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Wittgenstein's Metaphysics offers a radical new interpretation of the fundamental ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It takes issue with the conventional view that after 1930 Wittgenstein rejected the philosophy of the *Tractatus* and developed a wholly new conception of philosophy. By tracing the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas Cook shows that they are neither as original nor as difficult as is often supposed. Wittgenstein was essentially an empiricist, and the difference between his early views (as set forth in the *Tractatus*) and the later views (as expounded in the *Philosophical Investigations*) lies chiefly in the fact that after 1930 he replaced his early version of reductionism with a subtler version. So he ended where he began, as an empiricist armed with a theory of meaning.

This iconoclastic interpretation is sure to influence all future study of Wittgenstein and will provoke a reassessment of the nature of his contribution to philosophy.

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For
Frank B. Ebersole

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A man will be *imprisoned* in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inward; so long as it does not occur to him to *pull* rather than push it.

Ludwig Wittgenstein
Culture and Value

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Preface

This book is an exposition and critique of Ludwig Wittgenstein's basic philosophical ideas. The interpretation it offers differs greatly from that current in the philosophical community today. At one time I was myself a party to the received view of Wittgenstein's philosophy and was among those who helped to foster it. My views began to change during the 1970s, but it was not until 1984 that I came fully to the realizations that form the basis of this book. In that year an early draft of the book was completed. Since then several people have read and commented on the original and succeeding drafts. Some expressed doubts about my interpretation, and their skepticism forced me to dig deeper and provide additional documentation. I offer them my thanks, and I hope that what I have now produced will meet with their approval. Others applauded my efforts, and I am most grateful for the encouragement they provided. I am especially indebted in this regard to William Davie. Special thanks are due to Frank Ebersole, to whom this book is dedicated. Without the benefit of his philosophical contributions over the last three decades this book could not have been written.

My wife, Annie, has provided constant encouragement and editorial assistance, without which this project might never have reached fruition. For this and much more she has my deepest gratitude.

In articles published over the past dozen years I have discussed some of the topics dealt with in this book. Articles dealing especially with the topics of Chapters 14 and 15 include:

"Notes on Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*," *Philosophical Investigations*, Fall, 1980, pp. 15–27.

"Malcolm's Misunderstandings," *Philosophical Investigations*, Spring, 1981, pp. 72–90.

"The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*," *Philosophical Investigations*, April, 1985, pp. 81–119.

In "Wittgenstein and Religious Belief" (*Philosophy*, October, 1988, pp. 427–452, esp. Sec. III) I have tried, in a way quite different from anything found in this book, to bring out the behavioristic character of Wittgenstein's view of language.

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WITTGENSTEIN'S METAPHYSICS

Chapter 11 is a revised version of a paper read at the Oregon Annual Colloquium in Philosophy in 1982. Parts of Chapters 8 and 12 are derived from a series of lectures delivered at the University of Swansea in 1985.

Captiva, Florida
October, 1992

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations used to refer to Wittgenstein's writings, notes and lectures in roughly chronological order

- NB *Notebooks, 1914–16*, eds. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961).
- TLP *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).
- RLF "Some Remarks on Logical Form," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 9 (1929), pp. 162–171, reprinted in *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, eds. Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 31–37.
- WVC *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, shorthand notes recorded by Friedrich Waismann, ed. Brian McGuinness, trans. Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).
- EL "A Lecture on Ethics," *Philosophical Review*, LXXIV (1965), pp. 3–12.
- RGB "Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough,'" trans. A. C. Miles and Rush Rhees, *The Human World*, No. 3, May 1971.
- PB *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964).
- PR *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
- PG *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
- WL32 *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930–1932*, ed. Desmond Lee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- WL35 *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935*, ed. Alice Ambrose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- BB *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).
- NFL "Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data,'" ed. Rush Rhees, *Philosophical Review*, LXXVII (1968), pp. 271–320.
- LSD "The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience – I" and "The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience – II," notes taken by Rush Rhees in Wittgenstein's 1936 lectures,

- Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January, 1984), pp. 1–45, and Vol. 7, No. 2 (April, 1984), pp. 101–140.
- LC *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966).
- CE “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness,” *Philosophia*, Vol. 6, Nos. 3–4, pp. 391–408, Sept., Dec., 1976. Selected and edited by Rush Rhees. English translation by Peter Winch.
- LFM *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939*, ed. Cora Diamond (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976).
- RFM *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, revised edition, eds. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).
- PI *Philosophical Investigations*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).
- Z *Zettel*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967).
- RPP, I *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
- RPP, II *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II*, eds. G. H. von Wright and Neikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
- LW, I *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I*, eds. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- LW, II *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II*, eds. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
- WL47 *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology: 1946–1947*, ed. P. T. Geach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
- ROC *Remarks on Colour*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. Linda McAlister and Margarete Schattle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
- OC *On Certainty*, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969).
- CV *Culture and Value*, ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

Introduction

It has been common to regard Wittgenstein as being, in his later years, an ordinary language philosopher in some fairly obvious sense of that phrase. The reason for this is that in his later writings he frequently admonished us to consider how words are actually used. And he declared that the philosopher's task "is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI, §116). All of us, I suppose, have noticed that Wittgenstein persisted in the metaphysical use of various words. But these failures have commonly been regarded as nothing more than isolated errors he would have been happy to correct. No one, I think, saw in these a pattern indicative of a pervasive metaphysical theory. And yet this, I will argue, is precisely what these seeming lapses actually were. Wittgenstein, if I am right, never rejected the empiricist metaphysics that forms the basis of the *Tractatus*. By 1916 he had embraced that version of empiricism that William James called "radical empiricism" and Bertrand Russell later called "neutral monism." From that date until his death his fundamental views changed very little. In his later writings he did revise the *Tractatus* account of language, but beyond that he merely tinkered with empiricism, adjusting both it and ordinary language until he could bring them to a conformity that suited him.

Many philosophers would dismiss this interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. There are two principal reasons for this. One is that most philosophers have remained happily ignorant of Wittgenstein's early views, especially his adoption of neutral monism as the means of avoiding skepticism. The other reason is that numerous myths have dominated the way in which Wittgenstein is viewed. I will here list some of these myths so as to provide an orientation for the chapters that follow.

1) The basic myth, the one largely responsible for the others, is that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein showed little, if any, interest in epistemology. As will be shown in the chapters that follow, better sense can be made of the *Tractatus* if we recognize that its author was very much concerned with epistemology, especially skepticism, and that his linguistic doctrines were intended to subserve his epistemological convictions.

2) A second myth, related to the first, is that when writing the *Tractatus*

Wittgenstein had no definite ideas about the “simple objects” that he posits there, aside from the necessity of their being simple. The truth of the matter is that Wittgenstein had very definite ideas about the epistemological role of his “objects”: nothing may count as a Tractarian object unless it is given in immediate experience.

3) A third myth is that Wittgenstein cannot have thought of Tractarian objects as being sense-data. As with many myths, this one contains a grain of truth, for Wittgenstein, as we will see, did not share the usual, i.e., Moore's and Russell's, conception of sense-data. Once we understand his own conception, there can be no doubt that the ‘objects’ of the *Tractatus* are sense-data (or what he elsewhere calls “the material of experience”). This is important for understanding not only Wittgenstein's early writings but also such later works as *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*. For with only minor changes Wittgenstein retained the same ontology throughout his life: ‘reality’ and ‘immediate experience’ are one.

4) It is a pervasive myth that at some point after returning to philosophy in 1929 Wittgenstein wiped the slate clean and developed a philosophy that is independent of and indeed opposed to the fundamental ideas of the *Tractatus*.¹ This fourth myth is a direct product of the first, of the view that in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had no interest in epistemology and was chiefly concerned with the philosophy of language. Anyone holding this view will think that, because the *Investigations* criticized at length the Tractarian account of language, a fundamental change had taken place. The truth of the matter, however, is that the empiricist views that dominate the *Tractatus* and significantly determine its account of language play the same role in the *Investigations*. In both books an important question for Wittgenstein is this: By what account of meaning (or grammar) can one reconcile empiricism and ordinary language? This question is answered differently in the two books, but that is a comparatively minor matter. Wittgenstein's fundamental views changed very little after 1916, i.e., he remained a neutral monist.²

