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978-0-521-47274-6 - Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early Modern Russia: The False Tsars of the Time and Troubles

Maureen Perrie

Excerpt

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## Introduction

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More than a dozen impostors, all claiming to be long-lost tsars or tsareviches, appeared in Russia in the early seventeenth century, in the period of civil strife that is generally known as the ‘Time of Troubles’ (*smutnoe vremya*). The Troubles were sparked off by the invasion of Russia in 1604 by the First False Dimitry, a pretender proclaiming himself to be the youngest son of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1533–84). Tsarevich Dimitry of Uglich had died in 1591, in mysterious circumstances; seven years later, the old dynasty of the Muscovite rulers came to an end, with the death of Dimitry’s elder half-brother, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich. The throne passed to Boris Godunov, Tsar Fedor’s brother-in-law, who was widely believed to have plotted against the heirs of Ivan the Terrible in order to gain power for himself. Godunov had been tsar for five years when the pretender appeared in Poland. ‘Dimitry’ defeated Boris’s armies, succeeded in obtaining the throne, and occupied it for almost a year. The overthrow and murder of the pretender in May 1606 led to a further period of civil war and foreign invasion, in which there appeared not only new false Dimitrys, but also various other ‘tsareviches’ who professed themselves to be descendants of Tsar Ivan. Order was restored only in 1613, when a new dynasty was established with the election of Michael Romanov as tsar.

Pretence was not an exclusively Russian phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> Royal imposture, indeed, may be regarded as an occupational hazard of any hereditary monarchical system. Ancient history provides the examples of the Pseudo-Smerdis of Persia and the False Agrippa of Rome;<sup>2</sup> the medieval period offers

<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon of pretence or royal imposture is known in Russian as *samožvanstvo* or *samožvanchestvo*. A pretender (*samožvanets*) is literally a ‘self-styled’ (*samožvannyi*) tsar or tsarevich, that is, someone who has falsely adopted a royal title and identity. *Samožvanets* is therefore a narrower term than the English word ‘pretender’, which can be used for any claimant to a throne (the broader Russian equivalent is *pretendent*). ‘Impostor’ is perhaps the more correct translation, but I shall follow established custom and practice in using ‘pretender’ along with ‘impostor’ as English equivalents of *samožvanets*.

<sup>2</sup> Bercé, *Le roi caché*, pp. 369–70. This book provides a useful overview of pretenders and the popular political ideas associated with them.

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the False Count Baldwin of Flanders and the False Emperor Frederick II.<sup>3</sup> The closest parallels and the most immediate precedents for the Russian pretenders of the Time of Troubles, however, can be found in early modern Europe. England had known the impostors Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck in the late fifteenth century;<sup>4</sup> and in the last decades of the sixteenth century a number of royal pretenders appeared in Moldavia,<sup>5</sup> as well as a series of False Don Sebastians in Portugal.<sup>6</sup> Nor was pretence purely a pre-modern phenomenon: about forty claimants to the identity of Louis XVII were to appear in the early nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

In spite of these precedents and parallels elsewhere, however, royal imposture has long been considered to have had especial significance in Russia.<sup>8</sup> It has particularly attracted the attention of historians because it was associated with major popular uprisings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: not only those of the Time of Troubles, but also the Pugachev rising of 1773–4 and (to a lesser extent) the revolt of Sten'ka Razin in 1669–71. Two generalising essays about pretence by pre-revolutionary Russian historians, written almost a century apart, linked the phenomenon with revolts in which cossacks sought to take advantage of the credulity and gullibility of the uneducated peasant masses in order to rouse them to rebel under the banner of a 'true tsar'.<sup>9</sup> A number of more recent scholars have associated pretence with 'popular monarchism', the naive faith in the benevolence of the tsar towards the common people (*narod*) that was believed to be particularly characteristic of the Russian peasantry.<sup>10</sup> My own interest in *samo-zvanchestvo*, indeed, sprang from a concern with the evolution of popular monarchism in Russia, in its various forms, from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries.<sup>11</sup> Yet not all Russian pretenders were themselves recruited from the ranks of the *narod*, nor were their supporters drawn exclusively from the lower classes. A number of pretenders were confidence tricksters, political opportunists or adventurers; others were pathetic deluded individuals. Many had no popular support, or only a handful of followers.<sup>12</sup> And popular monarchism itself could assume forms other than pretence, such as rebellion 'in

<sup>3</sup> Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, pp. 90–93, 113–15.

