

# 1 Introduction

AMIN SAIKAL AND WILLIAM MALEY

In December 1993, Russian voters adopted a new constitution and elected a new Parliament. In doing so they inaugurated a further phase in Russia's turbulent march towards a constitutional political order, which had begun over a century and a half earlier with the famous Decembrist uprising against the absolute rule of the Tsar.<sup>1</sup> However, the outcome of the December 1993 polls has fallen far short of resolving the uncertainties which surround Russia's political future. With a significant portion of votes going to candidates of Vladimir Zhirinovskii's neo-fascist 'Liberal-Democratic Party', and the new government in January 1994 apparently abandoning any commitment to what Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin labelled 'market romanticism', the future of political and economic reform in Russia remains clouded, with one prominent reformer even asserting that reform is dead.<sup>2</sup>

In the highly charged atmosphere which the election results produced, there has been open talk of a Weimar scenario for Russia. The combination of ineffectual government and economic crisis which prevailed in Germany in the early 1930s was widely blamed for permitting the rise of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers' Party<sup>3</sup>—and some would see in the votes for Zhirinovskii a similar phenomenon. Zhirinovskii's crude nationalism, hectoring rhetoric, willingness to use racialism as a mobilising strategy, and even his publication of a bizarre autobiographical tract, are hauntingly reminiscent of various steps on Hitler's path to power.

There are, however, voices of optimism as well as pessimism in contemporary Russia, and they should not be discounted. Zhirinovskii's organisation is weak—witness the March 1994 resignation of his chief of staff Viktor Kobelev—and other Russians have the awful example of what happened in Germany as an inducement not to throw in their lot with him. Furthermore, while a prolonged phase of political struggle seems almost certain, this is not atypical in transitions from autocracy to democracy. 'What infant democracy requires', Dankwart Rustow once wrote, 'is not lukewarm struggle but a hot family feud'.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, so dramatic have recent events been in Russia that we can too readily forget how much has been achieved in a relatively short space of time, and how comparatively low has been the cost in terms of bloodshed—although it is clear that Russia's new Time of Troubles is far from over.

## 2 Introduction

Much has changed in the mere space of a decade. When Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he assumed the leadership of a venerable<sup>5</sup> and apparently secure monocratic system<sup>6</sup> in which political freedoms were limited, dissident voices were routinely silenced by agents of the Committee of State Security (KGB),<sup>7</sup> and personal advancement largely came through cooptation into an entrenched party elite.<sup>8</sup> The military might of the Soviet Union made it a recognised superpower, and its conventional forces over the previous decade had been used in both nearby and far-flung parts of the world, and with comparative impunity, to advance Soviet interests as formulated in the ideology of developed socialism. While some Western observers expected generational change and elite turnover to affect the character and style of the Soviet leadership,<sup>9</sup> and others in the mid-1980s highlighted weaknesses as well as strengths in the Soviet system,<sup>10</sup> few saw a Soviet Union careering towards a terminal crisis.

A tantalising and possibly unanswerable question is whether the Soviet Union was ineluctably on such a path when Gorbachev assumed the leadership, or whether he and his associates set it on that path. Irrespective of how one might attempt to address this question, there were a number of important signs which pointed to coming troubles. The new leadership inherited problems which demanded innovative solutions. These arose in both the domestic and international spheres. Domestically, the leadership was faced with serious problems of poverty and economic inefficiency,<sup>11</sup> corruption,<sup>12</sup> and bureaucratisation on a phenomenal scale.<sup>13</sup> Internationally, the Soviet Union faced challenges as a consequence of the decline of *détente* in the later years of the Brezhnev era (1964-1982), which provided incentives for change in both foreign and domestic policy.<sup>14</sup> More significantly, the USSR was entangled in a disastrous war in Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup> It brought sorrow to the Soviet masses as had no other event since the Second World War,<sup>16</sup> and reflected the perils of closed decision-making on momentous issues. In the words of one commentator, the 'large costs of the war and the inability of the Soviet military to bring it to a successful conclusion contributed to the political liberalization Gorbachev brought to the Soviet Union'.<sup>17</sup>