The myth that Wittgenstein's thinking underwent a fundamental change in the 1930s has led to the misconception that one can understand his later writings – in particular, *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty* – without having mastered the basic ideas of the *Tractatus*, such as his conception of objects, his treatment of solipsism, and his Humean view of causation. The general acceptance of this myth has rendered worthless most of what has been written about Wittgenstein's so-called “later philosophy.” One cannot, for example, properly understand the way in which Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations*, deals with the problem of other minds or criticizes the idea of a “private language” without seeing that he remained committed to the ontology of the *Tractatus*. Nor

can one understand the epistemological problems addressed in *On Certainty* without recognizing that they are problems generated by that ontology, i.e., phenomenalism.³

5) A myth that has dominated much of the thinking about Wittgenstein's later work is one that links his thought after 1929 closely with that of G. E. Moore.⁴ Nothing could be further from the truth. As will become apparent in the chapters that follow, Wittgenstein held a metaphysical view of the world that was fundamentally opposed to Moore's. If we are to find similarities between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries, we will do better to look to Russell and the neutral monists, especially Ernst Mach and Karl Pearson. The neutral monists, Wittgenstein believed, provided an ontology that showed how to escape solipsism and solve the problem of other minds. And it was Russell's distinction between grammatical and logical form that provided him with the view of language that, in a fundamental way, guided him for the rest of his life.⁵ Although he later modified this distinction, along lines anticipated by Berkeley, it remained fundamental to his conceptions of language and philosophy. He also accepted uncritically certain other of Russell's views. But as for Moore, Wittgenstein said this: "Moore? – he shows you how far a man can go who has absolutely no intelligence whatever."⁶ And he remarked to Malcolm that "he did not believe that Moore would *recognize a correct* solution [to a philosophical problem] if he were presented with one."⁷

6) Perhaps the gravest misunderstanding of Wittgenstein is the myth that he became an ordinary language philosopher. An ordinary language philosopher, as I understand this, is one who tests his philosophical ideas against examples drawn from the discourse of everyday life, including the discourse of scientists. Wittgenstein was never an ordinary language philosopher in this sense. Rather, he brought his philosophical preconceptions to his encounter with language and then adopted a theory of meaning to show how his empiricism could be reconciled with what plain men say. When he found that we say things that conflict with his preconceptions, he declared that here ordinary language (including that of scientists) is misleading. Far from letting himself be guided by ordinary language, he found himself at odds with it. "Philosophy," he declared, "is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI, §109).

The myth that Wittgenstein's later writings belong to the tradition of ordinary language philosophy has fostered a particular way of explicating those writings, one that ignores a great many passages and focuses exclusively on those in which he claims (often inaccurately) to be pointing out how certain words are actually used. This selective reading displaces his later writings from the tradition in which they can best be understood, namely, the philosophical developments of the early years

of this century. It overlooks the fact that Wittgenstein was a philosopher of his times whose early work inspired Logical Positivism and whose philosophical intimates in the early 1930s were members of the Vienna Circle. The standard reading disregards the many similarities between Wittgenstein's later work and the neutral monism of Ernst Mach, William James, and Karl Pearson.⁸ We ignore these cues at our peril, for much that Wittgenstein wrote in his later years was written for the benefit of philosophers who, like Rudolph Carnap, shared his empiricist assumptions but whose ideas about language he sought to correct.⁹ If we would understand Wittgenstein, we must read his later writings, not in the light of recent ordinary language philosophy, but in the historical context in which they were written.¹⁰ This, I realize, is none too easy a thing to do, for in the sixty years that separate us from *Philosophical Investigations* many views that were widely accepted then have lost their air of plausibility. But those who insist that Wittgenstein *could not* have held such views because they are so ridiculous merely reveal a lack of historical perspective. The views of the neutral monists were commonplace from 1900 to 1940.

