

For many years scholars have sought to explain why the European states which emerged in the period before the French Revolution developed along such different lines. Why did some states become absolutist and others constitutionalist? What enabled some to develop bureaucratic administrative systems, while others remained dependent upon patrimonial practices?

This book presents a new theory of statebuilding in medieval and early modern Europe. Ertman argues that two factors – the organization of local government at the time of state formation and the timing of sustained geomilitary competition – can explain most of the variation in political regimes and in state infrastructures found across the continent during the second half of the 18th century. Drawing on theoretical insights developed in the fields of historical sociology, comparative politics, and economic history, and on the most recent historical research, this book makes a compelling case for the value of interdisciplinary approaches to the study of political development.



BIRTH OF THE LEVIATHAN



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BUILDING STATES AND REGIMES IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE



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CONTENTS

List of Tables Acknowledgments		page x
		xi
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	Early Modern States: Four Types	6
	Competing Explanations	10
	Explaining Variations in Early Modern States: The Argument	19
2.	THE ORIGINS OF PATRIMONIAL	3
2.	ABSOLUTISM IN LATIN EUROPE	35
	The Late Roman Empire and Early State Formation in Visigoth Spain, Lombard Italy, and Merovingian and	
	Carolingian Gaul	37
	Economic and Ecclesiastical Renewal and the Rebirth of Royal Power in Latin Europe	48
	Early Geopolitical Competition, Representative Assemblies, and the Creation of Systems of National Taxation	59
	The Impact of War and Taxes on Finance and Administration: The Beginnings of Patrimonial	99
	Absolutism	74
	Conclusion	88
<i>3</i> .	THE TRIUMPH OF PATRIMONIAL ABSOLUTISM AND THE FAILURE OF REFORM	
	IN LATIN EUROPE, c. 1500–1789	90
	War and the Triumph of Patrimonial Absolutism in	
	France, 1494–1659	91
	Patrimonial Absolutism in Iberia and Italy, 1492–1789	110
	The "Reform" of Patrimonial Absolutism Under	
	Colbert and Louis XIV, 1660–1714	125

vii



viii	Contents	
	Geopolitical Pressures, the Failure of Reform, and the End of Patrimonial Absolutism, 1715–1791	139
	Conclusion	154
4.	BUREAUCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN BRITAIN	156
	Unencumbered State Formation, Early Geopolitical Pressure, and a Precocious Attempt at Shared Rule, c. 400–1453	158
	Deepening Patrimonialism and Its Temporary Demise, 1453–1659	178
	The Restoration and the English "Revolution in Government," 1660-1688	187
	The Consolidation of the New British State After 1689	208
	Conclusion	221
5.	BUREAUCRATIC ABSOLUTISM IN GERMANY	224
	Failed Dark Age Statebuilding, Empire, and the Emergence of Territorial States in Germany, 511-c. 1450	226
	Representative Institutions, Geopolitical Competition, and the Consolidation of Bureaucratic Absolutism in the German Territorial States, c. 1450–1789	237
	The Limits and Contradictions of Bureaucratic Absolutism: The Case of Brandenburg-Prussia	
	Conclusion	² 45 262
_		202
6.	THE TRIUMPH OF PATRIMONIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN HUNGARY AND POLAND AND ITS PREMATURE DEMISE IN	
	SCANDINAVIA	264
	Unencumbered State Formation and the Consolidation of Local Elite Self-Government in Hungary and Poland,	
	c. 1000–1387	267
	The Advent of Sustained Geopolitical Competition and the Triumph of Patrimonial Constitutionalism in Hungary and Poland, 1387–1648	285
	Internal and External Threats to Patrimonial	209
	Constitutionalism in Hungary and Poland, 1648–1795	300
	Abortive Patrimonial Constitutionalism in Scandinavia	305
	Conclusion	314



		Contents	ix
<i>7</i> ·	CONCLUSION		317
Bibl	iography		325
Index			351



TABLES

1	Outcomes to Be Explained: States of 18th-Century Western Christendom Classified by Political Regime and	
	Infrastructural Type pa	ge 10
2	Outcomes That Would Have Occurred If the Character	_
	of Local Government and Timing Had Been the Only	
	Factors at Work	29
3	Actual Outcomes Explained When Account Is Taken of the	
	Influence of Parliaments on Infrastructural Development	34
4	Government Spending as a Percentage of National Income,	
	Britain and France, 1689-1783	220



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This book began life as a doctoral dissertation written in the Sociology Department at Harvard University under the title "War and Statebuilding in Early Modern Europe." The dissertation's principal aim was to analyze the impact of sustained warfare on the methods of administration, finance, and military organization employed in England, France, Spain, and Prussia from about the 14th century to 1789. After I took up a position in the Harvard Government Department in 1990, persistent questioning by my colleagues there led me to rethink that project and direct my attention to a set of issues with much broader resonance for political science: namely, why had some states developed in a constitutionalist direction during the formative centuries of European statebuilding, while others had become absolutist? And why had military pressures driven some states to construct effective, proto-modern bureaucracies, while others remained wedded to administrative methods that seemed highly dysfunctional? In order to address this subject in a satisfactory way, I was forced to expand substantially the scope of my research in terms of both the cases examined and the period covered. In consequence, little now remains of the original dissertation. I hope the results justify these efforts.

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