aberdeen and the Enlightenment*, ed. Carter and Pittock; John Dwyer, 'Enlightened spectators and classical moralists: Sympathetic relations in eighteenth-century Scotland', in *Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland*, ed. J. Dwyer and R.B. Sher, Edinburgh, 1993, pp. 96–118; Ned C. Landsman, 'Presbyterians and provincial society: The evangelical enlightenment in the west of Scotland, 1740–1775', in *ibid.*, pp. 194–209; Mark Goldie, 'The Scottish Catholic Enlightenment', *Journal of British Studies*, 30 (1991), 20–62; same, 'Common Sense philosophy and Catholic theology in the Scottish Enlightenment', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, 302 (1992), 281–320. Roger L. Emerson, *Professors, Patronage and Politics: The Aberdeen Universities in the Eighteenth Century*, Aberdeen, 1992; same, 'Lord Bute and the Scottish universities, 1760–1792',

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0.1 The Scottish Enlightenment

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work on the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment has been limited so far,⁹ but contributions in the fields of general history of philosophy and political theory have been rich and will be amply represented in this volume.

My concern in the following studies is not with the full variety of the Scottish Enlightenment but with a cluster of ideas and a pattern of argument that cut across the three interpretations just mentioned. My point of departure is, admittedly, one of the three, natural jurisprudence, but I shall show that this tradition is not what it has commonly been taken to be and that the form that was dominant in Scotland in the eighteenth century lent itself to synthesis with both practical moralizing and scientism. I shall, in particular, analyse some significant Scottish attempts to combine jurisprudence, civic humanism, and practical ethics in a coherent moral and political outlook.

The most important point to appreciate is that natural law theory in general was not deeply individualistic and dominated by the idea of subjective rights. There was, of course, a wide variety of purely *political* rights discourses in early modern Europe, not least in England. But few thinkers embraced, or even understood, the idea that moral agency, or personhood, might consist in asserting claims against the rest of the surrounding world with no other guidance than one's own lights and that any common, social world had to arise from accommodation of some sort among competing claims. We find attempts at this argument in Grotius and Hobbes and in parts of covenant theology. For these thinkers the moral life was – eschatology apart – an open-ended series

in *Lord Bute: Essays in Reinterpretation*, ed. Karl W. Schweizer, Leicester, 1991; Nicholas Phillipson, *The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session, 1785–1830*, Edinburgh, 1990; Richard B. Sher and Alexander Murdoch, 'Patronage and party in the Church of Scotland, 1750–1800', in *Church, Politics and Society: Scotland, 1408–1929*, ed. Norman MacDougall, Edinburgh, 1983, pp. 197–220.

9 See, however, Henry C. Clark's fine discussion of the literature that feminism has inspired, 'Women and humanity in Scottish Enlightenment social thought: The case of Adam Smith', *Historical Reflections/Réflexions historiques*, 19 (1993), 335–61. For discussion of women in eighteenth-century Scottish thought, see especially Jane Rendall's interesting 'Virtue and commerce: Women in the making of Adam Smith's political economy', in *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, ed. E. Kennedy and S. Mendus, New York, 1987, pp. 44–77. Other relevant studies include David Bowles, 'John Millar, the four-stages theory and women's position in society', *History of Political Economy*, 16 (1984), 619–38; David C. Cooper, 'Scottish communitarianism, Lockean individualism, and women's moral development', in *Women's Rights and the Rights of Man*, ed. A.J. Arnaud and E. Kingdom, Aberdeen, 1992, pp. 36–51; Sylvana Tomasselli, 'Reflections on the history of the science of woman', in *History of Science*, 29 (1991), 185–205.

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of contractual adaptations among individuals. In ways traced in a previous work and pursued in this volume, Hume and Adam Smith became part-heirs to this tradition by transforming contractarian negotiation into a complex socio-political development that had to be understood historically.¹⁰

In general, however, natural law theory gave a very different idea of the moral condition of humanity. According to most natural lawyers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, moral agency consisted in being subject to natural law and carrying out the duties imposed by such law, whereas rights were derivative, being mere means to the fulfilment of duties. Each person had a right to the acts he or she was under a duty to do and a right to what others had a duty to render. Similarly, contracts were means for implementing the performance of the duties imposed by natural law. Within this conceptual framework an intense battle was fought during the last three decades of the seventeenth and the early years of the eighteenth century. At issue was the old problem of whether natural law had moral force for humanity solely because it was God's will or whether in addition it had independent moral authority with us. Few disputed that natural law *existed* because of God's will; the question was rather whether or not there were moral values shared by God and humanity which entailed the moral obligations of natural law independently of our regard for God's willing this to be so. This was closely associated with the question of what powers of moral discernment human beings possessed, and that was in effect a question of the impact of original sin. The mainstream of moral philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment was formed by dealing with these issues.