<sup>4</sup> Gairdner, *History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third*; Gairdner, *Henry the Seventh*; Pollard, ed., *The Reign of Henry VII*; Alexander, *The First of the Tudors*.

<sup>5</sup> Mokhov, *Ocherki; Istoricheskie svyazi*, vol. 1.

<sup>6</sup> D'Antas, *Les faux Don Sébastien*; Brooks, *A King for Portugal*; Bercé, *Le roi caché*, ch. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Bercé, *Le roi caché*, pp. 328–39.

<sup>8</sup> Solov'ev, 'Zametki o samozvantsakh', p. 265; Klyuchevskii, *Sochineniya*, vol. 3, p. 27; Chistov, *Russkie narodnye*, p. 29; Troitskii, 'Samozvantsy', p. 134; Longworth, 'The Pretender Phenomenon', p. 61; Uspenskii, 'Tsar' i samozvanets', p. 201.

<sup>9</sup> [Shcherbatov], *Kratkaya povest'*; Solov'ev, 'Zametki o samozvantsakh'.

<sup>10</sup> Field, *Rebels*, pp. 1–26.

<sup>11</sup> Perrie, *The Image of Ivan the Terrible*, pp. 1–4.

<sup>12</sup> Troitskii, 'Samozvantsy'; Longworth, 'The Pretender Phenomenon'.

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the name of the tsar' – directed against his evil counsellors – and the idealisation of individual rulers of the past as 'good tsars'. Thus the precise relationship of pretence to popular monarchism has to be established empirically for each individual occurrence of the phenomenon.

Of all the Russian pretenders of the seventeenth century, the best known is the First False Dimitry. His adventures captured the imagination of contemporaries well beyond the frontiers of Russia, and literary treatments of his story were popular throughout Europe long before Pushkin's verse drama served as the basis for Musorgskii's opera, *Boris Godunov*.<sup>13</sup> Nineteenth-century historians were fascinated by the question of the pretender's true identity, and some were intrigued by the possibility that he might really have been the son of Ivan the Terrible.<sup>14</sup> By the end of the nineteenth century, the proliferation of popular literature about the First False Dimitry had somewhat discredited the topic of pretence in the Time of Troubles as a 'serious' subject for historical study. S. F. Platonov, the author of what is still the most influential account of the period, referred somewhat prissily to the 'arbitrary conjectures and speculative hypotheses' of popular historians, and insisted that for the purposes of his own scholarly analysis there was 'not the slightest necessity to dwell on the question of the identity of the first Pretender'.<sup>15</sup> For Platonov, pretence was simply a political device employed by various warring social groups whose struggle for power in the Time of Troubles derived from a deep-rooted crisis in sixteenth-century Muscovy.

In the Soviet period the designation of the early seventeenth century as a 'Time of Troubles' was abandoned in favour of the notion of a 'peasant war', and the historiography was dominated by sterile debates about how best to fit the events of the period into a conceptual framework derived from the inappropriate model of Germany in 1525.<sup>16</sup> I. I. Smirnov's study of the Bolotnikov revolt of 1606–7 depicted that episode alone as the 'first peasant war' in Russia,<sup>17</sup> and this became the orthodox position. After Stalin's death, however, some Soviet historians contended that the entire sequence of events from 1603 to 1614 constituted a 'peasant war'.<sup>18</sup> Pretenders were of interest to Soviet historians if – like Pugachev – they could be identified as leaders of peasant wars. But the pretenders of the early seventeenth century did not

<sup>13</sup> Brody, *The Demetrius Legend*; Emerson, *Boris Godunov*.

<sup>14</sup> See especially Kostomarov, *Kto byl pervyi Lzhedimitrii?*; Pierling, *Rome et Démétrius*; Bestuzhev-Ryumin, *Pis'ma*; Suvorin, *O Dimitrii Samozvanitse*; Waliszewski, *La crise révolutionnaire*; Barbour, *Dimitry*.

