

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Substance among other categories

This book revives a neglected but important topic in philosophy: the nature of substance. The belief that there are individual substances, for example, material objects and persons, is at the core of our commonsense view of the world, yet many metaphysicians deny the very coherence of the concept of substance. The authors develop a novel account of what an individual substance is in terms of independence from other beings. In the process many other important ontological categories are explored: Property, Event, Space, Time. The authors show why alternative theories of substance fail and go on to defend the intelligibility (though not the existence) of interacting spiritual and material substances.

"This is a well-informed and up-to-date contribution to an important topic in modern metaphysics, filling a significant gap in the recent literature." (E. J. Lowe, University of Durham)



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Substance among other categories

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For my wife, Ruth, and my parents, Jack and Bea (J.H.)

For my wife, Sheree (G.R.)



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