7) The final myth is that Wittgenstein was an original thinker, a philosopher without precedent.¹¹ One cannot deny, of course, that there is originality in the way Wittgenstein developed or used his predecessors' ideas, such as neutral monism and Wolfgang Köhler's Gestalt theory of perception. At bottom, however, he was merely an empiricist, and, as will be shown in Chapter 8, his later views about language and the nature of philosophy amount to little more than a generalizing of the position already taken by Berkeley, the position that says: while the grammar of ordinary language is on many points philosophically misleading, this is no defect because the plain man does not *mean* what the grammar suggests, for grammar is arbitrary and the plain man's meaning is determined by the use he makes of words in the practical affairs of life. Following his return to philosophy in 1929 Wittgenstein systematically invoked this 'use' theory of meaning as a means of reconciling empiricism and ordinary language. In short, he was carrying on in the tradition of Berkeley, whom he regarded as a "very deep thinker."¹² It was not modesty that led him to say: "I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I don't believe I have ever *invented* a line of thinking. I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification" (CV, pp. 18–19). And again: "I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. (Perhaps I have no seed of my own.) Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil" (CV, p. 36). These remarks seem to me to be accurate self-assessments. Wittgenstein spent his life tinkering with empiricism, but while some of

his tinkering was indeed novel, it was bound to leave him essentially where he had begun: as an empiricist armed with a theory of meaning.

That these seven myths, and other misunderstandings, should have grown up around his philosophy is largely the fault of Wittgenstein himself. For while his fundamental views were, for the most part, borrowed from earlier empiricists, he rendered them obscure by the aphoristic style in which he wrote. Moreover, as his ideas developed, he constantly took it for granted that his thinking had followed a perfectly natural and inevitable course, so that he needn't spell out for his readers what his starting points had been. What struck him as obvious should also, he thought, be obvious to others. Wittgenstein said in 1948: "Nearly all of my writings are private conversations with myself. Things that I say to myself *tete-à-tete*" (CV, p. 77). The result is that his later writings fail to mention the assumptions he was making throughout, and with those assumptions hidden from view his remarks often lend themselves to interpretations inconsistent with his actual views. This is why it is necessary to follow his thinking chronologically, beginning with the pre-*Tractatus* notebooks. Only in this way can one see how much metaphysical baggage he carried with him throughout his life.

One other impediment to reading Wittgenstein critically should be mentioned here and that is the fact that we live in an age still dominated by empiricism or by certain of its conceptions. A few philosophers – preeminently Frank Ebersole – have worked themselves free from that tradition, but to the extent that we remain its captives (e.g., as believers in 'logical possibilities'), we will fail to recognize the extent to which Wittgenstein systematically misunderstood ordinary language because he looked at it through empiricist spectacles. This has posed a problem for the writing of this book. Should I rely on the maxim that to expound is to expose, or must I accompany my chronicle of Wittgenstein's views with a critique of empiricism? I am not confident that I have solved this problem satisfactorily. In some cases, and especially on the topics of causation (Chapters 11, 12, and 13) and "logical possibility" (Chapter 14), I have provided the philosophical critique; in other cases I have not. In particular, I have taken it for granted that all those theories of perception (and the 'proper objects of perception') that philosophers have found attractive must be scrapped. (While I feel some discomfort at having left this matter unargued, Ebersole's work in this area has been so impressive that I could add nothing to it.) Accordingly, I hold no brief for such terms as "sense-datum," "sense impression," "visual picture," and the like that are so essential to empiricism. The fact, then, that these terms occur throughout my exposition of Wittgenstein's views should not be construed as an endorsement of them. The same holds for the other philosophical terms – "proposition," "grammar," "criterion" and others – that are required for exposition. While empir-

icists may find these terms unproblematic, I do not, and I have tried to indicate this even where I have omitted criticism of them. This book is written, then, from a point of view outside empiricism, and I can only hope that this will not strike the reader as question begging.