The question of the adequacy of humanity's moral powers was answered empirically in the well-known theories of 'moral sense' and 'common sense'. Similarly, an objective moral order was supposedly demonstrated empirically to be the telos of moral life as we know it, and this was accepted as an answer to the obligation to natural law. Realization of this moral order would consist of the perfect discharge of the myriad of complementary roles or 'offices' – that is, duties with matching rights – that make up human life. The activity of being a public moralist inculcating the virtues of fulfilling one's office in the communal life of one's group was therefore securely anchored in the natural law theory of duties. At the same time, the *prima facie* contractarian account of all the central moral and political institutions was

10 In setting Hume and Smith aside from the mainstream of Scottish moral thought, I am, of course, in line with Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Notre Dame, IN, 1988, chs. 12–16, but I do not share most of his premises or his polemics.

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reinterpreted in strongly anti-individualistic terms. The contractual obligations apparently upholding familial and civic roles were understood as implied by these roles, irrespective of whether the roles originated in free choice by the individual or in the coincidences of life. That line of argument is of importance for an understanding of the place of history in this type of moral thought. If moral life consists of the discharge of overlapping offices, and if these offices in general are formed communally, then the history of this process will help us to understand the content of each office. Or, more generally, the discharge of our offices is dependent upon our acquaintance with tradition. On the other hand, history – survival through time – is not by itself prescriptive. Natural law obliges to duty; history, tradition, and one's own choices detail the content of one's duty. But if history is merely informative, the future is prescriptive, and the science of morals can inform us of it. Moral guidance is in the future, in the ideal moral order and harmony of roles that are providentially appointed as our goals and described by moral science. Therein lies the great moral and political ambiguity of this line of thought. On the one hand it relies on a conservative notion of the historically given offices of life; on the other hand, it needs a teleological and providentialist norm, and that invites utopian scheming. This was, as we shall see, Thomas Reid's dilemma, from which Dugald Stewart tried to escape in a haze of historicist inevitability.

As we play this theme through with variations, we shall see that the educational value of history was not enough to give history a role in moral theory. It is no accident that those Scottish thinkers who pursued this line of argument with clarity contributed little or nothing to the historical work of the Scottish Enlightenment. I am thinking here of Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull, Thomas Reid, George Campbell, James Beattie, James Oswald, Dugald Stewart. This is not to say that all those who did contribute histories had a different moral outlook; Lord Kames and Adam Ferguson, at least, bear witness against such a proposition. But I think it fair to say that for these eclectic thinkers the moral role of history was as a repository of exemplars, for good or for evil. For David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Millar, on the other hand, history was essential to moral theory, because moral consciousness, moral judgement, and moral institutions were formed by the accommodations reached at a given stage of society and in a given type of government. The 'historicism' of Smith, in particular, became a watershed in moral and political thought in the late phase of the Scottish Enlightenment. Consequently, my major themes are, in the later chapters in this book, discussed as part of the question of what became of Smith's historico-theoretical 'science of a legislator', which I reconstructed in an earlier book of that title.

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0.2 *The history of ideas*

Despite the extraordinary variety of fruitful approaches to the Scottish Enlightenment that has emerged in recent years, there seems still to be an unaccountable hankering for *the* total history of the Scottish Enlightenment. It may be necessary to stress that the present work is not meant to satisfy such cravings. Although the moral philosophy with which I am concerned is central to any understanding of the Scottish Enlightenment, there is obviously much more to this phenomenon. Nor do I present this work as a history of the moral thought of the Scottish Enlightenment. My concern is with specific ideas and patterns of argument that are also to be found, in more or less comparable forms, elsewhere in Europe. This inevitably raises the question of the genre in which I write, and, in a methodology-conscious age, it may be as well to set this out clearly and briefly.¹¹

During the past generation, one of the central disputes in the historiography of intellectual history has concerned the relationship between historical and theoretical endeavours. The general tendency has been to see intellectual – and, indeed, all – history as a *sui generis* study of the past which should not be defined and directed by modern theoretical concerns. This argument has been put forward with particular force by historians of morals and politics, notably Quentin Skinner and John Pocock.¹² Their argument is premised on the general view that the chief subject-matter of intellectual history is the linguistic behaviour of agents in the past. This view has some family resemblance to hermeneutic theory, and it has facilitated appreciation of hermeneutics in the Anglo-American world. The notion that linguistic usage should be an object of behavioural study does, however, have a distinct

11 The rest of this introduction is adapted from part of my introduction to *Traditions of Liberalism: Essays on John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill*, ed. K. Haakonssen, Sydney, 1988, pp. xi–xxi.