<sup>15</sup> Platonov, *Ocherki*, p. 189; p. 447, n. 71.

<sup>16</sup> See, in particular, the debate in the journal *Voprosy Istorii* in 1958–61: Zimin, 'Nekotorye voprosy'; Smirnov, 'O nekotorykh voprosakh'; 'O nekotorykh spornykh voprosakh'; Koretskii, 'Iz istorii krest'yanskoi voiny'; Ovchinnikov, 'Nekotorye voprosy'; Sklyar, 'O nachal'nom etape'; 'O krest'yanskoi voine'.

<sup>17</sup> Smirnov, *Vostanie Bolotnikova*.

<sup>18</sup> Zimin, 'Nekotorye voprosy'; Makovskii, *Pervaya krest'yanskaya voina*.

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easily lend themselves to such a categorisation. In the early Soviet period M. N. Pokrovskii and his disciples had attempted to present the First and Second False Dimitrys as cossack or peasant tsars, but the revival of Russian nationalism under Stalin encouraged scholars to view these pretenders as puppets of the ‘feudal Polish interventionists’.<sup>19</sup> Only Bolotnikov’s ally, the cossack ‘Tsarevich Peter’, was regarded as the leader of an anti-feudal uprising.<sup>20</sup> In the post-Stalin period, however, revisionists such as A. A. Zimin argued that although pretenders such as the First False Dmitry were themselves ‘political adventurers’, they were able to acquire widespread popular support from peasants and slaves.<sup>21</sup>

In discussing the ‘ideology’ of ‘peasant wars’, Soviet historians of the older generation were required to base themselves on Stalin’s comment of 1931 that leaders of popular rebellions in Russia, such as Razin and Pugachev, were ‘tsarists’, who ‘acted against the landowners, but for “the good tsar”’. Stalin identified Bolotnikov, along with Razin and Pugachev, as the leader of a peasant uprising against ‘feudal oppression’;<sup>22</sup> and in his monograph on the Bolotnikov rising I. I. Smirnov linked pretence with peasant monarchism: ‘the tsarist psychology of the peasantry created the social base for “*samozvanstvo*”, because in this the peasant faith in the “good tsar” found its expression’.<sup>23</sup> The slogan of the ‘good tsar’, Smirnov observed somewhat cryptically, constituted a ‘peculiar peasant utopia’.<sup>24</sup>

An interesting development of this approach to the phenomenon of pretence was provided, after Stalin’s death, in an influential book by the Soviet folklorist K. V. Chistov. Chistov was primarily concerned not with pretenders but with popular myths. He placed *samozvanchestvo* in the context of ‘popular socio-utopian legends’ in which tsars or tsareviches were removed from power because their courtiers feared that they planned to liberate the people from oppression. The peasants however believed that these ousted rulers would return one day to implement the reforms that had been thwarted by the ‘traitor-boyars’. Pretenders, according to Chistov, attracted popular support because they were seen as the embodiments of these longed-for royal ‘deliverers’, and pretence constituted ‘one of the most curious ideological and political manifestations of the feudal crisis and one of the most specific and persistent forms of anti-feudal protest’.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>19</sup> For a review of Soviet historiography of the period, see Skrynnikov, *Sotsial’no-politicheskaya bor’ba*, pp. 6–9.

<sup>20</sup> Troitskii, ‘Samozvantsy’, pp. 134–8.

<sup>21</sup> Zimin, ‘Nekotorye voprosy’, p. 99.

<sup>22</sup> Stalin, ‘Beseda’, p. 113.

<sup>23</sup> Smirnov, *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*, p. 29.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 506.

<sup>25</sup> Chistov, *Russkie narodnye*, p. 29. For a critical review of Chistov’s views, based on evidence relating to the Time of Troubles, see Perrie, ‘“Popular Socio-Utopian Legends”’.