These accumulated difficulties did not make significant reform inevitable—to argue that there were no other options open to the Soviet leadership ignores the fact that in politics there are always options—but they certainly created a climate of opinion in which a vigorous General Secretary would be more likely to secure approval for radical proposals. The classic example of a radical move accommodated by a manifest failure of the Soviet system of administration was the expansion of the policy of *glasnost*'

(candour) following the Chernobyl nuclear accident in April 1986.<sup>18</sup> The panic which spread in the vicinity of the accident when the only source of information for locals came from rumours or foreign radio broadcasts proved sufficient to prompt a policy which was to have revolutionary effects. The selection of Gorbachev as General Secretary brought to office a man of subversive opinions who managed with unusual speed to acquire the power needed to act crypto-legislatively.<sup>19</sup> Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that Gorbachev alone was responsible for the change of opinion within the Soviet elite. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Aleksandr Iakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze played crucial roles in the reorientation of specific spheres of official policy; and their contributions should be recognised as well.<sup>20</sup>

The unanticipated consequences of Gorbachev's actions proved fatal for the integrity of the Soviet system. While the policy of *perestroika* (reconstruction) had relatively limited impact, the associated policies of *glasnost'* and *demokratizatsiia* undermined the foundations of monocratic rule. *Glasnost'* facilitated not only a cultural renaissance, but the emergence of alternative ideological positions with which the party elite was singularly ill-prepared to cope. The result was an increasingly open schism within the elite, between on the one hand, conservatives such as Egor Ligachev, and on the other, radicals such as Boris Yeltsin—between whom Gorbachev manoeuvred in an attempt to bolster his own evolving position. Furthermore, as freedom of speech and freedom of association are almost inseparable companions, *glasnost'* rapidly led to the emergence of informal political groups.<sup>21</sup> The decisive blow to the old system came with the endorsement in June 1988 of the principle of holding contested elections.<sup>22</sup> This struck at the very heart of the established system of party control by coopted elites, and linked with *glasnost'*, amounted to a shift to informal multi-party politics.<sup>23</sup> In turn, this had insidious effects on the cohesion of the Soviet empire, as ethnonational groups emerged in the non-Russian republics, ostensibly to defend *perestroika*, but in reality to assert the importance of national sovereignty, and, ultimately, independence.<sup>24</sup> This message was not lost on democratic forces in Eastern Europe, who exploited it crucially to press for release in late 1989 from the domination which the Soviet Union was no longer in a position to maintain by military means in the aftermath of its humiliating retreat from Afghanistan earlier in the year.<sup>25</sup> But most importantly of all, it obliterated the unique role of the party as a mechanism of organisational integration, although Gorbachev seems to have been almost the last man in Russia to realise that the party was no longer part of the solution but part of the problem.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4 Introduction

By the time those opposed to Gorbachev's views moved decisively against him, in August 1991, their own power bases had been so weakened that the counter-revolution failed.<sup>27</sup> The events of the previous three years had delegitimated the Communist Party, and eroded the cement which held together the principal instrumentalities of state coercion. The leaders of the State Committee on the Emergency Situation (GKChP) faced a far more formidable task than those who mounted the palace coup against Nikita Khrushchev in 1964: as a Soviet commentator observed with remarkable prescience in August 1989, the political activeness of the masses provided the most reliable protection against such a coup.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the popular election of Yeltsin as President of Russia on 12 June 1991 had established a legitimate focus of opposition to the decrees of the GKChP. Finally, the stalwart and effective resistance by citizens of Latvia and Lithuania in January 1991 to moves by similar 'National Salvation Committees' to overthrow constitutional government provided a telling precedent which the citizens of Moscow were able to follow. Whether Gorbachev should be blamed for promoting those who ultimately moved against him, or praised for adroitly preventing a conservative counterstroke until it was too late to abort the process of change which had engulfed the USSR, will remain one of the great imponderables of history. It is beyond question, however, that the failure of the coup attempt drove the last nail into the coffin of the Soviet system.

The death rattle of the USSR held out little promise of a pain-free birth for the political and economic systems which succeeded it. The post-independence experiences of the Baltic states and of the former Soviet republics which formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Minsk in December 1991 fall outside the scope of this book.<sup>29</sup> Fortunately, a study of the tumultuous experiences of post-independence Russia illustrates some of the deeper dilemmas and uncertainties which all to some extent have had to face. Russia, like all these states, had witnessed the demise of significant features of its political system, in the midst of a developing economic crisis. However, its problems were also complicated by the widespread popular perception within Russia itself that it had lost the acknowledged status as a superpower which the Soviet Union had enjoyed.