A word about sources and chronology is in order here. Throughout the book I have identified the sources of quotations from Wittgenstein by means of the abbreviations listed on pages xiii–xiv, which are given there in roughly chronological order. Wittgenstein's early ideas are set out in his pre-*Tractatus* notebooks (NB) and in the *Tractatus* itself (TLP), which was published in 1921. For the next seven years he stayed away from philosophy. When he returned to it in 1929, he held a series of conversations with several members of the Vienna Circle, which continued into 1932. Friedrich Waismann recorded those conversations, and they were eventually published as *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (WVC), together with Waismann's "Theses," which the latter composed as a compendium of Wittgenstein's views in the early 1930s. This is a valuable source for identifying the changes that were taking place in Wittgenstein's thinking in the years 1929–1932, as is *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (PB) – in English, *Philosophical Remarks* (PR), which Wittgenstein wrote during this period. By 1930, when he began lecturing at Cambridge, his new ideas had begun to gel, and we are fortunate in having a rather complete record, in the form of students' notes, of the lectures Wittgenstein gave during the years 1930–39 (WL32, WL35, LSD, and LFM). (Some of his own lecture notes (NFL and CE) have also been published.) We also have from this period *The Blue and Brown Books* (BB), which he dictated during the years 1933–34 and 1934–35. (The Blue Book is a sustained exposition and refinement of neutral monism.) *Philosophical Grammar* (PG) was composed, and underwent several revisions, during the years 1932–34. It contains many passages that were later incorporated into Part I of *Philosophical Investigations* (PI). Wittgenstein's last lectures were delivered in 1946–1947, and the copious notes of three of his students, published as *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology* (WL47), show that he had not abandoned the radical empiricism (neutral monism) he was so plainly espousing in the early 1930s.

The date of composition of the *Investigations* requires some explaining. In the "Editors' Note" (PI, p. vi) we are told only that Part I was completed by 1945 and that Part II was written between 1947 and 1949. This has left some readers with the impression that the *Investigations* was composed during the mid- and late-1940s – an impression that helps to sustain the belief that Wittgenstein's development included three periods: the *Tractatus* phase, the phenomenalist phase of the 1930s, and his later philosophy of the 1940s. This, however, was certainly not how Wittgenstein himself regarded his work. Discussing the history of the

Investigations with Oets Bouwsma in 1949, he said that he had begun it “eighteen years ago,” i.e., in 1931.¹³ From this we can infer that in 1949 Wittgenstein saw his book as being of a piece with the neutral monism he was so clearly espousing in the early 1930s. As I remarked above, the *Investigations* contains many passages taken directly from *Philosophical Grammar*, which was completed by 1934. (These are found mainly in the middle portion of Part I, where Wittgenstein again expounds and refines his neutral monism.) Moreover, the first 189 sections of the *Investigations* were composed in the mid 1930s,¹⁴ and accordingly these sections, too, must be interpreted in the light of the views Wittgenstein was expounding in his notes and lectures of that period. Part II of the *Investigations*, written between 1947 and 1949, is largely derived from the notes later published as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (RPP I and RPP II) and *Last Writings on Philosophy of Psychology* (LW, I). (The notes comprising these volumes are, to a large extent, concerned with developing a theory of perception that Wittgenstein first adopted in 1930.) *Zettel* (Z), which Wittgenstein regarded as the repository of important remarks, is also mainly a selection of material from these last-mentioned notes and can therefore be mainly credited to the final years of his life, but it also contains passages he had preserved from as early as 1929.¹⁵ *On Certainty* (OC), written during the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein's life, shows him struggling with a problem he had mentioned in his conversations with Waismann in 1929 (WVC, p. 47) but had left largely uninvestigated, namely, whether one can “know truths, not only about sense-data but also about things” (OC, §426).

Notes

1. Thus Norman Malcolm describes the *Investigations* as “an assault upon the fundamental conceptions of Wittgenstein's first book” and goes on to say that “Wittgenstein purged himself of the thinking of the *Tractatus* and created a revolutionary new philosophy” [*Nothing is Hidden* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 1986), pp. vii and ix]. In a well-known essay D. A. T. Gasking and A. C. Jackson declare: “. . . in the last twenty or so years of his life Wittgenstein turned his back on the *Tractatus* and went on to produce and to teach at Cambridge a whole new way of philosophizing” [“Wittgenstein as Teacher,” reprinted in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy*, ed. K. T. Fann (New York: Dell, 1967), p. 49].
2. In 1948, just three years before his death, Wittgenstein remarked to Drury: “My fundamental ideas came to me very early in life” [quoted by M. O'C. Drury, “Conversations With Wittgenstein,” in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 158]. He could hardly have spoken in this way in 1948 if what were then his fundamental ideas had come to him only after 1929, when he was forty years of age. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein chose as his motto for the *Investigations* a passage from Nestroy that can be translated: “It is in the nature of progress that it appears much greater than it actually is.” The significance