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The most recent work by a Russian historian on the early seventeenth century is a series of volumes by the prolific R. G. Skrynnikov.<sup>26</sup> In his first publications on this period Skrynnikov presented the events as an anti-feudal peasant war that constituted a form of popular protest against the process of enserfment. In line with this approach, Skrynnikov not only reproduced Smirnov's view that faith in the 'good tsar' was a 'peculiar peasant utopia', but he also endorsed Chistov's views about 'popular socio-utopian legends', and saw pretenders as leaders of anti-feudal peasant movements.<sup>27</sup> In his most recent works, however, Skrynnikov has abandoned these interpretations. He now rejects the appropriateness of the concept of a 'peasant war' even for the Bolotnikov rising of 1606–7, and views the Time of Troubles as a civil war caused not only by the enserfment of the peasantry, but also by a crisis within the system of land allocation to the nobility. Skrynnikov continues to regard pretence as an expression of a 'social utopia or myth about a kindly tsar-deliverer', but he now argues that this myth, together with faith in the 'good tsar', was characteristic not only of the peasants but also of many other social groups.<sup>28</sup>

Rather a different approach to the phenomenon of pretence has been taken by the distinguished Russian scholar B. A. Uspenskii, in a brief but stimulating essay on *samozvanchestvo* that places it in the broader context of the political philosophy of Muscovite Russia and its religious culture. The process of the sacralisation of the monarchy in the sixteenth century, in Uspenskii's view, reflected the notion that true tsars were chosen by God alone. When the natural hereditary order of succession was broken, the new elected ruler was seen by some as a false tsar; and the accession of such a usurper – or 'pretender on the throne' – provoked the appearance of other pretenders, all claiming to be the true tsar. Uspenskii's approach is of particular interest because – in contrast to other Soviet scholars – he considers pretence from the perspectives of both 'high' and popular culture, and his semiotic outlook illuminates many aspects of contemporary reactions to the appearance of pretenders.<sup>29</sup>

The present study too endeavours to place pretence in the broad context of the mentality of the age, and to examine both popular and 'official' atti-

<sup>26</sup> Skrynnikov has produced a bewildering number of works on the period, some of a scholarly nature and others of a more popular character. Many of them overlap considerably in their content. His more scholarly works, which cover events to 1607, are: *Sotsial'no-politicheskaya bor'ba; Rossiya v nachale XVII v.* (a revised version of the previous work); and *Smuta v Rossii*. His 'popular-scientific' works are: *Boris Godunov* (available in an English translation with the same title); *Minin i Pozharskii* (available in an English version as *The Time of Troubles*); and *Samozvantsy*.

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Skrynnikov, *Sotsial'no-politicheskaya bor'ba*, pp. 97–100, 324–6.

<sup>28</sup> Skrynnikov, *Rossiya v nachale XVII v.*, pp. 79–80, 249–51; Skrynnikov, *Smuta v Rossii*, pp. 246–53.

<sup>29</sup> Uspenskii, 'Tsar' i samozvanets'.

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tudes towards the phenomenon. The book is not primarily designed as a history of the Time of Troubles, but it inevitably deals with the main political and military events of the period as background to the appearance and activities of the pretenders.<sup>30</sup> The main focus, however, is on the *samozvantsy* themselves, and on the ways in which they were perceived both by their supporters and by their opponents. Because of this emphasis, attention has been paid not just to major historical actors such as the first two False Dimitrys, but also to the minor pretenders and to the theatres of the civil war where they were active – the Volga basin, and the towns of north-west Russia.

The book comprises four main sections. The Prologue, entitled ‘Tsarevich Dimitry and Boris Godunov’, deals with events from the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584 to the Khlopko rising of 1603, as background to the appearance of the first pretender in Lithuania. Part 1 is devoted to the career of the First False Dimitry, while Part 2 covers the period of the Bolotnikov rising of 1606–7. Part 3 is concerned with the later stages of the Troubles, to 1614. Two chapters in this section deal with the career of the Second False Dimitry, while the final chapter is devoted to the Third False Dimitry and to the fate of ‘Tsarevich’ Ivan Dimitrievich, the son of the Second False Dimitry. A brief Epilogue discusses later pretenders in early modern Russia, focussing on the period between the end of the Time of Troubles and the accession of Peter the Great. The Conclusion attempts to place the Russian impostors of the Time of Troubles in a wider context, comparing them with pretenders elsewhere in early modern Europe. It also discusses how and why *samozvantsy* succeeded in attracting so much support in the early seventeenth century, and tries to establish the precise relationship of pretence to ‘popular monarchism’ in this period.