12 It is not necessary for the points to be made here that I go into the differences between Pocock and Skinner or that I discuss the development of their methodological views. My *précis* relies on the following selection: J.G.A. Pocock, 'The history of political thought: A methodological enquiry', in *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, 2nd ser., ed. P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, Oxford, 1969, pp. 183–202; chs. 1, 7, and 8 in Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*, London, 1972; 'Reconstructing the traditions: Quentin Skinner's historians' history of political thought', *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory / Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale*, 3 (1979), 95–113; 'The concept of language and the *métier d'historien*: Some considerations on practice', in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. A. Pagden, Cambridge, UK, 1987, pp. 19–38. Skinner's main contributions are now collected in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, ed. J. Tully, Cambridge, UK, 1988.

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source in Wittgenstein's theory of language and, more immediately, in the theory of 'speech acts' developed by thinkers such as J. L. Austin and J. R. Searle.¹³ According to this theory, our use of language cannot be understood merely as oral or written utterance with propositional meaning, that is, with sense and reference – the so-called 'locutionary function'. We must, in addition, understand the use of language as an act, as a form of behaviour that meshes with the rest of the speaker's behaviour. Like other deliberate behaviour, it has a point, a purpose, a 'force': this is the so-called 'illocutionary function', or force, of language.¹⁴ In order to understand the illocutionary function – that is, what the author was doing in saying or writing something – we need to know the situation or context in which he or she was doing it. Otherwise we will not see the point of his or her action but will be left with a free-floating statement. Hence the method recommended by the 'speech activists' among the historians is often referred to as the 'contextualist method'. Although ideally we should study linguistic behaviour in the full context of the author's general behaviour, we cannot, of course, observe the behaviour of the past. To a large extent we must rely on linguistic reports of it, that is, on other speech acts, though historians naturally draw on a wide variety of additional evidence of past behaviour. The available context for a given past speech act is, therefore, primarily, though not exclusively, linguistic in character, as Pocock stresses.¹⁵

The effect of the contextualist turn in contemporary historiography of moral and political thought and, increasingly, in other areas of intellectual history, has been dramatic and generally beneficial. It has provided an ever-richer texture in many areas of history, and this has led in turn to an unprecedented rapprochement between the history of moral and political thought and other forms of history. It has begun to dispose of the numerous anachronisms in traditional histories in these fields. In some cases it has led to important revaluations of major thinkers in the traditional canon, and it has created a rising standard of historical sensibility in other areas of history.

It is questionable, however, whether the intended divorce of history and theory has been achieved, and even more problematic whether any failure in this respect is owing to inattention to the methodological lessons offered or to some inadequacy in these lessons. It seems to me that the historical and theoretical pursuits of moral and political ideas are as interwoven as ever, and, although this is not the place either to

13 J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford, 1971; J.R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge, UK, 1969.

14 Austin, *How to Do Things*, pp. 99–131.

15 Pocock, 'The concept of language', p. 20.

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document or to defend this practice, it is a place for putting forward another perspective on the study of intellectual history than that provided by the speech activists in banning theory from history.

At the heart of the matter is the speech-act theory. Although its proponents are aware that this theory encompasses both the locutionary and the illocutionary functions of language, they nevertheless allow the former no role when they apply the theory in their historiographical programme. The background to this neglect is undoubtedly Austin's insistence that the two functions are intertwined in every utterance, so that referential function must be understood in performative context. Although they adhere to a correspondence theory of reference, they insist that the truth of a description, considered as an utterance, is a matter of its adequacy to the linguistic community in which it is being uttered. 'True' means 'very well said', as has been said very well.¹⁶

Despite Austin's own attempt to achieve a balanced view, the referential function of language, as ordinarily understood, has to a large extent gone begging for a place in the contextualist methodology. For the purposes of formulating a methodology for, or even an attitude to, the study of the history of ideas, we do not, however, have to commit ourselves to an elaborate alternative metaphysical and linguistic theory about the 'real' referents and *the* proper referential function of language. We can take it as a matter for exploration, rather than assertion, that given utterances have identifiable objects of reference. If we accept that many utterances are intended to say something about these objects – in addition to whatever else the speaker may be 'doing' in the uttering – then it would seem to be part of the intellectual historian's task to write the history of the utterance not only as a performance but also as a reference. The latter, however, cannot be done except through an investigation of the purported objects of reference, which, in intellectual history, will primarily be the *ideas* employed by an historical speaker in making an utterance.

Once we see this as our task, we can no longer entirely reduce intellectual history to the history of discourse, in the sense of linguistic performance. We must always bear in mind that the speaker's choice of words may be inadequate to the formulation of the ideas he or she is trying to express. Since linguistic expression is the only immediate source for the ideas in question, historians seek to check their interpretation in various indirect ways. Some draw on socio-psychological theories of culture, in order to produce histories of 'mentalities'.¹⁷ Oth-

16 John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, London, 1966, p. 467.

17 In the study of the Scottish Enlightenment, Sher's *Church and University* is a notable example.