Three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is time to take stock of the position in which Russia finds itself. The early years of Russia's renewal proved extraordinarily disturbed,<sup>30</sup> marked by escalating conflict between President Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies inherited from the Soviet era. A nationwide referendum in April 1993 saw 58.7% of those who voted express confidence in Yeltsin personally, and 67.2% vote in

favour of early parliamentary elections, but while this vote substantially delegitimated the legislature, it did not divert it from pursuing increasingly irresponsible fiscal policies. A direct collision between the executive and the legislature appeared unavoidable, and finally came on 21 September 1993 when Yeltsin issued a decree calling for elections in December 1993 to a new Federal Assembly. These were resisted by the legislature, but the resort to violence in the streets by its more extreme supporters on 3 October prompted Yeltsin to use force to occupy its premises and imprison the leaders of the revolt, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi and Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yet within three months of the December 1993 elections, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov were again at large, thanks to an amnesty resolution passed by the new parliament, and Rutskoi had even resumed his public demand for moves to procure the reconstitution of the Soviet Union. The future of Russia appeared as uncertain as ever.

To attempt a definitive prognosis of future developments in Russia would be an act of supreme *hubris*. Russia is not following a pre-determined ballistic path. It is in *search* of its future, and a maelstrom of complex forces—political, economic, sociocultural, and international—will determine which of its possible futures actually eventuates. What one can do is seek to investigate these forces in as much detail as can be mustered. That is the aim of this book, which examines selected developments in Russia's politics, economy, foreign relations, and culture and society which are destined to play a substantial role in shaping Russia's future into the next century.

The context of political change in Russia is outlined in the opening chapter by A.V. Obolonsky. He provides an overview of the mechanisms of power within the Soviet system, and links this in the second part of the chapter to what he calls the deep structure of Russian conservatism—the psychological constants of mass consciousness. He concludes by examining the fragile state of Russia's post-communist political system, and highlighting some of the dangers which Russia faces along the road to a more democratic political order.

These issues are taken up by Archie Brown, who concentrates on the crisis of September-October 1993 and its aftermath. In contrast to those who see 'reform' mainly in economic terms, he emphasises the importance of political consolidation and protection of the ideal of the rule of law. Pursuing this line of reasoning, he is critical of the approach to the recalcitrant legislature taken by Yeltsin, and stresses the importance for political leadership in democratic polities of bargaining and negotiation between contending political forces.

## 6 Introduction

William Maley surveys the state of the Russian macroeconomy, and points to conflict between different institutional actors as a key source of difficulty in effective macroeconomic management. He suggests that this embodies a conflict of visions as to the appropriate role of macroeconomic policy, and the virtues of market as opposed to bureaucratic modes of allocation. He concludes that a retreat from the shift to a market economy is inappropriate, partly because the relative costs and benefits of transition are not adequately captured by statistics upon which officials rely, but more fundamentally because the 'non-monetary measures' upon which conservatives might wish to rely to prevent a hyperinflationary collapse are little more than items of rhetoric.

The specific problems of Russian agriculture are explored by Robert F. Miller. He highlights the complexity of the agricultural sector, and argues that a consequence of this is that an immediate shift to private family farming is not a realistic possibility. He notes that consumer demand for food has been falling, adding to the plight of emerging private farms, and concludes that in the wake of the December 1993 election, significant change in the structure of the agricultural system shaped by the Soviet collectivisation drive of the 1930s is not especially likely.

Stephen Fortescue addresses the successes, failures, and prospects of the process of privatisation of large-scale industry in Russia. While workforce ownership has thus far been the dominant form which privatisation has taken, he does not expect it to remain dominant given the need to attract outside equity. In the light of the drift of government policy since the December 1993 elections, he sees a danger that workforce ownership will be replaced by ownership structures which are hierarchical, rigid, and subsidy-oriented, but the ultimate outcome of the privatisation process still remains far from clear.