<sup>30</sup> For general coverage of the period in English, see Platonov, *Boris Godunov*, together with Platonov, *The Time of Troubles*; and Skrynnikov, *Boris Godunov*, together with Skrynnikov, *The Time of Troubles*. There is a useful short treatment in Crummev, *The Formation of Muscovy*, ch. 8.

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## Prologue Tsarevich Dimitry and Boris Godunov

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### The end of a dynasty

#### *Ivan the Terrible and the politics of succession*

The death of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich in 1598 brought to an end the old dynasty of Muscovite grand princes and tsars that traced its origins to the semi-legendary figure of Rurik the Viking, the ninth-century Prince of Novgorod (see Figure 1). The expiry of the dynasty can only partly be attributed to declining fertility in the royal house: the nature of Muscovite court politics also influenced the outcome.

Until the fifteenth century, succession in the grand-princely family had been collateral: it could pass to younger brothers and cousins before being transferred to the next generation. The ambiguities in this system had led to a dynastic war after the death of Vasili I in 1425; thereafter, linear succession from father to son became the norm, and the grand princes of Moscow took pains to eliminate collateral heirs. They imprisoned or exiled their uncles and brothers, and restricted their marriages. The resulting erosion of the collateral lines contributed to the end of the dynasty.

Succession by primogeniture in the royal house, it has been suggested, was favoured by the boyar clans, that group of elite families whose members were eligible for appointment as royal counsellors.<sup>1</sup> The boyars derived their influence at court from their marriage links with the grand prince, and linear succession enabled them to plan their marriage strategies around a stable dynasty with an established principle of succession. As long as the dynasty survived, the boyars competed for the tsar's favour; the end of the dynasty meant that they were faced with the prospect of competing for the throne itself. Marriage relationships with the royal house were to prove crucial to the outcome of that competition.

<sup>1</sup> Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics*, pp. 123–8, 155–9. See also Keenan, 'Muscovite Political Folkways', pp. 136–45.




Figure 1 The Muscovite royal house in the sixteenth century (simplified form).  
Note Reigning grand princes and tsars are given in capitals



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The marital history of Tsar Fedor's father, Ivan the Terrible, had been complex.<sup>2</sup> Ivan's first marriage, to Anastasiya Romanova (Anastasiya Romanovna Zakharina-Yur'eva), ended with Anastasiya's death in 1560. Four of the six children of this union died in infancy, including Dimitry, the firstborn son. The other two sons reached adulthood: Ivan and Fedor, born in 1554 and 1557 respectively. The tsar's second marriage, to the Kabardinian princess Mariya Temryukovna, produced a son who died in childhood. After Mariya's death in 1569 Ivan married for a third time, but the bride, Marfa Sobakina, died soon after the wedding. The Orthodox Church permitted only three marriages, but the tsar claimed that his union with Sobakina was unconsummated because of her illness, and he successfully petitioned the church council to permit him to marry again. This fourth marriage, to Anna Koltovskaya, was shortlived, however, and Anna was forced to take the veil.

Ivan married again in 1575, but this bride too – Anna Vasil'chikova – was despatched to a convent shortly afterwards. His next alliance, to the widow Vasilisa Melent'eva, lasted for about a year, and appears to have ended with Vasilisa's natural death. The tsar's seventh wife, Mariya Nagaya, survived her husband. Ivan's last three marriages were entered into against the rules of the church and their legality was therefore in doubt, although the tsar and his brides did go through a form of wedding ceremony.

