

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle
Lynne Spellman
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

This book is a study of Aristotle's metaphysics in which the central argument is that Aristotle's views on substance are a direct response to Plato's Theory of Forms. The claim is that Aristotle believes that many of Plato's views are tenable once one has rejected Plato's notion of separation.

There have been many books on Aristotle's theory of substance. This one is distinct from previous books in several ways. First, it offers a new, coherent interpretation of Aristotle's claim that substances are separate in which substances turn out to be specimens of natural kinds. Second, it covers a broad range of issues, including Aristotle's criticism of Plato, his views on numerical sameness and identity, his epistemology, and his account of teleology. There is also a discussion of much of the recent literature on Aristotle.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle

Lynne Spellman

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle

Lynne Spellman

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

Substance and Separation
in Aristotle

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle

Lynne Spellman

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle
Lynne Spellman
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

Substance and Separation in Aristotle

LYNNE SPELLMAN
University of Arkansas



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press
 978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle
 Lynne Spellman
 Frontmatter
[More information](#)

CAMBRIDGE
 UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York NY 10013-2473, USA

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521471473

© Cambridge University Press 1995

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1995

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Spellman, Lynne, 1948–

Substance and separation in Aristotle / Lynne Spellman.

p. cm.

ISBN 0-521-47147-8

1. Aristotle – Views on substance in philosophy. 2. Substance (Philosophy) 3. Aristotle – Views on separation of substances. 4. Separation (Philosophy) I. Title.

b491 .s8s64 1995

111'.1 – dc20

94-31450

CIP

ISBN 978-0-521-47147-3 Hardback

ISBN 978-0-521-89272-8 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle
Lynne Spellman
Frontmatter
[More information](#)

for James

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle

Lynne Spellman

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	page ix
Introduction	1
I The Separation of Platonic Forms	5
II Referential Opacity in Aristotle	21
III A Theory of Substance	40
IV Substance and Aristotle's Epistemology	63
V The Separation of Substance	83
VI Substance and Teleology	100
<i>Bibliography</i>	123
<i>Index</i>	129

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-47147-3 - Substance and Separation in Aristotle

Lynne Spellman

Frontmatter

[More information](#)

Acknowledgments

In the course of the argument of this book I draw heavily on recent scholarship. I have been aided in understanding the contemporary debates by the Ancient Greek Philosophy Workshops at the University of Texas, the Conference on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* at Florida State University in 1983, the Institute on Aristotle sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Council for Philosophical Studies in 1988, and an academic year at Cambridge University as the Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences Faculty Fellow at Lucy Cavendish College in 1990–91. I am grateful to the University of Arkansas and Lucy Cavendish for the year abroad, as well as, in the case of Arkansas, for support for the academic year 1985–86, during which work was begun. Chapters II and III are revisions of two published papers, "Referential Opacity in Aristotle," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7 (1990), and "Specimens of Natural Kinds and the Apparent Inconsistency of *Metaphysics Z–H*," *Ancient Philosophy* 9 (1989), and I thank the editors of these journals for permission to reuse this material. Much of Chapter V was presented at the meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy held in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association, Central Division, in the spring of 1994. Finally, thanks are owed to James Spellman, who read the aforementioned papers in many versions, for his philosophical insight and unfailing support for the project, and to the referees for Cambridge University Press for their helpful comments on the penultimate draft of the manuscript.