In the sphere of foreign policy, Amin Saikal and William Maley trace the implications of the replacement of 'new thinking' about international relations with intellectual underpinnings for foreign policy more directly based on diverse visions of Russia's role as a power, both in the wider world and with respect to areas of direct local interest. They explore ways in which the formulation of policy has changed with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, examining the broader institutional context of the foreign policy making process, and conclude by addressing the tensions surrounding Russian policy towards the United States, the countries of NATO, and China and Japan, as well as the Baltic States and Ukraine.

Leslie Holmes examines Russia's relations with the former external empire of Eastern Europe, arguing on the one hand that they are shaped to a significant extent by the domestic political

developments in the countries concerned, but on the other that both the domestic politics and international relations of these countries are in a state of flux. In the military sphere, he notes the ambivalence of NATO about expansion of its membership, and the concerns which this ambivalence, coupled with Zhirinovskii's stronger-than-expected electoral performance, has created for Eastern European leaderships. Nonetheless, he sees economic relations as probably the single most important determinant of the climate within which relations operate, and explores the factors which have made the 'turn to the West' prove problematical.

Amin Saikal then focuses on Russia's relations with Central Asia. He argues that within a short space of time, Russian policy towards the region has come full circle, progressing from an initial phase of neglect and confusion to a stage of reassertion to fill the power vacuum which was created in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR. He suggests that two factors—fear of ethnobationalism and fear of Islamic radicalism—have underpinned this turnaround, and claims that in the process, the Yeltsin leadership has taken on board many positions originating from the ranks of the military and security apparatuses, and from his hardline parliamentary critics. As a result, what has emerged is a policy which entails support of Central Asian leaderships who publicly scorn the ideals of democratisation to which Russia is ostensibly committed. Such support is based on a crude exaggeration of the Islamic 'threat', and runs the risk of sucking Russia into a quagmire which could prove unduly costly for it.

Sergei Serebriany offers a wide-ranging exploration of different meanings of 'culture'. He sees three dimensions of a Russian identity crisis, arising from the collapse of the USSR, the openness of Russia to the rest of the world, and the ideological vacuum arising from the collapse of communism, which pose questions about the future nature and place of Russia. The future of Russia is also tied to broader questions about the texture of civilisation generally, and he quotes Fazil Iskander's ominous warning that the *Kolyma Stories* of Varlam Shalamov, with their searing depiction of life in the GULAG, can be read as a warning of the future as well as a depiction of the past. Yet Serebriany shares Iskander's optimism that a new depth of spiritual culture will emerge in the face of the abyss.

Developments in Russian literature and literary criticism are further explored by Peter Sawczak. Taking as his point of departure Chuprinin's suggestion that changed political circumstances have allowed Russian literature to assume a 'normal' form, he notes that intelligent discussion of postmodernism has been limited in Russian criticism, and that

## 8 Introduction

Western studies of Russian literature also risk making assessments in terms of loaded dichotomies such as that between Slavophiles and Westernisers. Nonetheless, he detects diverse and talented responses from the literary community to the cultural problemata of the post-Soviet order.

John Miller examines four alternative visions of Russia's future—statism, reformism, Russian nationalism, and communitarianism—and delineates their strengths and weaknesses. He points to the resilience of traditional political culture, as embodied most starkly in the statist vision, and concludes that the statist tradition seems most likely to prevail. Although associated with the discredited Soviet system, it offers a solution to problems of law and order, and could be bolstered by the still-largely-intact Soviet bureaucracy. However, the nuances which surround a statist model remain significant, with both Gaullist France or theocratic Iran potentially providing parallels.

In the concluding chapter, T.H. Rigby draws together some themes which run through the volume. He argues that Russia's transformation process was essentially negative, with a *telos* defined in derivative terms, and inaugurated from above, although it then triggered lower-level chaos. By supplying a constitution, president, and parliament endorsed by popular vote, the December 1993 elections marked a great step forward in Russia's political development, ending the transition period between the Soviet and the post-Soviet phases of Russian history. However, while the exact shape of the Russian future remains indeterminate, it will surely, in his view, 'embody and transmute both elements culturally encoded over many generations, and others laid down in over seven decades of communist rule'. That, indeed, is the broader message of this book.