Ivan's marriage to Mariya Nagaya took place in 1580.<sup>3</sup> The English agent Jerome Horsey describes Mariya as 'a very beautiful young maiden of a noble house and great family'.<sup>4</sup> Although we must take Horsey's judgement of Mariya's beauty on trust, his assessment of her pedigree requires some qualification. The Nagois belonged to the higher ranks of the service nobility rather than to the old titled aristocracy. Mariya's father and grandfather held the rank of lord-in-waiting (*okol'nichii*), and at the time of her marriage to the tsar the most powerful member of the Nagoi clan at court was Mariya's uncle, Afanasii Fedorovich, who had been ambassador to the Crimea from 1563 to 1573. On his return to Moscow Afanasii Nagoi soon became a state councillor (*dumnyi dvoryanin*), and an influential courtier.<sup>5</sup> Ivan's betrothal to Afanasii's niece continued an established pattern of marriage to relatives of his current favourites: Marfa Sobakina had been the protégée of the notorious *oprichnik* Malyuta Skuratov, and Anna Vasil'chikova was a kinswoman of the boyar Vasiliu Umnoi-Kolychev.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For details of Ivan's wives and children, see Skrynnikov, *Ivan Groznyi*, pp. 206–14; Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora, passim*; Zimin, *V kanun, passim*; Kaiser, 'Symbol and Ritual', pp. 249–50.

<sup>3</sup> Skrynnikov, *Rossiia posle oprichniny*, p. 67.

<sup>4</sup> Berry and Crummey, eds., *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom*, p. 286.

<sup>5</sup> Skrynnikov, *Rossiia posle oprichniny*, pp. 11, 29, 100; Zimin, *V kanun*, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Skrynnikov, *Rossiia posle oprichniny*, p. 99.

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## 10 Prologue

At the time of Ivan's marriage to Mariya, the question of the succession did not seem to be an urgent one. The tsar had two adult sons by his first wife. Both were married, but childless. Since they were still young, however, their childlessness could not be considered to pose any major threat to the continuation of the dynasty. Barren or otherwise unwanted wives could be despatched to nunneries. This had been the fate of Solomoniya Saburova, the first wife of Ivan's father, Grand Prince Vasilii III. Tsar Ivan's fourth and fifth wives, Anna Koltovskaya and Anna Vasil'chikova, had been sent to convents, as had the first two wives of Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich. And Tsar Ivan himself, as we have seen, openly flouted the church's rules which limited the number of permitted marriages to three.

In November 1581 the situation was altered dramatically by the death of the tsar's elder son. Ivan Ivanovich died as the result of a blow inflicted by his father, during an argument in which the tsar also struck the tsarevich's pregnant wife, Elena Sheremeteva, causing her to miscarry.<sup>7</sup> Tsar Ivan was overcome by remorse as a result of his son's death. Apart from the personal tragedy, the dynastic implications were considerable. Tsarevich Ivan was undoubtedly the stronger and more capable of Ivan's sons. With his death, the succession passed to Fedor, the younger son, who was physically and mentally feeble. Fedor's childlessness now acquired much greater political significance. The Dutch merchant Isaac Massa asserts that Tsar Ivan tried to persuade Fedor to divorce his wife Irina,<sup>8</sup> but there is no contemporary evidence to support this claim.<sup>9</sup> Any attempt to make Fedor renounce Irina would have undermined the position at court of her kinsmen, the Godunovs: Irina's ambitious brother, Boris, would have been particularly opposed to such a move.

Dynastic considerations were very much to the fore in the last years of Ivan's life. In the spring of 1582 the tsar sent his ambassador Fedor Pisemskii to England to negotiate a marriage between Ivan and Lady Mary Hastings, a distant kinswoman of Queen Elizabeth. These negotiations were unsuccessful. The English understandably regarded Ivan's existing marriage to Mariya Nagaya as an obstacle, and although Pisemskii was instructed to explain that Ivan was willing to divorce his Russian wife in favour of a foreign bride, the envoy was embarrassed when news of the birth of Tsarevich Dimitry was received at the English court during his mission. 'When you left [home],' Sir Thomas Randolph informed the Russian envoy in January 1583, 'your sovereign had one son, but now a second son has been born to him.' Pisem-

<sup>7</sup> Sources differ as to the cause of the fateful quarrel between Ivan and his heir. See Skrynnikov, *Rossiya posle oprichniny*, pp. 91–2; Zimin, *V kanun*, pp. 90–93.

<sup>8</sup> Massa, *A Short History*, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> Massa's evidence is accepted by Skrynnikov (*Rossiya posle oprichniny*, pp. 106–7) but rejected by Zimin (*V kanun*, p. 106).