- of this lies in the fact that Wittgenstein intended (see PI, p. x) that the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* should be published in a single volume, so that this motto, sandwiched between them, would serve as a warning that the difference between the two books is not as great as it may appear.
3. I am going to use the term "phenomenalism" to mean any theory that maintains that there can be nothing 'beyond' immediate experience and, in one way or another, reduces material things to sense-data.
 4. G. A. Paul, for instance, began an essay on Wittgenstein by saying that "He follows Moore in the defence of Common Sense and in a regard for our ordinary language" ["Wittgenstein" in *The Revolution in Philosophy*, A. J. Ayer et al., (London: Macmillan, 1956), p. 88]. John Wisdom also discussed differences between Moore and Wittgenstein [*Paradox and Discovery* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), p. 156]. And Gilbert Ryle said of Wittgenstein: "Like Moore, he explores the logic of all the things all of us say. . . . What had, since the early days of this century been the practice of G. E. Moore has received a rationale from Wittgenstein; and I expect that when the curtain is lifted we shall also find that Wittgenstein's concrete methods have increased the power, scope and delicacy of the methods by which Moore has for so long explored in detail the internal logic of what we say" [Ludwig Wittgenstein," reprinted in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy*, op. cit. pp. 122 and 124].
 5. Norman Malcolm reports that "Wittgenstein believed that the Theory of Descriptions was Russell's most important production . . ." [*Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford, 1958), p. 68]. What he valued in the Theory of Descriptions was its distinction between logical and grammatical form.
 6. F. R. Leavis, "Memories of Wittgenstein" in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, ed. Rush Rhees, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 51. Leavis indicates that he is uncertain whether Wittgenstein said these exact words or only said something that could be expressed in these words.
 7. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, op. cit., p. 66.
 8. The views closest to Wittgenstein's, both early and late, are those found in Ernst Mach's *The Analysis of Sensations* (fifth ed., 1906; English trans., 1914), Karl Pearson's *The Grammar of Science* (third ed., 1911), and Moritz Schlick's *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (1938).
 9. Thus, we find Wittgenstein writing in 1947: "There just are many more language-games than are dreamt of in the philosophy of Carnap and others" (RPP, I, §920). That Wittgenstein meant to address only those who shared his philosophical perspective was made explicit in his notebooks:

If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if it can be called a circle), I do not mean that I believe this circle to be the elite of mankind; but it does comprise those to whom I turn . . . because they form my cultural milieu, my fellow citizens as it were, in contrast to the rest who are *foreign* to me (CV, p. 10).
 10. An example of the misunderstandings that arise from an ignorance of Wittgenstein's fundamental ideas is Norman Malcolm's *Nothing is Hidden*, op. cit. Malcolm advances an account of Wittgenstein's later work that bears scant resemblance to the truth. More egregious examples are noted below.
 11. This was certainly the received view among those close to Wittgenstein. G. H. Von Wright, for example, says: "The later Wittgenstein, I should say, has no ancestors in the history of thought. His work signalizes a radical departure from previously existing paths of philosophy" ["Biograph-

- ical Sketch" in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (op. cit.), p. 15].
12. Quoted by M. O'C. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein," op. cit., p. 157.
 13. O. K. Bouwsma, *Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949–1951* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1986), p. 9.
 14. G. H. von Wright tells us: "In August 1936 Wittgenstein began a revision, in German, of the Brown Book which had been dictated in English one year earlier. He called the revision *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. He soon abandoned work on it as unsatisfactory, and made a fresh start in the autumn of the same year. What he then wrote is substantially identical with the first 189 sections of the *Investigations* in its printed form" ("Biographical Sketch," op. cit., pp. 14–15).
 15. See the editors' preface (*Z*, p. iv). RPP II contains an appendix (pp. 123–130) showing correspondences to both *Zettel* and the *Investigations*.