## Notes

- 1 Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) pp.57-70.
- 2 Yuri N. Afanasyev, 'Russian Reform Is Dead: Back to Central Planning', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.73, no.2, March-April 1994, pp.21-26.
- 3 For different perspectives on the rise of Nazism, see William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1960); and Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Materialien, 1969).
- 4 Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, vol.2, no.3, April 1970, pp.337-363 at p.355.
- 5 On the history of the Soviet Union, see Michel Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *Utopia in Power: A History of the USSR from 1917 to the Present* (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet*



- Union* (London: Collins, 1985); Martin Malla, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
- 6 For more detailed depictions of the mature Soviet system, see T.H. Rigby, 'Politics in the Mono-organizational Society', in Andrew C. Janos (ed.), *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity and Diversity in One-Party States* (Berkeley: Research Series, no.28, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1976) pp.31-80; Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, stability, and change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in the USSR* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986); Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunset: The Fallure of Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
  - 7 On dissent, see Marshall S. Shatz, *Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985); Peter Reddaway, 'Sovietology and Dissent: New Sources on Protest', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.2, no.5, 29 January 1993, pp.12-16. On the KGB, see Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
  - 8 For detailed discussion of the *nomenklatura* system of elite recruitment, see Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol.2, no.4, December 1969, pp.493-512; Bohdan Harasymiw, *Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp.153-186; T.H. Rigby, *Political Elites in the USSR: Central leaders and local cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990).
  - 9 Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1980).
  - 10 Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986); Paul Dibb, *The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower* (London: Macmillan, 1986).
  - 11 See Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986) pp.32-67; Ed A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988).
  - 12 See Konstantin Simis, *USSR: Secrets of a Corrupt Society* (London: J.M. Dent, 1982); William A. Clark, *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite 1965-1990* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Leslie Holmes, *The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimacy Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
  - 13 According to A. Rumiantsev and Iu. Goland, 'Informatslia k razmyshleniiu. I tol'ko?', *Trud*, 12 May 1983, 800 billion official documents were created in the Soviet Union every year.
  - 14 See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The International Sources of Soviet Change', *International Security*, vol.16, no.3, Winter 1991-92, pp.74-118; R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) pp.245-284.
  - 15 For details, see Amin Saikal and William Maley, *Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) pp.81-99; Anthony Arnold, *The Fateful*

## 10 Introduction

- Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1993).
- 16 See Gennady Bocharov, *Russian Roulette: The Afghanistan War Through Russian Eyes* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990); Artyom Borovik, *The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1990); and Svetlana Alexievich, *Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992).
  - 17 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) p.54.
  - 18 See Zhores Medvedev, *The Legacy of Chernobyl* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
  - 19 There is by now a vast literature on Gorbachev and the reforms which he and his colleagues attempted to engineer. See Boris Meissner, *Die Sowjetunion im Umbruch* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1988); Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Alec Nove, *Glasnost' in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Abraham Brumberg (ed.), *Chronicle of a Revolution: A Western-Soviet Inquiry into Perestroika* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990); Geoffrey Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* (London: Heinemann, 1990); Jerry F. Hough, *Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and His Reforms 1985-1990* (New York: Phillip Allan, 1990); Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston (eds.), *Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991); Robert G. Kaiser, *Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumphs and His Failure* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); John Miller, *Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power* (London: Macmillan, 1993); Stephen White, *After Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  - 20 See Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: The Free Press, 1991); and Aleksandr Iakovlev, *Predislovie. Obval. Posleslovie* (Moscow: Novosti, 1992). The importance of their role is highlighted from an opponent's point of view in Yegor Ligachev, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).
  - 21 See Vladimir Brovkin, 'Revolution from Below: Informal Political Associations in Russia 1988-89', *Soviet Studies*, vol.42, no.2, April 1990, pp.233-257.
  - 22 See *Materialy XIX Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988).
  - 23 For a detailed discussions of this stage of reform, see Michael Urban, *More Power to the Soviets: The Democratic Revolution in the USSR* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); Brendan Kiernan, *The End of Soviet Politics: Elections, Legislatures, and the Demise of the Communist Party* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
  - 24 Nowhere was this more obvious than in the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *Baltic Independence and Russian Empire* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991); Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund, *The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire* (London: Routledge, 1993). On ethnic reassertion more generally, see Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A*